Communicative rationality
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Communicative rationality, or communicative reason, is a theory or t of theories which describes human rationality as a necessary outcome of successful communication. In particular, it is tied to the philosophy of Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas, and their program of universal pragmatics, along with its related theories such as tho on 日不落英文discour ethics andrational reconstruction. This view of reason is concerned with clarifying the norms and procedures乔布斯英文名 by which agreement can be reached, and is therefore a view of reason as a form of public justification.
According to the theory of communicative rationality, the potential for certain kinds of reason is inherent incommunication itlf. Building from this, Habermas has tried to formalize that potential in explicit terms. According to Habermas, the phenomena that need
to be accounted for by the theory are the "intuitively mastered rules for reaching an understanding and conducting argumentation", possd by subjects who are capable of speech and action. The goal is to transform this implicit "know-how" into explicit "know-that", i.e. knowledge, about how we conduct ourlves in the realm of "moral-practical" reasoning.
读万卷书不如行万里路The result of the theory is a conception of reason that Habermas es as doing justice to the most important trends in twentieth century philosophy, while escaping the relativism which characterizes postmodernism, and also providing necessary standards for critical evaluation. (Habermas, 1992).
Contents
时疫Three kinds of (formal) reason[edit]
According to Habermas, the "substantive" (i.e. formally & mantically integrated) rationality that characterized pre-modern worldviews has, since modern times, been empt
ied of its content and divided into three purely "formal" realms: (1) cognitive-instrumental reason; (2) moral-practical reason; and (3) aesthetic-expressive reason. The first type applies to the sciences, where experimentation & theorizing are geared towards a need to predict and control outcomes. The cond type is at play in our moral and political deliberations (very broadly, answers to the question "how should I live?"), and the third type is typically found in the practices of art and literature. It is the cond type which concerns Habermas.
Becau of the de-centering of religion and other traditions that once played this role, according to Habermas we can no longer give substantive answers to the question "How should I live?" Additionally, there are strict limits which a "post-metaphysical" theory (e below) must respect – namely the clarification of procedures and norms upon which our public deliberation depends. The modes of justification we u in our moral and political deliberations, and the ways we determine which claims of others are valid, are what matter most, and what determine whether we are being "rational". Hence the role that Habermas es for communicative reason in formulating appropriate methods by which t
o conduct our moral and political discour.
This purely formal "division of labour" has been criticized by Nikolas Kompridis, who es in it too strong a division between practical and aesthetic reasoning, an unjustifiably hard distinction between the "right" and the "good", and an unsupportable priority of validity to meaning.[1]
Post-metaphysical philosophy[edit]不堪一击的意思
There are a number of specific trends that Habermas identifies as important to twentieth century philosophy, and to which he thinks his conception of communicative rationality contributes. To look at the trends is to give a clear outline of Habermas's understanding of communicative rationality. He labels all the trends as being post-metaphysical. (Cooke, 1994) The post-metaphysical philosophical movements have, among other things:
1. called into question the substantive conceptions of rationality (e.g. “a rational person th
inks this”) and put forward procedural or formal conceptions instead (e.g. “a rational person thinks like this”);
2. replaced foundationalism with fallibilism with regard to valid knowledge and how it may be achieved;
3. cast doubt on the idea that reason should be conceived abstractly beyond history and the complexities of social life, and have contextualized or situated reason in actual historical practices;
4. replaced a focus on individual structures of consciousness with a concern for pragmatic structures of language and action as part of the contextualization of reason; and
5. given up philosophy's traditional fixation on theoretical truth and the reprentational functions of languagepreventative, to the extent that they also recognize the moral and expressive functions of language as part of the contextualization of reason.儿童节快乐英语
vince惟妙惟肖造句Communicative rationality explained[edit]
Habermas' conception of communicative rationality moves along with the contemporary currents of philosophy. Concerning (1) it can be said that:
[Communicative] rationality refers primarily to the u of knowledge in顺德碧桂园学校 language and action, rather than to a property of knowledge. One might say that it refers primarily to a mode of dealing with validity claims, and that it is in general not a property of the claims themlves. Furthermore…this perspective suggests no more than formal specifications of possible forms of life… it does not extend to the concrete form of life…(Cooke, 1994).
