鸽子汤做法B OOK REVIEW
Douglas Walton (1998). The New Dialectic. Conversational Contexts of Argument. University of Toronto Press, Toronto. x + 304 pages. ISBN 0-8020-7987-3.
Douglas Walton (1998). Ad Hominem Arguments. The University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa. xx + 315 pages. ISBN 0-8173-0922-5.
Douglas Walton (1999). One-Sided Arguments. A Dialectical Analysis Of Bias. State University of New York Press, Albany. xix + 295 pages. ISBN 0-7914-4268-3.
1Evaluating arguments
A central topic in the theory of argumentation is argument evaluation. For any particular argument, the question can be asked whether it is good or bad, rational or irrational, valid or invalid, reasonable or unreasonable. Formal logic has addresd the topic of argument evaluation focusing on certain idealized class of arguments, like tho involving the truth-functional connectives. In formal logic, argument evaluation is normally discusd in terms of a formal mantics or of inference rules. The focus of informal logic is on natural language, real-life arguments, for instance as they occur in the med
ia, in scientific debate or in the court room. Discussion of argument evaluation in informal logic typically involves fallacies like the argumentum ad baculum (appeal to force) and argumentum ad verecundiam (inappropriate appeal to authority).
A productive author in the field of informal logic and fallacies is Douglas Walton. The list of books by Walton is impressive: since 1989 he has published 16 titles.1 Walton’s work can roughly be divided into two categories. First there are the books in which he expounds his theoretical framework for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation. Examples are A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy (1995), Argument Structure: A Pragmatic Theory (1996) and The New Dialectic: Conversational Contexts of Argument (1998). Second there are the books in which a specific type of argumentation or fallacy is addresd. Examples are Appeal to Expert Opinion: Arguments from Authority (1997), Ad Hominem Arguments (1998) and One-Sided Arguments. A Dialectical Analysis Of Bias (1999).
党员会1The list of books is available on the web at www.uwinnipeg.ca/~walton/r_and_p.htm. Only one of the books has a coauthor, viz. Commitment in Dialogue (1995), written with Eric Krabbe.
A starting point in Walton’s work is that argumentation can only be rightly appreciated in its conversational context. As a conquence, in order to evaluate a particular instance of argumentatio
n as good or bad, it does not suffice to analyze it as a structured ries of statements that express a line of reasoning. Similarly relevant for the evaluation of argumentation is the dialogue context in which it occurs. In Walton’s theory, amongst others, the dialogue type and goal can determine whether an argument is good or bad.
网络编辑It turns out that Walton address many topics that are also dealt with by rearchers in artificial intelligence and law, such as the relation between dialogue and argument evaluation, the defeasibility of arguments, and the specification of particular kinds of arguments. Walton aims mainly at the informal logic community and other readers with a theoretical or practical interest in the analysis and evaluation of actual argumentation. His style is not formal and as such very different from that of the formally oriented work in artificial intelligence and law. As a result, Walton’s work can provide a refreshing perspective on a number of familiar themes and inspire future formal work.
In the following, two aspects of Walton’s theoretical framework are discusd that play a central role in the three books under review: dialogue types and argumentation schemes. Dialogue types and their relation to argument evaluation are the central topic of The New Dialectic: Conversational Contexts of Argument. Walton applies his theory of dialogue types to the evaluation and analysis of biad arguments in One-Sided Arguments. A Dialectical Analysis Of Bias. Dialogue types are discu
sd below in ction 2. Argumentation schemes are the basic tool in Walton’s analysis of personal attack arguments in Ad Hominem Arguments. Section 3 is about argumentation schemes.
2Dialogue types
As said, in Walton’s theoretical framework, arguments are analyzed and evaluated in their conversational context. According to Walton’s theory, the evaluation of an argument is in part determined by the rules and goals that obtain in the particular context of that argument. What counts as a fallacy in one context can be a reasonable u of argument in another. For instance, it can be reasonable when an attorney argues that a witness testimony is worthless becau of the witness biad position or bad moral standards. In another context, such ad hominem arguments would count as fallacious. For instance, a scientific discussion should not be about the moral standards of the rearchers involved.
2.1The six dialogue types
Walton distinguishes six main types of dialogue: persuasion, negotiation, inquiry, deliberation, information-eking and eristic dialogue. Each dialogue type reprents a conventional context with its own argumentative rules and goals.
In a persuasion dialogue, the proponent of a claim tries to persuade an opposing participant that the claim is true. The opposing participant rais doubts, e.g., by proposing an opposite claim. Persuasion dialogues have a so-called maieutic function, i.e., they can result in an explication of the commitments of the participants in the dialogue: in Walton’s terms, a ‘dark-side’ commitment becomes a ‘light-side’ commitment when it is made explicit. The success of a persuasion dialogue depends on this maieutic effect, and does not necessarily involve the resolution of the conflict of opinions. When the success of a dialogue requires that the conflict of opinions is resolved, Walton speaks of a critical discussion.
In negotiation, the goal is not in the first place to find out about truth and falsity or about the other participant’s or participants’ commitments, but to reach a good deal. Participants do not start with fixed proposals, but u the discussion in order to gradually fix the deal and find out what proposal is as good as possible. In contrast with the situation in persuasion dialogue, threats can be appropriate in negotiation. Walton mentions threatening to strike in a negotiation between unions and employers as an example. In the legal context, one can think of mediation and plea bargaining as kinds of negotiation.
The goal of inquiry is to establish that a claim can be proven or that it cannot. In contrast with the ad
versarial nature of persuasion dialogue, inquiry is in the first place collaborative, and does not involve the retraction of claims.
Deliberation has the goal to determine what to do. As such, the argumentation involved in deliberation is a form of what in philosophy is called practical reasoning. The typical example of such reasoning is means-end reasoning.2 Deliberation dialogue can take place by onelf (as a kind of ‘inner dialogue’), among two people or among a group of people. Just like negotiation, but unlike persuasion, deliberation does not necessarily start with a definite proposal. Lawyers providing legal advice to their clients are involved in a deliberation dialogue.
In information-eking, a participant wants to extract information from other participants. One can think of the consultation of an expert, for instance, in court.
2For a theoretical and computational perspective on practical reasoning in the context of decision support, e Girle et al. (2000).
The typical example of eristic dialogue is a quarrel. A function of eristic dialogue is to overcome or become aware of grievances. Emotion, irrelevant argumentation and personal attack - each in principle disallowed in the other dialogue types - occur frequently in eristic dialogue, and can rve a
purpo. In the legal context, the pre-court interaction between the lawyers of opposing parties, e.g., in a situation of divorce, can perhaps be thought of as a kind of formalized eristic dialogue.
Walton’s list of six types is not meant to be exhaustive or mutually exclusive, but is intended as a pragmatic and normative framework in order to evaluate actual argumentative exchanges. For instance, Walton explains how dialectical shifts, i.e., a change of one type of dialogue to another, can lead to fallacious argumentation. Walton also discuss the possibility of mixed dialogues, in which characteristics of more than one of the dialogue types are prent. As an example, he discuss argumentation in a criminal trial, which has many characteristics of the persuasion type of dialogue, e.g., since the procution tries to persuade the judge and the jury of the accud’s guilt. On the other hand, in some respects, argumentation in a trial is not evaluated according to the norms obtaining for persuasion dialogue. For instance, an appeal to pity - which would be fallacious in a persuasion context - can be relevant at the stage of determining the actual ntence, and the cross-examination of a witness can rightly involve arguments of the ad hominem type.
The theory of dialogue and their types is extensively discusd in Walton’s book The New Dialectic. Each type is discusd in a parate chapter, followed by chapters on dialectical shifts, mixed dialogue and argument evaluation.
The book One-Sided Arguments can be regarded as an application of Walton’s theory of dialogue. A starting point is to find a relativistic account of argumentation in which the relevance of an arguer’s biad commitments and interests are recognized without drawing the post-modernist conclusion that anything goes. According to Walton, bias is not in itlf wrong. For instance, in court, the bias of the opposing parties are natural and can help efficient information exchange. In other words, when bias occurs in an appropriate context it can rve reasonable goals.
尤克里里怎么弹
One-Sided Arguments starts with a historical overview on bias in argumentation theory and a summary of Walton’s theory of dialogue. Then Walton explains his theory of bias. Walton focus on what he calls dialectical bias: one-sided advocacy of one point of view, thus failing to be balanced. In a chapter on indicators of bias, Walton discuss for instance the biad lection of arguments, emphasis and hyperbole. The indicator of biad language is discusd in a chapter of its own. A number of ca studies follow, for instance on the role of bias in sales and advertising, in order to show how bias can be evaluated. In a chapter on legal and scientific argument, Walton explains how
bias can play a legitimate and esntial role in the specific contexts, but he also warns for the possibility that such institutionalized bias can be misud. In this respect one can think of the responsibility of a defendant’s lawyer: does it end with his client’s interests, or should other interests,
such as the justness and effectiveness of the legal system, in exceptional circumstances lead him to limit his u of legal gaps and mistakes?
天麻的做法和吃法2.2Dialogues in artificial intelligence and law
How does Walton’s classification of dialogue types relate to work on dialogue in artificial intelligence and law (cf. amongst others the work of Ashley, Aleven, Bench-Capon, Gordon, Hage, Leenes, Lodder, Loui, Nitta, Prakken, Rissland, Sartor)? An insightful review is given by Hage (2000). He distinguishes five roles of dialogue in the field of artificial intelligence and law: characterizing logical operators, modeling the defeasibility of legal reasoning, providing the basis for legal justification, identifying legal issues and establishing the law in concrete cas.3
Several of the roles fit in Walton’s classification of dialogue types. For instance, Walton thinks of intuitionistic logic as formally modeling the quence of argumentation in inquiry. In this way, the inquiry type of dialogue characterizes a logical operator. Modeling the defeasibility of legal reasoning can be associated with veral of the dialogue types. However, it ems that in artificial intelligence and law rearch the focus has been primarily on what Walton calls the persuasion type of dialogue, and then in particular the subtype of critical discussion: dialogue often rves the purpo of ttling
an issue or conflict of opinions. In some artificial intelligence and law rearch, the role of dialogue is that of identifying (and not necessarily solving) legal issues, corresponding to Walton’s discussion of the maieutic function of persuasion dialogue. The role of providing the basis for legal justification is also related to the persuasion type of dialogue, since it provides a medium to establish a t of shared commitments.
It ems that the role of establishing the law (and the facts for that matter) in concrete cas does not clearly fit in Walton’s classification. The idea is that the court procedure should not simply be thought of as establishing pre-existing fact and law, since neither the facts nor the law are sufficiently well accessible for the participants in the procedure: the available information can be conflicting, ambiguous and underspecified. As a result, court procedure is (at least in part) constitutive for the facts and the law as they obtain in the ca at hand. A court 3See also the notes of the venth lecture of my cour on the logic of defeasible argumentation (ajur.unimaas.nl/~bart/teaching/defarg/).
procedure is not perfect in the n that it only and always establishes objective truths. The participants’ actual actions and the judge’s decisions determine the outcome. For instance, in civil law, when a participant overlooks to provide evidence for a claim for which he bears the burden of pr
目标市场分析oof, the judge is not obliged to fill that gap. Also when there are differing opinions on a matter of law (as they frequently occur), a judge is to some extent free to choo between the different points of view. One symptom of the constitutive, imperfect nature of the court procedure is that it can occur that innocent people are convicted. In order to minimize such unwanted effects, the court procedure is especially strongly constrained by rules of procedure, e.g., that delimit the judge’s freedom and that allow revision of cas.
This apparent omission in Walton’s classification might lead to an interesting extension, perhaps by adding the constitutive dialogue as a venth type.
I want to make one additional point concerning Walton’s u of dialogue: it is very strongly connected to dialogue as a context of argumentation. By the focus on argumentation in Walton’s books, it can be good to keep in mind that dialogue is in the first place a context of information exchange, which does not always involve argumentation per . For instance, in current work on e-commerce or human-computer interaction, there are other relevant topics than argumentation, such as, for instance, the standardization of the relevant kinds of speech acts and the establishment of efficient protocols.
3Argumentation schemes
大禹的故事
A cond central aspect of Walton’s theoretical framework concerns argumentation schemes. The argumentation schemes ud in the dialogue provide further insight into the dialectical relevance of an argument, given a particular dialogue context with a specific type, stage and goal. Argumentation schemes reprent kinds of argument as they occur in conversation. Arguments bad on argumentation schemes need not be conclusive, but can be defeasible. Walton lists argumentation schemes as a kind of mi-formal argument templates. For instance, the scheme ‘Generic Ad Hominem Argument’ looks as follows (Ad Hominem Arguments, p. 249):
等额本金提前还款计算器GENERIC AH
a is a bad person.
Therefore, a’s argument α should not be accepted.
