挑战者号事故报告原版
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Editorial Head note: On July 28, 1986 Rear Admiral Richard H. Truly, NASA's Associate Administrator for Space Flight and a former astronaut, relead this report from Joph P. Kerwin, biomedical specialist from the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, relating to the deaths of the astronauts in the Challenger accident. Dr. Kerwin had been commissioned to undertake this study soon after the accident on January 28, 1986. A copy of this report is available in the NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC.
皮鞋磨脚
RADM Richard H. Truly
Associate Administrator for Space Flight
NASA Headquarters
低钾的临床表现廉洁党课Code M
Washington, DC 20546
Dear Admiral Truly:
The arch for wreckage of the Challenger crew cabin has been completed. A team of engineers and scientists has analyzed the wreckage and all other available evidence in an attempt to determine the cau of death of the Challenger crew. This letter is to report to you on the results of this effort. The findings are inconclusive. The impact of the crew compartment with the ocean surface was so violent that evidence of damage occurring in the conds which followed the explosion was masked. Our final conclusions are:
小学生300字作文∙the cau of death of the Challenger astronauts cannot be positively determined;
∙the forces to which the crew were expod during Orbiter breakup were probably not sufficient to cau death or rious injury; and
∙绅士风度网站the crew possibly, but not certainly, lost consciousness in the conds following Orbiter breakup due to in-flight loss of crew module pressure.
避孕药的危害和副作用
Our inspection and analys revealed certain facts which support the above conclusions, and the are related below: The forces on the Orbiter at breakup were probably too low to cau death or rious injury to the crew but were sufficient to parate the crew compartment from the forward fulage, cargo bay, no cone, and forward reaction control compartment. The forces applied to the Orbiter to cau such destruction clearly exceed its design limits. The data available to estimate the magnitude and direction of the forces included ground photographs and measurements from on board accelerometer s, which were lost two-tenths of a cond after vehicle breakup.
时间就像海绵里的水是谁的名言
Two independent asssments of the data produced very similar estimates. The largest acceleration pul occurred as the Orbiter forward fulage parated and was rapidly pushed away from the external tank. It then pitched no-down and was decelerated rapidly by aerodynamic forces. There are uncertainties in our analysis; the actual breakup is not visible on photographs becau the Orbiter was hidden by the gaous cloud surrounding the external tank. The range of most probable maximum accelerations is from 12 to 20 G's in the vertical axis. The accelerations were quite brie
f. In two conds, they were below four G's; in less than ten conds, the crew compartment was esntially in free fall. Medical analysis indicates that the accelerations are survivable, and that the probability of major injury to crew members is low.
After vehicle breakup, the crew compartment continued its upward trajectory, peaking at an altitude of 65,000 feet approximately 25 conds after breakup. It then descended striking the ocean surface about two minutes and forty-five conds after breakup at a velocity of about 207 miles per hour. The forces impod by this impact approximated 200 G's, far in excess of the structural limits of the crew compartment or crew survivability levels.
The paration of the crew compartment deprived the crew of Orbiter-supplied oxygen, except for a few conds supply in the lines. Each crew member's helmet was also connected to a personal egress air pack (PEAP) containing an emergency supply of breathing air (not oxygen) for ground egress emergencies, which must be manually activ
ated to be available. Four PEAP's were recovered, and there is evidence that three had been activated. The nonactivated PEAP was identified as the Commander's, one of the others as the Pilot's, and the remaining ones could not be associated with any crew member. The evidence indicates that the PEAP's were not activated due to water impact.
It is possible, but not certain, that the crew lost consciousness due to an in-flight loss of crew module pressure. Data to support this is:
∙The accident happened at 48,000 feet, and the crew cabin was at that altitude or higher for almost a minute. At that altitude, without an oxygen supply, loss of cabin pressure would have caud rapid loss of consciousness and it would not have been regained before water impact.线立体构成
∙PEAP activation could have been an instinctive respon to unexpected loss of cabin pressure.
∙If a leak developed in the crew compartment as a result of structural damage during or af
ter breakup (even if the PEAP's had been activated), the breathing air available would not have prevented rapid loss of consciousness.
∙The crew ats and restraint harness showed patterns of failure which demonstrates that all the ats were in place and occupied at water impact with all harness locked. This would likely be the ca had rapid loss of consciousness occurred, but it does not constitute proof.
