Journal of Political Ideologies (June 2006),Routledge 11(2), 115-140Taylor Francis Group
Ideology and discour analysis
TEUN A. VAN DIJK
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
ABSTRACT Contrary to most traditional approaches, ideologies are defined here within a multidisciplinary framework that combines a social, cognitive and discursive component. As 'systems of ideas', ideologies are sociocognitively defined as shared reprentations of social groups, and more specifically as the `axiomatic' principies of such reprentations. As the basis of a social group's lf-image, ideologies organize its identity, actions, aims, norms and values, and resources as well as its relations to other social groups. Ideologies are distinct from the sociocognitive basis of broader cultural communities, within which different ideological groups share fundamental beliefs such as their cultural knowledge. Ideologies are expresd and generally reproduced in the social practices of their members, and more particularly acquired, confirmed, changed and perpetuated through discour. Although general properties of language and discour are not, as such, ideologically marked, systematic discour analysis offers powerful methods to study the structures and functions of underlyi
ng' ideologies. The ideological polarization between ingroups and outgroups— a prominent feature of the structure of ideologies—may also be systematically studied at all levels of text and talk, e.g. by analysing how members of ingroups typically emphasize their own good deeds and properties and the bad ones of the outgroup, and mitigate or deny their own bad ones and the good ones of the outgroup.
Introduction
In this paper I discuss some of the issues raid by a discour analytical approach to the study of ideology. Since people acquire, express and reproduce their ideologies largely by text or talk, a discour analytical study of ideology is most relevant. Although the focus in this paper is on the discour–ideology interface, its theoretical framework is multidisciplinary, articulated by the fundamental triangulation of discour, cognition and society.1 This framework is critical of the traditional approaches to ideology—especially in the social sciences and philosophy—that fail to adequately theorize about the sociocognitive nature and
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Correspondence Address: Teun A. van Dijk, Dept. de Traducció i Filologia, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 08002 Barcelona, Spain.
ISSN 1356-9317 print; ISSN 1469-9613 online/06/020115-26 © 2006 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13569310600687908
TEUN A. VAN DIJK
structures of ideologies and their discursive reproduction. This paper, however, shall not extensively deal with the classical approaches to ideology.`好听的英文qq名
Theory of ideology
Before I deal with an analysis of the relations between ideology and discour, it is necessary to briefiy summarize the theoretical framework in which the relationships are to be made explicit.3
Defining ideology
The first assumption is that, whatever elle ideologies are, they are primarily some
kind of 'ideas', that is, belief systems. This implies, among other things, that ideologies, as such, do not contain the ideological practices or societal structures (e.g. churches or political parties) that are
bad on them. It also implies that a theory of ideology needs a cognitiye component that is able to properly account for the notions of `belief and `belief system,' for instance as the are dealt with in contemporary cognitive science.雅思和托福区别
Secondly, just as there are no private languages, there are no private, personal ideologies. Hence the belief systems are socially shared by the members of a
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collectivity of social actors. However, not any collectivity develops or needs an ideology, and it will be argued that this is only the ca for some kinds of group--
typically so in relation to other groups—and not for instance for communities, such as cultural, national or linguistic communities. In other words, ideologies consist of social reprentations that define the social identity of a group, that is, its shared beliefs about its fundamental conditions and ways of existence and reproduction. Different types of ideologies are defined by the kind of groups that 'have' an ideology, such as social movements, political parties, professions, or churches, among others. Thirdly, ideologies are not any kind of socially shared beliefs, such as sociocultural knowledge or social attitudes, but more fundamental or axiomatic. They control and organize other socially shared beliefs. Thus, a racist ideology may control attitudes about immigration, a feminist idei hate love
ology may control attitudes about abortion or glass ceilings on the job or knowledge about gender inequality in society, and a social ideology may fayour a more important role of the State in public affairs. Hence, ideologies are foundational social beliefs of a rather general and abstract nature. One of their cognitive functions is to provide (ideological) coherence to the beliefs of a group and thus facilitate their acquisition and u in everyday situations. Among other things, ideologies also specify what general cultural values (freedom, equality, justice, etc.) are relevant for the group. Fourthly, as the sociocognitive foundation of social groups, ideologies are gradually acquired and (sometimes) changed through life or a life period, and hence need to be relatively stable. One does not become a pacifist, feminist, racist or socialist overnight, nor does one change one's basic ideological outlook in a few days. Many experiences and discours are usually necessary to acquire or change ideologies. The often obrved variability of ideological opinions of group
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I DEOLOGY AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS members, thus, should be accounted for at the personal or contextual level, and is no ground to reject the notion of a shared, stable group ideology.4
Also the rever is true: if ideologies can be gradually developed by (members of) a group, they also
gradually disintegrate, e.g. when members no longer believe in a cau and 'leaye' the group, when group grievances have been attended to, or under a host of other social and political conditions, as, e.g. was the ca for the pacifist and anti-nuclear moyements of the 1970s.5
Sometimes, ideologies become shared so widely that they em to have become part of the generally accepted attitudes of an entire community, as obvious beliefs or opinion, or common n. Thus, much of what today are widely accepted as social or human rights, such as many forms of gender equality, were and are ideological beliefs of the feminist or socialist movements. In that n, and by definition, the beliefs thus lo their ideological nature as soon as they become part of the Common Ground. It is only in this n that I would agree to u the phra 'the end of ideology', since obviously our contemporary world is replete with ideologies, especially so by tho who deny they are ideologies.
上海尚德实验学校What ideologies are not
The are quite general properties of ideologies, but already define them in a way that is different from veral other approaches. Thus, ideologies are not personal beliefs of individual people; they are not necessarily `negative' (there are racist as
well as antiracist ideologies, communist and anticommunist ones); they are not some kind of `fal consciousness' (whatever that is exactly); they are not necessarily dominant, but may also define resistance and opposition; they are not the same as discours or other social practices that express, reproduce or enact them; and they are not the same as any other socially shared beliefs or belief systems.6 The social functions of ideologies
Ideologies, thus defined, have many cognitive and social functions. First of all, as explained aboye, they organize and ground the social reprentations shared by the members of (ideological) groups. Secondly, they are the ultimate basis of the discours and other social practices of the members of social groups as group members. Thirdly, they allow members to organize and coordínate their (joint) actions and interactions in view of the goals and interests of the group as a whole. Finally, they function as the part of the sociocognitive interface between social
structures (conditions, etc.) of groups on the one hand, and their discours and other social practices on the other hand.
Some ideologies may thus function to legitimate domination, but also to articulate resistance in relationships of power, as is the ca for feminist or pacifist ideologies. Other ideologies function as the basis of the `guidelines' of professional behaviour—for instance for journalists or scientists.
I shall say very little on the many social and political functions of ideologies, especially since the have received ample attention in classical theories.7 It
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should be emphasized however that the cognitive structures of ideologies need to be tailored to their societal functions for (the members of) groups.
Lacunae and open questions
Although this theory accounts for many general properties of ideologies, there are still important lacunae and open questions.
The structures of ideologies
The most important one is the preci cognitive nature of ideologies: What are their preci contents and structures? If socialism, feminism and neoliberalism are ideologies, what exactly do they look like? This yery general question is equally difficult to resol ve as the fundamental question about the preci structures of
knowledge.
On the basis of the ways ideologies organize social attitudes, such ts tho on immigration or abortion, and in view of their social functions, I have hypothesized
a general ideological schema consisting of a handful of basic categories defining the lf-identity of groups (identity criteria, typical activities, aims, norms and values, related groups and basic resources—or lack of resources). The explain many properties of ideologies, but I am not sure they apply to all ideologies equally well, such as religious ideologies, political ideologies or professional ideologies, among others. What does em the ca though is that in order to be able to be acquired and ud, ideologies need some kind of organization, as is also the ca for other belief systems. Thus, it is unlikely that they are merely long, unordered ts or mere lists of beliefs (the notion of organization of cognitive structures,
in terms of schemata, is a major characteristic of modem cognitive psychology'). The assumption about the organized nature of ideologies does not imply that they are in any way consistent. They are not logical systems, but socio-psycho-logical ones. So they may very well be heterogeneous or inconsistent, especially in their first, more or less spontaneous stages, although yarious ideologues (
writers, leaders, teachers, preachers, etc.) may try to enhance the coherence by explicit manifestoes, catechisms, theories, and so on. Thus, although ideologies organize
other social beliefs of groups, this does not mean either that the other social beliefs are consistent, as we also know from the well-known racist beliefs that hold that immigrants are lazy and do not want to work, and at the same time that they take away our jobs.9We also know that people u veral strategies to eliminate or disregard inconsistencies between ideological beliefs and the 'facts' with which
they are confronted.1°
Ideologies only as foundational' beliefs of a group?
Another point I am not yet sure about, is whether ideologies should be identified only in terms of foundational group beliefs, as I have done aboye, or should be conceiyed of more broadly as consisting of all ideological group beliefs, that is,毕业演说任务怎么做
including the more specific group knowledge and attitudes.
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I DEOLOGY AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
I prefer the first `axiomatic' option, first of all, becau it rules out the possibility that mere personal opinions or a single group attitude (say about nuclear energy) would as such be called an `ideology'. Secondly, by limiting ideologies to fundamental beliefs, we allow yariations or changes of less fundamental beliefs within the 'same' ideology—much in the same way as personal and regional variants exist of the 'same' language. Instead of `foundational' beliefs, we may also speak of 'core' beliefs, whateyer theoretical metaphor is more uful. In the latter ca, more specific attitudes bad on such core ideological beliefs need to be described as more peripheral.
Are ideologies `known' by all of their members?
Thirdly, although ideologies by definition are socially shared, obviously not all members of groups 'know' the ideologies equally well. As is the ca for natural languages, there are differences of `experti' in a group. Members are able to speak or act on the basis of the acquired ideology, but are not always able to formulate its beliefs explicitly. On the other hand, there are experts, teachers, leaders and other `ideologues' who teach, explain, inculcate and explicitly reproduce the group ideologies."
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In the same way, we might assume that not all members identify with an ideological group in the same way, and equally strongly.'2 This suggests that individuals may be 'more or less' members of ideological groups—and that the notion of an ideological group is defined as a fuzzy t of social actors. Variations of experti and identification need to be assumed to account for the empirical facts and to provide the necessary flexibility to the theory.
The social basis of ideologies: What kind of collectivity?
Finally, one of the more difficult problems concerns the exact social basis of ideologies. It has been assumed that they are properties of 'social groups' and that the groups may be fuzzy ts. But obyiously not all social collectiyities are `ideological groups'. The pasngers of a bus are not, nor are the professors of some university. Hence, a number of social criteria about permanence, continuity, social practices, interests, relations to other groups, and so on, need to be satisfied, including the fundamental basis of group identification: a feeling of group belonging that is typically expresd by the pronoun we.
我只在乎你日语版Some social groups may only or primarily be defined in terms of their shared ideologies, social reprentations and the discours and other social practices bad on them, as is the ca for femi
nists and racists. Other groups, such as political organizations or professional groups, may not only share a (professional, political) ideology, but may be further organized by explicit membership, membership cards, meetings, institutions, organizations, and so on.
美国国庆日In this perspective it ems relevant to distinguish between (various kinds of) social groups, on the one hand, and cultural communities, on the other hand. The first have ideologies—related to their goals and interests in relation to other
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