1 再创中国经济奇迹
Whichever way one looks at it, April really was the cruelest month for China’s economy. Industrial production, investment and retail spending were all much weaker than expected. With trade data also showing a sharp deceleration, it is no surpri that China’s premier, Wen Jiabao, has pledged that his government will do more to revive growth.
无论人们怎么看，4月都是中国经济最惨的一个月。工业产值、投资和零售支出都远远弱于预期。鉴于贸易数据也出现急剧减速，难怪中国总理温家宝承诺，他领导的政府将采取更多行动，力求恢复增长。
Optimists say there is no obvious reason to worry about China’s economy. According to the official statistics, in the first quarter of 2012 the economy expanded 8.1 per cent. While marking a slowdown compared with the end of 2011, such figures are the envy of almost every other country in the world.
2 乐观人士称，没有明显理由为中国经济忧心。官方数据显示，2012年首季中国经济同比增长8.1%。尽管这与2011年末季相比有所放缓，但这样的数据仍足以让世界上其他几乎所有国家艳羡。
The problem is that analysts are finding it increasingly hard to take official growth figures riously. China has a history of manipulating statistics for political reasons and, as the economy slows down, the
temptation to conceal the truth could grow even bigger. This is of cour lf-defeating. Obfuscating data is never a good way to build confidence in an economy, whatever its growth rates.
3 问题在于，分析师们正发现，他们越来越难以认真对待官方的增长数据了。中国在出于政治原因操纵统计数据方面是有过往记录的，而随着经济放缓，掩盖真相的诱惑力可能变得更大。这种做法当然是弄巧成拙的。在数据上遮遮盖盖，从来就不是构建各方对某个经济体信心的上策，无论其增长率是多少。
青蛙捕虫What Beijing should do instead is to find ways to reinvigorate its economy. To some extent, it is already doing so. Over the past fortnight it has reduced the amount of cash banks must hold as rerves. It also unveiled subsidies for the purcha of energy-saving white goods.
4 北京方面真正需要做的，是找到重振中国经济的途径。在一定程度上，它已经在这么做了。过去两周内，中国官方降低了银行存款准备金率，还公布了鼓励购置节能型白色家电的补贴政策。
The measures are unlikely to have a huge impact. And while the government has said it will do more, there is no reason to believe Beijing will embark on a monetary stimulus comparable to the one unleashed in 2008. As China is still struggling to contain the long-term impact of that credit frenzy, this would be a wi decision.
5 这些措施不太可能产生巨大影响。而且尽管中国政府已表示将采取更多行动，但人们没有理由相信，它将像2008年时那样，出台又一套巨额货币刺激方案。由于中国仍在艰难遏制那一波信贷狂潮的长期影响，这将是一个明智的决定。
In order to stimulate growth that is sustainable, the government should encourage consumer spending – cutting taxes or increasing the size of its welfare safety net. This could also help China rebalance its economy. While the weight of investment on national income is slowly decreasing, it remains too high.
6 要刺激可持续的经济增长，中国政府应当鼓励消费者支出，具体手段包括减税和扩大社保安全网。这还可能帮助中国实现经济的再平衡。在中国的国民收入中，尽管投资所占比重正在缓慢下降，但目前水平仍太高。
Another move would be to reform the banking ctor so that credit flows to small and medium-sized enterpris. As we report in our analysis today, too many bank loans go to large, politically connected enterpris. Pilot projects such as the one conducted in Wenzhou should pave the way for larger-scale reform.
7 另一个举措将是改革银行业，使信贷流向中小企业。正如本报在今日的分析文章中所报道的，中国
仍有太多银行贷款流向那些有政治后台的大企业。在温州开展的那种试点项目，应当为更大规模的改革铺平道路。
win10怎么设置自动关机This year’s slowdown could be a ed for future troubles or a platform for greater success. It will be up to Mr Jiabao and his successor to decide which is the ca.
出名的英文8 中国经济今年放缓，可能是未来麻烦的种子，也可能是更大成功的跳板。结果如何，要看温家宝和他2012年05月21日 06:48 AM
2012年05月21日 06:48 AM
适合生日唱的歌9 希腊退出欧元区的后果
The irritation of the eurozone with Greece is at extreme levels. After all, 80 per cent of Greeks say they are in favour of staying in the euro, but then they fail to elect politicians prepared to implement the agreed programme. This drives creditors crazy. Increasingly, the latter are inclined to accept Greek exit, even welcome it. But they should be careful what they wish for.
欧元区对希腊的不满已经到达顶点。毕竟，虽然有80%的希腊人声称支持希腊留在欧元区，但他们在选举时却没有把票投给那些打算贯彻商定计划的政治人士。债权人快被逼疯了。他们越来越倾向于接
受希腊退出欧元区，甚至乐见希腊退出。但这种愿望究竟意味着什么，债权人要仔细想明白。
A departure would create vere dangers. The danger of contagion is obvious. The long-run danger is more subtle. But the eurozone either is an irrevocable currency union or it is not. If countries in difficulty leave, it is not. It is then an exceptionally rigid fixed-currency system. That would have two dire results: people would not trust in its survival and the economic benefits of the single currency would largely disappear.
10 希腊退出欧元区会带来严重的风险。危机蔓延的风险是显而易见的。更长期的风险则不那么容易看穿。不过，欧元区要么是一个不可撤消的货币联盟，要么就不是。如果身处困境的国家退出，那么欧元区就不是一个不可撤消的货币联盟，而是一个特别严格的固定汇率体系。如此一来将带来两个可怕的后果：人们会对欧元区的存续失去信心，单一货币的经济好处在很大程度上会消失。
The perils are not of concern to the eurozone alone. Taken as a whole, this is the world’s cond-largest economy, with the largest banking system. The risk that a bigger eurozone upheaval would cau a global crisis is real. As frightening is the likelihood that eurozone cris would become permanent features of the world economy.
11 这些风险威胁的不只是欧元区。作为一个整体，欧元区是世界第二大经济体，而且有着世界最大的
银行体系。如果欧元区出现更大的动荡，将导致一场全球性危机，这是一种现实的风险。同样可怕的是，欧元区危机有可能对世界经济造成长期困扰。
What, then, are the dangers?
12 那么，到底存在哪些风险？说声再见
Start with Greece. It is in a doom loop. Unemployment soared from 7 per cent of the labour force in May 2008 to 22 per cent in January 2012, while the unemployment rate of people aged under 25 jumped from 21 per cent to 51 per cent. Wor, despite fiscal austerity and debt restructuring, the International Monetary Fund estimates that gross public debt will
be 160 per cent of gross domestic product in 2013, 50 percentage points higher than in 2008. Moreover, the IMF forecasts that the current account deficit –the balance of trade on goods and rvices – will be more than 7 per cent of GDP this year.
13 先说希腊。这个国家陷入了厄运循环。失业率从2008年5月的7%飙升至2012年1月的22%，同期，25岁以下人群失业率从21%飙升至51%。更糟的是，尽管希腊施行了财政紧缩、进行了债务重组，但国际货币基金组织(IMF)仍估计，该国公共债务总额与国内生产总值(GDP)之比在2013年将达到
160%，比2008年高出50个百分点。IMF还预测，今年希腊的经常账户赤字（商品和服务贸易余额）将达到GDP 的7%以上。
Thus, the economy will be uncompetitive and depresd for years, if not decades. Not surprisingly, a dysfunctional Greek polity has collapd. Politicians who believe they can obtain better terms are edging clor to power. This, in turn, creates a big potential dilemma for Athens’ outside supporters: either give Greece more money to alleviate pain, or stick to the programme and risk its collap.
14 因此，希腊经济缺乏竞争力且萎靡不振的局面将持续数年乃至数十年。运转失灵的希腊政体已经崩溃，这并不出人意料。那些认为自己能为希腊争取到更优厚条款的政客距掌权越来越近。这种局面反过来又使希腊的外部支持者陷入一种潜在的、严峻的两难境地：要么就给希腊更多的钱，减轻它的痛苦；要么就冒希腊发生崩溃的风险，坚守原计划。
So what might a collap entail?
那么，希腊崩溃可能带来怎样的后果？
As explained earlier in this ries, a cessation of external official funding could trigger a disorderly collap. The government would default. The European Central Bank would argue that Greek banks
no longer posss good collateral, which would prevent it from operating as a lender of last resort. There would be comprehensive bank runs. Athens would impo exchange controls, introduce a new currency, redenominate domestic contracts and default on external contracts denominated in euros.
15 如本系列之前的文章解释过的，如果外部停止提供官方援助资金，希腊可能陷入无序崩溃。希腊政府将会违约。欧洲央行(ECB)会主张，由于希腊银行不再拥有可靠的抵押品，因此它无法再扮演最后贷款人的角色。这会引发全面的挤兑。希腊政府将实施外汇管制、发行新本币、将国内合同的计价货币改为新本币，并对以欧元计价的国外合同违约。
课题申请书
This would be chaos. Unpaid police officers and soldiers are unlikely to keep order. Looting and rioting could occur. A coup or civil war would be conceivable. Any new currency would depreciate and inflation would soar.
16 这将引发动荡。拿不到工资的警员和士兵不太可能出来维持秩序。希腊可能出现抢劫和骚乱，政变或内战也并非天方夜谭。新发行的任何本币都会贬值，通胀将会飙升。
In the medium run, however, order might be restored. Assume Greece managed to bring its fiscal deficit under control, which is not inconceivable, since the IMF forecasts its primary fiscal deficit (bef
ore interest) at 1 per cent of GDP this year. Assume its exporters were able to retain access to the European Union market. Then, as Arvind Subramanian of the Washington-bad Peterson Institute for International Economics argues, Greece might enjoy a strong (though probably temporary) boom.
17 但从中期来看，希腊的秩序也许能得到恢复，只要它满足以下两个条件：将财政赤字降至可控水平（考虑到IMF预测希腊今年的息前基本财政赤字为GDP的1%，这一点并非不可能实现）；出口商重新打入欧盟(EU)市场。秩序得到恢复后，如彼得森国际经济研究所(PIIE)高级研究员阿文德•萨勃拉曼尼亚(Arvind Subramanian)所说的，希腊经济可能出现强劲增长（尽管这个增长很可能是暂时
性的）。
An orderly departure would end up in much the same place, sooner. Outsiders could support the banking system and pay beneficiaries of public spending during transition to a new currency. That should limit unrest as well as reducing the currency collap and inflationary upsurge.
18 希腊有序退出欧元区则会在更短的时间内带来与上面大体相同的后果。在希腊向新本币过渡期间，外部力量可为希腊银行体系提供支撑，并向希腊公共支出的受益人支付相关款项。这应该可以
抑制社会动荡、新本币大幅贬值和通胀飙升。
In a thought-provoking paper, “EMU Break-up: Pay Now, Pay Later”, Mark Cliffe of ING evaluates the conquences of a Greek exit. He assumes, first, that backstops for other countries would make such a departure a unique event. The result would be a manageable blow, with output falling 4 per cent between 2012 and 2014 in Greece and up to 2 per cent elwhere in the eurozone, compared with forecasts that assume no break-up. But non-eurozone currencies would appreciate, with negative effects on their economies, as well.
19 荷兰国际集团(ING)的马克•克利夫(Mark Cliffe)写了一篇发人深省的论文，名为《欧洲货币
布什联盟解体的代价》(EMU Break-up: Pay Now, Pay Later)。论文对希腊退出欧元区的后果进行了评估。克利夫首先假定，外部力量会对其他可能退出欧元区的国家提供支撑，确保它们不会追随希腊
的脚步。那么，希腊退出欧元区带来的冲击将是可承受的。与假定希腊不退出欧元区的预期结果相比，希腊若退出欧元区，该国产出会在2012年至2014年萎缩4%，同期欧元区其他国家总产出会萎缩2%。不过，非欧元区国家的货币将会升值，从而让这些国家的经济也受到负面影响。
我姓Yet limiting the impact would not be easy. A Greek exit, particularly a disorderly one, is likely to trigger bank runs in Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain, and even further afield. It could also cau collaps in the prices of financial and other asts. A flight to safety, to Germany or beyond the euro
zone, could accelerate.
20 但我们将很难抑制这些影响。希腊退出欧元区（特别是假如无序退出），很可能在葡萄牙、爱尔兰、意大利、西班牙甚至其他国家引发银行挤兑，还可能造成金融资产和其他资产价格暴跌。资
金逃向避风港（比如德国或欧元区以外国家）的速度可能加快。
The doom loop in which veral other nations are caught could worn substantially. Spain’s official unemployment rate was 24 per cent in March, and its youth unemployment more than 50 per cent. The IMF forecasts its general government fiscal deficit at just over 6 per cent of GDP this year. With real GDP contracting, its fiscal position is worning rapidly: gross debt is forecast to increa from 36 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 79 per cent and rising this year. Yields on government bonds are more than 6 per cent. A further large ri in the rates would be unmanageable.
21 在其他几个同样陷入厄运循环的国家，形势可能会大幅恶化。今年3月，西班牙的官方失业率
为24%，年轻人失业率超过50%。IMF预测，今年该国的总体财政赤字将略高于GDP的6%。随着实际GDP 不断萎缩，西班牙的财政状况正迅速恶化：预计总债务与GDP之比将从2007年的36%升至79%，而且今年还将继续升高。西班牙国债收益率已逾6%。如果这些数字继续大幅升高，形势就会失控。
Adecisive respon from the eurozone would be required to prevent vere contagion. The ECB would need to act as a lender of last resort on an unlimited scale, replacing money taken out in bank runs. Interest rates on sovereign debt would need to be capped by external measures, such as bond support schemes, and banking systems recapitalid. Above all, the commitment to keep the rest of the eurozone together must be reinforced. That would demand stronger forms of fiscal solidarity, probably eurobonds. Last but not least, the belief
that countries can starve themlves back to health, in the abnce of economic expansion and probably higher inflation in the core, would have to be abandoned.
22 要防范危机大规模蔓延，欧元区必须做出决定性回应。欧洲央行必须充当最后贷款人、提供无限额的贷款，填补因银行挤兑而出现的资金漏洞。必须以债券支持计划等外部措施和银行体系资本重组来抑制主权债务利率。最重要的是，必须更加致力于确保欧元区不会再有国家退出。这就需要建立更牢固形式的财政团结，那很可能是欧元区共同债券。最后但并非最不重要的一点是，必须抛弃如下想法：即欧元区国家可在核心成员国经济不扩张、通胀不走高的情况下，通过紧缩来恢复经济健康。
Suppo that such efforts were not undertaken and the eurozone disintegrated. Mr Cliffe has sought to evaluate such an event. He concludes that the impact on GDP would be huge, not least on Germa
ny. Thus, “in 2012 a deep recession across the eurozone emerges, dragging down the global economy. In the eurozone, output falls range from 7 per cent in Germany to 13 per cent in Greece. Individual country experiences would vary depending upon their exposure to foreign trade and financial interlinkages.”
23 假设欧元区没有做出这些努力并最终走向解体。克利夫试着对这一可能情形做出了评估。他得出结论称，这将对经济产出造成巨大影响，特别是对德国的产出。也就是说，“2012年整个欧元区将出现严重衰退，拖累全球经济。欧元区各国的经济产出将萎缩7%（德国）到13%（希腊）。各国的遭遇将有所不同，这取决于它们的外贸敞口和金融方面的相互关联。”
Inflation would soar in the periphery; in core nations, deflation would t in. Inflation should erode peripheral nations’debt mountains, provided they were promptly redenominated in the new domestic currencies. The value of the foreign asts of core countries would fall, their new currencies would soar relative to erstwhile partners and their economies shrink. It would be painful for all.
24 外围国家的通胀将会飙升；核心国家将出现通缩。通胀应会侵蚀外围国家的巨额债务，前提是这些债务迅速改用新本币计价。核心国家国外资产的价值将会下滑，它们的新本币相对昔日伙伴国新本币的汇率将会飙升，它们的经济将会萎缩。这一可能情形对所有国家都意味着痛苦。
This analysis may even be too optimistic in its estimate of the impact of a full break-up. The mechanisms at work would be powerful: runs; the imposition of (illegal) exchange controls; legal uncertainties; ast price collaps; unpredictable shifts in balance sheets; freezing of the financial system; disruption of central banking; collap in spending and trade; and enormous shifts in the exchange rates of new currencies. Further government bailouts of financial systems would surely be needed, at great cost. Big recessions would also worn already damaged fiscal positions.
25 在对欧元区全面解体之影响的估计方面，上述分析甚至可能过于乐观。各种发挥作用的机制将产生强大影响：挤兑；（非法）外汇管制的实施；法律方面的不确定性；资产价格暴跌；资产负债表中难以预料的变动；金融体系的冻结；央行体系的瓦解；支出和贸易的大幅收缩；新本币汇率的巨大波动。届时各国政府肯定需要对金融体系展开进一步纾困，代价将是巨大的。大规模衰退还会使本已受损的财政状况出现恶化。
Such a break-up would also trigger legions of lawsuits. Beyond this, the EU would be cast into legal and political limbo, with its most important treaties and its proudest achievement in tatters. It is impossible to guess at the result of such a profound change in the European order.
26 这种解体将引发大量诉讼。不仅如此，欧盟还将在法律和政治方面变得无所适从，其最重要的条约及最引以为傲的成就将彻底破产。我们无法猜测欧元区秩序发生如此深远的变化会造成何种结果。
