盈余管理：一种普遍现象[外文翻译]
外文翻译
Earnings Management：A Perspective Material Source: Managerial Finance Author:Messod D.Beneish Abstract
An issue central to accounting rearch is the extent to which managers alter reported earnings for their own benefit. In the 1970s and early 1980s, a large number of studies investigated the determinants of accounting choice. The studies provided evidence consistent with managers’ incentives to choo beneficial ways of reporting earnings in regulatory and contractual contexts (e Holthaun and Leftwich, 1983, and Watts and Zimmerman, 1986 for reviews of the studies). Since the mid-1980s studies of managerial incentives to alter earnings have focud primarily on accruals.
I trace the explosive growth in accrual-bad management rearch to three likely caus. First accruals are the principal product of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and if e
怎样画大眼妆arnings are managed it is more likely that the earnings management occurs on the accrual rather than the cash flow component of earnings. Second, studying accruals reduces the problems associated with the inability to measure the effect of various accounting choices on earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Third，if earnings management is an unobrvable component of accruals, it is less likely that investors can unravel the effect of earnings management on reported earnings.2016年10月13日
The main challenge faced by earnings management rearchers is that academics, like investors, are unable to obrve, or for that matter, measure the earnings management component of accruals. Indeed, managerial accounting actions intended to increa compensation, avoid covenant default, rai capital, or influence a regulatory outcome are largely unobrvable. Conquently, prior work has drawn inferences from joint hypothes that test both incentives to manage earnings as well as the construct validity of the various accrual models which are ud to estimate managers’ accounting discretion. Becau extant models of expected accruals provide impreci estimates of managerial discretion, questions have been raid about whether the unobrvable earni
try歌词翻译
英语基础知识ngs management actions do in fact occur.
merciNotwithstanding rearch design problems, a variety of evidence suggestive of earnings management has accumulated. In Section 2, I rai three general questions about earnings management: What is it? How frequently does it occur? How do rearchers estimate earnings management? Prior investigations of managerial incentives to alter earnings typically fall in three categories, namely studies that examine the effect of contracts in accounting choices, and studies that examine the incentive effects associated with the need to rai external financing. Rather than discussing the evidence along tho lines, I have chon to prent the evidence depending on the direction of the incentive context. Thus, I summarize in Sections 3 and 4, what is known about incentives to increa and decrea earnings. In Section 5, I discuss evidence on incentive contexts that provide incentives either to increa or to decrea earnings, and in Section 6, I prent conclusions and suggestions for future work.
2. Earnings Management
2.1 Definitions
Notice the plural: It reflects my view that academics have no connsus on what is earnings management. There have been at least three attempts at defining earnings management:
(1) Managing earnings is “the process of taking deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted accounting principles to bring about a desired level of reported earnings.” (Davidso n, Stickney and Weil, 1987,cited in Schipper，1989).
(2) Managing earnings is “a purpoful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as oppod to say，merely facilitating the neutral operati on of the process).” (Schipper, 1989).
慢速voa杭州电脑(3) “Earnings management occurs when managers u judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).
A lack of connsus on the definition of earnings management implies differing interpretations of empirical evidence in studies that ek to detect earnings management，or to provide evidence of earnings management incentives. It is thus uful to compare the above three definitions.
All three definitions deal with actions management undertaken within the盎司怎么读
context of financial reporting - including the structuring of transactions so that a desired accounting treatment applies (e.g. pooling, operating leas). However, the cond definition also allows earnings management to occur via timing real investment and financing decisions. If the timing issue delays or accelerates a discretionary expenditure for a very short period of time around the firm’s fiscal year, I envision timing real decisions as a means of managing earnings. A problem with the cond definition aris if readers interpret any real decisions - including tho implying that managers forego profitable opp
拉瓦尔ortunities –as earnings management. Given the availability of alternative ways to manage earnings, I believe it is implausible to call earnings management a deviation from rational investment behavior. This reflects my view that earnings management is a financial reporting phenomenon.
德语发音
