外文翻译
步虚
Pricing of Payment Cards, Competition, and Effciency:
A Possible Guide for SEPA
Material Source: Springer Link
Author: Wilko Bolt，Heiko Schmiedel
Abstract
This paper analyzes equilibrium pricing of payment cards and welfare conquences of payment card competition. In particular, we model competition between debit and credit cards. The paper argues that optimal consumer and merchant fees must take safety, income uncertainty, default risk, and the merchant's handling cost of cash into account. Market gmentation where debit and credit cards rve different gments of merchants yields a preferred "payment mix". However, when markets are gmented, payment card fees do not necessarily reach their socially effcient levels. Hence, thoughtful regulatory intervention regarding merchant fees may be necessary to rai total surplus.
Key Words: Payment card competition, equilibrium pricing, economic effciency
JEL Codes: L11, G21, D53
三七粉能长期服用吗1 Introduction
The rapid growth of payment cards usage is a striking feature in many economies. Today, payment cards are indispensable for the way consumers buy and merchants ll goods and rvices. In Europe, the number of debit card transactions per capita incread by more than factor of five across 13 countries during the period 1990-2005 (Amromin and Chakravorti,2009), and payment cards have now become the most ud non-cash payment instrument.Furthermore, payment cards have also been proven to be a simple, safe, and cost-eficient ayment instrument. Despite this surge in popularity of payment cards, questions about price determination, surplus extraction, and competitiveness of payment card markets remain.
The prent paper studies equilibrium pricing of payment cards and welfare
秋天的太阳怎么画conquences of payment card competition. Unlike most payment models, where card benefits are exogenous, our model is among the first to analyze payment network competition by explicitly incorporating consumers' liquidity constraints and curity concerns from which payment cards derive their intrinsic value. Consumers and merchants tradeoff incread consumption possibilities a
nd cost savings against payment fees for using cards. This interplay between cards versus cash determines the ability of card networks to extract surplus from consumers and merchants which is reflected in the level of the payment fees. We analyze both monopolistic and competitive payment card pricing arrangements. Competitive pressures dampen the merchant fee and increa merchant acceptance which in turn rais consumers' willingness to pay for payment cards. Payment card competition may take different forms. We focus on two stylized competitive scenario's. In the first scenario a debit card network competes with a credit card network for different gments of the merchant side of the market ("market gmentation"). In the cond competitive scenario two identical debit card networks -----each other for market share ("market integration").
Our analysis may provide a uful benchmark for market design and policy options regarding the realization of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). SEPA reprents a major step towards clor European ----nancial integration and may bring substantial economic benefits and opportunities as it will foster competition and innovation, and improve conditions for consumers and merchants. However, the European cards market continues to be very fragmented along national borders regarding payment habits, rules and infrastructures. There is an actual risk of decread competition when only a few payment schemes are likely to survive as commercial banks are withdrawing their p
articipation from (small scale) national payment card schemes. The obrvations have called for the need of an European-led initiative to create at least one additional European payment card scheme to increa the competitiveness in the payment market. The value added of this paper lies in the analysis of the various monopolistic and competitive market outcomes regarding pricing decisions by card networks, merchant acceptance, and overall economic effciency.
冬至阳生春又来Our paper contributes to the growing theoretical payment card literature that started
with Baxter (1983). He argued that the interchange fee----a transfer to reallocate funds between the two sides of the market| balances the demands of
consumers and merchants for payment rvices and improves consumer and merchant welfare. Many other contributions in the academic literature have followed and addresd key issues surrounding card payment networks in general and payment pricing in particular (e.g., Carlton and Frankel, 1995, Frankel, 1998; Chang and Evans, 2000; Balto, 2000; Schmalene, 2002; Rochet and Tirole, 2002, 2003a; Wright, 2003, 2004; Chakravorti and To, 2007; Guthrie and Wright, 2007; Bolt and Chakravorti, 2008; Bedre and Calvano, 2009). Many formal models have recently stresd the "two-sidedness" of payment markets (Rochet, 2007). That is, the consumption of card payment s
频段带宽20好还是40好
ervices involves two sides of the transaction|a consumer and a merchant-----each of whom takes actions, enjoys benefits, and incurs costs. As a result, tting the right price structure (e.g., the ratio of the consumer fee and merchant fee) is crucial for card adoption and usage, and resulting levels of economic effciency. Although a number of important findings has emerged from this payment literature, the issue of payment competition and market gmentation has mostly been overlooked. This paper attempts to start filling this gap.
Competition in payment markets is difficult to analyze without imposing further restrictions on urs' behavior (e.g. Armstrong, 2006; Chakravorti and Roson, 2006; Guthrie and Wright, 2007). First, since most policy and antitrust action has been geared towards the merchant fee, we only consider heterogeneity on the merchant side. This keeps the model tractable, while introducing consumer heterogeneity would not change the qualitative results of our model as long as a positive fraction of consumers would adopt payment cards (e Rochet and Tirole, 2002, for one-sided heterogeneity in a two-sided payment card model). Second, we critically assume that consumers "multihome" in the n that they subscribe to both networks and holding both cards, but that merchants "singlehome" in the n that
they only accept one card----debit or credit. Our price predictions rve as a lower bound on mercha
nt fees as multihoming merchants are likely to show less "merchant resistance" to higher fees. Moreover, while competitive pressures favor merchants in our specific t-up, it is also noted that merchants could always strategically opt out from their least preferred card network knowing that all (or most) consumers have both cards in their wallet (Hermalin and Katz, 2006).
Our analysis shows how the payment price structure is determined by income uncertainty, safety, default risk, processing cost and the merchant's handling cost of
cash. Due to payment externalities, socially optimal merchant fees and profit-maximizing merchant fees need not be equal. More competition between card networks substantially decreas merchant fees for debit and credit cards, boosting merchant acceptance and card usage. Interestingly, market gmentation where debit and credit cards rve different gments of merchants yields an optimal "payment mix" and may lead to the most preferable market outcome in terms of total economic surplus. Market gmentation thus allows different merchant fees for debit and credit cards, as long as the price differential is a fair reflection of the additional functionalities that credit cards offer to consumers and merchants. However, when markets are gmented, payment card fees do not fully reach their socially effcient levels. Hence, thoughtful regulatory intervention regarding merchant fees may be necessary to rai total surplus.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 prents a simple model of payment cards. Section 3 focus on monopolistic pricing of payment cards, while ction 4 analyzes competitive card pricing arrangements. Section 5 studies welfare comparisons.The final ction contains a summary and conclusions.单双数教案
2 A model of payment cards
The model considers three types of agents----consumers, merchants, and payment card networks. All agents are risk neutral. There is a (mass one) continuum of (ex ante identical) consumers and a (mass one) continuum of merchants that have (some) market power. Merchants in each country are differentiated by the type of good they ll and the profit margin.they realize when rving each customer. There are two card networks in our model. One network offers debit cards, the other network offers credit cards. In our model, we have combined the issuer and acquirer into one entity (i.e. the card network) so as to abstract from the interchange fee decision between issuers and acquirers. In planning their payment activities, consumers need to decide whether to subscribe to a card network and pay a fixed fee, while merchants need to decide whether to accept a payment card and pay a per-transaction merchant fee. We will analy both monopolistic and competitive payment card pricing arrangements.
支付卡的定价、竞争和有效性：欧洲独立支付体系地区的可行性研
究
资料来源: Springer Link
作者：Wilko Bolt Heiko Schmiedel
摘要——
本文分析了支付卡定价的均衡态势和由支付卡竞争带来的一系列福利政策。我们尤其以借记卡和信用卡的竞争作为模型来研究。本文讨论的焦点在于必须确保最优客户和商人的手续费安全收取、收入的不确定性、违约的风险性和商人用账户支取现金的交易费之间的关系。借记卡和信用卡服务不同的客户群体导致的市场细分产生出了一种更优的支付方式：“混合支付”。然而，当市场细分出现之后，支付卡收益并没有必然的达到它产生的社会效益的水平。因此，就客户交易手续费而言，成熟的体制进行干预对提高总产能来说是必要的。
记叙文300字>贝克特的代表作
关键词：支付卡竞争定价态势经济效率
引入——
支付卡使用的快速增长在很多经济体中是一个很引人注目的现象。现在，消费者购买和商人买卖物品和服务中使用支付卡是不可避免的。在欧洲的13个国家，从1990年到2005年之间支付卡交易人均使用数量增长高于1/5（Amromin and Chakravorti,2009）, 而且支付卡现在已经成为了使用率最高的非现金交易工具。
不仅如此，支付卡也逐渐被升级成为更简洁、更安全和更经济的支付工具。尽管支付卡普及速度如此的惊人，但是有关定价，剩余价值抽取和支付卡剩余市场的竞争始终存在问题。
现有的论文研究了支付卡定价态势和由支付卡竞争带来的一系列福利政策。不像很多其他支付卡的利益是外生的支付模型，我们研究的模型是在于首先研究通过明确地组建消费者资产流动性的约束和安全的网络支付竞争源于支付卡内在价值的获得。消费者和商人的交易增加了消耗可能、成本结余与使用支付卡之间产生的费用的矛盾。支付卡和现金的相互作用决定了支付卡在网络业务中提取消费者和商人的剩余价值的能力，这种能力已经在手续费中反映出来。我们也同时分析研究了垄断性和竞争性支付卡定价的策略。竞争压力减少了商人支付的手续费，但同时增加了商人对支付卡付费的主动接受度。支付卡竞争有可能形成不同的形式。我们重点关注两种竞争方式。第一种形式是借记卡网络服务对信用卡网络服务在商人角度的不同市场的竞争（“市场分割”）。第
