Contract farming and smallholder incentives to produce high quality: experimental evidence from the Vietname dairy ctor
扇形图片期刊名称： Agricultural Economics可有可无的意思>甘的笔画
永远的处女作者： Christoph Saenger,Matin Qaim,Maximo Torero,Angelino Viceisza
作者机构： International Food Policy Rearch Institute 2033 K Street, NW
Washington DC 20006‐1002 USA
中国传统文化介绍年份： 2013年
期号： 第3期
怎样容易怀孕关键词： C93;O13;Q13;Smallholders;High‐value products;Contract
假冒伪劣商品farming;Vietnam;Field experiment餐饮点评
摘要：In emerging markets for high-value food products in developing countries, processing companies arch for efficient ways to source raw material of high quality. One widely embraced approach is contract farming. But relatively little is known about the appropriate design of financial incentives in a small farm context. We u the example of the Vietname dairy ctor to analyze the effectiveness of existing contracts between a processor and smallholder farmers in terms of incentivizing the production of high quality milk. A framed field experiment is conducted to evaluate the impact of two incentive instruments, a price penalty for low quality and a bonus for consistent high quality milk, on farmers' investment in quality-improving inputs. Statistical analysis suggests that the penalty drives farmers into higher input u,
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