Strengthening intellectual property rights:Experience from the 1986Taiwane patent reforms
Shih-t Lo
Economics,Concordia University,Canada
a b s t r a c t
a r t i c l e i n f o Article history:
Received 28June 2008
Received in revid form 4October 2010Accepted 10November 2010
Available online 23November 2010JEL classi fication:O34
Keywords:
Intellectual property rights Patents Invention
Do stronger intellectual property rights spur inventive activity and foreign direct investment (FDI)in deve
loping countries?What are the characteristics of industries where strengthening patent rights has the most favorable impact?In an attempt to answer the questions,this paper us the 1986Taiwane patent reforms to examine the effects of strengthening patent rights in a developing economy.I find that the reforms encouraged R&D effort across industries.In addition,industries that were highly R&D intensive witnesd a marked increa in their patenting in the United States.The reforms also induced additional FDI.
©2010Elvier B.V.All rights rerved.
1.Introduction
There has long been a tension between developed and developing countries on intellectual property rights protection.1Developed countries have encouraged or pressured developing countries to adopt stronger systems of intellectual property rights.Despite the obvious intent to help their own inventors to extract greater returns from their discoveries,artistic creations,brand-name capital,and the like,developed countries often contend that a strengthening of intellectual property rights protection would also bene fit developing societies,stimulating more domestic production of inventions as well as attracting more foreign direct investment (FDI).However,developing countries have been less tha
n enthusiastic in embracing such an argument becau an increa in intellectual property rights protection may rai the cost of goods and rvices produced with technologies developed abroad,decreasing not only the rate of technological diffusion but also economic welfare.2Conquently,there exists a stark divergence between developed and developing countries in their systems of intellectual property rights.As
intellectual property plays an increasingly important role in the produc-tion of goods and rvices and as the volumes of international trade and investment continue to grow rapidly,the tension between developed and developing economies about the policies has escalated in recent years.
Given the resurgence in international debates on intellectual property rights,scholars such as Kortum and Lerner (1999)and Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001)have sought to investigate changes in the patent system as well as their effects.However,they focus on experiences in the United States and Japan respectively.3As the contemporary policy debate centers on the advisability of strengthening intellectual property rights in developing countries,the changes in the patent systems of developed countries,or their economic circumstances more generally,may not be reprentative of conditions in less developed societies.A similar policy shift may,therefore,have a very different impact in a developing economy from that in a rich,advanced country.
E-mail address:shiht. .
1
See,for example,Maskus (2000)for current debates on intellectual property rights and Machlup and Penro (1950)for different views toward patent protection in the late 19th century.2
In addition to their potential negative effects on developing countries,stronger patent protections can be detrimental to developed countries as well.See Jaffe and Lerner (2004,pp.78–95).
3
Notable exceptions are,for example,Lanjouw (1998),Lanjouw and Cockburn (2001),and Qian (2003).The studies explore changes in intellectual property rights system in developing-country contexts.However,most of the studies are exclusively focud on the introduction of pharmaceutical patents,and their findings of no signi ficant evidence of causality running from the introduction of new patent laws to domestic invention may not extend to other industries.Furthermore,successful R&D in pharmaceuticals typically requires workforces with highly specialized human capital and substantial investments in resources.Few developing countries would
have the capacity and inclination to carry out signi ficant inventive activity in this field.It is,therefore,not clear that studies bad on pharmaceutical patent data yield much general insight into the issue of whether stronger patent protection would spur invention in developing
countries.
International Journal of Industrial Organization 29(2011)524–536
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j o u r na l ho m e p a g e :w w w.e l s ev i e r.c o m /l o c a t e /i j i o
I examine the effects of strengthening intellectual property rights in a developing economy.To what extent do stronger intellectual property rights spur inventive activity?What are the characteristics of industries in which strengthening intellectual property rights may have the most favorable impact on inventive activity?Will the strengthening of intellectual property rights induce more FDI?
I explore the1986Taiwane patent reforms.Taiwan,under considerable pressure from the United States,made important changes to her patent system in1986that became effective in January1987.The reforms were mainly centered on improving enforcement of patent rights,such as allowing patent holders to obtain much higher compensation through civil suits for infringement.The government also introduced a wide range of administrative measures to curb infringement. Moreover,the new law stipulated the creation of a special court,which would have exclusive jurisdicti
on over patent litigations.This policy shift, not only sudden but also mainly pushed by foreign governments, provides an unusual natural experiment that allows one to study the impact of strengthening patent protection in a developing country.
To gauge the impact of the reforms on inventive activity,I u patent statistics.Particularly I rely on patents awarded by the United States Patent and Trademark Office(USPTO)to residents of Taiwan.I also employ R&D spending.The u of the two types of measures helps parate the impact of stronger patent protection on the propensity to patent an invention from that on investment in inventive activity(a well known issue among tho who rely on patent counts).An exploration into the number of USPTO patents awarded to Taiwane inventors allows one to further alleviate the complication due to changes in the propensity to patent.Inventors may be more inclined to employ the new Taiwane patent system for their creations,as the new law strength-ened patent protection in Taiwan.A change in patenting of Taiwane inventions in Taiwan may result from either a change in the propensity to patent in Taiwan,or a change in inventive activity,or both.Becau Taiwane inventors have aggressively sought patent protection in the United States and becau there was no significant change in the United States patent system around the time when the reforms came into effect,patenting of Taiwane inventions in the United States provides a better measure to gauge ch
anges in inventive activity of Taiwane inventors than patenting of Taiwane inventions in Taiwan.In order to control for other economic activities that may influence R&D spending and patenting,I also collect data on exports and production of various Taiwane manufacturing industries.
服装促销Ifind that the1986Taiwane patent reforms stimulated R&D spending.Industries that were highly R&D intensive experienced an increa in their patenting in the United States.The favorable impact was most pronounced in the electronic and electrical industry.The reforms also appeared to have encouraged investment from abroad.
The positive effects of strengthening patent protection found in this paper differ from the results from prior work(Hall and Ziedonis, 2001;and Sakakibara and Branstetter,2001)that shows little impact of an increa in patent protection on inventive activity in advanced economies.4My results suggest that the effects of policy change in a developing country may be much stronger than for similar policy shifts in developed societies.
2.The1986Taiwane patent reforms:a natural experiment
An increa in patent protection may change the incentive to invent. The technologically creative can
also demand stricter protection so as to better cure returns from their inventions.To get around the problem of endogeneity and establish causality,one can u an exogenous variation in patent rights to examine the impact of such a shift on inventive activity.5Such an event took place in Taiwan in1986.6 The1986reforms were mostly due to tremendous pressure from the United States,Taiwan's most important military ally and then largest trading partner.By the1980s,many U.S.firms had become extremely concerned that they were being undercut by competitors who not only benefited from locating production in developing countries with low labor costs,but who were also infringing on their intellectual property rights.Such rentment among Americans was further elevated as the y in the early1980s experienced its highest ever unemploy-ment since the Great Depression.Many American companies,together with the vernment,thus initiated a campaign to cure reforms of intellectual property rights systems(focud particularly on patents) throughout the world.The view of Clayton Yeutter,the U.S.Trade Reprentative from1985to1989,is a vivid example of this movement: The pirating of U.S.-financed rearch and development dis-courages innovation,denies markets to American exports,and threatens technological progress.Protection of intellectual prop-erty rights prerves America's technological edge,which is a key to our continued international competitiveness.7
This atmosphere was reflected in ade policies.In1984,the U.S.began to treat inadequate protection of intellectual property rights as an unfair trade practice.Taiwan's lack of intellectual property protection became a growing concern to the American public.For example,as a1985Wall Street Journal article stated: When Pfizer Inc.of New York introduced an arthritis drug in Taiwan four years ago,local manufacturersflooded the market with capsules that looked exactly like Pfizer's turquoi-and-maroon Feldeanes.The company says that within a year it had20 competitors and within two years it held less than a30%market share.Last year Pfizer's share slipped to18%.8
A1985New York Times article also expresd the same concern: Taiwan is to counterfeiting what Miami is to drug trafficking….[F]ake goods cost American Business$6billion in1982and…60percent of the bogus products were made in Taiwan….Counterfeiting is a problem common to most developing countries.But Taiwan is distinguished by the wide range of products it manufactures and by the large amount of the output that it exports.9
Given that Taiwan enjoyed a substantial bilateral trade surplus with the U.S.in the1980s and was itsfifth largest trading partner,it is not surprising that in November1986Taiwan was one of thefirst three
4Intellectual property rights reforms in the developed world are in general initiated by the technologically creative companies.For example,companies like General Electric,IBM, Microsoft,and Red Hat have joined forces to call for reforms to the U.S.patent system in recent years.As a result,the policy shifts in,or variation across intellectual property rights systems examined by the investigators em less than exogenous.
5See,for example,Meyer(1995).
6In the1990s,many developing countries also strengthened their intellectual property rights systems.The reforms can be largely due to the pressure from the developed world or in order to comply with the Trade Related Intellectual Property Agreement(TRIP)in the World Trade Organization(then the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,henceforce GATT).However,this wave of strengthening intellectual property rights in the developing countries was much anticipated becau the United States had embarked on a campaign to harmonize intellectual property rights systems around the world since the late1980s and also becau it took veral years for GATT to conclude the TRIP.The technologically creative in the developing countries was very likely to foree such a policy shift and respond prior to the changes.
the moment7The quotation is from Alison Butler(1990),“The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights:What Is at Stake?”
8The Wall Street Journal,November13,1985,p.37.
9The New York Times,May7,1985,p.D12.
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countries put on the U.S.priority watch list for lack of intellectual property rights protection.10
In respon to U.S.pressure,the Taiwane government submitted a comprehensive new patent law to the country's supreme legislature (the Legislative Yuan)in December 1986.The new law was promulgated on December 24,and came into force in January 1987.The new law extended patent protection to not only pharmaceuticals and chemicals,but new plant varieties and microorganisms as well.11However,the crucial feature of the new regime was the emphasis on improved enforcement of patent rights.For example,the new law stipulated the creation of a new court that would exclusively handle patent litigation.The reforms also sought to enhance protection through incread penalties a
nd expanded liability for infringement.For example,the maximum fine for infringement was raid from 40,000to 100,000New Taiwan dollars (approximately from 1300to 3300USD).12The reforms also substantially incread the compensa-tion that patent holders could realize through civil actions.Unlike the pre-reform regime in which damages were estimated exclusively by the Taiwane Intellectual Property Of fice,the new system included two other ways to determine damages:pro fits lost by patent holders,or pro fits made by infringers from the infringed article.Moreover,in cas of business defamation as a result of infringement,a parate compensation could be up to three times the actual damage.
In addition,the government introduced a wide range of adminis-trative measures to curb infringement.For example,veral govern-ment agencies jointly formed task forces to raid suspected intellectual property rights violators.To prevent infringers from exporting
counterfeit goods to foreign markets,the Taiwane Directorate General of Customs enhanced its inspection procedure of export cargo.Other policy instruments such as withdrawing violators'credits from state-owned banks were also utilized.13Rapid growth in the number of both patent opposition and anti-counterfeiting cas,as shown in Fig.1,not only suggests that the general public in Taiwan became more aware of intellectual property rights,but also further supports the view that the legal,jud
icial and regulatory reforms taken by the government signi ficantly enhanced the enforcement of patent protection in Taiwan.14Moreover,the number of patent applications filed by foreigners at the Taiwane Intellectual Property Of fice surged by 36.4%from 7826to 10,673.15The sharp and sudden increa in foreign inventors and firms eking patent protection in Taiwan is an evidence that the new patent system signi ficantly improved patent protection in Taiwan.
The speed of the implementation of the reforms caught many Taiwane firms off guard.16This sudden and exogenous shift in patent policy provides an unusual natural experiment to study the impact of strengthening patent rights on inventive activity in a developing country.
100200300
400500600700800opposition cas 0
50100150
200250300350
anti-counterfeiting
cas
Fig.1.Patent opposition and government action against counterfeiting.Notes:Any person who asrts that a published invention has violated any requirements,stipulated in the patent law,of granting a patent,may,within three months from the publication date,submit a written opposition application.Upon receipt of a written opposition,the patent of fice shall re-examine the issued patent.(Translated from Chine to English by the Taiwane Intellectual Property Of fice and posted on the page of its website,v.tw/eng/laws/laws.asp .)Patent opposition cas are reported by year of disposition instead of by year of application.On the other hand,anti-counterfeiting cas are reported by year of disposition.Sources:Yearbook of Patents and Trademarks ,1990and 1996,Republ
ic of China.
10
There had been veral talks between the U.S.and Taiwane governments on issues concerning bilateral trade including intellectual property rights protection since 1985.Nevertheless,it was not until the cond half of 1986that the lack of patent protection in Taiwan became the central issue in the US –Taiwan trade negotiation.In October 1986,the vernment first accud South Korea for her inadequate protection on intellectual property rights.Shortly afterwards,in November Taiwan along with Japan was accud of the same matter.11shorts
The Taiwane patent system had long awarded patents on manufacturing process of both chemicals and pharmaceuticals.Yet,it was not until the 1986reforms that patent protection was finally extended to chemical and pharmaceutical products.12
According to the Taiwane Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistics,in 1986Taiwan"s GDP per capita was merely 3974USD.
13
In the late 1980s,most banks in Taiwan were state-owned.Even in trust companies and private banks,the Taiwane governments still accounted for a signi ficant proportion of their stock shares.14
Any person who asrts that an issued patent has violated any requirements of granting a patent,may,within three months from the issue date,submit a written opposition application.Upon receipt of a written opposition,the Taiwane Intellectual Property Of fice (TIPO)shall re-examine the issued patent.(Translated from Chine to English by TIPO and posted on the page of its website v.tw/eng/laws/laws.asp ).15
This sharp increa in foreigners'employing patent protection demonstrated the effectiveness of the new patent system.(However,some of the increa can be due to the extension of patent protection to pharmaceutical and chemical product patents.The increa in Taiwane patents granted to foreigners during 1986and 1987was about 42%for chemical and metallurgy patents and 28%for other patents.)16
Certainly the U.S.pressure did not just realize in the late 1986.The U.S.demand to enhance intellectual property rights in Taiwan had begun since 1985.The Taiwane government had,since th
en,made some changes to improve IPRs protection.For example,the fact that the number of governmental anti-counterfeiting cas jumped from 112in 1985to 193in 1986is evident in Fig.1.However,few people in Taiwan would expect that the Taiwane government would give in to the pressure from the U.S.so quickly.
526S.Lo /Int.J.Ind.Organ.29(2011)524–536
3.Possible effects of strengthening patent protection
What are the effects of the1986patent reforms?In the standard view,stronger patent protection deters(or delays)imitation and helps inventors realize returns to their investments in inventive activity.The resulting increa in the expected return to investment in inventive activity leads to increas in such investment.17If this perspective applies in the economic condition of the developing world,like Taiwan, the1986reforms would result in increas in R&D,patent applications, as well as in patent grants on inventions generated.Moreover,an increa in patent protection better safeguards the interest of inventors by decreasing the risk that their rivals free ride on their newly developed technologies and compete with counterfeit products,so foreign inventors(orfirms)may introduce and even manufacture goods in the reforming country that are produced with better techno
logy developed abroad.Therefore,a surge of technology transfer and investment from abroad likely takes place after reforms.
Not everyone agrees with this conventional asssment.The Netherlands,Denmark,and Switzerland did not have any patent system during the19th century,but did rather well at technological innovation.18Conditions in modern-day developing countries may be sufficiently unfavorable to invention that the positive effects from changes in the patent system are weak.19An increa in patent protection may have a detrimental impact on inventive activity if stronger patent rights discourage potential inventors from working with already patented inventions.In some economies,there may actually be less invention after patent rights are strengthened.
Even if reforms stimulate inventive activity overall,the effects of the policy shift may vary across industries.Becau patent rights are granted on a country-by-country basis,patent holders can only safeguard their rights in the countries where such rights are awarded. Intuitively,an increa in patent protection within one economy would have a stronger impact on industries that chiefly target the domestic market than on industries that primarily focus on foreign markets since the patent policy change affects only the domestic market.R&D investment byfirms focusing on foreign markets should also depend on the ability to cure property rights on new technology in tho markets.If this
civil rightsintuition holds,the impact of the1986reforms should be more pronounced in Taiwane industries that focus on the domestic market.
The impact of a change in the patent system may also differ by industry becau mechanisms other than patent rights also cure the returns from inventions.For example,the food and beverage industry is widely known for its extensive u of trade crets,such as food recipes and beverage formulas,instead of patents to protect product inventions.Patent protection requires full disclosure by the inventor. In return a temporary monopoly position is granted for up to 20years.20In contrast,crecy keeps the invention from the inventor's competitors and may cure the monopoly position indefinitely,as it is in general difficult to rever engineer food and beverage products. Apparently,the choice to employ patent protection or other mechanisms to extract the returns from an invention is very much affected by the substance of the newly developed technology.It is not surprising that both Levin et al.(1987)and Cohen et al.(2000)find that whilefirms in the chemical and pharmaceutical ctors consider patents an effective instrument to cure the income stream from their inventions,many other industries tend to employ crecy and other mechanisms.The effects of strengthening patent protection should be thus more pronounced in industries that are more reliant upon patent protection than industries that chiefly employ other mechanisms to protect the returns to their inventions.
A strengthening of intellectual property rights should have a greater impact on industries that are more geared toward the generation of new technological knowledge.Better enforcement of protection helps inventors to recoup their R&D investment.Thus, industries that in general devote higher R&D effort would be more responsive to a change in patent protection.Given the fact that the 1986reforms substantially enhanced enforcement,such a policy change would have stimulated incread R&D effort and investments in inventive activity,and thereby yielded more patent grants in industries that were highly R&D intensive.
In addition to changes in inventive activity on the whole as well as across different groups of industries,a policy shift in patent protection may change the volume of investment from aboard.Bad on a survey of100major Americanfirms in six manufacturing ctors,Mansfield (1994)reports that intellectual property rights system played an important role in the decision of thefirms whether to invest aboard, particularly if they were to establish manufacturing or R&D facilities.21 If strengthening patent rights induce investment from aboard,we would expect an increa in FDI into Taiwan around the new patent system came into force.
4.The data
4.1.Measuring inventive activity
Following previous studies on invention and technological progress such as the pioneering work of Schmookler(1966),Pakes and Grilliches(1980),Sokoloff(1988),I u patent statistics to gauge inventive activity.22A strengthening of patent protection may also increa the willingness of an inventor to obtain a patent.A change in the number of patent applications after patent reform,and thereby with a lag in the number of grants,may not be solely attributed to a change in inventive activity.One must differentiate an increa in patenting due to an increa in inventive activity from an increa in patenting due to an increa in the propensity to patent.
tell laura i love herMoreover,patent reforms often come with changes in patent examination.A different process of patent examination(performing patentability arches by examiners)may alter the willingness of inventors to ek patent protection at the reforming country,and lead to changes in applications and thereby patents there.In fact,the Taiwane Intellectual Property Office did adopt a number of measures to improve the efficiency of patent examination around the time when the1986reforms came into effect.23This further complicates the u and utility of Taiwane patents awarded to Taiwane residents to examine changes in actual inventive activity.
17Stronger patent protection may also spur invention by making it easier for the technologically creative to mobilize resources to carry out inventive activity., Lamoreaux and Sokoloff(2003).
18See Mor(2005).
19Another reason why stronger patent rights may fail to spur inventive activity is that patents may not be an effective means for inventors to extract returns from their discoveries.It is often argued that patent protection sometimes award property rights for inventions that would have been discovered anyway.
20A patent holder,in order to keep her patent in effect,needs to pay maintenance fees periodically.Conquently,a significant number of patents expire prematurely, falling into the public domain prior to the full term allowed under patent laws.
21Studies,such as Lee and Mansfield(1996),find that there exists a positive correlation between a country's level of intellectual property protection and its FDI, but they largely do not establish the causal relationship between them.
22See Griliches(1990,1994)for a detailed discussion on prior work and the issues associated with using patent records to measure inventive activity.
23See TIPO Annual Reports for1987–1989.To name a few of the improvements, during1987–198
8TIPO allocated its patent examiners into eight different teams according to their specialties so as to improve the quality of examination as well as to shorten the processing time.In addition,each application was examined twice by different examiners.The Office also teamed up with the Chine national Federation of Industries,a nonprofit industrial organization,to create thefirst archable patent records that allow rearchers and examiners to arch past patent grants by the international patent classification and thereby facilitate patent examination.
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In order to avoid the measurement problems,I focus on U.S.patents awarded to Taiwane residents.Taiwane inventors and firms have long sought patent protection in the their discoveries.24Given the fact that there were no changes in the U.S.patent system around 1986,the record of U.S.patents granted to residents of Taiwan provides a better gauge of actual inventive output of Taiwane inventors than do Taiwane patents.
As an alternative gauge of inventive activity,I employ information on R&D expenditures.25The u of R&D data should also help in distinguishing between the effects of stronger patent protection on the
propensity to patent an invention and on the investment in inventive activity.
4.2.Data
Taiwan's estimates of industrial R&D during 1983and 1991are from the Yearly Indicators of Science and Technology ,1991–2001,published by the Taiwan National Science Council.Macroeconomic and trade data as well as information on FDI were also collected from various Taiwane government publications and online sources.26
The patent data were collected from the U.S.Patent and Trademark Of fice online patent grant databas.27The patent data t includes all 5829U.S.patents awarded to inventors and assignees residing in Taiwan from 1984to 1991.28It is necessary to classify the 5829patents by industry.The conventional register of patent classi fication is of limited u becau the register categorizes inventions bad on their functions.For example,under the USPTO patent classi fication,both a sprayer for agricultural u and an atomizer for medical purpos are categorized into class 239—fluid sprinkling,spraying,
condchanceand diffusion.I thus read through the abstracts,claims,and drawings of the 5829patents so as to categorize them according to the standard industry classi fication into 25different industries.
Unfortunately,annual information on R&D expenditures,exports and production values was not available for all 25industries.In order to match the patent ries with data on R&D,production and other relevant economic activities,I had to drop patents taken out for inventions in construction or miscellaneous manufacturing industries (about 20%of the total sample),and consolidate the remaining 23industries into 10major ctors.Table 1reports the distribution of patents.5.Empirical analysis
5.1.Did the reforms stimulate overall inventive activity?
If a strengthening of patent protection in a developing country stimulates its inventive activity,the 1986Taiwane patent reforms would lead to an upsurge in R&D effort and patent grants around the time when the reforms came into force (January 1987).However,R&D spending tends to expand along with the growth of the industry.It is possible that R&D spending exhibits an increasing trend,whereas such an increa may not keep pace with the growth of the industry.Conquently,it would be too premature to conclude that strength-ening patent protection encourages R&D effort from merely an increa in R&D spending.To avoid such a fallacy,I compute R&D spending as a proportion of industrial production (R&D intensity)for each obrvation year and plot the ratios in Fig.2.R&D intensity was rather flat and stable between 1983and 1986.An abrupt increa took place
in 1987and it stayed at a high level afterwards.29The pattern is consistent with the view that a strengthening of patent protection spurs investment in R&D.30
The positive impact,however,was not so apparent in patent grants.Fig.3plots the ratios of the total annual patent counts of U.S.patents awarded to Taiwane inventors,relative to real industrial production,by year of patent application.While the ratio incread from 1986to 1987,no obvious increa above trend around 1987is visible.Patenting by Taiwane residents grew rapidly in the United States both prior to and after 1987.The effect of the reforms was likely less visible on the total number of patents than on R&D effort,given the fact that not all inventions are patentable and,not all patentable inventions are actually patented.
While the pattern in Fig.2is consistent with the notion that the reforms spurred R&D effort,the obrved increa in R&D spending may result from other factors,for example,competition in the global market.To control for the factors and to consider variation in R&D intensities across industries,I test whether the 1986reforms had any effect on R&D effort by estimating the following regression equation.R &D it =β0+β1⋅ex it +∑i
δi ⋅D i +∑t
γt ⋅D t +εit
overallsð1Þ
where R &D it is the natural logarithm of R&D intensity of industry i in it is the natural log of export intensity of industry i in year t and it intends to re flect the impact of global competition.31I also add industry dummies,D i ,to capture differences across industries in factors such as the returns to inventive activity.Most importantly,the inclusion of year dummies,D t ,allows us to focus on the change in R&D
24
The U.S.market accounted for one half of Taiwan's total exports in the 1970s and 1980s so many Taiwane firms and invertors had sought to ek patent protection in the U.S.even for non-export ctors.25
Most prior empirical studies on technological progress consider R&D expenditures as a major input of inventive activity while patent counts are widely regarded as a measure of invention output.26
FDI data were retrieved from the Statistical Yearbook on Overas Chine &Foreign Investment,Te
chnical Cooperation Outward,Technical Cooperation,Indirect Mainland Investment,Guide of Mainland Industry Technology ,1996,the Republic of China.Macroeconomic and trade data come from Taiwan's Monthly Statistics of Exports and Imports,and the online databa provided by the Taiwane Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistics.27
The URL address of USPTO is v .28
An assignee is a person or an organization to which the rights of a patent have been assigned.
Table 1
U.S.patents granted to Taiwane residents by year of application and industry.Sources:USPTO online patent grant databas,v .Year
19841985198619871988198919901991Food and tobacco 11112Textile and apparel 3446109512Leather
6687116810Paper and publishing 75324Wood and furniture 611111918252830Industrial goods 73107168230229291430488Machinery
234054557276100116Electronic and electrical 4784111142183265306431Transportation equipment 911102122414947Instruments 1414263944505265Total
td是什么意思
181
277
400
525
593
普通英文
766
978
1205
Notes:The machinery ctor in the table includes engines and turbines,and all of the machinery industries.Also,I removed construction and miscellaneous manufacturing industries becau I do not
integralhave supplementary data such as exports and R&D on the two industries.
29
I also plot the total R&D spending of the 10major manufacturing ctors around the time of the 1986patent reforms.The overall pattern appears the same (if not stronger)as obrved in Fig.2.30
Fig.2also ems to suggest that the reforms had long-term effects as the time pattern not only showed a marked increa around 1987but also remained high in later years.31
Export intensity is measured as the ratio of exports to production value.
528S.Lo /Int.J.Ind.Organ.29(2011)524–536
