项目代码资本结构、股权结构与公司绩效外文翻译
三国演义貂蝉
中文2825字
1868单词
外文文献：
Capital structure, equity ownership and firm performance
Dimitris Margaritis, Maria Psillaki 1
Abstract：This paper investigates the relationship between capital structure, ownership structure and firm performance using a sample of French manufacturing firms. We employ non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods to empirically construct the industry’s ‘best practice’frontier and measure firm efficiency as the distance from that frontier. Using the performance measures we examine if more efficient firms choo more or less debt in their capital structure. We summarize the contrasting effects of efficien
cy on capital structure in terms of two competing hypothes: the efficiency-risk and franchi value hypothes. Using quantile regressions we test the effect of efficiency on leverage and thus the empirical validity of the two competing hypothes across different capital structure choices. We also test the direct relationship from leverage to efficiency stipulated by the Jenn and Meckling (1976) agency cost model. Throughout this analysis we consider the role of ownership structure and type on capital structure and firm performance.
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Firm performance, capital structure and ownership
Conflicts of interest between owners-managers and outside shareholders as well as tho between controlling and minority shareholders lie at the heart of the corporate governance literature (Berle and Means, 1932; Jenn and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). While there is a relatively large literature on the effects of ownership on firm performance (e for example, Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Himmelberg et al., 1999), the relationship between ownership structure and capital struct怎样美容
ure remains largely unexplored. On the other hand, a voluminous literature is devoted to capital structure and its effects on corporate performance –e the surveys by Harris and Raviv (1991) and Myers (2001). An emerging connsus that comes out of the corporate governance literature (e Mahrt-Smith, 2005) is that the interactions between capital structure and ownership structure impact on firm values. Yet theoretical arguments alone cannot unequivocally predict the relationships (e Morck et al., 1988) and the empirical evidence that we have often appears to be contradictory. In part the conflicting results ari from difficulties empirical rearchers face in obtaining direct measures of the magnitude of agency costs that are not confounded by factors that are beyond the control of management (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). In the remainder of this ction we briefly review the literature in this area focusing on the main hypothes of interest for this study.好利来生日蛋糕
Firm performance and capital structure
The agency cost theory is premid on the idea that the interests of the company’s mana
gers and its shareholders are not perfectly aligned. In their minal paper Jenn and Meckling (1976) emphasized the importance of the agency costs of equity arising from the paration of ownership and control of firms whereby managers tend to maximize their own utility rather than the value of the firm. The conflicts may occur in situations where managers have incentives to take
1来源：Journal of Banking & Finance , 2010 (34) : 621–632，本文翻译的是第二部分
excessive risks as part of risk shifting investment strategies. This leads us to Jenn’s (1986) “free cash flow theory”where as stated by Jenn (1986, p. 323) “the problem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it below the cost of capital or wasting it on organizational inefficiencies.”Thus high debt ratios may be ud as a disciplinary device to reduce managerial cash flow waste through the threat of liquidation (Grossman and Hart, 1982) or through pressure to generate cash flows to rvice debt (Jenn, 1986). In the situations, debt will have a positive effect on the value of the firm.
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Agency costs can also exist from conflicts between debt and equity investors. The conflicts ari when there is a risk of default. The risk of default may create what Myers (1977) referred to as an“underinvestment”or “debt overhang”problem. In this ca, debt will have a negative effect on the value of the firm. Building on Myers (1977) and Jenn (1986), Stulz (1990) develops a model in which debt financing is shown to mitigate overinvestment problems but aggravate the underinvestment problem. The model predicts that debt can have both a positive and a negative effect on firm performance and presumably both effects are prent in all firms. We allow for the prence of both effects in the empirical specification of the agency cost model. However we expect the impact of leverage to be negative overall. We summarize this in terms of our first testable hypothesis. According to the agency cost hypothesis (H1) higher leverage is expected to lower agency costs, reduce inefficiency and thereby lead to an improvement in firm’s performance.
Rever causality from firm performance to capital structure
But firm performance may also affect the choice of capital structure. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) stipulate that more efficient firms are more likely to earn a higher return for a given capital structure, and that higher returns can act as a buffer against portfolio risk so that more efficient firms are in a better position to substitute equity for debt in their capital structure. Hence under the efficiency-risk hypothesis (H2), more efficient firms choo higher leverage ratios becau higher efficiency is expected to lower the costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. In esnce, the efficiency-risk hypothesis is a spin-off of the trade-off theory of capital structure whereby differences in efficiency, all el equal, enable firms to fine tune their optimal capital structure.
