Bureaucracy
Max Weber
1.Characteristics of Bureaucracy
Modern officialdom functions in the following specific manner:喝的英语单词
Ⅰ.There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas,which are generally ordered by rules,that is,by laws or administrative regulations.[Italics added]
1.The regular activities required for the purpos of the bureaucratically governed structure
are distributed in a fixed way as official duties.
2.The authority to give the commands required for the discharge of the duties is distributed
in a stable way and is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive means,physical, sacerdotal,or otherwi,which may be placed at the disposal of officials.
3.Methodical provision is made for the regular and continuous fulfillment of the duties
and for the execution of the corresponding rights;only persons who have the generally regulated qualifications to rve are employed.
In public and lawful government the three elements constitute“bureaucratic authority.”In private economic domination,they constitute bureaucratic“management.”Bureaucracy,thus understood,is fully developed in political and ecclesiastical communities only in the modern state,and,in the private economy,only in the most advanced institutions of capitalism.
Permanent and public office authority,with fixed jurisdiction,is not the historical rule but rather the exception.This is so ever in large political structures such as tho of the ancient Orient,the Germanic and Mongolian empires of conquest,or of many feudal structures of state.In all the cas,the ruler executes the most important measures through personal trustees,table-companions,or court-rvants.Their commissions and authority are not precily delimited and are temporarily called into being for each ca.
Ⅱ.The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered system of super-and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones.Such a system offers the governed the possibility of appealing the decision of a lower office to its higher a
瑞士原装手表uthority,in a definitely regulated manner.With the full development of the bureaucratic type,the office hierarchy is monocratically organized.The principle of hierarchical office authority is found in all bureaucratic structures:in state and ecclesiastical structures as well as in large party organization and private enterpris.It does not matter for the character of bureaucracy whether its authority is called“private”or“public”.When the principle of jurisdictional“competency”is fully carried through,hierarchical subordination—at least in public office—does not mean that the“higher”authority is simply authorized to take over the business of the“lower.”Indeed,the opposite is the rule.Once established and having fulfilled its task,an office tends to continue in existence and be held by another incumbent.
Ⅲ.The management of the modern office is bad upon written documents(“the files”), which are prerved in their original or draught form.There is,therefore,a staff of subaltern officials and scribes of all sorts.The body of officials actively engaged in a“public”office,along with the respective apparatus of material implements and the files,make up a“bureau.”In private enterpri,“the bureau”is often called“the office.”
In principle,the modern organization of the civil rvice parates the bureau from the private domicile of the official,and,in general,bureaucracy gregates official activity as something distinct fr
om the sphere of private life.Public monies and equipment are divorced from the private
property of the official.This condition is everywhere the product of a long development. Nowadays,it is found in public as well as in private enterpris;in the latter,the principle extends even to the leading entrepreneur.In principle,the executive office is parated from the houhold, business from private correspondence,and business asts from private fortunes.The more consistently the modern type of business management has been carried through the more are the parations the ca.The beginnings of this process are to be found as early as the Middle Ages.
It is the peculiarity of the modern entrepreneur that he conducts himlf as the“first official”of his enterpri,in the very same way in which the ruler of a specifically modern bureaucratic state spoke of himlf as“the first rvant”of the state.The idea that the bureau activities of the state are intrinsically different in character from the management of private economic offices is a continental European notion and,by way of contrast,is totally foreign to the American way.
Ⅳ.Office management,at least all specialized office management--and such management is distinctly modern--usually presuppos thorough and expert training.This increasingly holds for the modern executive and employee of private enterpris,in the same manner as it holds for the state official.
Ⅴ.When the office is fully developed,official activity demands the full working capacity of the official,irrespective of the fact that his obligatory time in the bureau may be firmly delimited. In the normal ca,this is only the product of a long development,in the public as well as in the private office.Formerly,in all cas,the normal state of affairs was reverd:official business was discharged as a condary activity.
Ⅵ.The management of the office follows general rules,which are more or less stable,more or less exhaustive,and which can be learned.Knowledge of the rules reprents a special technical learning,which the officials posss.It involves jurisprudence,or administrative or business management.
The reduction of modern office management to rules is deeply embedded in its very nature.The theory of modern public administration,for instance,assumes that the authority to order certain matters by decree—which has been legally granted to public authorities—does not entitle the bureau to regulate the matter by commands given for each ca,but only to regulate the matter abstractly.This stands in extreme contrast to the regulation of all relationship through individual privileges and bestowals of favor,which is absolutely dominant in patrimonialism,at least in so far as such relationships are not fixed by sacred tradition.
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圆锥形的体积公式2.The Position of the Official
All this results in the following for the internal and external position of the official:
I.Office holding is a“vocation.”This is shown,first,in the requirement of a firmly prescribed cour of training,which demands the entire capacity for work for a long period of time,and in the generally prescribed and special examinations,which are prerequisites of employment. Furthermore,the position of the official is in the nature of a duty.This determines the internal structure of his relation,in the following manner:Legally and actually,office holding is not considered a source to be exploited for rents or emoluments,as was normally the ca during the Middle Ages and frequently up to the threshold of recent times.Nor is office holding considered a usual exchange of rvices for equivalents,as is the ca with free labor contracts.Entrance into an office,including one in the private economy,is considered an acceptance of a specific obligation of faithful management in return for a cure existence.It is decisive for the specific nature of modern loyalty to an office that,in the pure type,it does not establish a relationship to a
person,like the vassal’s or disciple’s faith in feudal or in patrimonial relations of authority. Modern loyalty is devoted to impersonal and functional purpo.Behind the functional purpos, of cour,“id
eas of culture-values”usually stand.The are ersatz for the earthly or supramundane personal master:ideas such as“state,”“church,”“community,”“party,”or “enterpri”are thought of as being realized in a community;they provide an ideological halo for the master.
The political official—at least in the fully developed modern state—is not considered the personal rvant of a ruler.Today,the bishop,the priest,and the preacher are in fact no longer,as in early Christian times,holders of purely personal charisma.The supramundane and sacred values,which they offer are given to everybody who ems to be worthy of them and who asks for them.In former times,such leaders acted upon the personal command of their master;in principle, they were responsible only to him.Nowadays,in spite of the partial survival of the old theory, such religious leaders are officials in the rvice of a functional purpo,which in the prent-day “church”has become routinized and,in turn,ideologically hallowed.
Ⅱ.The personal position of the official is patterned in the following way:
1.Whether he is in a private office or a public bureau,the modern official always strives and usually enjoys a distinct social esteem as compared with the governed.His social position is guaranteed by the prescriptive rules of rank order and,for the political official,by special definitions of the criminal code against“insults of officials”and“contempt”of state and church authorities.
The actual social position of the official is normally highest where,as in old civilized countries,the following conditions prevail:a strong demand for administration by trained experts;
a strong and stable social differentiation,where the official predominantly derives from socially and economically privileged strata becau of the social distribution of power;or where the costliness of the required training and status conventions are binding upon him.The posssion of educational certificates—to be discusd elwhere—are usually linked with qualification for office.Naturally,such certificates or patents enhance the“status element”in the social position of the officials.For the rest this status factor in individual cas is explicitly and impassively acknowledged;for example,in the prescription that the acceptance or rejection of an aspirant to an official career depends upon the connt(“election”)of the members of the official body.This is the ca in the German army with the office corps.Similar phenomena,which promote this guild-like closure of officialdom,are typically found in patrimonial and,particularly,in prebendal officialdoms of the past.The desire to resurrect such phenomena in changed forms is by no means infrequent among modern bureaucrats.For instance,they have played a role among the demands of the quite proletarian and expert officials(the tretyj element)during the Russian revolution.天翼3g太快了>电脑壁纸励志
Usually the social esteem of the officials as such is especially low where the demand for expert admi
nistration and the dominance of status conventions are weak.This is especially the ca in the United States;it is often the ca in new ttlements by virtue of their wide fields for profitmaking and the great instability of their social stratification.
2.The pure type of bureaucratic official is appointed by a superior authority.An official elected by the governed is not a purely bureaucratic figure.Of cour,the formal existence of an election do not by itlf mean that no appointment hides behind the election—in the state, especially,appointment by party chiefs.Whether or not this is the ca does not depend upon legal statutes but upon the way in which the party mechanism functions.Once firmly organized,
the parties can turn a formally free election into the mere acclamation of a candidate designated by the party chief.As a rule,however,a formally free election is turned into a fight,conducted according to definite rules,for votes in favor of one of two designated candidates.
In all circumstances,the designation of officials by means of an election among the governed modifies the strictness of hierarchical subordination.In principle,an official who is so elected has an autonomous position opposite the superordinate official.The elected official does not derive his position“from above”but“from below”or at least not from a superior authority of the official hierarchy b
ut from powerful party men(“boss”),who also determine his further career.The career of the elected official is not,or at least not primarily,dependent upon his chief in the administration.The official who is not elected but appointed by a chief normally functions more exactly,from a technical point of view,becau,all other circumstances being equal,it is more likely that purely functional points of consideration and qualities will determine his lection and career.As laymen,the governed can become acquainted with the extent to which a candidate is expertly qualified for office only in terms of experience,and hence only after his rvice. Moreover,in every sort of lection of officials by election,parties quite naturally give decisive weight not to expert considerations but to the rvices a follower renders to the party boss.This holds for all kinds of procurement of officials by elections,for the designation of formally free, elected officials by party boss when they determine the slate of candidates,or the free appointment by a chief who has himlf been elected.The contrast,however,is relative: substantially similar conditions hold where legitimate monarchs and their subordinate monarchs and their subordinates appoint officials,except that the influence of the followings are then less controllable.
Where the demand for administration by trained experts is considerable,and the party followings have to recognize an intellectually developed,educated,and freely moving“public opinion,”the u of
unqualified officials falls back upon the party in power at the next election. Naturally,this is more likely to happen when the officials are appointed by the chief.The demand for a trained administration now exists in the United States,but in the large cities,where immigrant votes are“corralled,”there is,of cour,no educated public opinion.Therefore, popular elections of the administrative chief and also of his subordinate officials usually endanger the expert qualification of the official as well as the preci functioning of the bureaucratic mechanism.It also weakens the dependence of the officials upon the hierarchy.This holds at least for the large administrative bodies that are difficult to supervi.The superior qualification and integrity of federal judges,appointed by the President,as over against elected judges in the United States is well known,although both types of officials have been lected primarily in terms of party considerations.The great changes in American metropolitan administrations demanded by reforms have proceeded esntially from elected mayors working with an apparatus of officials who were appointed by them.The reforms have thus come about in a“Caesarist”fashion. Viewed technically,as an organized from of authority,the efficiency of“Caesarism,”which often grows out of democracy,rests in general upon the position of the“Caesar”as a free trustee of mass(of the army or of the citizenry),who is unfettered by tradition.The“Caesar”is thus the unrestrained master of a body of highly qualified military officers and officials whom he lects freely and personally without regard to tradition or to any other conside
rations.This“rule of the personal genius,”however,stands in contradiction to the formally“democratic’principle of a universally elected officialdom.
3.Normally,the position of the official is held for life,at least in public bureaucracies;and this is increasingly the ca for all similar structures.As a factual rule,tenure for life is presuppod,even where the giving of notice or periodic reappointment occurs.In contrast to the worker in a private enterpri,the official normally holds tenure.Legal or actual life-tenure, however,is not recognized as the official’s right to the posssion of office,as was the ca with many structures of authority in the past.Where legal guarantees against arbitrary dismissal or transfer are developed,they merely rve to guarantee a strictly objective discharge of specific office duties free from all personal considerations.In Germany,this is the ca for all juridical and, increasingly,for all administrative officials.
Within the bureaucracy,therefore,the measure of“independence,”legally guaranteed by tenure,is not always a source of incread status for the official who position is thus cured. Indeed,often the rever holds,especially in old cultures and communities that are highly differentiated.In such communities,the stricter the subordination under the arbitrary rule of the master,the more it guarantees the maintenance of the conventional igneurial style of the living for the official.Becau
of the very abnce of the legal guarantees of tenure,the conventional esteem for the official may ri in the same way as,during the Middle Ages,the esteem of the nobility of office ro at the expen of esteem for the freemen,and as the king’s judge surpasd that of the people’s judge.In Germany,the military officer or the administrative official can be removed from office at any time,or at least far more readily than the“independent judge,”who never pays with loss of his office for even the grosst offen against the“code of honor”or against social conventions of the salon.For this very reason,if other things are equal,in the eyes of the master stratum the judge is considered less qualified for social intercour than are officers and administrative officials,who greater dependence on the master is a greater guarantee of their conformity with status conventions.Of cour,the average official strives for a civil-rvice law, which would materially cure his old age and provide incread guarantees against his arbitrary remove from office.This striving,however,has its limits.A very strong development of the“right to the office”naturally makes it more difficult to staff them with regard to technical efficiency,for such a development decreas the career-opportunities of ambitious candidates for office.This makes for the fact that officials,on the whole,do not feel their dependency upon tho at the top. This lack of a feeling of dependency,however,rests primarily upon the inclination to depend upon one’s equals rather than upon the socially inferior and governed strata.The prent conrvative movement among the Badenia clergy,occasioned by the anxiety of a
presumably threatening paration of church and state,has been expressly determined by the desire not to be turned“from
a master into a rvant of the parish.”
4.The official receives the regular pecuniary compensation of a normally fixed salary and the old age curity provided by a pension.The salary is not measured like a wage in terms of work done,but according to“status,”that is,according to the kind of function(the“rank”)and,in addition,possibly,according to the length of rvice.The relatively great curity of the official’s income,as well as the rewards of social esteem,make the office a sought-after position,especially in countries which no longer provide opportunities for colonial profits.In such countries,this situation permits relatively low salaries for officials.白蛇传的故事>不想上班了
5.The official is t for a“career”within the hierarchical order of the public rvice.He moves from the lower,less important,and lower paid to the higher positions.The average official naturally desires a mechanical fixing of the conditions of promotion:if not of the offices,at least
