The Principles of Philosophy
Rene Descartes
The Principles of Philosophy
Table of Contents
The Principles of Philosophy (1)
Rene Descartes (1)
From the Publisher's Preface (1)
LETTER OF THE AUTHOR (2)
TO THE MOST SERENE PRINCESS, (8)
OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE (9)
PART III. OF THE VISIBLE WORLD (33)
己
洋葱拌木耳的家常做法PART IV. OF THE EARTH (34)
The Principles of Philosophy
韩国电影排行榜前十名Rene Descartes
TRANSLATED BY JOHN VEITCH, LL. D.
This page copyright © 2002 Blackmask Online.
梦到自己被蛇咬毛概论述题
• From the Publisher's Preface.
• LETTER OF THE AUTHOR
• TO THE MOST SERENE PRINCESS,
• OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
• PART III. OF THE VISIBLE WORLD.
• PART IV. OF THE EARTH.
Produced by Steve Harris, Charles Franks
and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team.
SELECTIONS FROM THE PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY
OF
RENE DESCARTES
(1596−1650)
From the Publisher's Preface.
The prent volume contains a reprint of the preface and the first part of the Principles of Philosophy, together with lections from the cond, third and fourth parts of that work, corresponding to the extracts in the French edition of Gamier, are also given, as well as an appendix containing part of Descartes' reply to the Second Objections (viz., his formal demonstrations of the e
xistence of Deity). The translation is bad on the original Latin edition of the Principles, published in 1644.
The work had been translated into French during Descartes' lifetime, and personally revid and corrected by him, the French text is evidently derving of the same consideration as the Latin originals, and conquently, the additions and variations of the French version have also been given t he additions being put in square brackets in the text and the variations in the footnotes.
A copy of the title−page of the original edition, as given in Dr. C. Guttler's work (Munich: C. H. Beck. 1901), are also reproduced in the prent volume.
SELECTIONS FROM THE PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY
OF DESCARTES
TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN AND COLLATED WITH THE FRENCH
LETTER OF THE AUTHOR
TO THE FRENCH TRANSLATOR OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY SERVING FOR A PREFACE.
Sir, T he version of my principles which you have been at pains to make, is so elegant and finished as to lead me to expect that the work will be more generally read in French than in Latin, and better understood. The only apprehension I entertain is lest the title should deter some who have not been brought up to letters, or with whom philosophy is in bad repute, becau the kind they were taught has proved unsatisfactory; and this makes me think that it will be uful to add a preface to it for the purpo of showing what the MATTER of the work is, what END I had in view in writing it, and what UTILITY may be derived from it. But although it might be my part to write a preface of this nature, eing I ought to know tho particulars better than any other person, I cannot nevertheless prevail upon mylf to do anything more than merely to give a summary of the chief points that fall, as I think, to be discusd in it: and I leave it to your discretion to prent to the public such part of them as you shall judge proper.
I should have desired, in the first place, to explain in it what philosophy is, by commencing with the most common matters, as, for example, that the word PHILOSOPHY signifies the study of wisdom, and that by wisdom is to be understood not merely prudence in the management of affairs, but a perfect knowledge of all that man can know, as well for the conduct of his life as for the prervation of his health and the discovery of all the arts, and that knowledge to subrve the ends must nece
ssarily be deduced from first caus; so that in order to study the acquisition of it (which is properly called philosophizing), we must commence with the investigation of tho first caus which are called PRINCIPLES. Now the principles must posss TWO CONDITIONS: in the first place, they must be so clear and evident that the human mind, when it attentively considers them, cannot doubt of their truth; in the cond place, the knowledge of other things must be so dependent on them as that though the principles themlves may indeed be known apart from what depends on them, the latter cannot nevertheless be known apart from the former. It will accordingly be necessary thereafter to endeavour so to deduce from tho principles the knowledge of the things that depend on them, as that there may be nothing in the whole ries of deductions which is not perfectly manifest. God is in truth the only being who is absolutely wi, that is, who posss a perfect knowledge of all things; but we may say that men are more or less wi as their knowledge of the most important truths is greater or less. And I am confident that there is nothing, in what I have now said, in which all the learned do not concur.
I should, in the next place, have propod to consider the utility of philosophy, and at the same time have shown that, since it embraces all that the human mind can know, we ought to believe that it is by it we are distinguished from savages and barbarians, and that the civilisation and culture of a nati
美字on is regulated by the degree in which true philosophy nourishes in it, and, accordingly, that to contain true philosophers is the highest privilege a state can enjoy. Besides this, I should have shown that, as regards individuals, it is not only uful for each man to have intercour with tho who apply themlves to this study, but that it is incomparably better he should himlf direct his attention to it; just as it is doubtless to be preferred that a man should make u of his own eyes to direct his steps, and enjoy by means of the same the beauties of colour and light, than that he should blindly follow the guidance of another; though the latter cour is certainly better than to have the eyes clod with no guide except one's lf. But to live without philosophizing is in truth the same as keeping the eyes clod without attempting to open them; and the pleasure of eing all that sight disclos is not to be compared with the satisfaction afforded by the discoveries of philosophy. And, finally, this study is more imperatively requisite for the regulation of our manners, and for conducting us through life, than is the u of our eyes for directing our steps. The brutes, which have only their bodies to conrve, are continually occupied in eking sources of nourishment; but men, of whom the chief part is the mind, ought to make the arch after wisdom their principal care, for wisdom is the true nourishment of the mind; and I feel assured, moreover, that there are very many who would not fail in the arch, if they would but hope for success in it, and knew the degree of their capabilities
for it. There is no mind, how ignoble soever it be, which remains so firmly bound up in the objects of the ns, as not sometime or other to turn itlf away from them in the aspiration after some higher good, although not knowing frequently wherein that good consists. The greatest favourites of fortune t ho who have health, honours, and riches in abundance are not more exempt from aspirations of this nature than others; nay, I am persuaded that the are the persons who sigh the most deeply after another good greater and more perfect still than any they already posss. But the supreme good, considered by natural reason without the light of faith, is nothing more than the knowledge of truth through its first caus, in other words, the wisdom of which philosophy is the study. And, as all the particulars are indisputably true, all that is required to gain asnt to their truth is that they be well stated.
But as one is restrained from asnting to the doctrines by experience, which shows that they who make pretensions to philosophy are often less wi and reasonable than others who never applied themlves to the study, I should have here shortly explained wherein consists all the science we now posss, and what are the degrees of wisdom at which we have arrived. The first degree contains only notions so clear of themlves that they can be acquired without meditation; the cond comprehends all that the experience of the ns dictates; the third, that which the convers
ation of other men teaches us; to which may be added as the fourth, the reading, not of all books, but especially of such as have been written by persons capable of conveying proper instruction, for it is a species of conversation we hold with their authors. And it ems to me that all the wisdom we in ordinary posss is acquired only in the four ways; for I do not class divine revelation among them, becau it does not conduct us by degrees, but elevates us at once to an infallible faith.
There have been, indeed, in all ages great minds who endeavoured to find a fifth road to wisdom, incomparably more sure and elevated than the other four. The path they essayed was the arch of first caus and true principles, from which might be deduced the reasons of all that can be known by man; and it is to them the appellation of philosophers has been more especially accorded. I am not aware that there is any one of them up to the prent who has succeeded in this enterpri. The first and chief who writings we posss are Plato and Aristotle, between whom there was no difference, except that the former, following in the footsteps of his master, Socrates, ingenuously confesd that he had never yet been able to find anything certain, and that he was contented to write what emed to him probable, imagining, for this end, certain principles by which he endeavoured to account for the other things. Aristotle, on the other hand, characterid by less candour, although for twenty years the disciple of Plato, and with no principles beyond tho of his m
aster, completely reverd his mode of putting them, and propod as true and certain what it is probable he himlf never esteemed as such. But the two men had acquired much judgment and wisdom by the four preceding means, qualities which raid their authority very high, so much so that tho who succeeded them were willing rather to acquiesce in their opinions, than to ek better for themlves. The chief question among their disciples, however, was as to whether we ought to doubt of all things or hold some as certain, a dispute which led them on both sides into extravagant errors; for a part of tho who were for doubt, extended it even to the actions of life, to the neglect of the most ordinary rules required for its conduct; tho, on the other hand, who maintained the doctrine of certainty, supposing that it must depend upon the ns, trusted entirely to them. To such an extent was this carried by Epicurus, that it is said he ventured to affirm, contrary to all the reasonings of the astronomers, that the sun is no larger than it appears.
It is a fault we may remark in most disputes, that, as truth is the mean between the two opinions that are upheld, each disputant departs from it in proportion to the degree in which he posss the spirit of contradiction. But the error of tho who leant too much to the side of doubt, was not followed for any length of time, and that of the opposite party has been to some extent corrected by the doctrine that the ns are deceitful in many instances. Nevertheless, I do not know that this err
or was wholly removed by showing that certitude is not in the ns, but in the understanding alone when it has clear perceptions; and that while we only posss the knowledge which is acquired in the first four grades of wisdom, we ought not to doubt of the things that appear to be true in what regards the conduct of life, nor esteem them as so certain that we cannot change our opinions regarding them, even though constrained by the evidence of reason.
清明文案From ignorance of this truth, or, if there was any one to whom it was known, from neglect of it, the majority of tho who in the later ages aspired to be philosophers, blindly followed Aristotle, so that they frequently corrupted the n of his writings, and attributed to him various opinions which he would not recogni as his own were he now to return to the world; and tho who did not follow him, among whom are to be found many of the greatest minds, did yet not escape being imbued with his opinions in their youth, as the form the staple of instruction in the schools; and thus their minds were so preoccupied that they could not ri to the knowledge of true principles. And though I hold all the philosophers in esteem, and am unwilling to incur odium by my censure, I can adduce a proof of my asrtion, which I do not think any of them will gainsay, which is, that they all laid down as a principle what they did not perfectly know. For example, I know none of them who did not suppo that there was gravity in terrestrial bodies; but although experience shows us very clearly that bodies
we call heavy descend towards the center of the earth, we do not, therefore, know the nature of gravity, that is, the cau or principle in virtue of which bodies descend, and we must derive our knowledge of it from some other source. The same may be said of a vacuum and atoms, of heat and cold, of dryness and humidity, and of salt, sulphur, and mercury, and the other things of this sort which some have adopted as their principles. But no conclusion deduced from a principle which is not clear can be evident, even although the deduction be formally valid; and hence it follows that no reasonings bad on such principles could lead them to the certain knowledge of any one thing, nor conquently advance them one step in the arch after wisdom. And if they did discover any truth, this was due to one or other of the four means above mentioned. Notwithstanding this, I am in no degree desirous to lesn the honour which each of them can justly claim; I am only constrained to say, for the consolation of tho who have not given their attention to study, that just as in travelling, when we turn our back upon the place to which we were going, we recede the farther from it in proportion as we proceed in the new direction for a greater length of time and with greater speed, so that, though we may be afterwards brought back to the right way, we cannot nevertheless arrive at the destined place as soon as if we had not moved backwards at all; so in philosophy, when we make u of fal principles, we depart the farther from the knowledge of truth and wisdom exactly in proportion to the care with which we cultivate them, and apply ourlves to the deduction of divers
熊猫作文e conquences from them, thinking that we are philosophizing well, while we are only departing the farther from the truth; from which it must be inferred that they who have learned the least of all that has been hitherto distinguished by the name of philosophy are the most fitted for the apprehension of truth.
After making tho matters clear, I should, in the next place, have desired to t forth the grounds for holding that the true principles by which we may reach that highest degree of wisdom wherein consists the sovereign good of human life, are tho I have propod in this work; and two considerations alone are sufficient to establish this t he first of which is, that the principles are very clear, and the cond, that we can deduce all other truths from them; for it is only the two conditions that are required in true principles. But I easily prove that they are very clear; firstly, by a reference to the manner in which I found them, namely, by rejecting all propositions that were in the least doubtful, for it is certain that such as could not be rejected by this test when they were attentively considered, are the most evident and clear which the human mind can know. Thus by considering that he who strives to doubt of all is unable nevertheless to doubt that he is while he doubts, and that what reasons thus, in not being able to doubt of itlf and doubting nevertheless of everything el, is not that which we call our body, but what we name our mind or thought, I have tak
en the existence of this thought for the first principle, from which I very clearly deduced the following truths, namely, that there is a God who is the author of all that is in the world, and who, being the source of all truth, cannot have created our understanding of such a nature as to be deceived in the judgments it forms of the things of which it posss a very clear and distinct perception. Tho are all the principles of which I avail mylf touching immaterial or metaphysical objects, from which I most clearly deduce the other principles of physical or corporeal things, namely, that there are bodies extended in length, breadth, and depth, which are of diver figures and are moved in a variety of ways. Such are in sum the principles from which I deduce all other truths. The cond circumstance that proves the clearness of the principles is, that they have been known in all ages, and even received as true and indubitable by all men, with the exception only of the existence of God, which has been doubted by some, becau they attributed too much to the perceptions of
