UNIT7
1. Several leading modern business leaders em, surprisingly, to downplay the importance of strategy. You can make too much fuss about strategy, they imply--- you have a few clear options; just choo one and get on with it. is it really that simple?
痔疮小偏方2. “Strategy is straightforward---just pick a general direction and implement like hell.”
Jack Welch, for example---the chairman and CEO of the USA’s General Electric Company; the man who grow the company from a market capitalization of $27 billion to a $140 billion, making GE the largest and most valuable company in the world. he must know a thing or two about strategy. But here’s what he says: “In real life, strategy is actually very straightforward. You pick a general direction and you implement like hell.”Or Allan leighton, the man who was recruited by Archie Norman to help res cue the UK’s ailing Asda supermarket chain, and went on to build the company into one of Britain’s most successful retailers. “Strategy is important,” says Leighton, “but it is a compass, not a road map. It tells you in which direction you are heading, but the important bit is how you get there.”
Or Louis Gerstner, the man who rescued IBM in the 1990’s when the struggling mainframe supplier was about to be driven into extinction by the new, smaller and more agile personal computer manufact
urers. “It is extremely difficult to develop a unique strategy for a company; and if the strategy is truly different, it is probably highly risky. Execution really is the critical part of a successful strategy. Getting it done, getting it done right, getting it done better than the next person is far more important than dreaming up new visions of the future.”
3. So strategy is simple. And having an ingenious new strategy is less important than carrying it out successfully. In fact it might be dangerous. It that right?歌手赵雷
Let’s look at one last quote from Mr. Welch. “When I became CEO in 1981, we launched a highly publicized initiative: be number one or number two in every market, and fix, ll or clo to get there. This was not our strategy, although I’ve often heard it descri bed that way.
It was a galvanising mantra to describe how we were going to do business going forward. Our strategy was much more directional. GE was going to move away from business that were being commoditized toward business that manufactured high-value technology products or sold rvices instead of things.”
Grand strategy versus strategy燃烧脂肪的食物
4. I would argue that the CEO’s blue chip corporations are taking a slightly Olympian view of the concept of “strategy.” Let’s call what hey are talking about “grand strategy” a strategy, but in the overarching n, like the American car industry saying that they are going to move out gas-guzzlers and into smaller, more fuel-efficient models. 1.一些领先的现代企业领导人似乎，奇怪的是，淡化战略的重要性。你可以对策略太过计较，他们暗示---你有几个明确的选择，只需选择一个，并应对它就可以了。难道真的那么简单吗？
2. “策略很简单- 只需选择一个大方向，然后拼命地实施。”
例如- 美国的通用电气公司董事长兼首席执行官杰克·韦尔奇，把市场资本增长从270亿美元升到1400亿美元，使得GE成为世界上的最大和最有价值的公司。他必须对战略略知一二。但这是他说的：“在现实生活中，战略其实很直截了当。你选择一个大方向，然后拼命地实现它。”
或者阿伦.雷特顿，被阿奇诺曼所聘用，以帮助拯救英国疲弱的阿斯达连锁超市，并继续将公司建设成英国最成功的零售商之一的人是这样看待战略的：“战略是非常重要的，”他说，“但它是一个指南针，而不是一个地图。它会告诉你，你正朝着哪个方向前进，但重要的一点是你如何到达那里。”
或者路易斯.格斯特纳，在1990年的时候挽救IBM，当时这个苦苦挣扎的主机供应商即将被新的，更小的，更灵活的个人电脑制造商所淘汰。他眼中的战略是：“对一个公司来说发展一个独一无二的战略是
沥青延度试验
极其困难的；如果战略是真的不同，那么它可能是极其危险的.执行确实是一个成功的战略的重要组成部分。做完它，做对它，做得比别人好远比憧憬未来更重要。“
3.因此策略很简单。具有独创性的新战略没有成功地实现它重要。事实上，这可能是危险的。是这样吗？
让我们来看看韦尔奇说过的一句话。“当我在1981年成为首席执行官[GE]的时候，我们推出了广为宣传的口号：在每一个市场成为头号或排名第二，为达目的不惜整顿，出售或关闭。这不是我们的战略，虽然我常常听到有人那么说。
这是一个激励人心的口头禅来形容我们的业务应该向什么方向发展。我们的策略不仅仅是方向性的。通用电气公司打算从生产商品化产品转向生产高附加值的科技产品或出售服务替代出售产品。“色乱
大战略与策略
4. 我认为，这些CEO的蓝筹公司都对战略概念采取了稍微涵盖一切的观点。让我们把他们所谈论的“大战略”称为一个战略，但这是在总体意义上来说的，就像美国汽车业说，他们会从高耗油车辆转型到更小，更省油的车型。
And perhaps this is where Allan leighton and Louis Gerstner were coming
from in their earlier quotes. “It was simple,” Leighton might say. “Asda had always been about value.” Or Gerstner might say: “It was simple. We had to get IBM back to thinking about customer rvice.” Maybe, for a chief executive, that’s strategy---and rightly so. But I can’t agree with Welch when he says that “Be number in every market, and fix, ll or clo to get there” was not a strategy.
It was, in my humble opinion, a very clear business strategy: one of the many strategies that Welch must have employed in pursuit of his grand strategy, to move out of commodities. And I also don’t beli eve (as Leighton and Gerstner appear to believe) that “low level” strategy is simple or easily chon, even once the grand strategy is clear, or that it is difficult to devi a radically new strategy.
A battle of wits
5. Strategy is about detailed planning; a battle of wits between the leader/manager and whatever forces he or she is pitted against. Even relatively simple business initiatives require “strategic” thinking---the need to act in a way that moves you clor to the final goal, rather than in a way that merely solves the immediate problem.
6. Napoleon Bonaparte was, in my opinion, one of the greatest strategic thinkers of history, a brilliant planner and a masterful logistician. In a career studded with brilliant victories, Napoleon’s most over
whelming strategic victory was perhaps his campaign of 1805, when he made a preemptive strike against the armies of Austria and Russian who were combining forces to invade France.
He dispatched 210,000 troops from northern France to the Danube, collecting 25,000 Bavarian allies along the way: an unprecedented number of men travelling more than two hundred miles in the remarkably short time of thirteen days. Napoleon surprid the Austrians with both the speed and direction of his attack, cutting them off in the fortress city of Ulm on the upper reaches of the Danube. The Austrian General Mack was forced to surrender his 30,000 men without any significant battle having been fought.
Napoleon’s impe tuous commander of cavalry then failed to execute Napoleon’s plan to encircle the Russian army in a similar way, leaving Napoleon in a very expod position, even though his cavalry commander did achieve the trophy victory of occupying Vienna, the Austrian capital. French troops were tired after eight weeks of campaigning; their lines of communication were very stretched.
Napoleon’s impetuous commander of cavalry then failed to execute Napoleon’s plan to encircle the Russian army in a similar way, leaving Napoleon in a very expod position, even though his cavalry commander did achieve the trophy victory of occupying Vienna, the Austrian capital. French troops w
ere tired after eight weeks of campaigning; their lines of communication were very stretched. 也许这就是阿伦.雷特顿和路易.斯格斯特纳先前所说的。“这很简单,” 雷特顿可能会说。“阿斯达一直与价值有关。”格斯特纳可能会说：“这很简单。我们必须让IBM回到考虑客户服务上面来。”也许，对于一个首席执行官来说，这就是战略–-的确如此。但我不同意韦尔奇的“在每一个市场成为世界第一或排名第二，为达目的不惜整顿，出售或关闭”不是一个战略的观点。
依我的愚见，那是很清晰的商业策略：是韦尔奇在追求他的大战略---离开商品制造业时必定采用的许多战略之一。而且我也不赞同这种说法（雷特顿和格斯特纳似乎相信）：一旦大战略是明确的，那么“低层次”的策略是很简单或容易选择的，或者说是很难设计出一种全新的战略。
智慧的战役
5.战略是关于详细规划，是一场领导者/管理者和任何他或她反抗的势力之间的智慧战役。即使是相对简单的业务计划也需要“战略”思维- 需要你以更接近最终的目标的方法行动，而不是以只是解决了眼前的问题的方式行事。
6.拿破仑·波拿巴，在我看来，是历史上最伟大的战略思想家，杰出的策划者和高超的军需师之一。在满是辉煌的胜利的职业生涯中，拿破仑的最压倒性的战略胜利也许是他1805年的战役，当时他对奥地利和俄罗斯联合入侵法国的军队进行了先发制人的打击。
他派出210,000军队从法国北部到多瑙河，沿途汇集25,000巴伐利亚盟友：以空前数量在十三天非常短的时间行驶两百多英里。拿破仑以他的攻击的速度和方向震惊了奥地利人，在多瑙河上游的要塞城市乌尔姆切断他们。奥地利将军马克在没有任何显著战斗的情况下被迫带着30000人投降。
拿破仑的浮躁的骑兵指挥官则无法执行拿破仑以类似的方式包围俄国军队的计划从而使拿破仑处于一个非常暴露的位置，即使他的骑兵指挥官确实取得了占领奥地利首都维也纳的纪念性胜利。法国军队在八周的征战后非常疲惫，其通信线路也延伸太长。
拿破仑的浮躁的骑兵指挥官则无法执行拿破仑以类似的方式包围俄国军队的计划从而使拿破仑处于一个非常暴露的位置，即使他的骑兵指挥官确实取得了占领奥地利首都维也纳的纪念性胜利。法国军队在八周的征战后非常疲惫，其通信线路也延伸太长。
The Russians had met with the remnants of the Austrian Army in the interior and their combined forces now numbered some 90,000 men. Napoleon was expod between a rock and a hard place. He made a key strategic decision: attack. From a position of apparent weakness, he marched towards the enemy, luring them into the decisive battle that was his best hope of success---the battle of Austerlitz, in what in now the Czech Republic..
7 Napoleon marched north from Vienna with only 53,000 troops. The Allies watched as the French ar
my emed to walk into a trap. On the day of the battle, Napoleon sprung a trap within a trap. Having made a great show of relinquishing the key high ground of the chon battlefield, in a apparent confusion, before the action began, he allowed the Russian and Austrian Allies to ize this commanding position. He then dispod of his troops in a way that encouraged the Allies to attack his apparently vulnerable right wing. As the Allies poured troops off the high ground in the center to attack this wing, the French attacked with reinforcements who had arrived by forced march from Vienna, as planned, on the very eve of the battle.
A heavy fog filled the valley beneath the heights, concealing the troops that Napoleon was gathering at his center. As the sun broke through the mist at nine o’clock---”the glorious sun of Austerlitz”---the French stormed and ized the high ground, cutting the Allied position in two. The Russians and Austrians lost 15,000 killed with 12,000 taken prisoner: nearly one third of their force. The remainder of the army was scattered: the Russians retreated through Hungary and Poland. The day after the battle, the Austrian Emperor asked for an armistice.
Destroy the opposition as a cohesive force
8.The battle of Austerlitz was surely a great “strategic victory.” Napoleon never wanted merely to win
a battle; in every campaign, he tried to bring the enemy to a position where their defeat would be catastrophic. He sought either to neutrali whole armies by outmanoeuvring them, or to destroy them as a cohesive fighting force. Napoleon outthought his enemies strategically, which was far more significant than his undoubted tactical brilliance on the battlefield.
9. Perhaps Jack Welch would argue that Napoleon had simply “picked his general direction and implemented like hell.” If that is the ca, then we would have to step back and consider what would reprent Napoleon’s “grand strategy”---the overarching strategy that would then enable him to pick “general directions” and get implementing.
At this stage in his career, his grand strategy was the defen of the French Republic: ever since the French Revolution, the established monarchies of Europe had tried to snuff out the revolution and reestablish the French Bourbon monarchy. On Welch’s analysis, Napoleon was following this “general direction” and implementing away by destroying or neutralizing the invading Austrian and Russian armies and 俄国人会合了奥地利军队的残部，他们的联合部队现在人数达到90,000人。拿破仑进退两难。他做了一个重要的战略决策：攻击。从明显的弱点位置，他向敌人进军，他们进入决战，这是他最好的成功的的希望---奥斯特利茨战役（在现在的捷克共和国）。
7.拿破仑的只有53,000人的部队从维也纳向北部前进。盟军看着法军仿佛走进一个陷阱。在战斗的这一天，拿破仑在陷阱中拿出了王牌。让人很困惑的是，在行动开始前，法军故意做出放弃了选择战场的关键制高点的样子，他让俄罗斯和奥地利的盟友占领了这一制高点。然后，他以鼓励盟军攻击他显然是脆弱的右翼方式部署他的部队。当盟军海啸般从高地攻击法军的右翼部队时，法国和它的增援部队开始还击，这支增援部队是按计划在战斗的前夕从维也纳急行军抵达的。
高地之下的山谷大雾弥漫，隐藏了拿破仑在中心聚集的部队。当太阳在九点透过薄雾的时候- “奥斯特利茨的伟大太阳' –法军猛攻并占领了制高点，切断盟军的位置，把它一分为二。俄国人和奥地利人失去了15,000人，12,000被俘：损失了近三分之一的力量。该部队的残余也分散了：俄罗斯通过匈牙利和波兰撤退。战役后的第二天，奥地利皇帝要求停战。
集中优势兵力摧毁敌人
8. 奥斯特利茨战役无疑是一个巨大的“战略胜利” 。拿破仑从来不想只是为了赢得一场战役，在每一场战斗中，他尽力把敌人逼到灾难性的失败的绝境。他要么智胜一筹地打垮整个军队，要么作为一个有凝聚力的战斗力量摧毁他们。拿破仑在战略方面是智胜了他的敌人，这是远远比在战场上他不容置疑的战术辉煌更为重要。
9.也许杰克·韦尔奇会说，拿破仑只是简单地“选择了他的大方向并拼命地实现它罢了。如果是这样的话，
那么我们将不得不后退一步，考虑什么可以代表拿破仑的“大战略”---这个让他选择了”大方向”并实现它的总体战略。
在他的职业生涯的这个阶段中，他的大战略是保卫法兰西共和国：自法国大革命以来，欧洲的各帝国就一直试图扼杀革命，并重新建立法国波旁王朝。依韦尔奇的分析，拿破仑就是在这个“大方向”的指导下，通过摧毁或打垮入侵奥地利和俄国军队并缔结一项极为有利的停战协议而实
10. At this point, we are in danger of arguing about mantics. Nevertheless, I would argue strongly that, although Napoleon’s “strategy” was the defen of France, his lower-level decisions - to surpri the Austrians with the speed and direction of his fast attack, or to lure the Allies into a decisive battle---were still strategic decisions.
Grand strategy: life of death
11. Intriguingly it was Napoleon’s grand strategy that was later to lead to his downfall. Britain, un-invaded and unconquered, became an increasing thorn in Napoleon’s side as it ud the huge rerves of cash and credit, derived from the industrial revolution and the expanding empire, to fund alliances of various European nations against the new French Republic. Napoleon decided to starve Britain of cash: he would conquer the whole of Europe and force the continent to stop trading with Br
itain. It was an over-ambitious strategy that led him to invade Britain’s old trading ally. Portugal, and then Spain, and finally Russia, with disastrous conquences.
12. Welch, Leighton, Gerstner and their fellow business leaders will not be wrong: get the grand strategy right and then sweat the execution; get it wrong and your are doomed. But, if the grand strategy is right, then the devil (and potential victory) is still in the detail. You can execute for all you’re worth but, without brilliant conception and faultless planning, the minor strategies that you employ in pursuit of the overall goal will fail.
13. And I stick to my guns: the are indeed strategies: they are not mere “implementation.”
英译汉
1)Let’s look at one last quote from Mr. Welch. “When I became CEO [of GE] in 1981, we launched6 a highly publicized initiative: Be number one or number two in every market, and fix, ll or clo to get there. This was not our strategy, although I’ve often heard it described that way.
It was a galvanising mantra to describe how we were going to do business going forward. Our strategy was much more directional. GE was going to move away from business that were being c
ommoditized toward business that manufactured high-value technology products or sold rvices instead of things.”
2)Intriguingly it was Napoleon’s grand strategy that was later to lead to his downfall. Britain, un-invaded and unconquered, became an increasing thorn in Napoleon’s side as it ud the huge rerves of cash and credit, derived from the industrial revolution and the expanding empire, to fund alliances of various European nations against the new French Republic. Napoleon decided to starve Britain of cash: he would conquer the whole of Europe and force the continent to stop trading with Britain. It was an over-ambitious strategy that led him to invade Britain’s old trading ally, Portugal, and then Spain, and finally Russia, with disastrous 在这一点上，我们存在争论语义的危险。不过，我强烈认为，虽然拿破仑的“战略”是保卫法国，但是他的低层的决策- 以他的快攻的速度和方向震惊了奥地利人或盟军进入决战–仍然是战略决策。
大战略：生或死
11.很困惑的是，正是拿破仑的大战略导致他后来的失败。英国，这个未被入侵和征服的国家，越来越成为拿破仑的身边的刺，因为它利用来源于工业革命和不断扩大的帝国的巨额的现金和信誉储备给各个联盟的欧洲国家提供资金反对新的法兰西共和国。拿破仑决定要困死英国的现金：他要征服整个欧
洲，并迫使欧洲大陆停止与英国的贸易。入侵英国的交易老友葡萄牙，然后西班牙，最后是俄罗斯，正是这个过度野心的战略给他带来了灭顶之灾。
12.韦尔奇，雷特顿，格斯特纳和其他的企业领袖不会是错的：只要大战略正确了，那么就拼命地执行；弄错了，你是注定要失败的。但是，如果大战略是正确的，那么拼命地执行（和潜在的胜利）仍然取决于细节。您可以不顾一切地执行，但是，没有杰出的构思和完美的规划，你在追求的大目标时所使用的小策略将会失败。
13.我固执己见：这些的确是策略：他们不是单纯的“实施” 。
让我们来看看韦尔奇说过的一句话。“当我在1981年成为首席执行官[GE]的时候，我们推出了广为宣传的口号：在每一个市场成为头号或排名第二，为达目的不惜整顿，出售或关闭。这不是我们的战略，虽然我常常听到有人那么说。
这是一个激励人心的口头禅来形容我们的业务应该向什么方向发展。我们的策略不仅仅是方向性的。通用电气公司打算从生产产品的制造业转向生产高附加值的科技产品或出售服务的商业。
很有趣的是，正是拿破仑的大战略导致他后来的失败。英国，这个未被入侵和征服的国家，越来越成为拿破仑的身边的刺，因为它利用巨额储备的现金和信誉，这些现金和信誉来源于工业革命和不断扩宿迁考试鉴定中心官网
大的帝国，给各个联盟的欧洲国家提供资金反对新的法兰西共和国。拿破仑决定要饿死英国的现金：他要征服整个欧洲，并迫使欧洲大陆停止与英国的贸易。正是这个过度野心的战略促使他以灾难性的后果入侵英国的老交易盟友，
汉译英
Paying the highest wages, while having the lowest wage costs. We had to get the best people in the world and had to pay the hell out of them. But we couldn't carry along people we didn't need. We needed to have better people if we were going to get more productivity from fewer of them. Needing to be “hard” in order to be “soft.” Soft stuff won't work if it doesn't follow demonstrated toughness. It works only in a performance-bad culture.
Maximizing an Organization's Intellect. Getting every employee's mind into the game is a huge part of what the C.E.O job is all about. The first step is being open to the best of what everyone, everywhere, has to offer. The cond is transferring that learning across the organization.
People First, Strategy Second. Getting the right people in the right jobs is a lot more important than developing a strategy. We learned the hard way that we could have the greatest strategies in the world, but with the wrong leaders developing and owning them, we'd get good-looking prentations
and so-so results.
Self - Confidence. Arrogance is a killer, legitimate lf-confidence is a winner. The true test of lf-confidence is the courage to be open-to welcome change and new ideas regardless of their source.
Managing Loo, Managing Tight. Knowing when to meddle and when to let go was a pure decision. I managed tight when I nd I could make a difference. I managed loo when I knew I had little if anything to offer. Consistency was not a requirement here. Sometimes being an undisciplined, unmade bed got the job done faster. I loved to go on the field when I thought I could play, and I loved cheering from the sidelines when I didn't think I belonged in the game. 支付最高薪金的同时保持最低工资开支：我们必须得到世界上最优秀的人才，并向他们支付高额报酬。但我们不能留用那些我们不需要的人。如果我们想从相对少量的人身上获得更高的生产效率，我们就需要有更优秀的人才。鸡兔同笼练习题
为达到“温和”目标而必须“强硬”：如果不首先实施明确的强硬措施，温和的措施不会发挥作用。只有在一个以遵循为基础的企业文化基础上，温和措施才会发挥作用。
充分调动团体的聪明才智：总裁职责主要是使每个雇员全神贯注。第一步是最大限度地对能向你提供建议的每个人和每个地方都敞开心扉。第二步是将你所学到的东西传导给团体。
人才第一，战略第二：将合适的人安排在合适的职位上比开发一项战略更为重要。我们的一条重要经验教训是，我们可以拥有世界上最伟大的战略，但若让错误的领导去开发和拥有它们，得到的便是看上去不错的表演而结果却乏善可言。
自信：傲慢是杀手，而合理的自信则是胜利者。对自信的真正考验是勇敢地敞开心扉去欢迎变革和新建议，无论这种革新和建议来自何处。
坚定的近义词和反义词
放手管理与严格管理：知道什么时候插手，什么时候放手是一种纯粹直觉的决定。当我意识到我会做的更好时，我就采取严格的管理；当我意识到我没有多少东西可以提供时，我就采取松散的管理。这里不需要一贯性。有时候，不受约束、不拘常规反而办事更快。
