A BEHA VIORAL AGENCY MODEL OF MANAGERIAL RISK TAKING
直线英语管理风险承担的行为代理模型
Building on agency and prospect theory views, we construct, in this article, a behav-ioral agency model of executive risk taking. In the model we combine elements of internal corporate governance with problem framing to explain executive risk-taking behavior. The model suggests that executive risk taking varies across and within different forms of monitoring and that agents may exhibit risk-eking as well as risk-aver behaviors. We develop specific propositions that combine monitoring with performance and the framing of strategic problems to explain executive choices of strategic risk. The resulting propositions enhance and extend the agency-bad cor-porate governance literature on executive risk taking.
"Agency theory ... [is characterized] by its em-phasis on the risk attitudes of principals and agents" (Barney & Hesterly, 1996: 124). Specifi-cally, principals are considered risk neutral in their preferences for individual firm actions, since they can diversify their shareholdings across multiple firms. Converly, since agent employment curity and income are inextrica-bly tied to one firm, agents are assumed to ex-hibit risk aversion in decisions regarding the firm in order to lower risk to personal wealt
影响研究h (Donaldson, 1961; Williamson, 1963). However, agent risk aversion creates opportunity costs for risk-neutral principals who prefer that agents maximize firm returns (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; Garen, 1994; Hill & Hann, 1989; Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1988; Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1992; Morck, Schleifer, & Vishny, 1988). This "risk differential" (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Coffee, 1988) between agents and principals creates a "moral hazard" problem in the principal-agent relation-ship. The challenge of corporate governance is to t up supervisory and incentive alignment mechanisms that alter the risk orientation of agents to align them with the interests of prin-cipals (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989). Despite the fundamental role risk plays in the calculus of agency theory, it is our contention that agency theory's formulation of risk has been too restrictive and naive. This narrow view of risk has prevented a fuller understanding of managerial decision making under conditions of dissimilar risk bearing and risk preferences between agents and principals. In this article we attempt to enhance agency theory's treatment of risk by addressing the limitations.
We can challenge agency-bad views of risk on veral counts. First, risk remains an under-developed concept within agency theory. In gen-eral, agency-bad corporate governance mod-els restrict risk-taking behavior of agents either to risk aversion (preferring lower risk options at the expen of returns) or neutrality (eking options where risk is compensated), thus tend-ing to negle
ct the possibility of risk-eking (cf., Fiegenbaum, 1990; Jegers, 1991; Machina, 1983; Markowitz, 1952; Piron & Smith, 1995; Wiman & Bromiley, 1996) or risk-"loving" behavior (accept-ing options where risk is not fully compensated; e.g., Asch & Quandt, 1990; Bulmash & Maherz, 1985; Coffee, 1988; Piron & Smith, 1995). In gen-eral, agency scholars consider non-risk-aver preferences outside tho induced by the com-pensation contract as
萝卜丝虾汤的做法either special cas (Jenn & Meckling, 1976: 338-340) or "uninter-esting" (Arrow, 1971) and, therefore, generally ignore them altogether. In contrast, a large body of knowledge on risk-taking behavior (Bowman, 1980; Bromiley, 1991; Fiegenbaum, 1990; Jegers, 1991; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986; March & Shapira, 1987; Sinha, 1994; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) has grown independently from the agency literature, challenging the restrictive risk assumptions often included in agency-bad mod-els. By incorporating this literature into agency-bad models of corporate governance, we can relax the assumptions and possibly improve the explanatory power of agency models of cor-porate governance.
Second, both normative and positivist agency scholars typically assume stable risk prefer-ences (often characterized as a cond-order utility curve; e.g., Lambert, 1986; Shavell, 1979) in models explaining changes in organization wealth (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979). This premi con-tradicts behavi
数据分析统计图表oral decision theory (Bazerman, 1994; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; March & Shapira, 1992) and rearch (Bromiley, 1991; Fiegenbaum, 1990; Jegers, 1991; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Lant, 1992; Wiman & Catanach, 1997) and ultimately limits agency theory's con-tribution to explaining how managerial risk tak-ing affects firm performance. In this article we relax the assumption that agents hold consis-tent risk preferences (e.g., increasing or decreas-ing risk aversion) and utilize a contingency-bad view from behavioral rearch on risk taking to allow for the possibility of varied risk preferences by the agent in a corporate gover-nance context.
Third, despite considerable theoretical (e.g., Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Coffee, 1988), ana-lytical (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Shavell, 1979), and empirical (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 1992) support for a link between governance structure and agent risk choices, the preci relationship remains in question. This suggests that models relying on governance structure alone may be inadequate and that additional factors may influence man-agerial risk taking. For example, scholars exam-ining managerial risk taking have found that governance factors alone provide insufficient explanations of managerial risk preferences (Catanach & Brody, 1993; Golbe & Shull, 1991). Further, some preliminary evidence suggests that aspects of the decision situation, as cap-tured in "problem framing" and as suggested by prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), add to corporate gover
nance models of manage-rial choice behavior (Palmer, 1995; Wiman & Catanach, 1997). We propo here a more com-prehensive view of managerial risk taking, for-mally integrating both the risk and performance attributes of the choice situation as well as the internal governance structure into a synthetic view of managerial risk.
Finally, despite a growing body of rearch on multiperiod contracts (Elitzur & Yaari, 1995; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1987; Lambert, 1983), scholars' treatments of agent risk and perfor-mance in the corporate governance literature often are linear and recursive. That is, their models of agent behavior tend to predict perfor-mance outcomes bad on the agent's risk pref-erences (McGuire, 1988; Rees, 1985), current
wealth (Elitzur & Yaari, 1995), and the risk and performance characteristics of available op-tions (Hoskisson et al., 1992; Kerr & Kren, 1992).1 Evidence from outside of the agency stream, however, demonstrates a more complex relation between performance and executive choices of risk (cf., Wiman & Bromiley, 1996). For exam-ple, an executive's current wealth may provide only a point of reference for asssing prospects as oppod to directly influencing the prefer-ence for risk (cf., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), as some agency models contend (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1987). Further, executives' choices of risk also may be influenced by their prior suc-cess at lecting risky al
ternatives (March & Shapira, 1987; Webber & Milliman, 1997). Taking a more longitudinal and dynamic view of risk and performance may enhance our explanation of agent risk taking and may improve explana-tions of firm performance resulting from mana-gerial choices.
In sum, agency theory's contribution to corpo-rate governance has been limited by its simplis-tic assumptions of consistent risk aversion among agents, its modeling of a recursive influ-ence from risk choice on performance, and its inability to provide unambiguous predictions of corporate governance's influence on executive behavior. The limitations provide both a chal-lenge and an opportunity for us to improve agency-bad models of managerial risk taking. It is our contention that the recent emergence of behavioral decision models of risk can contrib-ute directly to redressing the limitations. Al-though the potential contribution of behavioral decision theory to agency theory has been ac-knowledged (Coffee, 1988; Gomez-Mejia, 1994; Gomez-Mejia & Wiman, 1997), scholars have not yet formally linked or integrated it with the parallel agency-bad literature on the same subject. In this article we integrate behavioral decision theory views on risk with agency rela-tions in a corporate governance context in order to develop a synthetic model of managerial risk taking.
在代理和前景理论观点的基础上，我们在本文中构建了一个执行风险承担的行为代理模型。在该模型
未来的爱人中，我们将内部公司治理的要素与问题框架相结合，以解释执行风险承担行为。该模型表明，执行风险承担在不同形式的监控中不同，并且代理商可能表现出寻求风险以及规避风险的行为。我们制定了具体的命题，将监控与绩效和战略问题的框架相结合，以解释执行战略风险的选择。由此产生的命题增强并扩展了基于机构的公司执法风险承担治理文献。
“代理理论...... [通过其对委托人和代理人的风险态度的表达来表征”（Barney＆Hesterly，1996：124）。具体而言，委托人在个人公司行为的偏好中被认为是风险中性的，因为他们可以在多个公司中分散他们的股权。相反，由于代理人的就业保障和收入与一家公司紧密相关，因此为了降低个人财富风险，代理人被假定在公司决策中避免风险规避（Donaldson，1961; Williamson，1963）。然而，代理人风险规避为风险中立的委托人创造了机会成本，他们更喜欢代理人最大化公司的回报（Baysinger，Kosnik，＆Turk，1991; Garen，1994; Hill＆Hann，1989; Hill，Hitt，＆Hoskisson，1988; Hoskisson ，Hitt，＆Hill，1992; Morck，Schleifer，＆Vishny，1988）。代理人和委托人之间的这种“风险差异”（Beatty＆Zajac，1994; Coffee，1988）在委托- 代理关系中产生了“道德风险”问题。公司治理的挑战是
建立监督和激励调整机制，改变代理人的风险取向，使其与主要利益保持一致（Tosi＆Gomez-Mejia，1989）。尽管风险在代理理论的微积分中发挥着重要作用，但我们认为代理理论的风险表达过于严格和天真。这种狭隘的风险观点阻碍了在代理人和委托人之间存在不同风险和风险偏好的条件
下对管理决策的更全面理解。在本文中，我们试图通过解决这些局限性来增强代理理论对风险的处理。
我们可以在几个方面挑战基于代理的风险观点。首先，风险在代理理论中仍然是一个欠发达的概念。总的来说，基于代理的公司治理模式将代理人的冒险行为限制在风险规避（倾向于以回报为代价的低风险期权）或中立性（寻求风险得到补偿的期权），从而趋向于忽视冒险的可能性（参见，Fiegenbaum，1990; Jegers，1991; Machina，1983; Markowitz，1952; Piron＆Smith，1995; Wiman＆Bromiley，1996）或冒险- “爱”行为（接受- 风险未得到充分补偿的选择；例如，Asch＆Quandt，1990; Bulmash＆Maherz，1985; Coffee，1988; Piron＆Smith，1995）。在一般情况下，机构学者认为补偿合同引起的非风险规避偏好不是特殊情况（Jenn＆Meckling，1976：338-340）或“uninter-esting”（Arrow，1971）和因此，通常完全忽略它们。相比之下，大量关于冒险行为的知识（Bowman，1980; Bromiley，1991; Fiegenbaum，1990; Jegers，1991; MacCrimmon＆Wehrung，1986; March＆Shapira，1987; Sinha，1994; Tversky＆Kahneman，1981年）独立于代理文献发展，挑战通常包含在基于代理的模型中的限制性风险假设。通过将这些文献纳入基于代理的公司治理模型，我们可以放松这些假设，并可能提高公司治理机构模型的解释力。
其次，规范和实证主义代理学者通常在解释组织财富变化的模型中假设稳定的风险偏好（通常表征为二阶效用曲线；例如，Lambert，1986; Shavell，1979）（例如，Holmstrom，1979）。这个前提包
括行为决策理论（Bazerman，1994; Kahneman ＆Tversky，1979; March＆Shapira，1992）和研究（Bromiley，1991; Fiegenbaum，1990; Jegers，1991; Kahneman＆Lovallo，1993; Lant，1992; Wiman＆Catanach，1997）并最终限制了代理理论对解释管理风险如何影响公司业绩的贡献。在本文中，我们放松了这样的假设即代理人持有一致的风险偏好（例如，增加或减少风险规避），并利用从风险承担行为研究的基于偶然性的观点，以允许代理人在公司治理背景下具有不同的风险偏好的可能性。
第三，尽管有相当多的理论（例如，Baysinger＆Hoskisson，1990; Coffee，1988），ana-lytical（例如，Holmstrom，1979; Shavell，1979），以及经验（例如，Hoskisson 等，1992）支持治理结构和代理风险选择之间的联系，确切的关系仍然有问题。这表明仅依靠治理结构的模型可能不充分，而其他因素可能会影响管理风险。例如，考察管理风险的学者发现，治理因素本身并不能解释管理风险偏好（Catanach ＆Brody，1993; Golbe＆Shull，1991）。此外，一些初步证据表明，决策情境的各个方面，如“问题框架”和前景理论（Kahneman＆Tversky，1979）所暗示的那样，增加了管理层选择行为的公司治理模式（Palmer，1995; Wiman＆Catanach，1997）。我们在此提出一个更全面的管理风险倾向观，将选择情况的风险和绩效属性以及内部治理结构正式地整合到管理风险的综合视图中。
最后，尽管对多期合同的研究越来越多（Elitzur＆Yaari，1995; Holmstrom＆
Milgrom，1987; Lambert，1983），学者们对公司治理文献中的代理风险和绩效的处理往往是线性的和递归的。也就是说，他们的代理行为模型倾向于根据代理人的风险偏好（McGuire，1988; Rees，1985），当前财富（Elitzur＆Yaari，1995）以及风险和绩效特征来预测绩效结果。可用的选择（Hoskisson等，1992; Kerr ＆Kren，1992）.1然而，来自代理流之外的证据表明，绩效与执行风险选择之间的关系更为复杂（参见Wiman＆Bromiley，1996年）。例如，正如一些机构模型所认为的那样，高管当前的财富可能只是评估潜在客户的参考点，而不是直接影响风险偏好（参见Kahneman＆Tversky，1979）（Holmstrom＆Milgrom），1987）。此外，高管们对风险的选择也可能受到他们之前选择风险替代品的成功的影响（March＆Shapira，1987; Webber＆Milliman，1997）。对风险和绩效采取更加纵向和动态的观点可以增强我们对代理人承担风险的解释，并可以改善因管理者的选择导致的公司业绩解释。
总之，代理理论对公司治理的贡献受限于其对代理人一致的风险规避的简单假设，其对风险选择对绩效的递归影响的模型，以及无法提供公司治理对高管行为的影响的明确预测。这些限制既是挑战，也是我们改进基于机构的管理风险承担模式的机会。我们的观点是，最近出现的风险行为决策模型可以直接有助于纠正这些局限性。尽管行为决策理论对代理理论的潜在贡献得到了认识（Coffee，1988; Gomez-Mejia，1994; Gomez-Mejia＆Wiman，1997），但学者尚未正式将其与平行关联或整合关于同一主题的机构文献。在本文中，我们将行为决策理论对风险的看法与公司治理背景下的代理关系相结合，以便开发一个管理风险承担的综合模型。
苏国勋
Conclusions
Models are inherently incomplete depictions of the empirical world. The meso-theoretic per-spective we develop here combines behavioral decision theory with agency theory in order to reexamine the influence of various designs of internal corporate governance on executive risk bearing and risk taking. By necessity, our explo-ration narrowly frames the tting and issues that we consider and leads us to overlook some potentially important and relevant relations and issues. For instance, we explicitly focus on only two theoretical perspectives and thus ignore other theories that may also contribute uful explanatory power to a model of executive be-havior. By focusing on internal corporate gover-nance, we ignore the potential role that external market factors may play in limiting our argu-ments. Converly, it is possible that our argu-ments extend beyond the corporate governance tting examined here. For example, our argu-ment concerning the influence of internal and external performance measures on risk bearing could be extended to consider the locus of con-trol influences on reward designs in general. Finally, we place certain restrictive assump-tions on the model that should be given explicit attention in the future. In particular, we assume that executives u and therefore perceive ba pay differently from variable pay. We can easily envision compensation designs where this dis-tinction may be lost becau of a heavy reliance on variable pa
y in the form of commissions. We also assume shareholders are consistently risk neutral, even though we relax assumptions of consistent risk preferences by agents. Accom-modating variable risk preferences on the part of diver principals reprents a further ave-nue
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