2016年电视机尺寸选择《商务翻译》课程期中作业：
仁者见仁什么意思
指令：每一组同学从1+6；2+7；3+8；4+9；5+10中选其一进行翻译，译文完成后必须润色三遍，要有三次润色的电子稿三篇，到时发给这三篇电子稿我作为评阅译文的参照。
本练习必须在第十一周之前完成，第十二、十三周为本次商务翻译的展示大赛，每一组派两人陈述。第十四周开始训练汉英商务翻译。
Passage 1
Big Is Bigger Than Ever
As companies compete and ek the marketplace reach they need for viability, they will need to get bigger. Marketing, sales, supply chains, and rvice functions are being expanded and adapted to a host of geographic markets and adjacent gments and rvices. At the same time, many basic participation costs of doing business are escalating, which means that companies need greater investment capacity and financial muscle just to stay even or to thrive. For instance, new marketing technologies allow companies to create
so-called gments of one to reach customers better, but the are expensive tools. A CEO and executive team might reasonably ask, “How big must we get to be able to afford the technologies?” and then pursue growth to attain that size. This imperative naturally makes mergers and acquisitions more appealing and has helped drive M&A (Merger and Acquisition) activity.
However, big is often regarded as an undesirable corporate attribute. Citigroup’s recent troubles, for example, are often pegged to its creation of a gigantic “financial supermarket.”Witness also the language that is frequently ud to describe big companies, such as “behemoth,”“sprawling,” and “lumbering.”
But getting bigger in this emerging environment does not simply mean an increa in size. Coherence—the complexity, range, and related nature of a company’s offerings—is an equally significant factor in a company’s ability to sustain its competitiveness against rivals. Together, size and coherence create the relevant 七大洲轮廓scale that helps companies gain the depth and experti they need if they are to deploy their asts and capabilities (such
as technologies, customers, and supply chains) effectively. This insight might em simple, but it reprents a critical evolution beyond the prevailing conglomerate mindt of the past 40 years—a mindt that formerly focud on size alone, with insufficient emphasis on coherence beyond a financial rationale.
中国好诗词Passage 2
Velocity and Impatience奥运会
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Capital and information are moving in greater quantities and over greater distances more rapidly than ever—around the clock, across borders, and in real time—thanks to advances in technology and the global networking of media and markets. Customers shift their purchasing habits and investors shift their funds with unprecedented speed. With a few keystrokes, revenue and capital flow into and out of industries and companies.
Along with this velocity has come a cultural impatience among all of a company’s stakeholders, including its investors, business partners, customers, and employees. Inve
stors demand returns; business partners don’t tolerate delays; customers expect prompt rvice; talented employees expect instantaneous rewards and quick promotions.
瘦脸方法The conquence of all this velocity and impatience is an anxious, high-strung mindt that now defines the way the world’s major physical and financial markets view corporate performance. Minuscule time delays and tiny price differentials can quickly translate into huge loss from defecting investors, business partners, customers, or employees, upping the ante on even the slightest corporate delay or misstep. This “side effect” of velocity, of cour, was one of the factors contributing to the financial “tsunami” (as some have called it) of 2008 and 2009. But the factors leading to it will not go away as the economy shifts; no matter how long the downturn lasts, the increa in velocity and impatience will remain.
This creates extraordinary pressure on corporate leaders to execute complex deal strategies instantaneously, and without a hiccup, once they are ready to go forward. The conundrum for managers is that in reality, big, complex mergers and acquisitions should
not be undertaken at high speed. They can take many months, if not years, to evaluate, negotiate, and integrate fully. Yet stakeholders now want positive results from every deal in short order. Corporate leaders will increasingly be judged on their ability to satisfy the emingly incompatible needs for speed and deal quality.
及川悠纪夫Passage 3
The New Blues
Globalization has created a raft of new opportunities for companies and state-owned business in emerging markets to compete, relatively unhindered by the inten regulation, trade barriers, vying political ideologies, and antagonism toward capitalism that hobbled them in the recent past. Companies emerging from nations such as Brazil, Russia, India, Saudi Arabia, and China are competing head to head with the most renowned blue chip companies from North America, Europe, and Japan—and they are competing not just locally, but globally. Call the recent entrants the “New Blue Chips.” In their home nations, fast-emerging middle class will continue to develop—perhaps no
t as rapidly as they did in the mid-2000s, but at least rapidly enough to support high-growth, influential new world-class companies.
The New Blues are especially adept at rving developing nations, but they will also compete in providing products and rvices for developed nations. The New Blues have asoned management teams with international experience at leading companies, and they will continue to change the face of M&A globally as they compete for deals and collectively form a new pool of potential partners. Furthermore, the New Blues are remaking their industries through domestic and regional acquisitions, and they have t their sights on developed markets and the companies headquartered within them. Saudi Basic Industries, for instance, paid $11.6 billion for GE Plastics in 2007, and in early 2008, Tata Motors purchad the storied Jaguar and Land Rover brands from Ford for $2.3 billion. Tata said that Ford will continue to supply engines, transmissions, and other components for five to nine years, ironically turning one of America’s Big Three into a tier 1 supplier for an Indian automaker!
