On Communicative Competence
橘色玫瑰Hymens, D. H.
This paper is theoretical. One connotation of "theoretical" is "programatic"; a related connotation is that one knows too little about the subject to say something practical. Both connotations apply to this attempt to contribute to the study of the "language problems of disadvantaged children". Practical work, however, must have an eye on the current state of theory, for it can be guided or misguided, encouraged or discouraged, by what it takes that state to be. Moreover, the language development of children has particular pertinence just now for theory. The fundamental theme of this paper is that the theoretical and the practical problems converge.
It is not that there exists a body of linguistic theory that practical rearch can turn to and has only to apply. It is rather that work motivated by practical needs may help build the theory that we need. To a great extent programs to change the language situation of children are an attempt to apply a basic science that does not yet exist. Let me review the prent stage of linguistic theory to show why this is so.
Consider a recent statement, one that makes explicit and preci an assumption that has underlain mu
ch of modern linguistics (Chomsky, 1965, p. 3): Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance.画圆圈
From the standpoint of the children we ek to understand and help, such a statement may em almost a declaration of irrelevance. All the difficulties that confront the children and ourlves em swept from view.
One's respon to such an indication of the state of linguistic theory might be to ignore fundamental theory and to pick and choo among its products. Models of language structure, after all, can be uful in ways not envisioned in the statements of their authors. Some linguists (e.g., Labov, Ronbaum, Gleitman) u transformational generative grammar to study some of the ways in which a speech community is not homogeneous and in which speaker-listeners clearly have differential knowledge of a language. Perhaps, then, one ought simply to disregard how linguists define the scope of "linguistic" theory. One could point to veral available models of language - Trager-Smith-Joos, tagnemic, stratificational, transformational generative (in its MIT, Pennsylvania, H
arvard and other variants), and, in England, "system-structure" (Halliday and others); remark that there are distinguished scholars using each to analys English; regret that linguists are unable to agree on the analysis of English; and pick and choo, according to one's
problem and local situation, leaving grammarians otherwi to their own devices.
To do so would be a mistake for two reasons: on the one hand, the sort of theoretical perspective quoted above is relevant in ways that it is important always to have in mind; on the other hand, there is a body of linguistic data and problems that would be left without theoretical insight, if such a limited conception of linguistic theory were to remain unchallenged.公共标志
考试总结The special relevance of the theoretical perspective is expresd in its reprentative anecdote (to u Kenneth Burke's term), the image it puts before our eyes. The image is that of a child, born with the ability to master any language with almost miraculous ea and speed; a child who is not merely molded by conditioning and reinforcement, but who actively proceeds with the unconscious theoretical interpretation of the speech that comes its way, so that in a few years and with a finite experience, it is master of an infinite ability, that of producing and understanding in principle any and all grammatical ntences of language. The image (or theoretical perspective) express the esnti
al equality in children just as human beings. It is noble in that it can inspire one with the belief that even the most dispiriting conditions can be transformed; it is an indispensable weapon against views that would explain the communicative differences among groups of children as inherent, perhaps racial.
The limitations of the perspective appear when the image of the unfolding, mastering, fluent child is t beside the real children in our schools. The theory must em, if not irrelevant, then at best a doctrine of poignancy: poignant, becau of the difference between what one imagines and what one es; poignant too, becau the theory, so powerful in its own realm, cannot on its terms cope with the difference. To cope with the realities of children as communicating beings requires a theory within which sociocultural factors have an explicit and constitutive role; and neither is the ca.
For the perspective associated with transformational generative grammar, the world of linguistic theory has two parts: linguistic competence and linguistic performance. Linguistic competence is understood as concerned with the tacit knowledge of language structure, that is, knowledge that is commonly not conscious or available for spontaneous report, but necessarily implicit in what the (ideal) speaker-listener can say. The primary task of theory is to provide for an explicit account of such knowledge, especially in relation to the innate structure on which it must depend. It is in terms o
f such knowledge that one can produce and understand an infinite t of ntences, and that language can be spoke of as "creative", as .mergeia. Linguistic performance is most explicitly understood as concerned with the rocess often termed encoding and decoding. Such a theory of competence posits ideal objects in abstraction from sociocultural features that might enter into their description. Acquisition of competence is also en as esntially independent of sociocultural features, requiring only suitable speech in the environment of the child to develop. The theory of performance is the one ctor that might have a specific sociocultural content; but while equated with a theory of language u, it is esntially concerned with psychological byproducts of the analysis of grammar, not, say, with social interaction. As to a constitutive role for
sociocultural features in the acquisition or conduct of performance, the attitude would em quite negative. Little or nothing is said, and if something were said, one would expect it to be depreciatory. Some aspects of performance are, it is true, en as having a constructive role (e.g., the cycling rules that help assign stress properly to ntences), but if the passage quoted at the outt is recalled, however, and if the illustrations of performance phenomena in the chapter from which the passage comes are reviewed, it will be en that the note struck is persistently one of limitation, if not disability. When the notion of performance is introduced as "the actual u of language in concret
e situations", it is immediately stated that only under the idealization quoted could performance directly reflect competence, and that in actual fact it obviously could not. "A record of natural speech will show numerous fal starts, deviations from rules, changes of plan in mid-cour, and so on." One speaks of primary linguistic data as "fairly degenerate in quality" (Chomsky, 1965, p. 31), or even of linguistic performance as "adulteration" of ideal competence (Katz, 1967, p. 144). While "performance" is something of a residual category for the theory, clearly its most salient connotation is that of imperfect manifestation of underlying system. I do not think the failure to provide an explicit place for sociocultural features to be accidental. The restriction of competence to the notions of a homogeneous community, perfect knowledge, and independence of sociocultural factors does not em just a simplifying assumption, the sort that any scientific theory must make. 1£ that were so, then some remark to that effect might be made; the need to include a sociocultural dimension might be mentioned; the nature of such inclusion might even be suggested. Nor does the predominant association of performance with imperfection em accidental. Certainly, any stretch of speech is an imperfect indication of the knowledge that underlies it. For urs that share the knowledge, the arrangement might be thought of as efficient. And if one us one's intuitions as to speech, as well as to grammar, one can e that what to grammar is imperfect, or unaccounted for, may be the artful accomplishment of a social act (Garfinkel, 1972), or the patterned, spontaneous evidence of problem
solving and conceptual thought (John, 1967, p. 5). The things might be acknowledged, even if not taken up. It takes the abnce of a place for sociocultural factors, and the linking of performance to imperfection, to disclo an ideological aspect to the theoretical standpoint. It is, if I may say so, rather a Garden of Eden view. Human life ems divided between grammatical competence, an ideal innately-derived sort of power, and performance, an exigency rather like the eating of the apple, thrusting the perfect speaker-hearer out into a fallen world. Of this world, where meanings maybe won by the sweat of the brow, and communication achieved in labor (d. Bonhoffer, 1965, p. 365), little is said. The controlling image is of an abstract, isolated individual, almost an unmotivated cognitive mechanism, not, except incidentally, a person in a social world.
Any theoretical stance of cour has an ideological aspect, and that aspect of prent linguistic theory is not its invention. A major characteristic of modern linguistics has been that it takes structure as primary end in itlf, and tends to depreciate u, while not relinquishing any of its claim to the great significance that is attached to language. (Contrast classical antiquity, where structure was a means to u, and the grammarian subordinate to the rhetor.) The result can
sometimes em a very happy one. On the one hand, by narrowing concern to independently and readily structurable data, one can enjoy the prestige of an advanced science; on the other hand, des
同心战疫pite ignoring the social dimensions of u, one retains the prestige of dealing with something fundamental to human life.
In this light, Chomsky is quite correct when he writes that his conception of the concern of linguistic theory ems to have been also the position of the founders of modern general linguistics. Certainly if modern structural linguistics is meant, then a major thrust of it has been to define the subject matter of linguistic theory in terms of what it is not. In de Saussure's linguistics, as generally interpreted, fa langue was the privileged ground of structure, and la parole the residual realm of variation (among other things). Chomsky associates his views of competence and performance with the Saussurian conceptions of langue and parole, but es his own conceptions as superior, going beyond the conception of language as a systematic inventory of items to renewal of the Humboldtian conception of underlying process. The Chomsky conception is superior, not only in this respect, but also in the very terminology it introduces to mark the difference. "Competence" and "performance" much more readily suggest concrete persons, situations, and actions. Indeed, from the standpoint of the classical tradition in structural linguistics, Chomsky's theoretical standpoint is at once its revitalization and its culmination. It carries to its perfection the desire to deal in practice only with what is internal to language, yet to find in that internality that in theory is of the widest or deepes
t human significance. No modern linguistic theory has spoken more profoundly of either the internal structure or the intrinsic human significance.
关于篮球的游戏This revitalization flowers while around it emerge the sprouts of a conception that before the end of the century may succeed it. If such a succession occurs, it will be becau, just as the transformational theory could absorb its predecessors and handle structural relationships beyond their grasp, so new relationships, relationships with an ineradicable social component, will become salient that will require a broader theory to absorb and handle them. I shall return to this historical conjecture at the end of this paper. Let me now sketch considerations that motivate a broader theory. And let me do this by first putting forward an additional reprentative anecdote.
初中生电影II吃黄连
As against the ideal speaker-listener, here IS Bloomfield's account of one young Menomini he knew (1927, p. 437): The findings can be quickly summarized: on all the measures, in all the studies, the upper socio-economic status children, however defined, are more advanced than the lower socioeconomic status children. speaks a beautiful and highly idiomatic Menomini ... (and) speaks Ojibwa and Linguistically, she would correspond to a highly educated America
n woman who spoke, say, French and Italian in addition to the very best type of cultivated, idiomatic English. (Bloomfield, 1927, p. 437).The differences reviewed by Cazden involve enabling effects for the upper status children just as much as disabling effects for the lower status children. Moreover, given subcultural differences in the patterns and purpos of language u,
children of the lower status may actually excel in aspects of communicative competence not obrved or measured in the tests summarized. And among the Menomini there were not only young men like White Thunder, but also tho like Red Cloud Woman, who Bloomfield goes on to suggest that the commonness of the ca is due, in some indirect way, to the impact of the conquering language. In short, there is here differential competence within a heterogeneous speech community, both undoubtedly shaped by acculturation. (The alternative to a constitutive role for the novel sociocultural factor is to assume that atrocious Menomini was common also before contact. If taken riously, the assumption would still implicate sociocultural factors.) Soeiallife has affected not merely outward performance, but inner competence itlf. Let me now review some other indications of the need to transcend the notions of perfect competence, homogeneous speech community, and independence of sociocultural features. In her excellent article reviewing recent studies of subcultural differences in language development in the United States, Cazden (1966, p. 190) writes t
hat one thing is clear: There are tribes of the northeast Amazon among whom the normal scope of linguistic competence is a control of at least four languages, a spurt in active command coming during adolescence, with repertoire and perfection of competence continuing to be augmented throughout life. Here, as in much of our world, the ideally fluent speaker-listener is multilingual. (Even an ideally fluent monolingual of cour is master of functional varieties within the one language.) In this connection it should be noted that fluent members of communities often regard their languages, or functional varieties, as not identical in communicative adequacy. It is not only that one variety is obligatory or preferred for some us, another for others (as is often the ca, say, as between public occasions and personal relationships). Such intuitions reflect experience and lf-evaluation as to what one can in fact do with a given variety. This sort of differential competence has nothing to do with "disadvantage" or deficiency relative to other normal members of the community. All of them may find Kurdish, say, the medium in which most things can best be expresd, but Arabic the better medium for religious truth; urs of Berber may find Arabic superior to Berber for all purpos except intimate domestic conversation (Ferguson, 1966).
The combination of community diversity and differential competence makes it necessary not to take the prence in a community of a widespread language, say, Spanish or English, at face value. Just
as one puts the gloss of a native word in quotation marks, so as not to imply that the meaning of the word is thereby accurately identified, so one should put the name of a language in quotation marks, until its true status in terms of competence has been determined. (Clearly there is need for a theoretically motivated and empirically tested t of terms by which to characterize the different kinds of competence that may be found.) In an extreme ca what counts as "English" in the code repertoire of a community may be but a few phonologically marked forms (the Iwam of New Guinea). The cas in general constitute a continuum, perhaps a scale, from more restricted to less restricted varieties, somewhat crosscut by adaptation of the same inherited "English" materials to different purpos and needs. A linguist analysing data from a community on the assumption "once English, always English" might miss and sadly misreprent the actual
competence suppodly expresd by his grammar.
There is no way within the prent view of linguistic competence to distinguish between the abilities of one of the pure speakers of Menomini noted by Bloomfield and tho of whom White Thunder was typical. Menomini ntences from either would be referred to a common grammar. Perhaps it can be said that the competence is shared with regard to the recognition and comprehension of speech. While that would be an important (and probably true) fact, it has not been the intention of th
e theory to distinguish between models of competence for reception and models of competence for production. And insofar as the theory intends to deal with the "creative" aspect of language, that is, with the ability of a ur to devi novel ntences appropriate to situations, it would em to be a retrenchment, if not more, to claim only to account for a shared ability to understand novel ntences produced by others. In some fundamental n, the competence of the two groups of speakers, in terms of ability to make "creative" u of Menomini, is clearly distinct. Difference in judgement of acceptability is not in question. There is simply a basic n in which urs of Menomini of the more versatile type have a knowledge (syntactic as well as lexical) that urs of White Thunder's type do not. [ ... ]
Labov has documented cas of dual competence in reception, but single competence in production, with regard to the ability of lower-class Negro children to interpret ntences in either standard or substandard phonology, while consistently using only substandard phonology in speaking themlves. An interesting conver kind of ca is that in which there is a dual competence for production, a sort of "competence for incompetence" as it were. Thus among the Burundi of East Africa (Albert, 1964) a peasant may command the verbal abilities stresd and valued in the culture but cannot display it in the prence of a herder or other superior. In such cas
appropriate behavior is that in which "their words are haltingly delivered, or run on uncontrolled, their voices are loud, their gestures wild, their figures of speech ungainly, their emotions freely displayed, their words and ntences clumsy." Clearly {behavior is general to all codes of communication, but it attaches to the atical among them. Such work as Labov's in New York City, and examples such as the Burundi, in 'ch evidence for linguistic competence co-varies with interlocutor, point to the essity of a social approach even if the goal of description is a single homogeneous e. Indeed, much of the difficulty in determining what is acceptable and intuitively reet in grammatical description aris becau social and contextual determinants not controlled. By making explicit the reference of a description to a single u in ,single context, and by testing discrepancies and variations against differences of and context, the very goal of not dealing with diversity can be achieved -in the ,hted, and only possible, n in which it can be achieved. The linguist's own lintuitions of underlying knowledge prove difficult to catch and to stabilize for u (and of cour are not available for languages or varieties he does not himlf know).
':If analysis is not to be reduced to explication of a corpus, or debauch into subjectivity, then the respons and judgements of members of the community who language is analyd must be utilized -and not merely informally or ad hoc, but in some explicit, systematic way. In particular,
