Five years ago in the former Soviet Union, governments loyal to 忠于Moscow were falling roughly every six months. Tho were the glory days of the "color revolutions" that brought new leaders to Georgia格鲁吉亚, Ukraine乌克兰 and Kyrgyzstan吉尔吉斯斯坦 （in quick succession）紧接着 between 2003 and 2005, all with the backing of the United States. The region's political center of gravity重心 was tilting倾斜 sharply toward the West. But now that trend has been reverd翻到. In the past three months, two of tho governments have been ousted推翻. Leaders far friendlier to Russia have again taken power in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, displacing置放 the Orange and Tulip郁金香 revolutions respectively分别地，各自的. (Indeed, Kiev just agreed to extend Moscow's naval海军的 lea on the Black Sea port of Sevastopol in exchange for cheaper gas; the previous Ukrainian regime政体 had oppod the move.) The region's last standing leader of a color revolution (the Ro), Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, is feeling lonelier than ever, and he has a warning for the Obama administration管理 行政: Don't give Russia a free hand in the former Soviet bloc团体.
In an interview with TIME at his glass-domed半球形的 presidential palace, Saakashvili laid
out责骂 how he es the situation: President Barack Obama has been put in an awkward尴尬的 spot by his drive to invigorate鼓舞 ties with the Kremlin, having to deal with the legacy遗赠 of George W. Bush, who had infuriated激怒的 Moscow by supporting the color revolutions and building clo ties with the governments they brought to power. Now Obama is being urged by the Russians to back away from tho relationships. "It's not just about abandoning your ally同盟国 Georgia. No, Russia is asking the U.S. to give back the Soviet（ sphere of influence）影响范围," Saakashvili says. (See pictures of the Russia-Georgia war.)
（In practical terms）实际上 在实践中, this ems to require three things of the United States and its European allies同盟国: do not push for any more ex-Soviet countries to join NATO; do not openly support any opposition movements that ek to oust 剥夺 取代pro-Russian governments; and more generally, make sure to consult参阅 参考 Moscow before going ahead with any big initiatives主动权 in Russia's backyard, especially military军事的 ones. Under the Bush administration, all three were ignored忽略, and relations with Russia became nastier 安脏的 龌龊的than they had been since the Cold War. Obam
a, on the other hand, has been far more obliging约束, and his Administration believes Moscow is reciprocating互给的，报答 — much to Saakashvili's chagrin懊恼 气愤.
Nowhere has this been more clear than in NATO's changing attitudes. In a statement on April 14, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmusn urged NATO countries to integrate使完整 Russia into their curity保证的 strategy instead of eing Russia as a potential可能的 潜在的 threat. "The United States and Russia now clearly e eye to eye on a range of curity issues. And we should u this new momentum动力 to take further steps to enhance增强 提高 our common curity," Rasmusn said. Earlier plans to put Ukraine and Georgia on the fast track to NATO membership成员资格 have been put aside, and as a result, Russia is helping NATO get its supplies into Afghanistan阿富汗斯坦. The American approach to missile 导弹的defen防卫 in Eastern Europe has also changed. Whereas鉴于 反之 然而 Bush plowed ahead with his plan despite Moscow's fierce凶猛的 objections反对意见, Obama has invited the Kremlin to take part in a dialogue对话 over the issue. (See pictures of Obama in Russia.)
The Russians are taking notice. "It's been very encouraging that the U.S. has refud to interfere干涉 in Ukraine's domestic policy in the way it was doing during the Orange Revolution [in 2004]. Americans have also sharply cut their support to Georgia. At least they are not giving one dollar of military assistance援助, as far as I know, to Saakashvili," says Sergei Markov, a long-time Kremlin （spin doctor）起主导作用者 and a parliamentary国会的 deputy代理人 for the United Russia party led by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Officially官方地 正式地, of cour, the Obama team insists it has not turned away from U.S. allies（ for the sake of）为了、、利益 better ties with Moscow, and Saakashvili says he has "no reason to complain about day-to-day relations." The U.S. has also continued to criticize Russia for occupying about a fifth of Georgia's territory after the two countries fought a war in 2008. But that war still marked a turning point for America's broader广大的 strategy. It showed that Russia was willing to u force to defend its interests in the region, while the United States could （be dragged into）使卷入 a war if it continued to oppo tho interests to the end. Even the Bush administration was not pre
pared to take that risk. "[Bush's Secretary of State] Condoleezza Rice told me that you must avoid an open military conflict冲突 with Russia," says Nino Burjanadze, former speaker of the Georgian parliament议会国会 and now a leading opposition figure. "She told me, 'We respect Georgia, but we will not go to war with Russia over Georgia.'" (See 10 things to do in Moscow.)
That approach probably saved the U.S. from a military catastrophe大灾难 惨败, and now under Obama, the U.S. has become even less willing to cheer on Russia's adversaries对手 敌手. It has instead embraced Russia as a partner for global curity, and this tactic策略 is paying off. Concrete具体的 实在的 agreements have already been signed签署, most notably显著的 尤其 this month's treaty条约 协议 谈判 to reduce the world's two biggest nuclear arnals核武库 by （a third）三分之一. But it remains to be en how countries like Georgia will fit into this budding萌芽的 发育期的 relationship. Right now, it doesn't appear congenial 意气相投to the government in Tblisi. As Russia continues to clamor喧闹 叫喊 to have Saakashvili removed from office, the United States ems to be keeping him（ at arms length）公平的 商业的. At this month's nuclear non-proliferation 增值 扩散
conference in Washington, Obama snubbed冷落 责斥 Saakashvili's request 要求 请求for their first one-on-one meeting, and instead sat down with the new Kremlin-friendly president of Ukraine, who had agreed at the summit顶点 最高级会议 to get rid of his country's （highly enriched uranium高浓缩铀.
