Diversity in Land Tenure Arrangements under the Houhold
Responsibility System in China
Charles C. Krukopf
Austin College
Abstract:
undivided loveThis paper examines how successful China has been in implementing policies that enhance land tenure rights for rural houholds. The paper us a unique data t to analyze various measures of land rights in veral regions and socioeconomic groups within China. It considers veral measures of land tenure rights, land u and transfer rights, and village policies regarding land management. The results of the analysis show that substantial variations exist with regard to land tenure rights across the country. The findings indicate that local government officials continue to have a great deal of influence in determining local land-tenure regulations, and national regulations and policies have not been adopted in many local villages. (JEL Classifications: Q15; O13; P32) (Keywords: Chine Agriculture, Houhold Responsibility System, Land Tenure)
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DIVERSITY IN LAND-TENURE ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE HOUSEHOLD RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM IN CHINA
SECTION 1INTRODUCTION
Given the almost universal adoption of the HRS form of agricultural management within China and the clear policy statements offered by the central government regarding key aspects of land tenure administration in the country, it might be expected that land-tenure institutions would be fairly homogenous across the country. However, as with many economic reforms in China, pronouncements from the central government have not necessarily translated into unified policies at the local level. For example, in some areas houholds enjoy cure rights to the land they farm, while in other areas land has been administratively reallocated numerous times leading to tenure incurity. Similar differences exist with regard to land transfer rights among houholds.
In order to gain a clearer understanding of the diversity of land-tenure rights in China, this paper utilizes a unique data t that offers a two-period cross-ction of obrvations measuring land rights in the country. The results provide clear evidence that substantial heterogeneity exists with regard to land-tenure institutions in China, even after the almost universal adoption of the HRS. The findings indicate that local government officials have a great deal of influence in determining local land-tenure regulations. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for land policy formation in China.obfuscate
SECTION 2DATA DESCRIPTION
The data t ud in this paper was gathered in 83 villages and 800 houholds in 8 counties across four provinces in China1. The surveys were designed by the Development Rearch Center (DRC) of the State Council of China, with assistance from the Land Tenure Center of the University of Wisconsin. The survey data was collected in 1989 and 1994, and focud on conditions in 1988 and 1993. The surveys included corresponding village and houhold surveys from 32 villages from Gongzhuling and Dehui counties in Jilin province, 10 villages in Weihui county in Henan province, 30 villages in Shaoxing, Ning and Leqing counties in Zhejiang province, and 11 villages in Anfu and Nancheng counties in Jiangxi province. 100 houholds in each county were surveyed. The counties included were chon from a national statistical sample to reprent the wide variety of development stages and agricultural zones within China. The villages and houholds were chon randomly within the lected counties.
1 Political administrative levels in China include, in descending order, province, county, township and village. Each of the larger administrative areas includes veral of the smaller areas, for example, each township includes veral village areas, and each county includes veral townships.
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The surveys for 1989 and 1994 were conducted in the same villages and houholds, and included many of the same houholds in each time period. Houholds were interviewed by a reprentative of the State Statistical Bureau and asked to complete an extensive questionnaire covering houhold demographics, finances, agricultural production and land holdings and tenure arrangements. The corresponding village survey interviewed village officials in 1994 in all 83 villages and contains information on village attributes in 1988 and 1993. Information gathered included village demographics, village land-u and land-tenure policies, information on agricultural quotas and taxes, and data on village agricultural and non-agricultural production. Supplemental village survey work was conducted in 1997 to gain additional information not included in the original surveys.
One feature of this data t that distinguishes it from tho ud in earlier studies is that it includes information on land rights in the surveyed villages across time. Most information in the surveys is available for two years, 1988 and 1993, while some houhold and village information is available for each year from the introduction of the HRS to 1993. The information in the data t allows an examination of how land reallocation behavior in villages has changed over time in respon to land policies and other factors.
The data t is also unique in the amount of information available from its surveys of houhold and village land rights. For example, the survey indicates the number, timing and size of every village land reallocation from the adoption of the HRS through 1993. This information permits the construction of veral measures of land-tenure curity. With regard to land transfer and u rights, the houhold surveys record houhold perceptions regarding their freedom to freely rent their contracted land to other houholds, to freely choo which crops to plant, and to choo where to ll the crop output. The information available from the surveys provides a clearer picture of the full t of land rights and land policies in Chine villages, and how the land rights and land policies have changed over time.remainder
gpbTables 1 and 2 offer an overview of some basic characteristics of the houholds and counties included in the survey. As can be en in the tables, significant variations in terms of income, land endowment and other factors exist between the different regions of China covered. For example, houholds in Zhejiang, one of the rapidly growing coastal provinces in south central China, are relatively prosperous and less reliant on agriculture as a source of income than other regions. In the areas the total amount of land per capita is relatively low, but the land is of high quality judging by agricultural yields. Most farmers in this area grow two rice crops per year. Rice is also the primary
crop on the farms in Jiangxi province, which is located in southern China. However off-farm income in this area is much lower than in Zhejiang.
In terms of land resources, the northern province of Jilin is relatively abundant in the amount of land available per capita. However, this land is less productive in terms of agricultural yields than land in other areas. The primary crop in this region is corn. Farmers in Weihui County in central China’s Henan province grow both wheat and rice. However, it is the poorest county in the survey with limited off-farm opportunities anddigitalcamera
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low grain yields. Overall, the areas reprented in the sample provide a cross-ction of the diversity found in demographic and agro-climatic areas across China.
SECTION 3EVIDENCE OF LAND-TENURE HETEROGENEITY Just as demographic characteristics vary across the areas surveyed, land-tenure administration also shows significant within the sample. While there are many potential aspects of land tenure administration that can be evaluated, this ction will focus on descriptions of three of the most important aspects of rural land rights in China: land-tenure curity; land-transfer rights; and land u rights. A variety of different methods of measu
小学数学难题ring each aspect of land rights are available. This paper identifies veral methods of quantifying each rights category, and prents alternative measurements for each rights group from the data.
3.1 LAND-TENURE SECURITY
Several indices related to land-tenure curity in China have been considered in previous studies. Almost all of them measure the number and scope of administrative land reallocations in a village. Most authors consider the reallocations to be the primary determinant of the degree of land-tenure curity enjoyed by rural houholds2 (Liu et al 1996; Rozelle et al 1998; Turner et al 1998; Carter and Yao 1998; Li 1998). Villages that have reallocated land would be expected to have poorer tenure curity than tho that have not, and likewi, villages that have reallocated land more frequently or more thoroughly would also be expected to have poorer tenure curity.
Administrative land reallocations can be measured in veral ways, including a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a village has reallocated land since the introduction of the HRS or measures of the frequency or size of land reallocation activity in a village. While each of the measures is related, they do yield somewhat distinct information and help build a more complete picture of land reallocation behavior in Chine villages. For example, some villages reallocate infreq
uently, but reallocate all the 2Some critics have challenged the notion that variables measuring reallocation behavior or length of tenure accurately reflect the tenure curity enjoyed by houholds. For example, James Kung has argued that in some areas tenure may grow more incure the longer houholds hold land. This is becau in areas with few past adjustments, houholds perceive that future adjustments are more likely (Kung 1995). However, this problem might be expected to diminish over time. By 1993 many houholds had been farming the same land plots for over twelve years, and their villages had never reallocated land. It could plausibly be argued that village leaders in tho areas had the time and opportunity to reallocate land, but cho not to do so. It is therefore probably less likely, rather than more likely, that tho villages will reallocate their land in the future.
Another argument that has been raid is that areas without reallocations might still have poor tenure curity becau it may be the ca that in the areas village leaders have threatened to reallocate land, even if they did not carry through with the threat. Such threats might induce land-tenure incurity. However, as Li Guo has described, it might be presumed that village leaders would have to reallocate land at least once to make such a threat credible. Therefore village reallocation behavior would remain a valid instrument for determining land-tenure curity (Li 1998). As with all s
ubjective economic variables, an exact measurement of land-tenure curity is impossible. The rearcher is forced to do the best that he can with the data and information available to him.otc什么意思啊
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village land when they do reallocate. (This is known as a large land reallocation.) Other villages reallocate land frequently, but only reallocate part of each houhold’s land or only include a few houholds in the reallocation. (This is known as a small land reallocation.)
This study introduces two additional measures of land-tenure curity that have not been reported in previous published studies. The measures include the average length of time village houholds have farmed the plots of land in their posssion, and the percentage of village houholds that report having some of their land reallocated. The length of time houholds have farmed their land reflects both the timing and scope of administrative land reallocations in the village. Farmers in villages without any major land reallocations would have held their land for long periods of time, and be presumed to have relatively cure tenure rights3. Likewi, the portion of houholds reporting having had some of their land reallocated since the introduction of the HRS also indicates the scope of land reallocations in the village. The measures are important becau they indicate the actual p
attern of land reallocation experienced by houholds. Previous studies relied only on reported allocation behavior by village leaders. This study allows one to corroborate the village surveys with houhold survey work.
Table 3 summarizes information on veral measures of land-tenure curity for houholds and villages in the eight counties included in the survey. The results indicate that land administration and land-tenure rights vary a great deal both across and within the counties included in the survey. For example, while 65 percent of the villages in the total sample had reallocated land through administrative means at least once since the introduction of the HRS (and 26.5 percent of all villages had reallocated more than once), significant variations in reallocation behavior existed between the counties. In one county, Gongzhuling, only one village had reallocated land, while in two other counties, Dehui and Weihui, all the villages reallocated land. An indication that land reallocation behavior is not tied to regional factors can be en in the fact that Gongzhuling and Dehui, counties at opposite ends of the reallocation behavior spectrum, are both located in Jilin province in northern China.
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It can be noted as well that the frequency of land reallocation differed not only among counties, but also within the villages of a single county. For example, in Anfu County in Jiangxi one village had nev
er reallocated land while another village in the same county had reallocated land six times from 1984-93. Other counties showed less extreme differences in reallocation behavior among villages, but only one county, Dehui, experienced homogeneity in reallocation behavior among the villages in the county. In that county all the villages reallocated one time.
3 The number of years the land has been held will vary somewhat from village to village depending on when the HRS was implemented. Therefore, houholds in a village that have held their land for 13 years versus houholds in another village that have held their land for only 11 years would not necessarily have poorer land-tenure rights. The change in length of time held between the two villages may only be due to differences in when the HRS was initially implemented. The important thing to consider is the difference between the average length of land holding and the time since the HRS was implemented. Greater disparities indicate land reallocations in that village have been more frequent or more widespread.
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