关于革命的名言350 BC
ON MEMORY AND REMINISCENCE
by Aristotle
translated by J. I. Beare
1
WE have, in the next place, to treat of Memory and Remembering, considering its nature, its cau, and the part of the soul to which this experience, as well as that of Recollecting, belongs. For the persons who posss a retentive memory are not identical with tho who excel in power of recollection; indeed, as a rule, slow people have a good memory, whereas tho who are quick-witted and clever are better at recollecting.
We must first form a true conception of the objects of memory, a point on which mistakes are often made. Now to remember the future is not possible, but this is an object of opinion or expectation
(and indeed there might be actually a science of expectation, like that of divination, in which some believe); nor is there memory of the prent, but only n-perception. For by the latter we know not
the future, nor the past, but the prent only. But memory relates
to the past. No one would say that he remembers the prent, when it is prent, e.g. a given white object at the moment when he es it; nor would one say that he remembers an object of scientific
contemplation at the moment when he is actually contemplating it,
and has it full before his mind;-of the former he would say only
that he perceives it, of the latter only that he knows it. But when
one has scientific knowledge, or perception, apart from the actualizations of the faculty concerned, he thus 'remembers' (that the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles); as to
the former, that he learned it, or thought it out for himlf, as to
the latter, that he heard, or saw, it, or had some such nsible experience of it. For whenever one exercis the faculty of remembering, he must say within himlf, 'I formerly heard (or otherwi perceived) this,' or 'I formerly had this thought'.
Memory is, therefore, neither Perception nor Conception, but a state
or affection of one of the, conditioned by lap of time. As already obrved, there is no such thing as memory of the prent while prent, for the prent is object only of perception, and the future,
新手司机of expectation, but the object of memory is the past. All memory, therefore, implies a time elapd; conquently only tho animals which perceive time remember, and the organ whereby they perceive time is also that whereby they remember.
The subject of 'prentation' has been already considered in our
work On the Soul. Without a prentation intellectual activity is impossible. For there is in such activity an incidental affection
identical with one also incidental in geometrical demonstrations.
For in the latter ca, though we do not for the purpo of the
proof make any u of the fact that the quantity in the triangle
(for example, which we have drawn) is determinate, we nevertheless draw it determinate in quantity. So likewi when one exerts the intellect (e.g. on the subject of first principles), although the
object may not be quantitative, one envisages it as quantitative, though he thinks it in abstraction from quantity; while, on the
other hand, if the object of the intellect is esntially of the class
of things that are quantitative, but indeterminate, one envisages it
试想as if it had determinate quantity, though subquently, in thinking
it, he abstracts from its determinateness. Why we cannot exerci
the intellect on any object absolutely apart from the continuous, or apply it even to non-temporal things unless in connexion with time, is another question. Now, one must cognize magnitude and motion by means of the same faculty by which one cognizes time (i.e. by that which is also the faculty of memory), and the prentation (involved in such cognition) is an affection of the nsus communis; whence this follows, viz. that the cognition of the objects (magnitude, motion time) is effected by the (said nsus communis, i.e. the) primary faculty of perception. Accordingly, memory (not merely of nsible, but) even of intellectual objects involves a prentation: hence we may conclude that it belongs to the faculty of intelligence only incidentally, while directly and esntially it belongs to the primary
faculty of n-perception.
Hence not only human beings and the beings which posss opinion or intelligence, but also certain other animals, posss memory. If memory were a function of (pure) intellect, it would not have been
韩系服装
as it is an attribute of many of the lower animals, but probably, in
that ca, no mortal beings would have had memory; since, even as the ca stands, it is not an attribute of them all, just becau
all have not the faculty of perceiving time. Whenever one actually remembers having en or heard, or learned, something, he includes
in this act (as we have already obrved) the consciousness of
'formerly'; and the distinction of 'former' and 'latter' is a
雪国读后感distinction in time.
Accordingly if asked, of which among the parts of the soul memory is a function, we reply: manifestly of that part to which
清明节简介
'prentation' appertains; and all objects capable of being
prented (viz. aistheta) are immediately and properly objects of memory, while tho (viz. noeta) which necessarily involve (but only involve) prentation are objects of memory incidentally.
One might ask how it is possible that though the affection (the prentation) alone is prent, and the (related) fact abnt, the
latter-that which is not prent-is remembered. (The question aris), becau it is clear that we must conceive that which is generated through n-perception in the ntient soul, and in the part of
the body which is its at-viz. that affection the state whereof we
call memory-to be some such thing as a picture. The process of movement (nsory stimulation) involved the act of perception stamps in, as it were, a sort of impression of the percept, just as persons
do who make an impression with a al. This explains why, in tho who are strongly moved owing to passion, or time of life, no mnemonic impression is formed; just as no impression would be formed
if the movement of the al were to impinge on running water; while there are others in whom, owing to the receiving surface being frayed, as happens to (the stucco on) old (chamber) walls, or owing to the hardness of the receiving surface, the requisite impression is not implanted at all. Hence both very young and very old persons are defective in memory; they are in a state of flux, the former becau
of their growth, the latter, owing to their decay. In like manner,
猹的图片also, both tho who are too quick and tho who are too slow have bad memories. The former are too soft, the latter too hard (in the texture
of their receiving organs), so that in the ca of the former the prented image (though imprinted) does not remain in the soul,
最伤感的人while on the latter it is not imprinted at all.
But then, if this truly describes what happens in the genesis of memory, (the question stated above aris:) when one remembers, is
it this impresd affection that he remembers, or is it the
objective thing from which this was derived? If the former, it would
