551 U.S. 877, *;127 S. Ct. 2705, **;
168 L. Ed. 2d 623, ***;2007 U.S. LEXIS 8668
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LEEGIN CREATIVE LEATHER PRODUCTS, INC., Petitioner v. PSKS, INC., dba KAY'S KLOSET . . . KAY'S SHOES
No. 06-480
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
army551 U.S. 877; 127 S. Ct. 2705; 168 L. Ed. 2d 623; 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8668; 75 U.S.L.W. 4643; 2007-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P75,753; 35 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 631; 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 466
March 26, 2007, Argued
June 28, 2007, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
On remand at, Remanded by冰雪奇缘2彩蛋PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 498 F.3d 486, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20957 (5th Cir. Tex., Aug. 30, 2007)
PRIOR HISTORY:ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.
PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 171 Fed. Appx. 464, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
6879 (5th Cir. Tex., 2006)
DISPOSITION:Reverd and remanded.
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Emerging Issues Analysis
Kansas Supreme Court Declares "Rule of Reason" Inapplicable to Kansas Antitrust Law; Legislature May Have a Different Idea
The Kansas Supreme Court has now rejected the application of Leegin to Kansas law, holding that a rule of reason approach was incompatible with the unambiguous language of the applicable Kansas Restraint of Trade Act. The rule of reason remains with us today as a vital part of federal antitrust juris-prudence,...Mark Twain stated: "No man's life, libert
y, or property is safe while the legislature is in ssion." Let's e what happens in Kansas.等等 英文
Emerging Issues Analysis
James M. Wilson Jr. on the Legislative Effort to Rever the Supreme Court's Decision in Leegin v. PSKS Creative Leather Products Inc
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the rule that prohibited suppliers from tting the minimum resale price at which retailers could ll their products. This decision was viewed as a threat to the retail market, including small business and internet retailers that rely on discounting to attract customers. In respon, federal legislation is being considered to reinstate the rule that existed prior to Leegin.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:Respondent retailer sued petitioner manufacturer, alleging an antitrust violation under搂 1(15 U.S.C.S. 搂 1) of the Sherman Act. Under the per rule,
the district court excluded the manufacturer's expert testimony regarding the procompetitive effects of its pricing policy. A jury found for the retailer, and the district court trebled the damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Certiorari was granted.
OVERVIEW:The manufacturer instituted a retail pricing and promotion policy, refusing to ll to retailers that discounted its goods below suggested prices. The manufacturer planned to introduce expert testimony describing the procompetitive effects of its pricing policy, but the district court excluded the testimony, relying on the rule that it was per illegal under the Sherman Act for a manufacturer to agree with its distributor to t the minimum price the distributor could charge for the manufacturer's goods. The United States Supreme Court decided to overrule the per rule and determined that vertical price restraints were to be judged according to the rule of reason. The rule of reason was the appropriate standard to judge vertical price restraints and vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements becau (1) procompetitive justifications existed for a ma
nufacturer's u of resale price maintenance, (2) the primary purpo of the antitrust laws was to protect interbrand competition, (3) administrative advantages were not sufficient in themlves to justify the creation of per rules, and (4) stare decisis did not compel the Court's continued adherence to the per rule.
OUTCOME:The Court reverd the appellate court's judgment and remanded the ca for further proceedings.
CORE TERMS:resale prices, manufacturer, per , vertical, retailer's, consumer, rule of reason, antitrust, dealer, anticompetitive, retail, brand, procompetitive, distributor, producer, antitrust laws, overruling, Sherman Act, pricing, cartel, common-law, resale, interbrand, horizontal, lling, amici, riding, census, stare decisis, economists'
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Antitrust & Trade Law>Sherman Act>Coverage>General Overview
HN1 | 棕色的英文Section 1of the Sherman Act prohibits every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwi, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the veral States.15 U.S.C.S. 搂 1. While搂 1could be interpreted to proscribe all contracts, the United States Supreme Court has never taken a literal approach to its language. Rather, the Supreme Court has repeated time and again that搂 1outlaws only unreasonable restraints.More Like This Headnote|Shepardize:Restrict By Headnote | |
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Antitrust & Trade Law>Price Fixing & Restraints of Trade>down by the salley gardensPer Se Rule & Rule of Reason>Sherman Act
HN2 | The rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains trade in violation of搂 1(15 U.S.C.S. 搂 1) of the Sherman Act. Under this rule, the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a ca in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition. Appropriate factors to take into account include specific information about the relevant business and the restraint's history, nature, and effect. Whether the business involved have market power is a further, significant consideration. In its design and function the rule distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer's best interest.More Like This Headnote|Shepardize:Restrict By Headnote | |
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Antitrust & Trade Law>天钥桥路333号Price Fixing & Restraints of Trade>Per Se Rule & Rule of Reason>General Overview
HN3 | The rule of reason does not govern all restraints. Some types are deemed unlawful per . The per rule, treating categories of restraints as necessarily illegal, eliminates the need to study the reasonableness of an individual restraint in light of the real market forces at work, and, it must be acknowledged, the per rule can give clear guidance for certain conduct. Restraints that are per unlawful include horizontal agreements among competitors to fix prices or to divide markets.More Like This Headnote|Shepardize:Restrict By Headnote | |
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