私募股权与⼈⼒资本风险外⽂⽂献翻译中英⽂最新
外⽂⽂献翻译原⽂及译⽂
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标题：私募股权与⼈⼒资本风险外⽂翻译2019
⽂献出处：Manfred Antoni, Ernst Maug, Stefan Obernberger.[J]Journal of Financial Economics，Volume 133, Issue
小学英语教学网3，September 2019，Pages 634-657
译⽂字数：3900 多字
外贸基础知识英⽂
四级成绩什么时候公布Private equity and human capital risk
Manfred Antoni，
Ernst Maug，
Stefan Obernberger
Abstract
We study the human capital effects of private equity buyouts in Germany. We conduct atched-sample difference-in-differences estimations at the establishment and at the individual employee level with more than 152 thousand buyout employees and a carefully matched control group. Buyouts are followed by a reduction in overall employment and an increa in employee turnover. Employees of buyout targets experience earnings declines equivalent to 2.8% of median earnings in the fifth year after the buyout. Managers and older employees fare far wor after buyouts compared with the average target employee, even though they are not more likely to lo their jobs at the target compared with other employees. We argue that the employees most negatively affected after buyouts are tho who are less likely to find new employment, not tho who are most likely to lo their jobs. Evidence exists of a reduction in administrative staff and more hiring for jobs that require IT skills.
Keywords: Private equity, Restructuring, Human capital risk,
Buyouts, Wages
In this paper, we analyze the human capital risk associated with private equity (PE) buyouts in Germ
2012年12月英语四级真题及答案any. The social costs associated with private equity restructuring have been the subject of emotional debates. The head of the German Social Democratic Party once compared buyout firms with “swarms of locusts” who “descend on companies, graze, and then move on,” suggesting that private equity firms make short-term profits by imposing large costs on employees. Discussions in other countries created similar ntiments.
The literature in finance and economics has conventionally regarded private equity buyouts as vehicles for improving firms’governance and operating performance, facilitating growth and creative destruction, and, more recently, modernizing firms’technology.4 From this modernization perspective, private equity buyouts create value by fashioning leaner firms and enhancing growth through organizational, operational, and technological improvements. Critics argue that shareholders gain in private equity buyouts at the expen of other stakeholders, in particular, the government through lower taxes, and employees. This transfer-of- wealth view echoes the critical stance articulated in the public debate. Shleifer and Summers (1988) provide a theoretical foundation for this view and suggest that investor-led restructurings do not create value but simply transfer wealth from employees and other stakeholders to
shareholders by reneging on implicit contracts.
We contribute to this debate by analyzing 511 private equity buyouts in Germany between 2002 and 2008. Germany is fairly reprentative for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding employment protection legislation (EPL), making it a well- suited laboratory for studying this matter. We perform matched- sample difference-in-differences analys at the establishment level and the individual level. We first match each target establishment to multiple control establishments and then we match each target employee to another employee from one of the matching control establishments. Matching at both levels is performed bad on a rich t of establishment, job, and employee characteristics. We conduct analys at the establishment level and the individual level over a five-year period after the buyout.
We ask two questions: How do job growth, parations, and hiring at the establishment level develop after buyouts? Are buyouts associated with human capital risk for the employees of target firms? We ask both questions for all employees in our sample and for groups of employees who could be particularly vulnerable to or who could benefit from restructuring. The two
becaquestions we ask are related but distinct. PE firms may increa employee turnover without reducing overall establishment-level employment, and some of the employees who are replaced and lo
their jobs with the target perhaps do not find new employment. We find this to be the ca for older workers, who lo their jobs at target establishments at almost exactly the same rate as younger workers but experience significantly larger loss of long-term employment and wages. Hence, it is important to distinguish firm-level decisions and individual outcomes, becau some groups, e.g., low-paid workers, em to find new employment easily, whereas others, such as older workers, often remain unemployed.
音乐之声插曲Buyout establishments reduce their employment by 8.96% more compared with the control group in the period up to five years after the buyout. This effect can be decompod into an increa in the paration rate of 18.75% and an increa in the hiring rate of 9.79%. About half of the increa in departures from buyout targets results in replacements and the other half in job destruction. The investigation of deal-level growth, paration, and hiring rates shows a strong and positive correlation between hiring rates and paration rates and almost half of the buyouts are followed by a period of incread employee turnover. Moreover, we often find higher paration rates and higher hiring rates for the same groups of employees. Private equity firms restructure firms by reducing employment and by replacing employees. In our sample, they employ both strategies at about the same rate. The increa in hiring is largely concentrated in the first years after the buyout, whereas most of the
关于朋友的英语谚语parations happen in later years. We may obrve parations later becau buyout firms want to increa profitability toward the end of their investment horizon to achieve better sales prices. Alternatively, the evaluation of targets’ operations and the implementation of restructuring strategies could simply take time. We find, at the individual level, a downward trend in employee earnings after private equity buyouts. The average buyout target employee los € 980 in annual earnings after five years compared with the matched control group, which is 2.8% of median earnings in our sample.
The individual-level analys identify three groups of employees who post-buyout loss are significantly larger than tho of the average buyout employee: white-collar workers, managers, and older employees. Our discussion of employee groups is guided by three ts of explanations of buyout-related changes in employment and wages: (1) organizational streamlining, (2) technological modernization, and (3) transfers of wealth. We begin with organizational streamlining, i.e., the notion that buyout investors reduce administrative staff and layers of management. White-collar workers experience higher paration rates with less replacement in the short term and significantly higher loss of employment and earnings compared with other employees, consistent with the notion that buyout investors streamline firms by reducing administrative staff. For managers, we find very strong results at the
linux培训机构individual level, but not at the establishment level, which suggests that buyout firms do not systematically reduce layers of middle management. We thus attribute the adver development for managers to their difficulties in finding new employment, not the human resource policies of buyout investors.
Next, we turn to the argument that buyouts foster technological modernization. Private equity firms can implement new technologies, either becau target managers resist change or becau private equity investors have additional technological experti. As a result, buyout targets can undergo faster technological modernization than control firms. We are careful to distinguish different notions of technological change, each of which has specific and sometimes different implications for employees. Proponents of the skill-biad technological change (SBTC) hypothesis (Katz, Autor, 1999, Autor, Levy, Murnane, 2003) argue that technological change is biad against lower-skilled jobs and increas wage inequality. Separation rates for low-wage workers are almost twice as high as tho for the sample as a whole. They are not displaced by tho with higher wage levels, but by other low-wage employees. The net rate of job growth for low-wage workers is not unusually low, whereas turnover is unusually high. Individual-level results even show that low- wage employees lo less after buyouts than other employees, suggesting that skill-biad technological change does not determine individual2013考研国家线
