外文翻译
原文
Trade credit,collateral liquidation and borrowing constraint s
手写板怎么用Material Source:National Centre of Competence in Rearch Financial Valuation and Risk Management Working Paper No.251
Author:AnnaMaria C.Menichini The rest of the paper is organid as follows. Section 1 provides a sketch of the related literature. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analys the determinants of trade credit, distinguishing between liquidation and incentive motives. Section 4 prents and discuss the results. Section 5 explores the effect of incorporating the specific content of the bankruptcy and commercial laws on our predictions. Section 6 concludes.
1 Related literature
One of the main objectives of the literature on trade credit has been to explain why agents should want to borrow from firms rather than from financial intermediaries. The traditional explanation has been that trade credit rves a non financial role. More precily, it allows to reduce transaction cost
s (Ferris, 1981), implement price discrimination across customers with different creditworthiness (Brennan et al., 1988), facilitate the establishment of long term relationships with customers (Summers and Wilson, 2002), and even provide a warranty for product quality when customers cannot obrve product characteristics (Long et al., 1993).
Although the non-financial theories can explain the existence of trade credit, they do not deliver any prediction on how borrowing constraints affect the demand for trade credit, since credit rationing is not explicitly modeled in any of the papers. Financial theories have attempted to fill this gap (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingn, 2004, among others). In the theories the supplier has an information advantage over financial institutions in lending to the buyer. Burkart and Ellingn (2004), who analysis is clost to ours, construct a model in which banks have an intermediation advantage, while suppliers have an information advantage which mitigates their exposure to borrowers’ opport unistic behaviour. It
turns out that sufficiently rich firms, facing no incentive problems, never u trade credit, while, poorer firms, which do face incentive problems, experience bank credit rationing. For the firms, suppliers’ information advantage b ecomes relevant, as they can relax borrowing constraints by extending trade credit to their customers. Similarly, Biais and Gollier (1997) construct a screening m
odel in which the ller’s provision of trade credit signals the creditworthiness of the buyer and thus mitigates credit rationing.
Hence,both of the papers,and more generally existing financial theories of trade credit,fail to explain:(i)why trade credit is ud also by financially unconstrained firms;and (ii) why reliance on trade credit does not necessarily increa with the verity of financial constraints, as documented by the empirical literature (Petern and Rajan, 1997; Marotta, 2001). In order to distinguish between rationed and non-rationed firms, we model the information advantage as in Burkart and Ellingn (2004) but interact it with a liquidation advantage, which can explain why even wealthy firms may wish to u trade credit. The liquidation advantage of suppliers, when it exceeds the bank’s intermediation advantage, warrants relia nce on trade credit by rationed and unrationed firms alike. This squares withthe evidence that firms facing different degrees of credit rationing tend to rely to the same extent on trade credit.
The idea that trade credit can offer a way to exploit the sup plier’s liquidation advantage has been propod and tested in various empirical contributions (Mian and Smith,1992; Petern and Rajan,1997, among others). Frank and Maksimovic (2004) have also theoretically modeled the effects of such advantage, and shown that it makes trade credit cheaper than bank financing. Howev
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er, in their tting bank credit is never rationed, so that no prediction regarding the demand for trade credit by financially unconstrained firms can be derived.
Finally,the existing literature has disregarded the relations between financing and input decisions and has offered no explanation for why firms only lend inputs. The u of a multi-input technology allows us to fill the gaps.
2 The model
A risk-neutral entrepreneur has an investment project which us a tangible and an intangible input to produce a verifiable output. The tangible input can be interpreted as raw material as well as physical capital, while intangibles as skilled labour, for example employees working in R&D units. Let qk and qL denote the purchad amount of tangible and intangible inputs respectively and Ik qk, IL
qL, the amount of such inputs that is invested. The purcha of inputs is obrvable only to their respective suppliers. The amount invested is unobrvable to any party and is transformed into a verifiable state contingent output y, with 2 {G,B} and yG > yB = 0. The good state (= G) occurs with probability p. Uncertainty affects production through demand (i.e., production is demand-driven). At times of high demand, invested inputs produce output according to the increasing and strictly concav
e production function fG (Ik, IL). At times of low demand, no output is produced and the firm is worth only the scrap value of unud inputs, which can therefore be pledged as a collateral to financiers. Inputs are substitutes, but a positive amount of each is esntial for production. The entrepreneur is a price taker both in the inputs and in the output markets. The output priceis normalid to 1, as well as the prices of tangible and intangible inputs.
Although the entrepreneur has obrvable internal wealth(A),this is not large enough to finance the first-best investment. Hence,the entrepreneur needs external funding from competitive banks (LB≥0)and/or suppliers(LS≥0)to undertake the project.
Banks and suppliers of each input play different roles.Banks lend cash.The supplier of intangibles provides the input,which is fully paid for in cash.The supplier of tangibles,instead,not only lls the input,but can also act as a financier,lending both inputs and cash.
无线网卡哪个好Moral hazard.Unobrvability of investment to all parties and of input purchas to parties other than the respective suppliers introduce a problem of moral hazard for the entrepreneur:the funds raid,either in cash or in kind,might not be invested in the venture,but diverted to private us.If diversion occurs,creditors get paid only to the extent that project returns are eventually available.Ho
wever,the supplier can obrve whether inputs have been purchad.This advantage together with the lower li quidity of inputs relative to cash imply that the entrepreneur’s moral hazard problem is less vere if funding is raid from the supplier rather than from the bank.In particular,one unit of cash gives the entrepreneu r a returnφ<1 if diverted,where can be interpreted as the degree of vulnerability of creditor rights.One unit of the tangible input qk gives instead a returnφβk if diverted,whereβk<1 denotes the tangible input liquidity.Whenβk is clo to 1,the input can be resold at a price clo to its purcha price and transformed into monetary benefits.This applies to standardid products,which can be ud by many di?erent customers and thus have a high re-sale value.Converly,perishable
depgoods,rvices or inputs tailored to the specific needs of the buyer(di?erentiated)are less liquid and thus have a lowβk.Last,one unit of the intangible input qL gives a zero return if diverted.This implies that it is not possible to extract monetary benefits from workers by assigning them to tasks different from tho they were employed for. In many countries,such practices are indeed prohibited by the employment protection legislation.青春万岁电影
Collateral value.Inputs are also valuable if repossd in the event of firm’s default.We assume that only tangible inputs can be pledged to financiers,while intangibles have zero collateral value.Hence,t
he total value of pledgeable collateral is C=βkIk.However,financiers have diff erent liquidation abilities.We defineβiC as the liquidation value extracted by each financier in ca of default,with i=B,S referring to the bank or the supplier,respectively.Since the supplier has a better knowledge of the resale market,we assume that she has a better liquidation technology relative to the βS>βB.Finally,the cost of raising one unit of funds on the market is assumed to be higher for the supplier than for the bank(rB<rS).This appears realistic for veral reasons:first,it is consistent with the role of banks as specialid financial intermediaries.Second,suppliers are likely to be themlves credit constrained and to face a higher cost of funds than banks.Finally,it might be the e?ect of the supplier hacing bargaining power due to her cost advantages over other financiers.
Contracts.The entrepreneur-bank contract specifies:the credit granted by the bank LB;the entrepreneur’s repayment obligation R≥0,which depends on the realid revenues and on the size of the loan;the share of the collateral obtained in ca of defaultγ.The contract between the entrepr eneur and the supplier of the tangible input specifies:the credit granted by the supplier LS;the input provision qk;the entrepreneur’s repayment obligation R≥0,which depends on the realid revenues and on the size of the loan;the share of the collateral obtained in ca of default.Notice that,unlike the bank,the supplier can condition the contract also on the input purcha qk.Last,given that the int
angible input is fully paid for when it is purchad,the contract between entrepreneur and supplier specifies the purchad amount of the input qL.We assume that each party is protected by limited liability.
Time line
1.Competitive banks and suppliers make contract o?ers,given entrepreneur’s wealth;
2.the entrepreneur accepts or rejects;
李瑟娥4.uncertainty resolves;
5.the payo?realis and repayments are made.
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译文
公共基础知识题型贸易信贷、担保清算和借款的约束
资料来源：国际研究中心在财务风险评估与管理中的工作报告第251期作者：安娜玛丽亚
本文的其余部分安排如下：第1节相关文献的概述。第2节模式的描述。第3节贸易信贷决定因素的分析，动机和清算之间的区别。第4节讨论出的结果。第5节探讨了合并破产的具体内容和我们所预测的商业法律所产生的影响。第6节总结。
1相关文献
文献中有关贸易信贷的主要目标之一是要解释为什么代理人应当从企业借钱，而不是从金融中介机构。传统的解释是，贸易信贷扮演着非金融服务的角色。更确切地说，它允许降低交易成本（摩天，1981年），根据顾客间的不同信用实施价格歧视（布伦南等人，1988），方便与客户（萨默斯和Wilson，2002）建立长期关系，甚至提供了一个当客户无法观察产品特征的产品质量保修（龙等人，1993）。
虽然这些非金融理论可以解释贸易信贷的存在，他们不提供任何有关借款约束如何影响贸易信贷需求的预测，因为在这些论文的蓝本中没有明确的信贷配给。金融理论试图弥补这一差距（Biais和Gollier，1997; Burkart和艾林森，2004年，等等）。这些理论显示，贷款给买主，相对于金融机构，供应商有信息优势。Burkart和艾林森（2004）的分析是最接近我们的，建立一个有中介优势银行的模型，，同时供应商拥有信息优势而减轻他们受借款人机会主义行为的影响。事实证明，相当富裕的企业，面临激励的问题，从来不使用贸易信贷，同时，贫困公司，确实面临激励问题，经历银行信贷配
给。对于这些公司，供应商的信息优势变为相关的，因为他们可以通过扩大贸易信贷放松对客户贷款的限制。同样，Biais和Gollier（1997）建立一个筛选模型，卖方提供贸易信贷信号，买方信贷，从而缓解信贷配给。
因此，这些文件和更普遍存在着有关贸易信贷的金融理论都无法解释：（一）为何经济上无约束的企业也使用贸易信贷。（二）由实证文献记载，为何对贸易
