Governing the commons in the new millennium
遗失的时光Introduction
The impact of humans on global environmental change is becoming increasingly apparent, with conquences ranging from impacts on climate change to declines in ppt放映快捷键biodiversity, soil degradation and forest degradation. Governing natural resources sustainably thus reprents a major challenge for the future. Given increas in population and in levels of human consumption, how do we develop a diver and robust t of institutions for the sustainable u of natural resources?
The Debate Initiated by Garrett Hardin
上饶灵山风景区In his influential article in Science on “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 勤能补拙意思Garrett Hardin prented a logic that he presumed was general and referred to all common-pool natural resources that were not either government owned or privately owned. He envisioned a pasture open to all, in which each herder received an immediate individual benefit from addi
ng animals to graze on the pasture and suffered only delayed costs (with his fellow herders) from overgrazing. Hardin concluded: “Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increa his herd without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons” (Hardin, 1968: 1244).
Hardin’s conclusion was immediately accepted by many scholars. His article is still required reading in most environmental science programs and frequently assigned multiple times during an undergraduate program. In the early days of the scholarly discussion, scholars tended to develop theoretical papers that posited narrowly rational resource urs that did not take a long-term view of the problems they faced. Somehow, government officials, on the other hand, were posited as being able to take the public interest into account and develop policies that would avert the tragedy of the commons.
Policymakers tended to accept Hardin’s results and thought the conclusions made it obligatory for them to take positive actions to impo policies on the urs of pastures, fo
rests, fisheries, water systems and other common-pool resources in their domain. Government officials did not examine whether the urs of the resources had developed rules of their own over time, becau it was simply assumed that resource urs were trapped and helpless. National governments around the world declared that government ownership was the only way to save resources from destruction. Forests in India, Thailand, and many countries in Africa were nationalized during the 1970s and 1980s in an immediate acceptance that this was the only way to avoid massive deforestation. In many instances, the and the related conversion of inshore fisheries policies had the effect of overruling locally developed institutions that were on the ground. In practice, the resources were often converted to “open access” given the lack of administrative follow-up and that local urs were told they had no rights. As many of the policies appeared to accelerate deforestation and overu of resources, a major debate about the best property-rights system for sustainable management of natural resources was initiated.
Contrary Evidence
In addition to the findings that government policies nationalizing forests and other resources did not lead uniformly to a solution, other empirical studies recorded ttings where the resource urs themlves had developed their own rules that had enabled a resource to be ud sustainably over long periods of time—sometimes exceeding a century or longer. The National Resource Council of the US National Academy of Sciences has convened two major meetings—one in 1985 and one 15 years later in 2000—of scholars from multiple disciplines to examine the evidence related to the ability of local urs to organize their own rules. Slowly over time this led to the development of a more coherent theory of the commons.
Insights Concerning the Ability of Some Communities to Overcome Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas
When dealing with a presumption of an impossibility of resource urs solving their own problems of overu, finding a large number of cas where resource urs succeed is an important accomplishment. That is exactly what scholars during the last part of the 20t
h century did. One of the major conceptual accomplishments was the emphatic recognition of the confusion that had existed for some time over the name ud for resources and for potential institutional arrangements or property regimes. The term “common property resource” was abbreviated as CPR and widely ud across the social sciences for resources such as forests, lakes, pastures, fisheries and irrigation systems. The term confud a resource system that might or might not have a linked property-rights system with a form of institution called “common property.” This confud a resource—a common-pool resource—with a property system—a common property regime. The initials, CPR, were ud for both concepts.
兵马俑英文
Slowly, over time, general agreement has been reached that a common-pool resource is one with two characteristics: (1) it is very costly to exclude potential beneficiaries from accessing and harvesting from the resource and (2) the amount of resource flows harvested by one ur is subtracted from the quantity available to others. Thus, it shares the first characteristic with public goods (the cost of exclusion) and the cond characteristics with private goods (subtractability). A common-pool resource can be mana
关于美食的成语ged under any of a broad type of property-rights regimes ranging from:
∙ Government ownership, where a formal government ranging in size from a local city all the way to national government claimed ownership of the resource and the right to fully determine who could or could not u and under what circumstances;
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