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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES T. FELKNER v. STEVEN FRANK JACKSON ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 10–797. Decided March 21, 2011
P ER C URIAM.
A California jury convicted respondent Steven Frank Jackson of numerous xual offens stemming from his attack on a 72-year-old woman who lived in his apartment complex. Jackson raid a Batson claim, asrting that the procutor exercid peremptory challenges to exclude black prospective jurors on the basis of their race. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986). Two of three black jurors had been struck; the third rved on the jury. App. to Pet. for Cert. 49–50.
Jackson’s counl did not object when the procutor struck the first of the black jurors, Juror S. Counl later explained that he did not make a “motion at that time” becau he thought the excusal of Juror S “was a clo call.” After the procutor sought to dismiss the cond juror, Juror J, Jackson’s counl made the Batson motion challenging both strikes. Record in No. 2:07-cv-00555-RJB (ED Cal.), Doc. 29, Lodged Doc. No. 7, pp. 76–77 (hereinaf-ter Document 7).
The procutor offered a race-neutral explanation for striking each juror: Juror S had stated that from the ages of 16 to 30 years old, he was frequently stopped by Cali-fornia police officers becau—in his view—of his race and age. As the procutor put it, “Whether or not he still harbors any animosity is not something I wanted to roll the dice with.” Id., at 78; Record in No. 2:07-cv-00555-RJB (ED Cal.), Doc. 29, Lodged Doc. No. 10, pp. 57–58, 98–100 (hereinafter Document 10).湖北中考时间
美女与野兽 动画片 2012The procutor stated that he struck Juror J becau会计发展方向
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she had a master’s degree in social work, and had interned at the county jail, “probably in the psych unit as a sociolo-gist of some sort.” The procutor explained that he dis-misd her “bad on her educational background,” stating that he does not “like to keep social workers.” Document 7, at 78–79; Document 10, at 188–189; App. to Pet. for Cert. 49.
proficiencyJackson’s counl expressly disagreed only with the procutor’s explanation for the strike of Juror J, e App. to Pet. for Cert. 22–23, 47, arguing that removing her on the basis of her educational background was “itlf invidi-ous discrimination.” The procutor responded that he was not aware that social workers were a “protected class.” As for Juror S, Jackson’s counl explained that he “let [Juror S] slide” becau he anticipated the procutor’s respon and, in any event, he “only need[ed] one to estab-lish the grounds for” a Batson motion. After listening to each side’s arguments, the trial court denied Jackson’s motion. Document 7, at 78–80.
Jackson renewed his Batson claim on direct appeal, arguing that a comparative juror analysis revealed that the procutor’s explanations were pretextual. With respect to Juror S, Jackson argued that a non-black ju-ror—Juror 8—also had negative experiences with law enforcement but remained on the jury. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47–48. Juror 8 stated during jury lection that he had been stopped while driving in Illinois veral years earlier as part of what he believed to be a “scam”
by Illi-nois police targeting drivers with California licen plates. Juror 8 also complained that he had been disappointed by the failure of law enforcement officers to investigate the burglary of his car. Document 10, at 26–27, 56–57, 95–97. With respect to Juror J, Jackson claimed that the pro-cutor asked follow-up questions of veral white jurors when he was concerned about their educational back-grounds, but struck Juror J without asking her any ques-
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tions about her degree in social work. App. to Pet. for Cert. 49.
The California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s denial of the Batson motion and affirmed Jackson’s convic-tions. The appellate court explained that “[t]he trial court’s ruling on this issue is reviewed for substantial evidence,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 43 (internal quotation marks omitted), which the California courts have charac-terized as equivalent to the “clear error” standard em-ployed by federal courts, e, e.g., People v. Alvarez, 14 Cal. 4th 155, 196, 926 P. 2d 365, 389 (1996). With re
spect to whether the procutor’s stated reasons were pretex-tual, the court explained that it “give[s] great deference to the trial court’s ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excus.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 43.
After comparing Juror S to Juror 8, the court concluded that “Juror 8’s negative experience out of state and the car burglary is not comparable to [Juror S’s] 14 years of per-ceived harassment by law enforcement bad in part on race.” Id., at 48. As for Juror J, the court recognized that the procutor’s dismissal was bad on her social rvices background—“a proper race-neutral reason”—and that this explained his different treatment of jurors with “backgrounds in law, bio-chemistry or environmental engineering.” The court also noted that the “procutor focud on [Juror J’s] internship experience” at the county jail. Id., at 49.
After the California Supreme Court denied Jackson’s petition for review, Jackson sought federal habeas relief. The Federal District Court properly recognized that re-view of Jackson’s claim was governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). That law provides, in pertinent part, that federal habeas relief may not be granted unless the state court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was bad on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence pre-
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nted in the State court proceeding.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(2). After considering the state Court of Appeal decision and reviewing the record evidence, the District Court held that the California Court of Appeal’s findings were not unreasonable. App. to Pet. for Cert. 24. The District Court therefore denied Jackson’s petition.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reverd in a three-paragraph unpublished memorandum opinion. 389 Fed. Appx. 640 (2010). In so doing, the court did not discuss any specific facts or mention the reasoning of the other three courts that had rejected Jackson’s claim. Instead, after tting forth the basic background legal principles in the first two paragraphs, the Court of Ap-peals offered a one-ntence conclusory explanation for its decision:英语四级准考证号忘了怎么办
“The procutor’s proffered race-neutral bas for peremptorily striking the two African-American jurors were not sufficient to counter the evidence of purpo-
ful discrimination in light of the fact that two out of three prospective African-American jurors were stricken, and the record reflected different treatment of comparably situated jurors.” Id., at 641.
citizen kaneThat decision is as inexplicable as it is unexplained. It is reverd.after love
The Batson issue before us turns largely on an “evalua-tion of credibility.” 476 U. S., at 98, n. 21. The trial court’s determination is entitled to “great deference,” ibid., and “must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous,” Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U. S. 472, 477 (2008).
That is the standard on direct review. On federal ha-beas review, AEDPA “impos a highly deferential stan-dard for evaluating state-court rulings” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 5) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here the trial
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court credited the procutor’s race-neutral explanations, and the California Court of Appeal carefully reviewed the record at some length in upholding the trial court’s find-ings. The state appellate court’s decision was plainly not unreasonable. There was simply no basis for the Ninth Circuit to reach the opposite conclusion, particularly in such a dismissive manner.
The petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reverd, and the ca is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
