NEW IDEAS FROM THE WORLD BANK OF SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES World Bank Group SME Department V ol. 2, No. 1 March 2001
A thriving SME ctor is crucial to spurring growth and reducing poverty in developing and transition economies. But financial institutions often avoid SMEs, nsing—understandably—that the transaction costs of financing them will be excessively high. What SMEs need is not to be left without access to capital, but approached on a new model that combines early-stage equity investment and performance-enhancing technical assistance, writes Bert van der Vaart, CEO of Small Enterpri Assistance Funds (SEAF). This US- and Dutch-bad NGO manages a network of 14 commercially driven investment funds worldwide with total asts of $140 million, and has developed a unique “equity plus assistance” approach to SME investing.
Small and medium sized enterpris (SMEs) Sare widely credited with generating the highest rates of revenue and employment growth in virtually all economies. In transition and developing countries open to foreign direct investment, they also tend to pay disproportionately more in taxes and social curity contributions than either their larger and smaller counterparts. Larger enterpris, especially multinationals, often find a way to reduce their tax obligations through transfer pricing, royalty payments, and negotiated tax holidays. Microenterpris, on the other hand, often fall in the informal s跳绳的正确方法
ector, neither paying taxes nor making social curity contributions. Yet if SMEs constitute a critical dimension of growth and development and are often well positioned to achieve high revenue and profit growth, why have private and public financing institutions alike tended to avoid investing in them?
The reasons are multiple and, for the most part, understandable.
For private investors, the amount of work required to invest relatively small sums into veral SMEs ems unattractive compared to the work needed to support fewer investments in larger companies. Moreover, investing in local SMEs also often involves working with entrepreneurs who are less familiar with conventional financing relationships, business practices, and the English language than principals of larger firms. Accordingly, most private capital would much prefer to invest in a few large-ast There are broader issues to be considered as well, including the lack of transparency in local legal systems and governments that make investing in the countries difficult at best. enterpris in fields such as pharmaceuticals, telecommunications or privatized industry rather than in smaller companies with relatively few asts, low capitalization and a perceived greater vulnerability to market conditions. Public development institutions can also encounter high administrative costs in making SME investments. The can be coupled with perceptions that local SMEentrepreneurs may
not be trustworthy, and that working with them might bring fewer visibly “developmental” benefits than targeting more poverty-focud fields such as microfinance.
Local commercial banks too are often biad in favor of large corporate borrowers with considerable asts. This has meant that even the lines of credit local banks receive from development institutions for on-lending to SMEs are often under-utilized. SME entrepreneurs’ lack of experience in accounting and other areas of financial
documentation makes it difficult for banks or other potential sources to asss their creditworthiness and cash flows, again hindering the provision of financing. Combined, the factors have largely left what should be the most dynamic ctor of the economy in developing countries lacking the capital it needs to realize its potential.
SEAF believes that the investment levels it takes,coupled with its focud efforts on increa value after investments, allows it to invest at relatively attractive multiples. This offers an array of potential exit possibilities. By contrast, many conventional emerging market private equity investors have had disappointing records in achieving exits over the last four years. SEAF’s approach to early-stage investing in SMEs thus may one day be en as one of the more appropriate means of investing in d
eveloping countries. In the meantime, SEAF is achieving its developmental objectives by rapidly increasing the revenues, productivity, and employment growth of its investee SMEs.
世界银行对中小企业的援助计划
中小企业的蓬勃发展对促进经济增长，减少发展中国家的贫穷和经济转型具有重要意义。但金融机构往往因为向中小企业融资的费用过高而减少贷款甚至不向他们贷款。中小企业援助基金会的CEO Bert van der Vaart写道中小企业需要的并不是没有机会获得资本，而是在一个包含早期阶段股权投资加强技术援助的模型上前进.这个以美国和荷兰为基础的非政府组织管理着14个商业化投资基金，在全球范围内具有1.40亿美元总资产，并制定了独特的“股权加援助”对中小型企业投资的方式。
几乎在所有经济体中，中小企业是促进经济增长和提高劳动就业率的一大功臣。在转型国家和发展中国家的外国直接投资开放，他们也往往不成比例地比任何的更大和更小的同行多支付税收和社会保障缴款。较大的企业，特别是跨国公司，往往会找到一种方法，通过转移定价，专利费的税务义务，并协商免税以减少税费。另一方面，小企业经常在非正规部门，既不纳税，也不缴纳社会保障款。然而，如果中小型企业掌握了增长和发展的临界尺寸，往往能够获得高收入和利润的增长。但为什么有私人和公共金融机构都倾向于避免对他们进行投资呢？其原因是多方面的，并为大部分可以理解的。对于私人投资者，投入较少的资金到几个中小型企业需要的工作量与投入到大企业相比，似乎缺乏吸
中国核电邮箱
引力。此外，投资本地中小型企业也往往涉及与对企业融资，商业做法，英语不太熟悉的企业家合作。还有更多的问题要考虑，包括本地法律体系和政府透明度的缺失，如药品，电讯或私营工业企业，而不是在资产相对较少的
小公司，这些公司资本化程度低，以及被认为极易受到市场条件的影响。公共发展机构也会遇到对中小企业投资的高额的行政费用，再加上SMEentrepreneurs 可能不可靠。与他们一起工作可能会带来明显减少“发展”比更针对小额信贷扶贫等为重点领域的利益。地方商业银行也往往偏向于有相当大的资产的大公司借款人的。这意味着，即使是当地银行从发展机构获得的信贷额度转贷给中小企业往往利用不足。中小企业企业家在会计和其他财务文件方面的经验不足，使得银行或其他潜在来源难以评估其信用及现金流量，从而不符合融资的条件。总之，这些因素都在很大程度上影响着缺乏资金去实现其潜力的发展中国家的经济发展最具活力的经济部门。
中小企业援助基金会认为，他们的投资水平和投资后的努力允许它投资在相对具有吸引力的倍数。这就提供了一个潜在的出口机会。与此相反，许多新兴市场的私人股权投资者过去4年里的出口令人失望。因此中小企业援助基金早期阶段的做法可能有一天被视为投资发展中国家最合适的手段。同时，该基金通过迅速增加中小企业的收入，生产率和就业增长来实现其发展目标。
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