福州西湖公园Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are asked to decide whether the President was acting within his constitutional power when he issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take posssion of and operate most of the Nation's steel mills. The mill owners argue that the President's order amounts to lawmaking, a legislative function which the Constitution has expressly confided to the Congress and not to the President. The Government's position is that the order was made on findings of the President that his action was necessary to avert a national catastrophe which would inevitably result from a stoppage of steel production, and that in meeting this grave emergency the President was acting within the aggregate of his constitutional powers as the Nation's Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States. The issue emerges here from the following ries of events:
In the latter part of 1951, a dispute aro between the steel companies and their employees over terms and conditions that should be included in new collective bargaining agreements. Long-continued conferences failed to resolve the dispute. On December 18, 1951, the employees' reprentative, United Steelworkers of America, C. I. O., gave notice of an intention to strike when the existing bargaini赖小子
中国近现代历史ng agreements expired on December 31. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service then intervened in an effort to get labor and management to agree. This failing, the President on December 22, 1951, referred the dispute to the Federal Wage Stabilization [343 U.S. 579, 583] Board 1 to investigate and make recommendations for fair and equitable terms of ttlement. This Board's report resulted in no ttlement. On April 4, 1952, the Union gave notice of a nation-wide strike called to begin at 12:01 a. m. April 9. The indispensability of steel as a component of substantially all weapons and other war materials led the President to believe that the propod work stoppage would immediately jeopardize our national defen and that governmental izure of the steel mills was necessary in order to assure the continued availability of steel. Reciting the considerations for his action, the President, a few hours before the strike was to begin, issued Executive Order 10340, a copy of which is attached as an appendix, post, p. 589. The order directed the Secretary of Commerce to take posssion of most of the steel mills and keep them running. The Secretary immediately issued his own posssory orders, calling upon the presidents of the various ized companies to rve as operating managers for the United States. They were directed to carry on their activities in accordance with regulations and directions of the Secretary. The next morning the President nt a message to Congress reporting his action. Cong. Rec., April 9, 1952, p. 3962. Twelve days later he nt a cond message. Cong. Rec., April 21, 1952, p. 4192. Congress has taken no action.户外表
Obeying the Secretary's orders under protest, the companies brought proceedings against him in the District Court. Their complaints charged that the izure was not authorized by an act of Congress or by any constitutional provisions. The District Court was asked to declare the orders of the President and the Secretary invalid and to issue preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining their enforcement. Opposing the motion for preliminary [343 U.S. 579,
584] injunction, the United States asrted that a strike disrupting steel production for even a brief period would so endanger the well-being and safety of the Nation that the President had "inherent power" to do what he had done - power "supported by the Constitution, by historical precedent, and by court decisions." The Government also contended that in any event no preliminary injunction should be issued becau the companies had made no showing that their available legal remedies were inadequate or that their injuries from izure would be irreparable. Holding against the Government on all points, the District Court on April 30 issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from "continuing the izure and posssion of the plants . . . and from acting under the purported authority of Executive Order No. 10340." 103 F. Supp. 569. On the same day the Court of Appeals stayed the District Court's injunction. 90 U.S. App. D.C. ___, 197 F.2d 582. Deeming it best that the issues raid be promptly decided by this Court, we granted certiorari on May 3 and t the cau for argument on May 12. 343 U.S. 937 .
Two crucial issues have developed: First. Should final determination of the constitutional validity of the President's order be made in this ca which has proceeded no further than the preliminary injunction stage? Second. If so, is the izure order within the constitutional power of the President?上海超算中心
I.
It is urged that there were non-constitutional grounds upon which the District Court could have denied the preliminary injunction and thus have followed the customary judicial practice of declining to reach and decide constitutional questions until compelled to do so. On this basis it is argued that equity's extraordinary injunctive relief should have been denied becau (a) izure of the companies' properties did not inflict irreparable damages, [343 U.S. 579, 585] and (b) there were available legal remedies adequate to afford compensation for any possible damages which they might suffer. While parately argued by the Government, the two contentions are here cloly related, if not identical. Arguments as to both rest in large part on the Government's claim that should the izure ultimately be held unlawful, the companies could recover full compensation in the Court of Claims for the unlawful taking. Prior cas in this Court have cast doubt on the right to recover in the Court of Claims on account of properties unlawfully taken by government officials for public u as the properties were alleged to have been. See e. g., Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 335 -
336; United States v. North American Co., 253 U.S. 330, 333 . But e Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 701 -702. Moreover, izure and governmental operation of the going business were bound to result in many prent and future damages of such nature as to be difficult, if not incapable, of measurement. Viewing the ca this way, and in the light of the facts prented, the District Court saw no reason for delaying decision of the constitutional validity of the orders. We agree with the District Court and can e no reason why that question was not ripe for determination on the record prented. We shall therefore consider and determine that question now.
II.牛和兔合不合
The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itlf. There is no statute that expressly authorizes the President to take posssion of property as he did here. Nor is there any act of Congress to which our attention has been directed from which such a power can fairly be implied. Indeed, we do not understand the
Government to rely on statutory authorization for this izure. There are two statutes which do authorize the President [343 U.S. 579, 586] to take both personal and real property under certain co
nditions. 2However, the Government admits that the conditions were not met and that the President's order was not rooted in either of the statutes. The Government refers to the izure provisions of one of the statutes ( 201 (b) of the Defen Production Act) as "much too cumbersome, involved, and time-consuming for the crisis which was at hand."
Moreover, the u of the izure technique to solve labor disputes in order to prevent work stoppages was not only unauthorized by any congressional enactment; prior to this controversy, Congress had refud to adopt that method of ttling labor disputes. When the Taft-Hartley Act was under consideration in 1947, Congress rejected an amendment which would have authorized such governmental izures in cas of emergency. 3 Apparently it was thought that the technique of izure, like that of compulsory arbitration, would interfere with the process of collective bargaining. 4Conquently, the plan Congress adopted in that Act did not provide for izure under any circumstances. Instead, the plan sought to bring about ttlements by u of the customary devices of mediation, conciliation, investigation by boards of inquiry, and public reports. In some instances temporary injunctions were authorized to provide cooling-off periods. All this failing, unions were left free to strike after a cret vote by employees as to whether they wished to accept their employers' final ttlement offer. 5 [343 U.S. 579, 587]
It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the President. The contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President . . ."; that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"; and that he "shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exerci of the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cas upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cas need not concern us here. Even though "theater of war" be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take posssion of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities.
Nor can the izure order be sustained becau of the veral constitutional provisions that grant ex
里字笔顺
ecutive power to the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to e that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wi and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. The [343 U.S. 579, 588] first ction of the first article says that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . ." After granting many powers to the Congress, Article I goes on to provide that Congress may "make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." The President's order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress - it directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President. The preamble of the order itlf, like that of many statutes, ts out reasons why the President believes certain policies should be adopted, proclaims the policies as rules of conduct to be followed, and again, like a statute, authorizes a government official to promulgate additional rules and regulations consistent with the policy proclaimed and needed to carry that policy into execution. 文子
The power of Congress to adopt such public policies as tho proclaimed by the order is beyond question. It can authorize the taking of private property for public u. It can make laws regulating the relationships between employers and employees, prescribing rules designed to ttle labor disputes, and fixing wages and working conditions in certain fields of our economy. The Constitution does not subject this lawmaking power of Congress to presidential or military supervision or control.
It is said that other Presidents without congressional authority have taken posssion of private business enterpris in order to ttle labor disputes. But even if this be true, Congress has not thereby lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution [343 U.S. 579, 589] "in the Government of the United States, or any Department or Officer thereof."
The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice. Such a review would but confirm our holding that this izure order cannot stand.
The judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
