The Nuclear Ban Treaty: What Would Follow? George Perkovich
Abstract: Opponents and skeptics fear that the dynamics surrounding a nuclear ban treaty will distract attention and effort from the nonproliferation regime that has helped prevent nuclear war since 1945, and that has prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more states and to terrorist organizations. International support for a nuclear prohibition treaty became nearly inevitable, and non-nuclear-weapon states are in the majority; most of them do not accept this lack of progress toward disarmament and are reluctant to be held hostage to the potentially nuclear war–triggering decision-making of leaders such as Kim Jong-un, Vladimir Putin, and Donald Trump. In addition, despite the legitimate concerns that prompted it, the ban treaty’s simplicity and corresponding lack of rigorous verification and enforcement provisions are cau for concern. Therefore, nuclear-armed states could individually or with other actors take nuclear disarmament obligations more riously by specifying—theoretically, for now—how they would design a verifi able, enforceable nuclear disarmament regime. The process of designing a prototype disarmament regime would address vital questions that the ban treaty avoids. And an international debate is needed on the conditions, if any, under which the fi rst u of nuclear weapons could be necessary and legitimate. Keywords: the Nuclear Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention
1 Introduction
On March 27, 2017, negotiations began at the United Nations (UN) in New York to
* T his paper is for the Conference on “Asssing the International Nuclear Agenda”, Journal of International Security Studies, University of International Relations, Beijing, 16-17 June 2017.iorgane
世界杯主题曲we will rock you** George Perkovich is Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair, Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.gourmet
The Nuclear Ban Treaty: What Would Follow?47 draft a treaty “to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination.”1 Forty-eight countries in December 2016 registered their lack of support for this undertaking, either by voting no or abstaining. This included all of the world’s nuclear-armed states except North Korea. Most of the opposing and abstaining states rely to some degree on nuclear deterrence extended by their allies or curity partners. However, 113 countries voted to make the negotiations happen.
Proponents of a prospective prohibition treaty argue that dramatic action is needed to speed up achievement of the ultimate goal of global nuclear disarmament. They argue that “there has been littl
e perceptible progress on the multilateral nuclear disarmament pillar under the NPT,”2 and that “outlawing nuclear weapons is a moral and humanitarian imperative.”3 Further, they posit a legal requirement for nuclear disarmament bad on their reading of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1996 International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the “Legality of the Threat or U of Nuclear Weapons.” Proponents believe that a prohibition treaty ultimately will engender international pressure that will compel nuclear-armed states and others that rely on nuclear deterrence to “conform to the new global norm.”4
Yet opponents and skeptics fear that the dynamics surrounding the prohibition treaty will distract attention and effort from the nonproliferation regime that has helped prevent nuclear war since 1945, and that has prevented—beyond early expectations—the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more states and to terrorist organizations. In boycotting the negotiations, the French, United Kingdom (UK), and U.S. governments noted that the “propod ban fails to take into account the requisite curity considerations and . . . will not eliminate nuclear weapons.”5 Japan worries that “efforts to make such a treaty without the involvement of nuclear-weapon states will only deepen the schism and division not only between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, but also among non-nuclear-weapon states.”6
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From sharply divergent perspectives, then, states and attentive civil society organizations e a prohibition treaty as a signifi cant challenge to the global nuclear order that was built by fi ts and starts from the ill-fated Baruch Plan of 1946, through 1 “United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading towards Their
Total Elimination- Background Information,” United Nations, /disarmament/ptnw/.
2 “Statement by Patricia O’Brien,” statement, United Nations, New York, March 27-31, 2017, achingcriticalwill.
org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/statements/27March_Ireland.pdf.cheerleader
儿童饮食食谱3 Maaike Beenes, “Institutional Arrangements,” statement, United Nations, New York, March 31, 2017, /
campaign-news/ican-statements-to-the-negotiating-conference/.
4 Maaike Beenes, “Institutional Arrangements,” statement, United Nations, New York, March 31, 2017, /
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campaign-news/ican-statements-to-the-negotiating-conference/.
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like shit5 On behalf of France, the UK, and the United States, France delivered an explanation of their vote against UN Resolution L.41.
Plea e “France, United Kingdom & United States, Explanation of V ote,” statement, United Nations, New York, October 27, 2016, /wp-content/uploads/2016/10/France-UK-and-US-EOV.pdf
6 “Statement by H.E. Mr. Nobushige Takamizawa,” statement, United Nations, New York, March 27, 2017, statements.
