核安全文化的十项特征

2023年12月14日发(作者：若即若离什么意思)

档案

INPO12-012

2012年12月

INPO

Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture

健全的核安全文化特征

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OPEN DISTRIBUTION

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NOTICE: This information was prepared in connection with work sponsored by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO).

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expresd or implied, with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or ufulness of the information contained in this document, or that the

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注：该信息是由美国核电运行研究所发起准备的。无论是INPO组织，INPO成员，INPO的代表，或者任何人，（a）不对该文件的准确性，完整性或有效性做任何承诺。使用该文件中的信息，仪器，方法或过程不得侵犯私人权利。(b)因使用这些信息，仪器，方法或者过程，承担责任。

TABLE OF CONTENTS/目录

INTRODUCTION/介绍................................................................................................................................ 4

BACKGROUND/背景……………………………………………………………………………………...6

THE TRAITS AND THEIR ATTRIBUTES/特征及其特点.................................................................... 11

Individual Commitment to Safety/个人对安全的承诺...............................................................................11

3 Personal Accountability/个人职责...........................................................................................................11

Questioning Attitude/质疑的态度............................................................................................................11

Safety Communication/安全沟通............................................................................................................12

Management Commitment to Safety/管理者对安全的承诺.......................................................................14

Leadership Accountability/领导职责.......................................................................................................14

Decision-Making/决策.............................................................................................................................15

Respectful Work Environment/彼此尊重的工作环境..............................................................................16

Management Systems/管理体系..................................................................................................................17

Continuous Learning/持续学习...............................................................................................................17

Problem Identification and Resolution/识别问题、解决问题..................................................................17

Environment for Raising Concerns/关注的氛围................................. ....................................................18

Work Process/工作流程.......................................................................................................................19

Acknowledgements/致谢.............................................................................................................................21

4 INTRODUCTION

Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture builds on the

knowledge and experience developed since the publication

The change in the title reflects the commercial nuclear

industry’s alignment of its own terminology with that ud

document was developed through a collaborative effort by

U.S. industry personnel and the staff of the Institute of

介 绍

《健全的核安全文化特征》是基of Principles of a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture in 2004.

于2004年出版的核安全文化原则的知识和经验而产生的。标题的变化，by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This

体现了核工业的商业化与美国核管理委员会的一致。此文件由美国核行业Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), with input from

人员和美国核电运行研究所（INPO）reprentatives of various regulatory agencies, the public,

and the nuclear industry worldwide. Traits of a Healthy

Nuclear Safety Culture reflects an alignment in two ts of

化特征》整合了两套用于描述核安全terms that have been ud to describe nuclear safety culture:

INPO and the industry defined safety culture in leadership

terms of principles and attributes, and the U.S. Nuclear

（INPO）和核能产业以领导者的身份Regulatory Commission defined safety culture in regulatory

定义了安全文化的主要原则和特征，terms of components and aspects. Whereas each t of terms

rved its special function, the result created confusion

而美国核管理委员会定义了安全文化within operating organizations as to the esntial elements

的组成。每一套术语都有其特定的功of a healthy safety culture.

能，但两套术语同时使用容易在运营组织中引起混淆，这是一个健全的安全文化应当避免的。

文化的术语：美国核电运行研究所成员共同努力而成。《健全的核安全文

Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture describes the

esntial traits and attributes of a healthy nuclear safety

culture, with the goal of creating a framework for open

《健全的核安全文化特征》描述了一个健全的核安全文化的特征和他discussion and continuing evolution of safety culture

特点，目的在于在整个商用核电工业throughout the commercial nuclear energy industry. For the

领域中建立一个自由交流，持续改进purpos of this document, a trait is defined as a pattern of

thinking, feeling, and behaving such that safety is

安全文化的框架。根据该文件的目的，5 emphasized over competing priorities. Experience has

将特征定义为一种思维方式、感观、shown that the personal and organizational traits described

行为，认为安全重于一切。经验表明，in this document are prent in a positive safety culture and

that shortfalls in the traits and attributes contribute

该文件中描述的个人和组织的特征反significantly to plant events.

映在一个积极的安全文化中。缺少这些特征，将对电厂事故产生重要影响。

Rather than prescribing a specific program or

该文件描述的是基本特征，而不是特殊程序或者实施办法。一个组织implementation method, this document describes the basic

traits. The traits and attributes, when embraced, will be

reflected in the values, assumptions, behaviors, beliefs, and

及其成员的价值观、理念、行为、信norms of an organization and its members. Ideally, the traits

念、规范将体现这些特征和特点。理will describe what it is like to work at a nuclear facility and

how things are done there. Traits appear in boldface. The

想地讲，这里所述的特征描述的是在attributes clarify the intent of the traits.

一个核电环境中，做什么工作及怎样工作。 特征以黑体字出现。特点阐明特征的含义。

Utility managers are encouraged to make in-depth

comparisons between the traits and their day-to-day

policies and practices and to u any differences as a basis

for improvements.

绩效经理应在该特征与其它日常准则之间做深入对比，并以此为基础，持续改进。

In addition to the traits and attributes, two addendums are

available. Addendum I: Behaviors and Actions That Support

a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture, describes executive,

除了这些特征和特点，还有两个附件可供参考。 附件1：《支持健全核nior manager, manager, supervisor, and individual

安全文化的行为》，描述了总经理，高contributor behaviors that contribute to a healthy safety

级经理，监查人员以及个人对核安全culture. An additional table is provided to describe detailed

behaviors and actions for each attribute. Addendum II:

文化作用行为。另附有表格，描述了Cross-References, provides cross-references from INPO

每一个特征的具体行为和行动。附件12-012, Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture, to the

previous Principles of a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture, U.S.

6 Nuclear reactor

2：《交叉引用》，包括从INPO12-012，asssment program cross-cutting area components, and the

《健全的核安全文化特征》、以及之前International Atomic Energy Agency safety culture

attributes. This cross-reference can help individuals

的《核安全文化准则》、美国核管理委understand how the common language was developed and

员会相关文件、及国际原子能机构安can be uful in change management efforts in this

important area.

Regulatory Commission operating

全文化特征中的引用。 这些交叉引用可以帮助员工理解这些通俗易懂的语言是如何发展而来，以及怎样在这一重要领域改变管理方式。

BACKGROUND

Watershed events over the years have influenced the safety

culture at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The

result of the accident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station.

Many fundamental problems involving hardware,

背 景

过去几年，一些转折性事故影响industry had its first significant wake-up call in 1979 as a

了美国商用核电站的核文化。第一次警示是发生在1979年的三里岛核电procedures, training, and attitudes toward safety and

站事故。这次事故涉及许多基础性问regulation contributed to the event.

题，如硬件、程序、培训、安全态度以及监管。

In 1986, the Chernobyl accident was a stark reminder of the

hazards of nuclear technology. This accident resulted from

many of the same weakness that led to the Three Mile

1986年，切诺贝利事故是对核技术危害的另一个重要提醒。这次事故Island accident. In addition, it highlighted the importance of

由许多与三里岛事故相同的原因造maintaining design configuration, plant status control, line

成。此外，它强调了设计结构，核电authority for reactor safety, and cultural attributes related to

7 safety.

站运行控制，核反应堆安全业务权限，以及安全文化特点的重要性。

Respon from industry and regulatory organizations to both

the events was sweeping. Improvements were made in

standards, hardware, emergency procedures, process,

核工业领域以及监管组织对这两次事故的反应是彻底的。对安全的改training (including simulators), emergency preparedness,

进体现在许多方面，如标准、硬件、design and configuration control, testing, human

应急措施、程序、培训（包括模拟的）、performance, and attitudes toward safety.

The 2002 discovery of degradation of the Davis-Bes

problems that develop when the safety environment at a

plant receives insufficient attention.

应急预案、设计与结构控制、测试、Nuclear Power Station reactor vesl head highlighted

人员绩效、安全态度等。

2002年发现戴维斯-贝斯核电站反应堆压力容器封头老化，这表明，如果不重视安全环境，便可能出现问题。

Most recently, the 2011 nuclear accident at the Fukushima

Daiichi power plant illustrates the importance of thoroughly

asssing possible nuclear safety impacts of a hypothetical,

最近的一次事故，2011年日本福岛核电站核事故，证实了对假设可能yet credible, extreme external event. It also illustrates the

发生的极端外部事故全面评估的重要importance of emergency respon command and control,

性。它也证实了对类似事故紧急反应training, and resource availability for such an event.

指挥与控制，培训，资源有效性是非常重要的。

A theme common in the events is that, over time,

problems crept in, often related to or a direct result of the

plant culture. Had the problems been recognized,

这些事故的一个共性就是，一段时间内问题不知不觉出现。这经常与challenged, and resolved, the events could have been

电站的核文化有着直接的关系。如果prevented or their verity lesned. The ries of decisions

人们认识到这些问题，勇于挑战这些and actions that resulted in the events can usually be

traced to the shared assumptions, values, and beliefs of the

问题，解决这些问题，那么这些事故8 organization.

是可以避免的，或者这些事故的严重性是可以降低的。通常可以从共有的理念，价值观，以及组织的信条中找到这些决策及行为的某些踪迹。

The events and the notion that culture is a key ingredient

in the overall success of the plant form the basis for this

document.

Organizational culture is the shared basic assumptions that

are developed in an organization as it learns and copes with

problems. The basic assumptions that have worked well

这些事故、以及文化是核电站全面成功的关键因素的概念，形成了本文件的基础。

组织文化是一个组织在其学习和enough to be considered valid are taught to new members of

解决问题过程中形成的共有理念。这the organization as the correct way to perceive, think, act,

些理念之前运用的很好，因此组织的and feel. Culture is the sum total of a group’s learning.

Culture is for the group what character and personality are

新成员会继续学习，认为这些信念是for the individual.

理解、思考、以及感受的正确方法。文化是一个组织学习的总和。文化对于一个企业而言，就如同性格对于一个人的意义。

In addition to a healthy organizational culture, each nuclear

station, becau of the special characteristics and unique

hazards of the technology—radioactive byproducts,

由于核电站的特殊性和技术的特殊危害性——副产品有辐射、核反应concentration of energy in the reactor core, and decay

堆能量集中、衰变热，除了有一个健heat—needs a healthy safety culture.

全的组织文化，每个核电站还需要有Nuclear safety culture is defined as the core values and

behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by

leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over

competing goals to ensure protection of people and the

核安全文化定义为，领导及个人为了保护员工和环境，集体做出“安一个健全的安全文化。

9 environment.

全高于一切”的核心价值观和行为。

This updated definition was developed to apply broadly

across all industries that u nuclear technologies. For the

commercial nuclear power industry, nuclear safety remains

该定义广泛地适用于所有运用核技术的工业。对于商用核电工业，核the overriding priority. Although the same traits apply to

安全具有至高的重要性。尽管放射安radiological safety, industrial safety, curity, and

全，工业安全，环境安全具有相同的environmental safety, nuclear safety is the first value

adopted at a nuclear station and is never abandoned.

特征，核安全是核电站的第一价值观，并且永不废弃。

Nuclear safety is a collective responsibility. The concept of

nuclear safety culture applies to every employee in the

nuclear organization, from the board of directors to the

核安全是集体的责任。核安全的概念适用于所有工作在核电组织的人individual contributor. No one in the organization is exempt

员，从董事长到每一位员工。组织中from the obligation to ensure safety first.

的任何人都有责任确保“安全第一”，无一例外。

The performance of individuals and organizations can be

monitored and trended and, therefore, may rve as an

indicator of the health of an organization’s safety culture.

个人及组织的表现具有可监测性和可跟踪性，因此可以做为一个组织However, the health of a facility’s safety culture could lie

安全文化的指标。然而，根据安全文anywhere along a broad continuum, depending on the

化推广程度不同，一个健全的安全文degree to which the attributes of safety culture are

embraced. Even though safety culture is somewhat of an

化存在于一个广泛的连续范围内。尽intangible concept, it is possible to determine whether a

管安全文化是一个无形的概念，但确station tends toward one end of the continuum or the other.

认一个核电站是否持续发展还是可能的。

Commercial nuclear power plants are designed, built, and

operated to produce electricity. Safety, production, and cost

control are necessary goals for the operation of such a plant.

商用核电站是为了发电而设计、建造和运行的。安全、生产、成本控10 The outcomes are quite complementary, and most plants

制对于此类核电站来说是必要目标。today achieve high levels of safety, impressive production

而这些目标是互补的，现代的核电站records, and competitive costs, reinforced by decisions and

actions made with a long-term view. This perspective keeps

大多从长远的眼光来做决策和行动，safety as the overriding priority for each plant and for each

因此核电站运营较为安全、产出高、individual associated with it.

成本低。这种远见使每一个电站和个人将安全放在第一位。

Nuclear safety culture is a leadership responsibility.

Experience has shown that leaders in organizations with a

healthy safety culture foster safety culture through activities

such as the following:

核安全文化是一种领导层的责任。经验证实，组织中具有健全的安全文化观的领导在生产活动中注重以下方面：

Leaders reinforce safety culture at every opportunity.

The health of safety culture is not taken for granted.

领导利用每一次机会强化安全文化。领导不会理所当然地认为安全文化是健全的。

Leaders frequently measure the health of safety culture

with a focus on trends rather than absolute values.

领导经常是通过关注趋势，而不是根据绝对值来检验安全文化的健全度。

Leaders communicate what constitutes a healthy safety

culture and ensure everyone understands his or her role

in its promotion.

领导就构成健全的安全文化与他人交流，确保每一个人理解他/她在促进安全文化中的角色。

Leaders recognize that safety culture is not all or

nothing but is, rather, constantly moving along a

continuum. As a result, there is a comfort in discussing

safety culture within the organization as well as with

领导认识到安全文化并不是全部，但也不是无足轻重，而是认11 outside groups, such as regulatory agencies.

识到，它是连续的，不断变化的。因此，在组织内部和外部（如监管机构）讨论安全文化是非常必要的。

The traits described in this document are divided into three

categories that are similar to the three categories of safety

culture in International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group

本文所描述的特征分为三个类别，与《国际核安全顾问团（INSAG）(INSAG)-4, Safety Culture. The categories and their

-4——安全文化》中的分类相似。分primary traits are as follows:

类及其主要特征如下:

Individual Commitment to Safety

— Personal Accountability

— Questioning Attitude

— Safety Communication

—质疑的态度

个人安全承诺

—个人职责

—安全沟通

Management Commitment to Safety

— Leadership Accountability

— Decision-Making

— Respectful Work Environment

—决策

管理者安全承诺

—领导职责

—彼此尊重的工作环境

12 Management Systems

— Continuous Learning

— Problem Identification and Resolution

— Environment for Raising Concerns

— Work Process

管理体系

—持续学习

—识别问题、解决问题

—关注的氛围

—工作流程

THE TRAITS AND THEIR ATTRIBUTES

特征及其特点

Individual Commitment to Safety

PA. Personal Accountability

个人对安全的承诺

PA. 个人职责

All individuals take personal responsibility for safety.

Responsibility and authority for nuclear safety are well

defined and clearly understood. Reporting relationships,

每个人对安全负责。明确理解自己的核安全职责和权限。在隶属关系，positional authority, and team responsibilities emphasize the

职位权力，团队职责中强调核安全重overriding importance of nuclear safety.

13 于一切。

Attributes:

特点：

PA.1 Standards: Individuals understand the importance

PA.1标准：个人理解遵守核电标of adherence to nuclear standards. All levels of the

准的重要性。对不满足标准的情形，organization exerci accountability for shortfalls in meeting

standards.

各级组织应履行相应职责。

PA.2 Job Ownership: Individuals understand and

PA.2 工作主导权：个人理解和践demonstrate personal responsibility for the behaviors and

行自己有利于核安全的行为和工作。

work practices that support nuclear safety.

PA.3 Teamwork: Individuals and work groups

PA.3 团队协作：为确保维持核安communicate and coordinate their activities within and

全，个人和团体在组织内外就所从事across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is

maintained.

的活动进行沟通和协调。

QA. Questioning Attitude

QA. 质疑的态度

Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge

为了识别可能导致错误或不适当existing conditions, assumptions, anomalies, and activities

操作的差异，个人应避免自满,不断质in order to identify discrepancies that might result in error or

inappropriate action. All employees are watchful for

疑现有状况、假设、异常和活动。所assumptions, values, conditions, or activities that can have

有员工警惕可能对电厂安全造成不良an undesirable effect on plant safety.

影响的理念、价值观、情况或活动。

Attributes： 特点：

QA.1 Nuclear is Recognized as Special and Unique:

Individuals understand that complex technologies can fail in

unpredictable ways.

QA.1认为核技术是特殊的和独特的：个人应认识到，复杂的技术可14 能在不可预知的情况下失效。

QA.2 Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when

faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and

managed before work proceeds.

QA.2质疑不明情况：个人面临不确定性时应停止操作。工作前应评估和控制风险。

QA.3 Challenge Assumptions: Individuals challenge

assumptions and offer opposing views when they believe

something is not correct.

QA.3质疑假设：当人们认为某件事不正确时，应质疑假设，并提出相反观点。

QA.4 Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and

plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and

inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes.

QA.4避免自满：即使认为有成功的结果，个人也应意识到错误、潜在问题、内在风险可能存在，并做好应对计划。

CO. Safety Communication

Communications maintain a focus on safety. Safety

communication is broad and includes plant-level

CO. 安全沟通

沟通时应以安全为中心。有关安communication, job-related communication, worker-level

全的沟通非常广泛，包括电厂级沟通、communication, equipment labeling, operating experience,

工作相关的沟通、工人级沟通、设备and documentation. Leaders u formal and informal

communication to convey the importance of safety. The

标识、操作经验和文档管理。领导利flow of information up the organization is en as important

用正式和非正式的沟通传达安全的重as the flow of information down the organization.

Attributes:

CO.1 Work Process Communications: Individuals

特点：

要性。组织中上行和下行的信息流同等重要。

incorporate safety communications in work activities.

CO.2 Bas for Decisions: Leaders ensure that the bas for

operational and organizational decisions are communicated

15 in a timely manner.

CO.3 Free Flow of Information: Individuals communicate

openly and candidly, both up, down, and across the

organization and with oversight, audit, and regulatory

organizations.

CO.4 Expectations: Leaders frequently communicate and

reinforce the expectation that nuclear safety is the

organization’s overriding priority.

CO.1工作过程沟通：个人在工作过程中就安全信息进行沟通。

CO.2 决策依据：领导确保运营和组织决策的基础及时地得以沟通。

CO.3信息自由流通：个人开放、坦率地在组织中进行上行和下行的沟通。监督、审核和管理机构时也如此。

CO.4预期:领导经常沟通和强化预期：在组织中核安全高于一切。

16

Management Commitment to Safety

LA. Leadership Accountability

Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their

decisions and behaviors. Executive and nior managers

are the leading advocates of nuclear safety and demonstrate

their commitment both in word and action. The nuclear

safety message is communicated frequently

管理者安全承诺

LA.领导职责

领导在决策和行为中体现承诺。总经理和高级经理是核安全文化的倡and

导者，他们在言行上对核安全起到模范作用。应经常和不间断地对核安全consistently, occasionally as a stand-alone theme. Leaders

throughout the nuclear organization t an example for

safety. Corporate policies emphasize the overriding

信息进行交流，偶尔做为一个独立主importance of nuclear safety.

题进行交流。领导在整个核电组织中确立一个安全案例，公司法规强调核安全重于一切。

Attributes

特点：

LA.1 Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel,

LA.1资源：为支持核安全，领导equipment, procedures, and other resources are available

确保提供足够和适当的人员、设备、and adequate to support nuclear safety.

程序和其他资源。

LA.2 Field Prence: Leaders are commonly en in

LA.2巡视现场：领导经常巡查工working areas of the plant obrving, coaching, and

作场所：观察、指导，强化标准和预reinforcing standards and expectations. Deviations from

standards and expectations are corrected promptly.

期。对于偏离标准和预期的情况，迅速纠正。

LA.3 Incentives, Sanctions, and Rewards: Leaders

LA.3激励、惩罚和奖励：领导确ensure incentives, sanctions, and rewards are aligned with

保激励、惩罚和奖励与核安全方针一nuclear safety policies and reinforce behaviors and

17 outcomes that reflect safety as the overriding priority.

致，并强调，行为和结果体现出安全重于一切。

LA.4 Strategic Commitment to Safety: Leaders ensure

LA.4安全战略承诺：领导确保电plant priorities are aligned to reflect nuclear safety as the

厂的优先考虑的事与核安全高于一切overriding priority.

的信念相一致。

LA.5 Change Management: Leaders u a systematic

LA.5 变化管理：为确保安全重于process for evaluating and implementing change so that

一切，领导使用一个系统的过程评估nuclear safety remains the overriding priority.

和实施变化。

LA.6 Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities: Leaders

LA.6角色、责任和权力：为保证clearly define roles, responsibilities, and authorities to

核安全，领导明确定义角色、责任和ensure nuclear safety.

权力。

LA.7 Constant Examination: Leaders ensure that nuclear

LA.7持续检查：为确保对核安全safety is constantly scrutinized through a variety of

进行持续检查，领导使用多种监测技monitoring techniques, including asssments of nuclear

safety culture.

LA.8 Leader Behaviors: Leaders exhibit behaviors that

t the standard for safety.

术，包括核文化评估。

LA.8领导者行为：领导演示为安全确立标准的行为。

DM. Decision-Making

DM.决策

18 Decisions that support or affect nuclear safety are

决策可以系统、严格、彻底地支systematic, rigorous, and thorough. Operators are vested

持或影响核安全。当面对非预期或不with the authority and understand the expectation, when

faced with unexpected or uncertain conditions, to place the

plant in a safe condition. Senior leaders support and

reinforce conrvative decisions.

Attributes:

确定的情况时，为确保电厂置于安全状态，操作者拥有权限，并且了解预期。高层领导支持和强化做出保守决策。

DM.1 Consistent Process: Individuals u a consistent,

特点：

systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are

incorporated as appropriate.

DM.2 Conrvative Bias: Individuals

DM.1一致的过程：个人使用一个u

一致的、系统的方法来作决策。适当地洞察风险。

decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices

over tho that are simply allowable. A propod action is

determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe

in order to stop.

DM.2保守的偏见：个人在决策时谨慎选择那些简单可行的选项。不是DM.3 Accountability for decisions: Single-point

为了工作进行，而确认一个建议活动accountability is maintained for nuclear safety decisions.

WE. Respectful Work Environment

Trust and respect permeate the organization, creating a

是安全的，也不是为了停工而确认其不安全。

DM.3决策职责：有关核安全决策respectful work environment. A high level of trust is

的单点责任应保持下来。

established in the organization, fostered, in part, through

timely and accurate communication. Differing professional

opinions are encouraged, discusd, and resolved in a timely

WE.彼此尊重的工作环境

manner. Employees are informed of steps taken in respon

to their concerns.

组织中应存在信任和尊重，创造一个彼此尊重的工作环境。通过及时准19 Attributes:

确地沟通，高度信任可以局部地在一 WE.1 Respect is Evident: Everyone is treated with

个组织中建立，培养起来。鼓励和讨dignity and respect.

WE.2 Opinions are Valued: Individuals are encouraged

to voice concerns, provide suggestions, and rai questions.

Differing opinions are respected.

WE.3 High Level of Trust: Trust is fostered among

individuals and work groups throughout the organization.

WE.4 Conflict Resolution: Fair and objective methods

are ud to resolve conflicts.

特点：

WE.1尊重是明显的：尊重每个人。

WE.2重视意见：鼓励个人说出顾虑，提出建议和问题。尊重不同观点。

WE.3高度信任：在组织中的个体和工作团队之间培养信任。

WE.4解决冲突：解决冲突时使用公平和客观的方法。

论不一致的专业观点并及时解决矛盾。对于员工的关注应给予回应。

20 Management Systems

CL. Continuous Learning

CL.持续学习

管理体系

Opportunities to continuously learn are valued, sought

评估、寻求、实现持续学习的机out, and implemented. Operating experience is highly

会。重视操作经验，提高从以往经验valued, and the capacity to learn from experience is well

developed. Training, lf-asssments, and benchmarking

学习的能力。为了激励学习和提高能are ud to stimulate learning and improve performance.

力，可以应用培训、自我评估、对照Nuclear safety is kept under constant scrutiny through a

variety of monitoring techniques, some of which provide an

管理。用不同的监测技术对核安全进independent “fresh look.”

行持续的、详细的审查，其中的一些技术可以提供独立的新视角。

Attributes:

特点：

CL.1 Operating Experience: The organization systematically

and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements lessons

from relevant internal and external operating experience

information in a timely manner.

CL.1操作经验：组织适时、系统、有效地收集、评估和应用内部和外部的操作经验信息。

CL.2 Self-Asssment: The organization routinely conducts

lf-critical and objective asssments of its programs,

practices, and performance.

CL.2自我评估：组织例行地对程序、实践和表现进行自我批评和客观评价。

CL.3 Benchmarking: The organization learns from other

organizations to continuously improve knowledge, skills,

and safety performance.

CL.4 Training: High-quality training maintains a

knowledgeable workforce and reinforces high standards for

maintaining nuclear safety.

CL.3对照：为不断提高知识、技能及安全表现，组织向其它组织学习。

CL.4培训：高质量的培训可以维持一个学识渊博的员工团队，利于保21 持核安全的高标准。

PI. Problem Identification and Resolution

PI.识别问题、解决问题

Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly

迅速识别、彻底评估影响安全的identified, fully evaluated, and promptly addresd and

潜在问题，根据重要性迅速处理和纠corrected commensurate with their significance.

Identification and resolution of a broad spectrum of

正。为加强安全和提高表现，应识别problems, including organizational issues, are ud to

和解决包括组织问题在内的广泛问strengthen safety and improve performance.

题。

Attributes:

特点：

PI.1 Identification: The organization implements a

corrective action program with a low threshold for

identifying issues. Individuals identify issues completely,

PI.1识别:为识别问题，组织可执行一个低门槛的纠正措施计划。个人accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with the

按照程序及时、彻底、准确地识别问program.

题。

PI.2 Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates

issues to ensure that problem resolutions and solutions

address caus and extents of conditions commensurate with

their safety significance.

PI.2评估：为确保问题的解决措施、原因阐述和范围状况与其安全重要性一致，组织应彻底评估问题。

PI.3 Resolution: The organization takes effective corrective

actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate

with their safety significance.

PI.3解决问题：为解决问题，组织及时采取与问题安全重要性相一致的纠正措施。

PI.4 Trending: The organization periodically analyzes

information from the corrective action program and other

asssments in the aggregate to identify adver trends or

PI.4趋势：组织定期分析纠正措施计划和其它评估结果，以此识别不22 conditions.

利趋势和状况。

RC. Environment for Raising Concerns

RC.提出顾虑的氛围

A safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) is

maintained where personnel feel free to rai safety

concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation,

建立一个有安全意识的环境（SCWE），个人可以自由地提出顾harassment, or discrimination. The station creates,

虑，而不用担心遭到报复、威胁、侵maintains, and evaluates policies and process that allow

扰或歧视。电厂建立、维护、评估相personnel to freely rai concerns.

关政策和程序，允许员工提出顾虑。

Attributes:

特点：

RC.1 SCWE Policy: The organization implements a policy

that supports individual rights and responsibilities to rai

safety concerns and does not tolerate harassment,

intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination for doing so.

RC.1SCWE原则：组织鼓励个人提出安全顾虑，并不会受到报复、威胁、侵扰或歧视。

RC.2 Alternate Process for Raising Concerns: The

organization implements a process for raising and resolving

concerns that is independent of line management influence.

RC.2提出关注的其他程序：组织执行一套不受管理影响的鼓励提出顾Safety issues may be raid in confidence and are resolved

虑的程序。员工可以自信地提出安全in a timely and effective manner.

问题，并被及时有效地解决问题。

WP. Work Process

WP.工作程序

The process of planning and controlling work activities

为保证安全，执行计划和控制工is implemented so that safety is maintained. Work

作。工作管理是一个特定程序。该程management is a deliberate process in which work is

identified, lected, planned, scheduled, executed, clod,

序对工作进行识别、选择、计划、进and critiqued. The entire organization is involved in and

度、执行、完成和评审。整个组织参fully supports the process.

23 与并支持该程序。

Attributes:

特点：

WP.1 Work Management: The organization implements

a process of planning, controlling, and executing work

activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority.

WP.1工作管理：组织执行一套计划、控制和执行工作活动的程序，以The work process includes the identification and

确保核安全重于一切。工作程序包括management of risk commensurate to the work.

识别和管理与工作相关的风险。

WP.2 Design Margins: The organization operates and

maintains equipment within design margins. Margins are

carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic

WP.2设计裕量：组织在设计裕量内操作并维护设备。只有通过谨慎、and rigorous process. Special attention is placed on

系统的程序才可以监视和改变裕量。maintaining fission product barriers, defen-in-depth, and

对保持裂变产品屏障、纵深防御和安safety-related equipment.

全相关设备要保持特别注意。

WP.3 Documentation: The organization creates and

maintains complete, accurate, and up-to-date

documentation.

WP.4 Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow

process, procedures, and work instructions.

WP.3文件：组织建立和保持完整、准确和最新的文件。

WP.4遵守程序：个人遵守工艺流程、程序和工作指导书。

24

25

Acknowledgements

致谢

The following individuals participated in advisory groups that developed the traits and attributes in this

document.

以下个人参与了顾问团并对本文档作出了贡献。

Jeffrey B. Archie

Senior Vice President and

Chief Nuclear Officer

South Carolina Electric & Gas

Company

Ronald A. Barnes

Director, Nuclear Regulatory

Affairs

Arizona Public Service

Company

Elizabeth Beswick

Nuclear Professionalism

Consultant Nuclear Generation

EDF Energy

Susan Bristte

Manager, Management System

Department

Bruce Power

Annick Carnino

Director

Energy Strategists Consultancy

Limited

Conrad Dube

Project Manager

WANO Paris Center

Randall K. Edington

David F. Garchow

Vice President, Plant Technical

Support

Institute of Nuclear Power

Operations

Ronald Gaston

Licensing Manager

Exelon Corporation

Billie Garde, Esq.

Partner

Clifford & Garde, LLP

Pierre Francois Gest

Senior Safety Officer

Operational Safety Section

International Atomic Energy

Agency

Edward D. Halpin

Senior Vice President and

Chief Nuclear Officer

Pacific Gas and Electric

Company

Jun Hamada

General Manager & Group

Leader

Japan Nuclear Technology

Institute

Bernard Jeannin

Safety Standards Advisor

Safety and Security

Coordination

International Atomic Energy

Agency

Molly Keefe

Human Factors Analyst

Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Anne Kerhoas

Senior Safety Specialist

Division of Nuclear Installation

Safety

Department of Nuclear Safety

and Security

International Atomic Energy

Agency

G. Kenneth Koves, Ph.D.

Principal Program Manager

Institute of Nuclear Power

Operations

Johann Kritzinger

Corporate Consultant: Human

Kevin J. Mulligan

Vice President, Operations

Support

Entergy Nuclear

Michael J. Pacilio

President and Chief Nuclear

Officer Exelon Nuclear

Exelon Corporation

Ray Powell

Chief, Technical Support and

Asssment Branch

Region I

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Gregory Rolina

Rearcher

Mines ParisTech

Philip K. Rusll

Team Leader

Institute of Nuclear Power

Operations

Jack Rutkowski

Reactor Inspector

Region III

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

26 Executive Vice President and

Chief Nuclear Officer

Lori Hayes

Manager, Corporate Nuclear

Performance

Nuclear Operating Unit

Eric Ruesch

Senior Reactor Inspector

Arizona Public Service

Company

Edwin J. Eilola

Director, Nuclear Oversight

PSEG Nuclear LLC

Jo Manuel Diaz Francisco

Communication and Safety

Coordinator

Electronuclear

Preston D. Swafford

Executive Vice President and

Chief Nuclear Officer

Tenne Valley Authority

Carin Sylvander

Human Performance, RQH and

Safety Culture

Vattenfall AB; Ringhals NPP

Alexandra Tudor

Engineer, Performance

Monitoring Section

Safety and Compliance

Department

CNE Cernavoda,

S.N. Nuclearelectrica

Eduard Volkov

Director

Prognoz - Obninsk Science

Rearch Center

Andrew J. Vomastek

Fleet Manager, Dominion

Nuclear Employee Concerns

Programs

Dominion Generation

Oversight

Progress Energy, Inc.

Albert R. Hochevar

Deputy Director, OR Team

Leaders

Institute of Nuclear Power

Operations

Tom Houghton

Senior Director, Safety

Focud Regulation

Nuclear Energy Institute

William R. Illing

Senior Program Manager

Institute of Nuclear Power

Operations

Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd

Valérie Lagrange

Safety Management & Human

Factors Advisor

Nuclear Operation Division

Electricité de France

James E. Lynch

Vice President, Assistance

Institute of Nuclear Power

Operations

Kamishan Martin

Human Factors Engineer

Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Stephanie Morrow, Ph.D.

Human Factors Analyst

Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

27

Region IV

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Diane Sieracki

Senior Safety Culture Program

Manager

Office of Enforcement

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Undine Shoop

Chief, Health Physics and

Human Performance Branch

Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission