原文：
医保编号怎么查询The Right to Privacy”
Warren and Brandeis
Harvard Law Review.
V ol. IV December 15, 1890 No. 5
吉林省养老保险That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the new demands of society. Thus, in very early times, the law gave a remedy only for physical interference with life and property, for trespass vi et armis. Then the "right to life" rved only to protect the subject from battery in its various forms; liberty meant freedom from actual restraint; and the right to property cured to the individual his lands and his cattle. Later, there came a recognition of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect. Gradually the scope of the legal rights broadened; and now the right to life has come to mean the rig
ht to enjoy life, -- the right to be let alone; the right to liberty cures the exerci of extensive civil privileges; and the term "property" has grown to compri every form of posssion -- intangible, as well as tangible.
Thus, with the recognition of the legal value of nsations, the protection against actual bodily injury was extended to prohibit mere attempts to do such injury; that is, the putting another in fear of such injury. From the action of battery grew that of assault.[1] Much later there came a qualified protection of the individual against offensive nois and odors, against dust and smoke, and excessive vibration. The law of nuisance was developed.[2] So regard for human emotions soon extended the scope of personal immunity beyond the body of the individual. His reputation, the standing among his fellow-men, was considered, and the law of slander and libel aro.[3] Man's
family relations became a part of the legal conception of his life, and the alienation of a wife's affections was held remediable.[4] Occasionally the law halted, as in its refusal to recognize the intrusion by duction upon the honor of the family. But even here the demands of society were met.帮妈妈洗碗作文
A mean fiction, the action per quod rvitium amisit, was resorted to, and by allowing damages for injury to the parents' feelings, an adequate remedy was ordinarily afforded.[5] Similar to the expansio
宝墨园
n of the right to life was the growth of the legal conception of property. From corporeal property aro the incorporeal rights issuing out of it; and then there opened the wide realm of intangible property, in the products and process of the mind,[6] as works of literature and art, [7] goodwill,[8] trade crets, and trademarks.[9]
This development of the law was inevitable. The inten intellectual and emotional life, and the heightening of nsations which came with the advance of civilization, made it clear to men that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life lay in physical things. Thoughts, emotions, and nsations demanded legal recognition, and the beautiful capacity for growth which characterizes the common law enabled the judges to afford the requisite protection, without the interposition of the legislature.
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for curing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right "to be let alone" [10] Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterpri have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that "what is whispered in the clot shall be proclaimed from the hou-tops." For years there has been a feeling that the law must afford some remedy for the unauthorized circulation of por
traits of private persons;[11] and the evil of invasion of privacy by the newspapers, long keenly felt, has been but recently discusd by an able writer.[12] The alleged facts of a somewhat notorious ca brought before an inferior tribunal in New York a few months ago,[13] directly involved the consideration of the right of circulating portraits; and the question whether our law will recognize and protect the right to privacy in this and in other respects must soon come before our courts for consideration.
Of the desirability -- indeed of the necessity -- of some such protection, there can, it is believed, be no doubt. The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details of xual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle. The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more nsitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more esntial to the individual; but modern enterpri and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected
him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. Nor is the harm wrought by such invasions confined to the suffering of tho who may be the subjects of journalistic or other enterpri. In this, as in other branches of commerce, the supply creates the demand. Each crop of unemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the ed of more, and, in direct proportion to its circulation, results in the lowering of social standards and of morality. Even gossip apparently harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil. It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a people. When personal gossip attains the dignity of print, and crowds the space available for matters of real interest to the community, what wonder that the ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative importance. Easy of comprehension, appealing to that weak side of human nature which is never wholly cast down by the misfortunes and frailties of our neighbors, no one can be surprid that it usurps the place of interest in brains capable of other things. Triviality destroys at once robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling. No enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impul can survive under its blighting influence.
It is our purpo to consider whether the existing law affords a principle which can properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it does, what the nature and extent of such protection is.
Owing to the nature of the instruments by which privacy is invaded, the injury inflicted bears
a superficial remblance to the wrongs dealt with by the law of slander and of libel, while a legal remedy for such injury ems to involve the treatment of mere wounded feelings, as a substantive cau of action. The principle on which the law of defamation rests, covers, however, a radically different class of effects from tho for which attention is now asked. It deals only with damage to reputation, with the injury done to the individual in his external relations to the community, by lowering him in the estimation of his fellows. The matter published of him, however widely circulated, and however unsuited to publicity, must, in order to be actionable, have a direct tendency to injure him in his intercour with others, and even if in writing or in print, must subject him to the hatred, ridicule, or contempt of his fellowmen, -- the effect of the publication upon his estimate of himlf and upon his own feelings nor forming an esntial element in the cau of action. In short, the wrongs and correlative rights recognized by the law of slander and libel are in their nature material rather than spiritual. That branch of the law simply extends the protection surrounding physical property to certain of the conditions necessary or helpful to worldly prosperity. On the other hand, our law recognizes no principle upon which compensation can be granted for mere injury to the feelings. However painful the mental effects upon another of an act, though purely wanton or even malicious,
骄傲的妈妈
yet if the act itlf is otherwi lawful, the suffering inflicted is dannum absque injuria. Injury of feelings may indeed be taken account of in ascertaining the amount of damages when attending what is recognized as a legal injury;[14] but our system, unlike the Roman law, does not afford a remedy even for mental suffering which results from mere contumely and insult, but from an intentional and unwarranted violation of the "honor" of another.[15]
It is not however necessary, in order to sustain the view that the common law recognizes and upholds a principle applicable to cas of invasion of privacy, to invoke the analogy, which is but superficial, to injuries sustained, either by an attack upon reputation or by what the civilians called a violation of honor; for the legal doctrines relating to infractions of what is ordinarily termed the common-law right to intellectual and artistic property are, it is believed, but instances and applications of a general right to privacy, which properly understood afford a remedy for the evils under consideration.
The common law cures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what
extent his thoughts, ntiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.[16] Under our system of government, he can never be compelled to express them (except when upon the witness
stand); and even if he has chon to give them expression, he generally retains the power to fix the limits of the publicity which shall be given them. The existence of this right does not depend upon the particular method of expression adopted. It is immaterial whether it be by word[17] or by signs,[18] in painting,[19] by sculpture, or in music.[20] Neither does the existence of the right depend upon the nature or value of the thought or emotions, nor upon the excellence of the means of expression.[21] The same protection is accorded to a casual letter or an entry in a diary and to the most valuable poem or essay, to a botch or daub and to a masterpiece. In every such ca the individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be given to the public.[22] No other has the right to publish his productions in any form, without his connt. This right is wholly independent of the material on which, the thought, ntiment, or emotions is expresd. It may exist independently of any corporeal being, as in words spoken, a song sung, a drama acted. Or if expresd on any material, as in a poem in writing, the author may have parted with the paper, without forfeiting any proprietary right in the composition itlf. The right is lost only when the author himlf communicates his production to the public, -- in other words, publishes it.[23] It is entirely independent of the copyright laws, and their extension into the domain of art. The aim of tho statutes is to cure to the author, compor, or artist the entire profits arising from publication; but the common-law protection enables him to control absolutely the act of publication, and in the exerci of his own discretion, to decide whether there s
大丽花hall be any publication at all.[24] The statutory right is of no value, unless there is a publication; the common-law right is lost as soon as there is a publication.
什么然开朗What is the nature, the basis, of this right to prevent the publication of manuscripts or works of art? It is stated to be the enforcement of a right of property;[25] and no difficulty aris in accepting this view, so long as we have only to deal with the reproduction of literary and artistic compositions. They certainly posss many of the attributes of ordinary property; they are transferable; they have a value; and publication or reproduction is a u by which that value is realized. But where the value of the production is found not in the right to take the profits arising from publication, but in the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent any漾字组词
