From lakoff@cogsci.Berkeley.EDU Fri Jan 29 20:06:36 1993
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 93 18:02:16 -0800
From: George Lakoff
To: wwu.edu
Subject: Re: metaphors
The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor
George Lakoff
(c) Copyright George Lakoff, 1992
To Appear in Ortony, Andrew (ed.) Metaphor and Thought (2nd edition), Cambridge University Press.网页翻译在线
Do not go gentle into that good night. -Dylan Thomas
Death is the mother of beauty . . . -Wallace Stevens, Sunday Morning
Introduction
The famous lines by Thomas and Stevens are examples of what classical theorists, at least since Aristotle, have referred to as metaphor: instances of novel poetic language in which words like mother,go, and night are not ud in their normal everyday ns. In classical theories of language, metaphor was en as a matter of language not thought. Metaphorical expressions were assumed to be mutually exclusive with the realm of ordinary everyday language: everyday language had no metaphor, and metaphor ud mechanisms outside the realm of everyday
conventional language. The classical theory was taken so much for granted over the centuries that many people didn't realize that it was just a theory. The theory was not merely taken to be true, but came to be taken as definitional. The word metaphor was defined as a novel or poetic linguistic expression where one or more words for a concept are ud outside of its normal
conventional meaning to express a similar concept. But such issues are not matters for
definitions; they are empirical questions. As a cognitive scientist and a linguist, one asks: What are the generalizations governing the linguistic expressions re ferred to classically as poetic metaphors? When this question is answered rigorously, the classical theory turns out to be fal.
The generalizations governing poetic metaphorical expressions are not in language, but in
thought: They are general map pings across conceptual domains. Moreover, the general princi ples which take the form of conceptual mappings, apply not just to novel poetic expressions, but to much of ordinary everyday language. In short, the locus of metaphor is not in language at all, but in the way we conceptualize one mental domain in terms of another. The general theory of metaphor is given by characterizing such cross-domain mappings. And in the process, everyday
abstract concepts like time, states, change, causation, and pur po also turn out to be metaphorical. The result is that metaphor (that is, cross-domain mapping) is absolutely central to ordinary natural language mantics, and that the study of literary metaphor is an extension of the study of everyday metaphor. Everyday metaphor is characterized by a huge system of thousands of cross-domain mappings, and this system is made u of in novel metaphor. Becau of the empirical results, the word metaphor has come to be ud differently in contemporary metaphor rearch. The word metaphor has come to mean a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system. The term metaphorical expression refers to a linguistic expression (a word, phra, or ntence) that is the surface realization of such a cross-domain mapping (this is what the word metaphor referred to in the old theory). I will adopt the contemporary usage throughout this chapter. Experimental result
s demonstrating the cognitive reali ty of the extensive system of metaphorical mappings are discusd by Gibbs (this volume). Mark Turner's 1987 book, Death is the mother of beauty, who title comes from Stevens' great line, demonstrates in detail how that line us the ordinary system of everyday mappings. For further examples of how literary metaphor makes u of the ordinary metaphor system, e More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor, by Lakoff and Turner (1989) and Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science, by Turner (1991). Since the everyday metaphor system is central to the understanding of poetic metaphor, we will begin with the everyday system and then turn to poetic examples.
Homage To Reddy
The contemporary theory that metaphor is primarily conceptual, conventional, and part of the ordinary system of thought and language can be traced to Michael Reddy's (this volume) now classic paper, The Conduit Metaphor, which first appeared in the first edition of this collection. Reddy did far more in that paper than he modestly suggested. With a single, thoroughly analyzed example, he allowed us to e, albeit in a restricted domain, that ordinary everyday English is largely metaphorical, dispelling once and for all the traditional view that metaphor is primarily in the realm of poetic or figurative language. Reddy showed, for a single very significant ca, that the locus of met
aphor is thought, not language, that metaphor is a major and indispensable part of our ordinary, conventional way of conceptualizing the world, and that our everyday behavior reflects our metaphorical understanding of experience. Though other theorists had noticed some of the characteristics of metaphor, Reddy was the first to demonstrate it by rigorous linguistic analysis, stating generalizations over voluminous examples. Reddy's chapter on how we conceptualize the concept of communication by metaphor gave us a tiny glimp of an enormous system of conceptual metaphor. Since its appearance, an entire branch of linguis tics and cognitive science has developed to study systems of metaphorical thought that we u to reason, that we ba our actions on, and that underlie a great deal of the structure of language. The bulk of the chapters in this book were written before the development of the contemporary field of metaphor rearch. My chapter will therefore contradict much that appears in the others, many of which make certain assumptions that were widely taken for granted in 1977. A major assumption that is challenged by contemporary rearch is the traditional division between literal and figurative language, with metaphor as a kind of figurative language. This entails, by definition, that: What is literal is not metaphorical. In fact, the word literal has traditionally been ud with one or more of a t of assumptions that havewarspite
since proved to be fal:
Traditional fal assumptions
q All everyday conventional language is literal, and none is metaphorical.
q All subject matter can be comprehended literally, without metaphor.
q Only literal language can be contingently true or fal.
q All definitions given in the lexicon of a language are literal, not metaphorical.
q The concepts ud in the grammar of a language are all literal; none are metaphorical. The big difference between the contemporary theory and views of metaphor prior to Reddy's work lies in this t of assumptions. The reason for the difference is that, in the intervening years, a huge system of everyday, convention al, conceptual metaphors has been discovered. It is a system of metaphor that structures our everyday conceptual system, including most abstract concepts, and that lies behind much of everyday language. The discovery of this enormous metaphor system has destroyed the traditional literal-figurative distinction, since the term literal, as ud in defining the traditional distinction, carries with it all tho fal assumptions. A major difference between the contemporary theory and the classical one is bad on the old literal-figurative distinction. Given that distinction, on
e might think that one arrives at a metaphorical interpretation of a ntence by starting with the literal meaning and applying some algorithmic process to it (e Searle, this volume). Though there do exist cas where something like this happens, this is not in general how metaphor works, as we shall e shortly.
What is not metaphorical
Although the old literal-metaphorical distinction was bad on assumptions that have proved to be fal, one can make a different sort of literal-metaphorical distinction: tho concepts that are not comprehended via conceptual metaphor might be called literal. Thus, while I will argue that a great many common concepts like causation and purpo are metaphorical, there is nonetheless an extensive range of nonmetaphorical concepts. Thus, a ntence like The balloon went up is not metaphorical, nor is the old philosopher's favorite The cat is on the mat. But as soon as one gets away from concrete physical experience and starting talking about abstractions or emotions, metaphorical understanding is the norm.
The Contemporary Theory: Some Examples
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Let us now turn to some examples that are illustrative of contemporary metaphor rearch. They will
mostly come from the domain of everyday conventional metaphor, since that has been the main focus of the rearch. I will turn to the discussion of poetic metaphor only after I have discusd the conventional system, since knowledge of the conventional system is needed to make n of most of the poetic cas. The evidence for the existence of a system of conventional conceptual metaphors is of five types:
补贴英语-Generalizations governing polymy, that is, the u of words with a number of related meanings.
-Generalizations governing inference patterns, that is, cas where a pattern of inferences from one conceptual domain is ud in another domain.
-Generalizations governing novel metaphorical language (e, Lakoff & Turner, 1989).
-Generalizations governing patterns of mantic change (e, Sweetr, 1990).
-Psycholinguistic experiments (e, Gibbs, 1990, this volume).
We will primarily be discussing the first three of the sources of evidence, since they are the most robust.
Conceptual Metaphor
Imagine a love relationship described as follows: Our relationship has hit a dead-end street. Here love is being conceptualized as a journey, with the implication that the relationship is stalled, that the lovers cannot keep going the way they've been going, that they must turn back, or abandon the relationship altogether. This is not an isolated ca. English has many everyday expressions that are bad on a conceptualization of love as a journey, and they are ud not just for talking about love, but for reasoning about it as well. Some are necessarily about love; others can be understood that way: Look how far we've come. It's been a long, bumpy road. We can't turn back now. We're at a crossroads. We may have to go our parate ways. The relationship isn't going anywhere. We're spinning our wheels. Our relationship is off the track. The marriage is on the rocks. We may have to bail out of this relationship. The are ordinary, everyday English expressions. They are not poetic, nor are they necessarily ud for special rhetorical effect. Tho like Look how far we've come, which aren't necessarily about love, can readily be understood as being about love. As a linguist and a cognitive scientist, I ask two commonplace questions:
q Is there a general principle governing how the linguistic expressions about journeys are ud to characterize love?
q Is there a general principle governing how our patterns of inference about journeys are
ud to reason about love when expressions such as the are ud?
语文阅读方法
The answer to both is yes. Indeed, there is a single general principle that answers both questions. But it is a general principle that is neither part of the grammar of English, nor the English lexicon. Rather, it is part of the conceptual system underlying English: It is a principle for under standing the domain of love in terms of the domain of journeys. The principle can be stated informally as a metaphorical scenario: The lovers are travelers on a journey together, with their common life goals en as destinations to be reached. The relationship is their vehicle, and it allows them to pursue tho common goals together. The relationship is en as fulfilling its purpo as long as it allows them to make progress toward their common goals. The journey
isn't easy. There are impediments, and there are places (crossroads) where a decision has to be made about which direction to go in and whether to keep traveling together. The metaphor involves understanding one domain of experience, love, in terms of a very different domain of experience, journeys. More technically, the metaphor can be understood as a mapping (in the
mathematical n) from a source domain (in this ca, journeys) to a target domain (in this ca, love). The mapping is tightly structured. There are ontological correspondences, according to which
entities in the domain of love (e.g., the lovers, their common goals, their difficulties, the love relationship, etc.) correspond systematically to entities in the domain of a journey (the travelers, the vehicle, des tinations, etc.). To make it easier to remember what mappings there are in the conceptual system, Johnson and I (lakoff and Johnson, 1980) adopted a strategy for naming such mappings, using mnemonics which suggest the mapping. Mnemonic names typically (though not always) have the form: TARGET-DOMAIN IS SOURCE-DOMAIN, or alternatively, TARGET-DOMAIN AS SOURCE-DOMAIN. In this ca, the name of the mapping is LOVE IS A JOURNEY. When I speak of the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, I am using a mnemonic for a t of ontological correspondences that characterize a map ping, namely:
THE LOVE-AS-JOURNEY MAPPING
-The lovers correspond to travelers.
-The love relationship corresponds to the vehicle.
-The lovers' common goals correspond to their common destinations on the journey.
-Difficulties in the relationship correspond to impediments to travel.
It is a common mistake to confu the name of the mapping, LOVE IS A JOURNEY, for the mapping itlf. The mapping is the t of correspondences. Thus, whenever I refer to a metaphor by a mnemonic like LOVE IS A JOURNEY, I will be referring to such a t of correspondences. If mappings are confud with names of mappings, another misunderstanding can ari. Names of mappings commonly have a propositional form, for example, LOVE IS A JOURNEY. But the mappings themlves are not propositions. If mappings are confud with names for mappings, one might mistakenly think that, in this theory, metaphors are propositional. They are, of cour, anything but that: metaphors are mappings, that is, ts of conceptual correspondences. The LOVE-AS-JOURNEY mapping is a t of ontological correspondences that characterize epistemic correspondences by mapping knowledge about journeys onto knowledge about love. Such correspondences permit us to reason about love using the knowledge we u to reason about journeys. Let us take an example. Consider the expression, We're stuck, said by one lover to another about their relationship. How is this expression about travel to be understood as being about their relationship? We're stuck can be ud of travel, and when it is, it evokes knowledge about travel. The exact knowledge may vary from person to person, but here is a typical example of the kind of knowledge evoked. The capitalized expressions reprent entities n the ontology of travel, that is, in the source domain of the LOVE IS A JOURNEY mapping given above. Two TRAVELLERS pest
pure什么意思
are in a VEHICLE, TRAVELING WITH COMMON DESTINATIONS. The VEHICLE encounters some IMPEDIMENT and gets stuck, that is, makes it nonfunctional. If they do nothing, they will not REACH THEIR DESTINATIONS. There are a limited number of alternatives for action:
q They can try to get it moving again, either by fixing it or get ting it past the
masturbate for life
IMPEDIMENT that stopped it.installs
q They can remain in the nonfunctional VEHICLE and give up on REACHING THEIR
DESTINATIONS.
q They can abandon the VEHICLE.
q The alternative of remaining in the nonfunctional VEHICLE takes the least effort, but六级查分入口
