外文翻译
译文1
人定湖公园
并购的收益来源
资本市场领域研究的另一个课题是收入的一般来源。当收入只是别人非盈利成果时，资本市场领域的研究人员还不能确认资产已被重新分配，使之创造财富的盈利回升。虽然金融经济学家不能合理解释为什么并购是别人的非盈利目标的成果，但是，研究人员推断，这些合乎逻辑的假设值的目标收益不仅是重新通过并购得到的，也是分配产生的结果。一些研究者认为，股东的利益是从债券持有人处得来的。丹尼斯和麦康奈尔（1986）不支持这个意见。另外一个观点是，利润是从目标公司的资源税操作衍生而来的。从学术上讲这个证据是存在的，但不明确。奥尔巴赫和雷苏斯（1987）推测，在可能情况下税款这个因素占好处的20%，说明是足够重要的，它将影响并购的决策。吉尔森（1988）等人却发现，众多有关税收优惠的定义问题，交易成本和信息费复杂化的说法，以及税前利润方面肯定是并购活动产生的原因，或者说并购是公司实现税收优惠的最合适方法。在一个几项研究中，贾雷尔（1988）等人发现，大部分的并购活动也不能归因于税收方面的原因。施莱弗和萨默斯（1988）声称，利润从并购产生，因为新的董事会违反嵌入。施莱弗和萨默斯（1988）声称，利润从并购产生，原因是新的董事会，违反了公司与利益相关者群体的嵌入式就业条件。链接并购目标公司管理不佳的表现研究是由施莱佛和维什尼（1
988）审查的。他们的研究表明公司还没有建立完善的管理机制来制止执行者开展的活动，这个活动是不会为股东创造价值的。此外，莫克（1988）等分析这种敌意收购时声称，收购发生的过快，或者下属企业和管理当局不能尽快地减少相关程序或其他相匹配模型。结果验证了这一事实有代理成本，新股东们认为，这一成本将能够被减少。
收购公司的负面影响提出为什么并购活动能够开始进行的问题。鲁巴特肯（1983）提供了对这种有明显难度问题的一个可能解释。他认为与并购有关的行政上的困难会消除潜在的利润。他还断言，在使用该方法可能不足以发现利润，这与詹森（1986）并购投标人利润公司量化复杂性的观点一致。其结论解释了在投标人利润匮乏的情况下并购活动仍然活跃的原因。鲁巴特肯（1983）认为，只
有特定类型的并购战略才可能对购买公司的股东有好处。
除了这些论点，罗尔（1986）在同意有效率的市场假说的同时，声称在经验性地评估工作的目标和招标公司的集体价值后，并购是不能令人信服。他们没有办法估计投标人的假设。因此，他制定了“傲慢自大假说”的规定，即并购的总利润是确定的（罗尔1986）。换句话说，管理层继续对目标公司超值估价。这些结果显示金融界的研究人员是如何结合自由现金流假设，代理理论以及效率市场的事件研究方法，来解释并购活动的合理化的。然而，金融研究人员驳斥了金融经济学家中央假说以及一个市场公司控制权假设是约束经理的一个重要手段，这一事件的研究是创造价值的量化的有效方法，而股
票市场则能够恰当地估价公司。学者们使用现有的数据事件研究方法之外的其他方法，提出有关并购的利润的特定减免。索罗弗斯克莱福特和谢勒（1987年（二）），例如，他们声称，长期的结果通常显示，相比国内市场标准，并购目标执行一般高于行业平均水平的8％左右。此外，它们的财政收入表现既不增加也不减少，与并购后相当。这些研究人员不相信股市场总是有效-一个基本假设-提出对并购相比于金融学者提供的不同表现的解释。谢勒（1988）推测，由于股市并不总是能够正确估计股票价值，一些企业将在任何特定时间被高估了，这使他们能够购买其他公司，但有些公司将被低估，这是他们感兴趣的目标。被高估的公司，会研究可能的的目标公司，了解他们是否有被低估，导致其股价上升。这个发现被低估的公司将被购买，他们的新股票价格只是表达了一种市场调整。企业在审查后没有低估的将不会被购买，在被并购的目标中它们的股票价格可能回归到以前的水平。
作者：托马斯施特劳布
国籍：德国
出处：并购频繁失败的原因三氧化硫与水反应
原文1
The Origins of earnings through M&As
巧克力娃娃>年的传说故事>青菜怎么做
波兰人英语
Another of the capital market school’s field of study is the origins of earnings in general. When earnings are j ust the outcome of somebody el’s disprofit, the capital market school’s rearchers cannot confirm that asts have been redistributed so as to create wealth by picking up profitability. However, although financial economists cannot reasonably explain the gains in
M&A targets as somebody el’s disprofits,rearchers deduce that it is logical to suppo that value is not just re-allocated through M&As, but is produced.Some rearchers believe that shareholder profits come from bondholders’ loss.Dennis a nd McConnel (1986) do not uphold this opinion. An additional perspective is that profits are derived from tax manipulations of the target firm’s resources. In the literature, the evidence for this is, however, ambiguous. Auerbach and Reishus (1987) surmid that in possibly 20% of cas tax benefits are sufficiently important to affect the M&A decision. Gilson et al. (1988) nevertheless found that a multitude of problems concerning definitions of tax benefits, transaction costs, and information costs complicate the claim that tax profits are definitely the reason for M&A activities,or that M&As are the most suitable method for companies to realize tax benefits. In an evaluation of veral studies, Jarrell et al. (1988) found that much of the M&A activity could not be attributed to tax reasons.Shleifer and Summers (1988) claim that profits are derived from M&As becau a new board breaches the embedded employment conditions betw
een the company and the stakeholder groups. Studies that link M&As to poor target company management performance were examined by Shleifer and Vishny (1988c). Their study shows that firms have not succeeded in establishing controls to prevent managers from carrying out activities that do not increa the stockholder value.Moreover, Morck et al.’s (1988) analysis of hostile takeovers claims that such takeovers take place in swiftly changing or declining business and in firms wherethe management is not able to minimize procedures fast enough, or model other adaptations. The results verify the fact that there are agency costs that the new hareholders think they will be able to decrea.
魔芋葡甘聚糖The negative conquences of M&As for the buying companies rai the question why
M&A activities are undertaken at all. A number of potential explanations for this apparent puzzle are offered by Lubatkin (1983), who suggests that the administrative difficulties associated with
M&As could era potential profits. His further asrtion that the methods in u have possibly not been sufficient to uncover profits is consistent with Jenn’s (1986) argument of the complexity of quantifying profits for M&A bidder companies. As a concluding explanation for M&As’ permanence despite the lack of profits for the bidders, Lubatkin (1983) suggests that just specific types of M&A strategies might profit the buying company’s shareholders.
Besides the arguments, Roll (1986), while agreeing with the efficient market hypothesis, claims that the empiric work that evaluates the target and bidding companies’ collective value afte r an M&A is unconvincing. no way related to the bidders’ supposition that their estimations are He conquently formulated the “hubris hypothesis” which states that M&As’ aggregate profits are in correct (Roll1986). In other words: managements continue to over valuate target firms.The results demonstrate how the financial school’s rearchers combine the ypothes of free cash flow, a market for corporate control, the agency theory and efficient markets with the event studies method to improve the rationalization in respect of M&A activity. However, a number of financial rearchers refute the financial economists’ central hypothesis as well as the hypothesis that a market for corporate control is a key instrument for disciplining managers, that event studies are a valid method of quantifying value creation, and that the share market is capable of precily valuing firms.Scholars who u other methods than event studies of existing data make specific deductions with regard to M&A profits. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987(b)), for example, claim that long-term-bad results usually reveal that M&A targets perform above the industry average - at around 8% - compared to their home market standards. Furthermore, their financial income performances neither incread nor declined considerably after the M&A.Tho rearchers who do not believe that the share market is always efficient – a basic assumption - suggest different explanations for M&A perfor
贪婪近义词mance than the ones offered by financial scholars. Scherer (1988) hypothesizes that becau the stock market does not always properly value stock, some firms will be overvalued at any given point in time, enabling them to purcha other firms, but some firms will be undervalued, which renders them interesting targets. Companies that are overvalued, will examine possible target companies to find out if they have been
underestimated,causing their share price to increa.Firms that are discovered to be underestimated are purchad and their new share price simply express a market correction. Firms that are not purchad after being examined were not underestimated, and their share prices return to the level prior to their being possible M&A targets.
Author:Prof. Dr. oec. Thomas Straub
Nationality:Germany
Originate from: Reasons for Frequent failure in Mergers and Acquisitions
