Frequency Regulation Compensation
in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets
Technical Conference
AD10-11-000
May 26, 2010
AGENDA
Panelists
Bill Capp, CEO, Beacon Power Corporation
Praveen Kathpal, Market and Regulatory Affairs, AES Energy Storage Jonathan Lowell, Principal Market Design Analyst, ISO New England
Ralph D. Masiello, Sr. Vice President, Innovation, KEMA Inc.
Andrew Ott, Senior Vice President, Markets, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.
Robb Pike, Director Market Design, New York ISO
Todd Ramey, Executive Director Market Administration, Midwest ISO DeWayne Todd, Energy Services Manager, Alcoa Power Generating, Inc.
Don Tretheway, Senior Market Design and Policy Specialist, CAISO
Rahul Walawalkar, Vice President, Emerging Technologies and Markets, Customized Energy Solutions Ltd.
9:00 Welcoming Remarks
9:10 Session 1 -- Value of Higher-Quality Frequency Regulation Service in Organized Electric Markets
绯闻女孩 结局This ssion explores the value of new energy technologies that have the
potential to respond to a regulation dispatch signal faster, and follow it
more accurately, than traditional resources on automatic generation control.
1.Several recent technical studies1asrt new technologies are capable of
following a transmission system operator’s regulation control signal more
accurately than traditional automatic generation control (AGC) systems.
The studies also suggest that the new technologies are able to respond
to a regulation dispatch signal that requests faster and more frequent
changes in output levels than usually requested of other (traditional
generation) resources. Does experience to date support the asrtions?
2.Would greater entry of technologies that respond to a regulation dispatch
natuesignal faster, and follow it more accurately, potentially lower the total costs of Independent System Operators/ Regional Transmission Organizations
(ISO/RTOs)?
3.Would greater entry of technologies that respond to a regulation dispatchcomputerscience
signal faster, and follow it more accurately, provide enhanced reliability
benefits? If so, what are the benefits and how would they be realized?
4.Can any of the foregoing potential benefits be quantified, or even estimated
approximately, in dollar terms? Do market participants or ISO/RTOs
posss sufficient information to estimate the benefits? If not, what
information unavailable today would be needed to do so? Should
ISO/RTOs institute interim tariffs, demonstration projects or pilot programs to collect this information?
10:30 Break
10:45 Session 2 – Performance, Compensation, and Market Design This ssion will explore whether existing pricing mechanisms for frequency regulation rvice reflect the quality of the rvice provided, and whether
reforms are needed.
1.Do existing frequency regulation market designs in the ISO/RTO markets
provide compensation and efficient price signals for investment in new
5ingtechnologies that respond to a regulation dispatch signal faster, and follow
it more accurately than the traditional resources? Why or why not? How
does this vary across ISO/RTO markets?
1
R. Walawalkar and J. Apt, Market Analysis of Emerging Electric Energy Storage Systems, National E
nergy Technology Laboratory, Report DOE/NETL-2008/1330 (2008); R. Entriken and N. Taheri, A Prototype Method for Analyzing Regulation by Limited Energy Storage, Electric Power Rearch Institute (2009); Y.V. Makarov, J. Ma, S. Lu, and T.B. Nguyen, Asssing the Value of Regulation Resources Bad on Their Time Respon Characteristics, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Report PNNL-17632 (2008); KEMA Corporation, Benefits of Fast-Respon Storage Devices for System Regulation in ISO Markets, Technical Paper (2008).
2.Compensation design is inherently premid on the ability to measure the
marcherinnocentivervice provided by an individual facility. Can an ISO/RTO accurately
measure the impact on the system’s frequency and its area control error
(ACE) that results when an individual facility providing regulation rvice increas or decreas the power it supplies to the transmission system?
Why or why not?
3.Is it appropriate for a resource lected to provide frequency regulation
rvice to be (a) compensated by the ISO/RTO for the capacity it makes available “on call” for regulation rvice, as well as (b) compensated by the ISO/RTO for any changes in the level of power it supplies in respon to the ISO/RTO’s regulation control signal? Why or why not?
4.One market design model for compensation component (b) in the above
question pays a resource, in part, bad on the absolute sum of its changes in the level of power it supplies (or withdraws) in respon to the
ISO/RTO’s regulation control signal over a t time interval. (This is
sometimes called a “mileage-bad” compensation model.) What are the advantages and disadvantages of this type of regulation market design?
How should the “mileage” compensation rate be t? Would the resulting market design nd an efficient signal for new investment in resources
capable of providing frequency regulation rvice?
5.An alternative market design model for frequency regulation compensation
could compensate a resource, in part, bad on how accurately the changes in the resource’s real-time power output match the regulation control signal nt to it by the ISO/RTO. (This might be called an “accuracy-bad”
compensation model). What are the advantages and disadvantages of this type of market design? How would the compensation for “accuracy” be t?
Would the resulting market design nd an efficient signal for new
investment if the ISO/RTO finds it optimal to supply different regulation control signals to resources with different respon characteristics?
revital6. A third market design model for frequency regulation compensation might
have two “class” of rvice: The current AGC-bad regulation rvice class, and a new fast-respon regulation rvice class that is applicable to resources able to meet a higher performance standard for signal-respon speed and accuracy. What are the advantages and disadvantages of this type of regulation market design? How would compensation be t? Would the resulting market design nd an efficient signal for new investment in
adjusted
resources capable of providing each class of frequency regulation rvice?
7.If a storage-bad facility is lected to provide regulation rvice, and
responds to an ISO/RTO “regulation down” control signal by charging the
storage facility (thus placing a net load upon the network), should the
facility be paid by the ISO/RTO for incrementally “regulating down”, or
should the facility pay the ISO/RTO for the energy the facility absorbs from the network? How does the answer to this situation align with the
承担的意思美国威斯康星州进入紧急状态alternative market design approaches above?
8.Should the opportunity costs of resources capable of providing frequency
regulation rvice affect which resources are lected to provide this
rvice? If so, should each lected individual supplier receive the same
market-clearing price for each unit of capacity it makes available “on call”
for regulation rvice? Do energy-limited technologies that provide
frequency regulation rvice incur an opportunity cost? If so, why?
12:45 Concluding Remarks
