Journal of Shipping and Ocean Engineering 10 (2020) 1-4
Doi: 10.17265/2159-5879/2020.01.001
Rearch on Optimization Scheme of Ship Radar Information Storage Bad on Big Data
Li Ning
Department of Navigational Technology, Merchant Marine College, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China Abstract: With the development of marine information technology, ship radar data increas geometrically, and the traditional local rver storage architecture has become increasingly unable to meet the requirements of modern ship radar data capacity, so cloud storage has gradually become the mainstream technology of radar data storage. At the same time, becau the marine communication network is more vulnerable to external attacks and environmental interference, high-density encryption technology suitable for cloud storage is needed. In this paper, a ship radar cloud storage platform bad on big data is studied, and a high-density encryption algorithm CP-ASBE is designed. Finally, simulation is carried out.
Key words: Control access protocol, cloud storage platform, CP-ASBE.
1. Introduction
Cloud storage architecture is a rearch hotspot in recent years. It has the characteristics of large capacity, small bandwidth resources, convenient data acquisition and management, and has been widely ud in modern radar data storage. At the same time, radar data is more vulnerable to external attacks and environmental interference when it is transmitted through a shared or proprietary network [1], which requires a kind of adaptive marine environment And high-density storage technology of cloud storage architecture.
In this paper, we choo a highly reliable and scalable HDFS cloud storage architecture, study the system model and curity mechanism, design a high-density encryption algorithm CP-ASBE bad on this architecture, and finally simulate it.
2. HDFS Cloud Storage Platform
2.1 Cloud Storage Architecture
HDFS cloud storage platform is a cluster architecture bad on master-slave relationship, Corresponding author: Li Ning, Master, Lecturer, rearch fields: transportation information engineeri
ng & control. including a master node MasterNode and N distributed storage nodes DataNode. In order to ensure the reliability of the platform, an auxiliary node Auxiliarynodes, is configured for the MasterNode to play the role of dual machine backup.
Attribute data of ship radar is stored in MasterNode and backed up in Auxiliarynodes. Attribute data includes data block file name, starting address, data block size and other information. Specific data is stored in N distributed storage nodes DataNode, and all nodes are monitored by handshaking mechanism [2]. The architecture is shown in Fig. 1.
2.2 Access Control Process of Cloud Storage Platform The key problem of cloud storage platform is data access curity. HDFS platform carries a dual access guarantee mechanism. First, ur identity authentication is carried out in the list. After the authentication is pasd, the ur can access the master node MasterNode or auxiliary node Auxiliarynodes. After passing the ur authentication, the ur does not obtain the access control right of the distributed storage node DataNode, but also needs to judge the ur right in the masternode. The HD-FS cloud storage platform us 9 bit characters to reprent the
孤单的句子
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Rearch on Optimization Scheme of Ship Radar Information Storage Bad on Big Data
2
Fig. 1 HDFS cloud storage architecture.
Fig. 2 HDFS control access flow.
Ur’s readable, writable and executable permissions [3]. The whole control access process is shown in Fig. 2.
3. High-density Cloud Storage Encryption Algorithm Bad on CP-ASBE
3.1 Encryption and Decryption Principle of Control Tree
The last ction describes the access control process of the HDFS cloud storage platform. Although
the
ur identity is identified at the platform level, it is vulnerable to attack at the network level where the ur interacts with the data of the storage platform. CP-ASBE is an encryption algorithm bad on attribute t, which does not require identity binding for ur. When urs access the cloud storage platform, the platform provides a specific access strategy, which corresponds to the ur key one by one. Data confidentiality adopts one-to-many control tree structure.
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Rearch on Optimization Scheme of Ship Radar Information Storage Bad on Big Data 3
Fig. 3 Control tree data acquisition process bad on attribute t.
Different attributes of ship radar data are mapped to
non-leaf nodes of control tree, and data ts with
different attributes are stored in leaf nodes. Assuming
that the number of single attribute, that is, the number
of non-node is NC x, the number of data t, that is, the
number of leaf node is NC y, non-leaf node includes
attribute threshold value k x and the combined
attributes of single attribute ts can be reprented by
child nodes.
Comparing the threshold value k x with the number
of single attribute NC x: if k x<NC x, AND operation is
performed between single attributes; k x=NC x, OR
operation is performed between single attributes; k x>NC x, NON operation is performed between single attributes; three operations of AND, OR and NON
realize different combinations between single
attributes, that is, through the combination of non-leaf
nodes, access to different leaf nodes (ship radar data
stored at different address) is realized [4]. Such a
complete radar data can be divided according to
different attributes and stored in different leaf nodes.
The client of data acquisition only needs to obtain the
大脚板
attribute t key to decrypt. The control tree data
acquisition bad on attribute t is shown in Fig. 3.
3.2 CP-ASBE High-density Encryption and Decryption Algorithm
The last ction describes the principle of data
encryption and decryption bad on the control tree of
HDFS cloud storage platform. In the actual process of ship radar data encryption and decryption, the attribute access strategy of the control tree is not a calculation, but a recursive process [5]. CP-ASBE is a strategy of recursive control tree encryption and decryption. Supposing that the number of root node of the control tree is r, the subtree of the root node x is T x, and the key structure of CP-ASBE is W, the whole algorithm flow is as follows:
(1) Initialization Stage
The overall public key PK and the initial key MK of the control tree T are generated and transmitted to all root nodes.
(2) Key Generation Process
The function Key Gen is ud to generate keys for different urs and different attributes, and transmit to urs. Supposing ur uid is x and the attribute t is A the function of key generation is Key Gen (MK, A, x).
(3) Encryption Process
Using Encrypt (PK, M, T) to encrypt the control tree recursively. When encrypting, using the threshold value for all non-leaf nodes of the root node to determine the encryption polynomials q n, the degree of polynomials is the threshold value k x minus 1; different from the non-leaf node, the degree of polynomials of the leaf node is always 1.乘务员
(4) Decryption Process
服务质量保障措施
Finally, when the ur obtains the private key SK, decrypting it with Decrypt (SK, T).
The whole recursive flow of CP-ASBE algorithm is shown in Fig. 4.
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Rearch on Optimization Scheme of Ship Radar Information Storage Bad on Big Data
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Fig. 4 CP-ASBE encryption algorithm flow.
Table 1 Simulation result.
Number of attribute t Complexity(Recursive step) Time-consuming for encryption /s Time-consuming for decryption /s 10 3028 3.78 4.56
30 5620 5.29 6.09
90 6346 6.14 7.25
5. Conclusion
Bad on the study of the model of HDFS cloud storage of ship radar data platform, this paper focus on the analysis of the recursive encryptor algorithm CP-ASBE in cloud storage, and finally simulates it. References
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