牛乳石碱Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber
Outline of Relevance Theory*
l. Introduction
Pragmatics is the study of the general cognitive principles and abilities involved in utterance interpretation, and of their cognitive effects. In con-structing an explanatory pragmatic theory, a variety of specific problems must be solved. Utterances may be ambiguous or referentially ambiva-lent, as in (1):
(1) The football team gathered round their coach.
Pragmatic theory should explain how the hearer of (1) decides which football team the speaker has in mind, and whether ‘coach’ was intended to mean bus or games teacher. Utterances have not only explicit content but implicit import, as in (2):
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古诗游子吟(2)a.Peter:Is George a good sailor?
b.Mary:ALL the English are good sailors.
Pragmatic theory should explain how (2b) is understood as implying that George is a good sailor. Utterances may be metaphorical or ironical, as in (3) and (4):
特比萘芬软膏(3) Their friendship blossomed.
(4) Mary, of Peter, who has just tripped over his own feet:
Peter’s just like Rudolf Nureyev.
Pragmatic theory should describe and explain the differences between literal and non-literal interpretation. More generally, the style of an utter-ance may affect its interpretation — compare the mildly witty (4) with the explicitly critical (5):
(5) Peter is very clumsy.
Pragmatic theory should describe such stylistic effects and explain how they are achieved. In this paper, we outline a pragmatic theory —relevance theory — which offers a unitary solution to the and other * Deirdre Wilson would like to thank the faculty and students of the University of Min-ho, Portugal, and in particular Dr. Helio Oswaldo Alves and Mrs Helen Santos Alves, for their warm hospitality at the Linguistics Meeting at which an early version of this paper was first delivered.
pragmatic problems; the theory is developed in more detail in our book Relevance: Communication and Cognition(Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1987).
2. The code model of communication
It is clear from examples (1)-(5) that understanding an utterance invol-ves more than merely knowing the meaning of the ntence uttered. The hearer of (1) must not only know the two possible meanings of the word ‘coach’, but also decide which meaning the speaker intended to convey. The hearer of (2) must not only know the meaning of the ntence utter-ed, but also infer what was implicitly conveyed. The hearer of (3) or (4) must not only know the literal meaning of the ntence uttered, but also decide whether the utterance was literally, metaphorically or ironically intended. The stylistic differences between (4) and (5) cannot be explain-ed in purely mantic terms. The central aim of pragmatic theory is to describe the factors other than a knowledge of ntence meaning that affect the interpretation of utterances.
Until about twenty years ago, there emed to be only one possible approach to pragmatics. It was almost universally assumed that commu-nication in general, and verbal communication in particular, are achieved by encoding and decoding messages. On this account — the code, or miotic, accou
nt — communication involves a t of unobrvable mes-sages, a t of obrvable signals, and a code: that is, a method of pairing signals with messages. The communicator, on deciding to convey a cer-tain message, transmits the signal associated with that message by the code; the hearer, on receiving the signal, recovers the message associated with it by the code. In the ca of verbal commmunication, the obrv-able signals would be the phonetic (or graphemic) reprentations of utterances, the messages would be the thoughts that the speaker wanted to convey, and the task of pragmatics would be to discover the code that hearers u to recover the intended message from the obrvable signal.
Many linguists have assumed without question that the code model of pragmatics is correct. It is easy to e why. There is no doubt that utter-ance interpretation involves an element of decoding: the grammar of a natural language just is a code which pairs phonetic and mantic repre-ntations of ntences, and there is no doubt that understanding an utter-ance involves recovering the phonetic reprentation of the ntence utter-ed and decoding it into the associated mantic reprentation. However, as examples (1)-(5) show, there is more to understanding an utterance than merely recovering the mantic reprentation of the ntence utter-
若合符节ed: there is a gap between the mantic reprentations of ntences and the thoughts communicat
洋溢近义词ed by utterances.
各银行定期存款利率Advocates of the miotic approach to pragmatics assume that this gap can be filled by an extra layer of encoding and decoding. They assume, in other words, that pragmatics is an extension of grammar: that speakers of English know a pragmatic code which is ud to disambiguate utteran-ces in English, recover their implicit import, distinguish their literal and figurative meanings, and determine their stylistic effects. However, this assumption is very far from being justified.
The most general problem for the code model is its conception of what communication is designed to achieve. On the code model, the speaker’s thoughts, encoded into an utterance, should be replicated in the hearer by a decoding process. The result of verbal communication should be an exact reproduction in the hearer of the thoughts the speaker intended to convey. However, the most cursory examination of ordinary conversation reveals that in the ca of implicit import, figurative interpretation and stylistic effects, such reproduction is rarely intended or achieved. For example, the implicit import of (3) can be described in a number of differ-ent ways. What exactly is the implicit message it was intended to convey: that their friendship developed naturally, that it developed from small beginnings, that it grew into something beautiful, that like a flower it was destined to fade? The basic assumption of the code model — that a deter-minate subt of the messages must have be
en actually encoded and decoded — does not em remotely plausible.
The existence of indeterminacies in interpretation suggests a funda-mental inadequacy in the code model of communication. Where indeter-minacy is involved, it ems that the most that communication can a-chieve is to bring about some similarity between the thoughts of the com-municator and her audience1How could the code model describe tho cas where similarity, rather than identity, is intended and achieved? The solution which comes to mind would consist in adding to the deter-minate output of the decoding process some blurring mechanism. Such an obviously ad hoc solution is hardly worth developing.
To the extent that the code model of pragmatics has been successful, its success have been achieved by investigating a very restricted range of data. It is obvious that utterance interpretation is highly context-1For convenience, unless otherwi specified, we will refer to the communicator as female and the audience as male.
dependent; yet the success of the code model have generally been a-chieved by looking at utterances in which the role of context is either minimal or very easy to describe.
For example, although the pronoun ‘I’ refers to different people in dif-ferent contexts, it almost invaria
bly refers to whoever is speaking at the time. It is thus possible to write a decoding rule instructing the hearer of (6), on hearing the word ‘I’, to identify the speaker and interpret the pronoun as referring to Mary:
(6) Mary: I am unhappy today.
However, to be successful, the code model of pragmatics would have to show, not just that one pronoun can be dealt with along the lines, but that all can. Other pronouns are less amenable to the decoding approach.
Suppo that as I give a lecture, I make a slip of the tongue. You turn to your neighbour and whisper:
(7) That was interesting.
What decoding rule, analogous to the rule just given for ‘I’, could your neighbour u to decide that the pronoun ‘that’ referred to the slip of the tongue I had just made, rather than, say, to the example I had just been discussing, the theoretical claim I had just put forward, or the fact that a strange bird had just flown past the window? The code model of pragmatics tends to ignore such cas, but an adequate pragmatic theory must deal with them.
Similarly, the code model of pragmatics tends to concentrate on a few, relatively restricted types of implicit import which are only minimally context-dependent. For example, in most contexts, the speaker of (8) would implicitly convey (9):
(8) Some of my friends stayed away.
(9) Not all of my friends stayed away.
It would thus be possible to t up a decoding rule associating utteran-ces of the form in (8) with implications of the form in (9) and to prevent the rule from operating in a restricted class of contexts.
Often, however, the implicit import of an utterance is highly context-dependent. Consider (10):
(10) I’ll be in Dublin tomorrow.
In different contexts, (10) would have widely different implications. For example, said by Mary to Peter, who has just asked her to dinner in London tomorrow, it will imply that Mary can’t come to dinner; said to Peter, who lives in Dublin and has just asked Mary when they can next
meet, it will imply that they can meet the next day; and so on. Not only would it be hard to write a dec
oding rule assigning to each utterance of (10) the appropriate interpretation in the appropriate context: it would also be totally pointless. To e the implications of (10), all Peter needs is his knowledge of the world, and in particular his knowledge of the speak-er and the situation, and his general reasoning abilities. Given the, he can work out the implications of (10) for himlf. Might this not be true of (8)-(9) as well?
3. The inferential account of communication
It is certainly true that communication does not necessarily involve the u of a code. Consider (11):
(11)a. Peter: Did you enjoy your skiing holiday?
b.Mary: (displays her leg in plaster)
Here, Mary clearly communicates that her skiing holiday did not live up to expectations. Yet there is no code which states that displaying one’s leg in plaster means that one’s skiing holiday has not gone according to plan. To account for such examples, some alternative to the code model of communication is needed.
Intuitively, Peter does not need a code to understand Mary’s behaviour in (11) becau he can u hi
s knowledge of the world and his general reasoning abilities to work out what she must have intended to convey. On this account — an inferential account — communication is achieved not by coding and decoding messages, but by providing evidence for an intended hypothesis about the communicator’s intentions. Communica-tion is successful when the audience interprets the evidence on the intend-ed lines. Failures in communication result from misinterpretation of the evidence provided. Indeterminacy results from the fact that a single utter-ance may provide evidence for a range of related hypothes, all similar enough to the thoughts the communicator wanted to convey.
In (11b), for example, Mary provides evidence that she broke her leg on holiday, and that as a result her holiday did not live up to expectations. However, from a logical point of view this is not the only hypothesis that Peter might have entertained. He might have assumed, for example, that Mary broke her leg before leaving, and as a result did not go on holiday at all.
This example brings out a fundamental difference between code and inferential models of communication. According to the inferential model, the interpretation of utterances, like the interpretation of evidence in general, is always subject to risk. There are always alternative ways of
