Austin's definition
In order to define performatives, Austin refers to tho ntences which conform to the old prejudice in that they are ud to describe or constate something, and which thus are true or fal; and he calls such ntences "constatives". In contrast to them, Austin defines "performatives" as follows:
∙ (1) Performative utterances are not true or fal, that is, not 滚滚红尘简谱truth-evaluable; instead when something is wrong with them then they are "happy" or "unhappy".
∙ (2) The uttering of a performative is, or is part of, the doing of a certain kind of action (Austin later deals with them under the name illocutionary acts), the performance of which, again, would not normally be described as just "saying" or "describing" something (cf. Austin 1962, 5).
For example, when Peter says "I promi to do the dishes" in an appropriate context then he thereby does not just say something, and in particular he does not just describe what he 西安旅游攻略3日游
is doing; rather, in making the utterance he performs the promi; since promising is an illocutionary act, the utterance 书法的演变过程is thus a performative utterance. If Peter utters the ntence without the intention to keep the promi, or if eventually he does not keep it, then although something is not in order with the utterance, the problem is not that the ntence is fal: it is rather "unhappy", or "infelicitous", as Austin also says in his discussion of so-called felicity conditions. In the abnce of any such flaw, on the other hand, the utterance is to be assd as "happy" or "felicitous", rather than as "true". Austin dropped this distinction in favour of a distinction between explicit performatives (like I promi it will never happen again) and primary or implicit performatives (like It will never happen again, functioning as a promi).
he initial examples of performative ntences Austin gives are the:
∙ 'I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)' -- as uttered in the cour of the marriage ceremony.
∙ 'I name this ship the "Queen Elizabeth"'
∙ 'I give and bequeath my watch to my brother' -- as occurring in a will
∙ match函数的使用方法'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow' (Austin 1962, 5)
As Austin later notices himlf, the examples belong (more or less strikingly) to what Austin calls, explicit performatives; to utter an "explicit" performative ntence is to make explicit what act one is performing. However, there are also "implicit", "primitive", or "inexplicit" performatives. When, for instance, one us the word "Go!" in order to command someone to leave the room then this utterance is part of the performance of a command; and the ntence, according to Austin, is neither true nor fal; hence the ntence is a performative; -- still, it is not an explicit performative, for it does not make explicit that the act the speaker is performing is a command.
As Austin obrves, the acts purported to be performed by performative utterances may be socially contested. For instance, "I divorce you", said three times by a man to his wife, may be accepted to constitute a divorce by some, but not by others.
Examples (mainly of explicit performative utterances)
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∙ "I now pronounce you man and wife." - ud in the cour of a marriage ceremony
∙ "Go" - ud in ordering someone to go香蕉的画法
∙ "Yes" - answering the question "Do you promi to do the dishes?"
∙ "You are under arrest." - ud in tting someone under arrest
∙ 泰勒斯威夫特壁纸"I christen you"
∙ "I accept your apology"
∙ "I ntence you to death"
∙ "I divorce you, I divorce you, I divorce you" (Islamic: e: Talaq-i-Bid'ah or triple Talaq)
∙ "I do" – wedding
∙ "I swear to do that", "I promi to be there"
∙ "I apologize"
∙ "I " (...book to my wife; ...next song to the striking Stella Doro workers, etc.)
∙ "This meeting is now adjourned", "The court is now in ssion"
∙ "This church is hereby de-sanctified"
∙ "War is declared"
∙ "I quit" – employment
∙ "I resign" – employment, or chess
True/fal value and John Searle
John R. Searle argued in his 1989 article How Performatives Work王维的竹里馆 that performatives are true/fal just like constatives. Searle further claimed that performatives are what he calls declarations; this is a technical notion of Searle's account: according to his conception, an utterance is a declaration, if "the successful performance of the speech ac
t is sufficient to bring about the fit between words and world, to make the propositional content true." Searle believes that this double direction of fit contrasts the simple word-to-world fit of asrtives.
