10.3期经济学人翻译参考-L1theWorldEconomy-中国高翻团队
Leaders 1
The world economy
世界经济
Dominant and dangerous
统治与危机
As America’s economic supremacy fades, the primacy of the dollar looks unsustainable
随着美国经济霸权的衰落，美元的主导地位似乎难以为继
IF HEGEMONS are good for anything, it is for conferring stability on the systems they dominate. For 70 years the dollar has been the superpower of the financial and monetary system. Despite talk of the yuan’s ri, the primacy of the greenback is unchallenged. As a
means of payment, a store of value and a rerve ast, nothing can touch it. Yet the dollar’s rule has brittle foundations, and the system it underpins is unstable. Wor, the alternative rerve currencies are flawed. A transition to a more cure order will be devilishly hard.
霸权的好处，在于能够维持霸权本身主导体系的稳定。过去70年间，美元一直是金融及货币体系中的主导力量。即使有人民币崛起一说，但美元的主导地位还未受挑战。无论作为付酬方式、贮藏手段还是储备资产，美元的地位都无可撼动。然而，美元的主导力薄弱，美元主导的体系也缺乏稳定性。更糟糕的是，目前可取代其储备地位的他国货币都存在缺陷。要使全球市场向一个更为安全的金融秩序过渡极为困难。
When the buck stops
当美元无力维系霸权
For decades, America’s economic might legitimid the dollar’s claims to reign supreme. But, as our special report this week explains, a faultline has opened between America’s e
conomic clout and its financial muscle. The United Stat es accounts for 23% of global GDP and 12% of merchandi trade. Yet about 60% of the world’s output, and a similar share of the planet’s people, lie within a de facto dollar zone, in which currencies are pegged to the dollar or move in some sympathy with it. American firms’ share of the stock of international corporate investment has fallen from 39% in 1999 to 24% today. But Wall Street ts the rhythm of markets globally more than it ever did. American fund managers run 55% of the world’s asts under management, up from 44% a decade ago.
几十年来，美国的经济实力保障着美元的霸权地位。但本刊也在这周的“特别报道”一栏中指出，美国的经济影响力与财政实力已出现脱节。目前，美国在全球GDP总量中占23%，在商品贸易总量中占12%，而实际上，全球约60%的经济产量及人口都位于美元区内——区域内的货币要么直接与美元挂钩，要么与
美元走势休戚相关。虽然美国企业在全球股票交易中的份额从1999年的39%跌至如今的24%，但过去十年间，归属美国基金管理者的全球资产却从44%上升至55%，华尔街对全球金融市场的掌控达到前所未有的高度。
The widening gap between America’s economic and financial power creates problems for other countries, in the dollar zone and beyond. That is becau the costs of dollar dominance are starting to outweigh the benefits.
美国经济影响力与财政实力的脱节日益严重，给美元区内外的国家造成了许多问题。究其原因，是维系美元主导地位所需的成本逐渐超出了美元霸权带来的收益。
First, economies must endure wild gyrations. In recent months the prospect of even a tiny rate ri in America has sucked capital from emerging markets, battering currencies and share prices. Decisions of the Federal Rerve affect offshore dollar debts and deposits worth about $9 trillion. Becau some countries link their currencies to the dollar, their central banks must react to the Fed. Foreigners own
20-50% of local-currency government bonds in places like Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey: they are more likely to abandon emerging markets when American rates ri.
首先，各国经济必须经受剧烈动荡。最近数月，美联储或将微幅上调利率的消息已使新兴市场流失了大量资本，其货币、股价也遭到重创。美联储的决策影响着美国境外总价值高达9万亿美元的美元债务及存款。这是因为一些国家将本国货币与美元挂钩，因此美联储发布决策后，这些国家的央行就必须应声而动。在印度尼西亚、马来西亚、墨西哥、南非以及土耳其等地，外方在本币国债所占份额高达20%至50%，而一旦美联储上调利率，它们从新兴市场撤资的可能性也会随之增大。
At one time the pain from capital outflows would have been mitigated by the stronger demand-including for imports-that prompted the Fed to rai rates in the first place. However, in the p ast decade America’s share of global merchandi imports has dropped from 16% to 13%. America is the biggest export market for only 32 countries, down from 44 in 1994; the figure for China has rin from two to 43. A system in which the Fed dispens and the world convuls is unstable.
扩大市场需求——包括对进口的需求，一度可以减轻资本外流所带来的阵痛，这也是促使美联储加息的最初原因。然而过去十年中，美国在全球商品进口总量中所占的份额已经从1
6%下降至13%。1994年，全球共有44个国家将美国作为最大出口市场，而如今只有32个；相比之下，以中国为最大出口市场的国家则从2个上升至43个。如今，美元主导下的金融体系无法稳定运作，只会使各国经济频陷动荡。
A cond problem is the lack of a backstop for the offshore dollar system if it faces a crisis. In 2008-09 the Fed reluctantly came to the rescue, acting as a lender of
last resort by offering $1 trillion of dollar liquidity to foreign banks and central banks. The sums involved in a future crisis would be far higher. The offshore dollar world is almost twice as large as it was in 2007.By the 2020s it could be as big as America’s banking industry. Since 2008-09, Congress has grown wary of the Fed’s emergency lending. Come the n ext crisis, the Fed’s plans to issue vast swap lines might meet regulatory or congressional resistance. For how long will countries be ready to tie their financial systems to America’s fractious and dysfunctional politics?
