State Capacity and Recurring Civil Conflicts
*
LU Lingyu **
Abstract: The impacts of extractive capacity upon recurring civil conflicts are non-linear and conditional. This relationship is determined by three mechanisms that run in opposite directions. In the long run, stronger state capacity is expected to make military rebellion more difficult and expensive. In the short run, however, the effort to strengthen extractive capacity will increa taxpayers’ financial stress, thus engendering their grievance against the government and sympathy towards rebels. In the meantime, a government that attempts to rai more tax money will make its peace commitment less credible and endanger the fragile peace in the post-conflict period. Bad upon the regression analysis of 138 civil conflicts in 70 countries from 1960 to 2007, this paper finds that how state capacity influences relap to civil wars is esntially a domestic process. Specifically speaking, where there was a decisive victory in the previous episode of a conflict, increa in state capacity significantly makes the conflict less likely to recur. Nonetheless, the relationship is not significantly shaped by peace keeping operations. Furthermore, natural resources and foreign aid fail to significantly assist capable states in c
reating a more durable peace. Converly, the two factors repress the independent influences of state capacity upon the recurrence of civil conflicts.
Keywords: state capacity; extractive capacity; civil conflicts; recurrence
* N otes: First, the author would express his sincere gratitude towards the anonymous reviewer for making valuable revision suggestions and highlighting the directions for future rearch. The author will take full responsibility for potential errors in this writing. Second, this rearch is supported by the grant from “International Aid and State-Building in Africa,” a Major Rearch Project of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Zhejiang Province, 2014 (Project No. 2013QN079).
** L U Lingyu, Professor, Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, China.
14LU Lingyu
A significant change in the post-Cold War international curity is the rapid ri in renewed civil conflicts.1 From 1945 to 1999, approximately 69% internal rebellions returned.2 Specifically speaking, 1/5 to 1/3 of the wars relapd within five years of resolution, and about 17% of them within ten years of the end of the previous episode.3
This paper attempts to explore the impacts of state capacity upon the recurrence of civil conflicts. It is agreed that strong state capacity significantly reduces the risk of renewed conflicts by increasing the opportunity cost of rebellion, whereas polities with weak state capacity are far more likely to experience relap of conflicts.4 Following this logic, post-conflict states are compelled to consolidate the state machinery with a view to creating durable peace. But due to different strategic environments in the post-conflict period, the way that state capacity shapes the duration of peace is far more complex. This paper demonstrates that the connection between state capacity and recurring civil conflicts is shaped by three mechanisms that run in opposite directions. In the long run, stronger state capacity makes it financially and militarily more difficult for potential rebels to fight against the government; but in the short run, a government that tries to extract more resources will create financial difficulty for the society, causing civilians to rent the government and sympathize with rebels. Meanwhile, such efforts will reduce the credibility of the state’s commitment to peace, thus threatening the fragile peace. In a nutshell, state capacity affects recurring civil conflicts in a non-linear manner.
The empirical test, a quantitative analysis of 138 civil conflicts in 70 states from 1960 to 2007 verifies the major hypothesis of this rearch. Furthermore, the relationship between state capacity and retur
n of war is conditional as well. If the previous episode of a conflict ends with a decisive victory, the connection is negative. The connection remains significantly negative, although peace keeping operations do not play a due role. Besides, the positive impacts of state capacity upon durable peace are not merely significantly shaped by natural resources and foreign aid, but are found to inhibit the 1 Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, “How Much War will We See? Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution, V ol. 46, No. 3 (June 2002), pp. 307-344; Nils Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Håvard Strand, “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Datat,” Journal of Peace Rearch, Vol. 39, No. 5 (September 2002), pp. 615-637; Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict, 1989-2006,” Journal of Peace Rearch, V ol. 44, No. 5 (September 2007), pp. 623-634.
2 Andrew Mack, “Global Patterns of Political Violence,” working paper, March 2007, New York: International Peace
Academy.
3 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soederbom, “Post-Conflict Risks,” Journal of Peace Rearc
h, V ol. 45, No.
4 (July
2008), pp. 461-478. Some scholars argue that the probability of civil conflict recurrence is verely overestimated as a result of confusion in conceptualization, operationalization and measurement. Plea refer to Astri Suhrke and Ingrid Samt, “What’s in a Figure? Estimating Recurrence of Civil War,” International Peacekeeping, V ol. 14, No. 2 (March 2007), pp. 195-203.
4 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers, V ol. 56, No. 4 (August 2004),
pp. 563-595; James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” American Political Science Review, V ol.
97, No. 1 (February 2003), pp. 75-90; Mehmet Gurs and T. David Mason, “Weak State, Regime Types, and Civil War,”
Civil Wars, V ol. 12, No. 1-2 (June 2010), pp. 140-155; David Sobek, “Masters of their Domains: The Role of State Capacity in Civil Wars,” Journal of Peace Rearch, V ol. 47, No. 3 (May 2010), pp. 26
7-271.
State Capacity and Recurring Civil Conflicts15 independent influence of state capacity.
The rest of this paper includes four parts. Part I ts up a theoretical framework bad upon current literature and makes testable hypothes. Part II discuss the data and method of a empirical test. While a report and analysis of empirical findings are prented in Part III, Part IV concludes the rearch and highlights its theoretical and policy implications.
1. Financial Resources and the Risk of Recurring Civil Conflicts State capacity is one of the many concepts that social scientists most often utilize but lacks a connsus about who definition.5 Skocpol defines state capacity as the ability of the state to achieve goals, particularly in face of strong social groups or recalcitrant societal-economic situation.6 This paper adopts the conci definition which Hu and Wang propo: “the ability to transform the will and goal (of the state) into realities.”7 Despite the conci definition ud in this paper, the connotation of the concept is very complex. No variable can capture its whole intention.8 Among other things, the content and emphasis of state capacity vary according to the societal-economic development of each state. Globalization and liberalization have also profoundly shaped state capacity as well.9 For example, te
rrorism is challenging the ability of the state to protect its citizenry, while globalization has been weakening the ability of the state to provide welfare to its own underprivileged population in face of global economic competition and to effectively counter terrorism and ward its citizens off physical damage.
For all the, the fundamental components of state capacity are widely acknowledged. No political scientist has ever doubted the fundamental importance of extractive capacity. For instance, Hu and Wang propo that state capacity is made up of extractive capacity, steering capacity, legitimation capacity and coercive capacity. From the perspective of Mark Robinson, however, state capacity has four levels, namely, infrastructural capacity, transformative capacity, distributive capacity, and 5 Karl Derouen, Jr., and Jacob Bercovitch, “Enduring Internal Rivalries: A New Framework for the Study of Civil War,” Journal
of Peace Rearch, V ol. 45, No. 1 (January 2008), pp. 55-74.
6 Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Rearch,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich
Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back in, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer
sity Press, 1985, pp.
3-37.
7 Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang, State Capacity of the People’s Republic of China, Shenyang, China: Liaoning People’s
Press, 1994, p. 6 (胡鞍钢、王绍光：《中国国家能力报告》，沈阳：辽宁人民出版社1994年版，第6页).
8 Cullens Hendrix, “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict,” Journal
of Peace Rearch, V ol. 47, No. 3 (May 2010), p. 283.
9 Mark Robinson, “Hybrid States: Globalisation and the Politics of State Capacity,” Political Studies, V ol. 56, No. 3 (October
2008), pp. 566-583.s
16LU Lingyu
relational capacity.10
The two sources, which define state capacity in different manners, tend to converge on extractive capacity, which Robinson refers to as “infrastructural capacity.” Extractive capacity allows the state to mobilize societal economic resources. It is the foundation, nucleus and reprentative of state capacity.11 It not only reflects the ability of the state to penetrate into the society, but is the prerequisite for the function of other capacities.12 In any society, extractive capacity is the most fundamental state capacity.13 Insufficient extractive capacity would greatly impair the state machinery. Such states may have the ability to respond to societal changes, but are unable to induce social reforms.14 As a result, extractive or taxation capacity is often utilized as a proxy for state capacity in empirical rearch.15 It is becau the state must spend money whatever function it performs, including building up the army, controlling the citizenry, formulating and implementing public policy and providing public goods.16 Douglass North goes further to argue that extraction is the nature of the state. From his standpoint of view, the state, which monopolizes legitimate means of violence, is defined by the boundary that the extractive capacity of the ruler reaches.17 Furthermore, Cullen 10 In the viewpoint of Hu and Wang, state capacity is four dimensional: (1) Extractive capacity is the ability to mobilize societal-
economic resources. It is the cornerstone and reprentative of state capacity. (2) Steering capacity is the ability to guide national economy. (3) Legitimation capacity helps the state foster political connsus and consolidate the rule via political symbols. (4) Coercive capacity allows the state to safeguard its rule by violence, organization or coercion. Plea refer to Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang, State Capacity of the People’s Republic of China, pp.6-8. Another typology is contributed by Mark Robins. In his viewpoint, there is a hierarchy of state capacity from low to high: (1) Infrastructural capacity is the ability of the state to penetrate into the society for the extraction of resources and to ek cooperation with organized groups for the purpo of pursuing collective goals. In particular, this ability denotes the ability of the state to levy tax for public interests instead of for the purpo of the distribution of state revenues among a small batch of political elites or the ruling class. (2) Transformative capacity is the ability of domestic policy elites to collaborate with organized economic interest groups and implement economic policy and adjustment for the purpo of upgrading and transforming the industries. (3) Distributive capacity means the ability of the state to redistribute the benefits of economic development to the mass of the people via social welfare and transfer. (4) Relational capacity is the ability of officials to communicate to extra-institutional actors while changes are taking place to the nature and function of the state. Plea refer to Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang, State Capacity of the People’s Republic of China, Chapter 1; Mark R
obinson, “Hybrid States: Globalisation and the Politics of State Capacity,” Political Studies, V ol. 56, No. 3 (October 2008), pp. 569-580.
11 Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang, State Capacity of the People’s Republic of China, p.6.
12 Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang, State Capacity of the People’s Republic of China, p.10.
13 Philippe Schmitter, Claudius Wagemann, and Anastassia Obydenkova, “Democratization and State Capacity,” paper prented
at the X Congreso Internacional del CLAD sobre la Reforma del Estado y de la Administración Pública, Santiago, Chile, October 18-21, 2005, /intradoc/groups/public/documents/clad/clad0052201.pdf.
14 Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rules in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, and Tyrant, Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1982.
15 Cameron Thies, “Territorial Nationalism in Spatial Rivalries: An Institutionalist Account of the Argentine-Chilean Rivalry,”
International Interactions, V ol. 27, No. 4 (May 2001), pp. 399-431; Cameron Thies, “State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Post-Colonial Developing Country Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000,” International Studies Quarterly, V ol.
48, No. 1 (March 2004), pp. 53-72; Cameron Thies, “War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America,” American Journal of Political Science, V ol. 49, No. 3 (July 2005), pp. 451-465; Cameron Thies, “Public Violence and State Building in Central America,” Comparative Political Studies, V ol. 39, No. 10 (December 2006), pp. 1263-1282.
16 Marina Arbetman and Jacek Kugler, “Relative Political Capacity: Political Extraction and Political Rearch,” in Marina
Arbetman and Jacek Kugler, eds., Political Capacity and Economic Behavior, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997, pp. 11-46；
Miguel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America, University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002; A. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
17 Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History, New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1981.
