原文：
减肥食谱一日三餐表Pay Enough,Don’t Pay Too Much or Don’tPay at All?
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The Impact of Bonus Intensity on Job Satisfaction
KonstantinosPouliakas
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The principal-agent model, with its convincing illustration of the trade-off that aris between risk and incentive provision when attempting to align the Conflicting interests of two contracting parties,remains central for our under- standing of the compensation strategies employed by firms (Mirlees, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979). According to the standard model of agency theory, the introduction of financial incentives as part of an agent’s remuneration package will increa his/her productivity,as it is assumed that individuals derive utility from income whilst the exertion of effort entails a utility cost.Importantly, if the additional disutility of higher e?ort is compensated byan adequate wage premium ,anim placation of the theoryis that them arginalutilitiesof workers under fixed and variable compe
nsations chemes should be equalized in the long-run.What this implies is that there should be nodi?erenc ebetweenthejobsatis faction of employees receiving monetary incentives and tho on noncontingent payment arrangements,other things equal碱的作用.
The above conclusion has been disputed by a psychological (and, increas- ingly,economics)literature,which has stresd that the incorporation of nonpecuniary motives into the economic paradigm, such as the desire for reciprocation or for engaging in interesting tasks, has important implications for an individual’s motivation and job satisfaction (Deci,1971; Lepperetal. 1973; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey, 1986, 1997; Kreps, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001). In addition, it has been argued that ‘wrong’ monetary incentives may ncite dysfunctional behavioural respons by employees (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992; Prendergast, 1999), or have a detrimental effect on employee morale and job curity via the inequitable and risky pay distributions that ari as a conquence(Bakeretal.,1988).
Once the mechanisms are taken into consideration,it becomes clear that the theoretica
l impact of monetary incentives on worker effort and job satisfaction can be ambiguous. As corroborated in a number of economic experiments (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Eriksson and Villeval, 2008), the incentive effects of monetary rewards are likely to becompromid in a world of imperfect labour mobility populated by heterogeneous agents with varying psychological dispositions. To the extent that incentive schemes allow for optimization of effort, facilitate worker autonomy and enhance lf-determination they should increa job satisfaction,othe rthings equal.Yet increasing earnings risk, crowding out of the inherent pleasantness in performing one’s job and lower morale can lead to disgruntled employees.
The study of the effect of monetary rewards on job satisfaction is therefore an empirical issue, which has only until recently received any attention. In particular, a number of studies have shown that in Britain bonus result in higher job satisfaction, although the effect of individual-bad performancerelated pay (PRP) systems is not as clear-cut once unobrved heterogeneity is taken into account (Drago et al., 1992; McCausland et al., 2005, Artz, 2008, Green and Heywood,2008;Pouliakas and Theodossiou,2009).Using US
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data, Heywood and Wei(2006)have also confirmed that all types of PRP(bar piece rates)yield greater job satisfaction relative to time rates.
不在乎的英文A potential deficiency of the above-mentioned studies is that they only focus on the discrete difference in job satisfaction between workers receiving PRP and tho on alternative schemes. Thus, they ignore the fact that worker performance and satisfaction may vary according to the magnitude of incentives.As suggested by a ries of field experiments performed by Gneezy and Rustichini(2000[a],p.802),‘‘for all positive but small enough compensaions, there is a reduction in performance as compared with the zero compensation, or, better, with the lack of any mention of compensation’’. Nevertheless,once the extrinsic motivation is large enough,it results in better performance than in the no-incentive ca. This non-monotonicity in the reaction of worker effort to both positive and negative bonus or fines, respectively) has conquently been termed the ‘‘W effect’’ of incentives (Gneezy, 2004). By contrast, the recent experimental study of Pokorny (2008) finds an inver U-shaped relationship between effort levels and incentive intensity.
This paper attempts to test the above contrasting hypothes by looking beyond the mere incidence of incentive pay and examining the impact of the intensity of incentives (i.e. the proportion of workers’ salary that is tied to bonus) on job satisfaction instead.Specifically,10 waves(1998–2007)of the British Houhold Panel Survey(BHPS)are ud to investigate the association between the power of bonus payments and the utility derived from work, holding the incidence of individual-bad PRP and other important determi- nants constant.After controlling for individual fixed effects(such as ability or motivation) that may bias the influence of payment schemes on jobsatisfaction, jobutility is found to ri only in respon to‘large’ bonus payments.Evidence is also prented that revoking a bonus from one year to the next is likely to have a detrimental effect on employee utility,and that over time job satisfaction tends to diminish as employees potentially adapt to the payment of bonus The empirical evidence of the paper is therefore consistent with Gneezy and Rustichini’s (2000[a]) asrtion that employers wishing to motivate theirstaff should indeed ‘‘pay enough or don’t pay at all’’.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 engages in a review of the available literature on the effect of financial incentives on job satisfaction. In Section 3 the data ud in the study are described and preliminary statistical correlations are outlined.Section 4 describes the basi ceconometric methodology ud in the paper.Section5 outlines the main empirica lresults of the relationship between incentive intensity and the utility derived from employment.Section6 examines the heterogeneity in the sample further.Finally,Section7concludes.
勃的部首The growing economics literature on subjective well-being (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004; EPICURUS, 2007; Frey, 2008) has emphasized that measures of job satisfaction are significant predictors of employee quits(Free man, 1978), abnteeism (Clegg, 1983) or worker productivity (Judge et al., 2001)]. It follows that understanding the influence of monetary incentives on job satisfaction is important given that the composition of an employee’s remuneration package is an integral element of his/her overall working conditions.
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