摘要
企业风险承担决策是指企业在经营投资过程中对预期收益水平和波动性程度的选择。企业作为一个盈利组织追求高收益的同时必须承担相应风险。企业作为一个自负盈亏的法人组织，又必须防止过度承担风险，避免被列入“僵尸企业”，避免面临破产危机。因此，企业在经营决策过程中应学会在追求利益的同时如何规避风险，使企业风险承担水平适度。根据代理理论，股权激励被认为是一种有效解决委托代理问题的手段。实施股权激励不仅能吸引高质量人才，而且能有效解决委托代理问题。然而，股权激励过度会使得高管谋取私利而伤害企业利益，从而过度提高企业风险承担水平，引发不良经济后果。因此，企业必须注重股权激励及其程度，才能在如今激烈的市场竞争环境下要发展的好。银行贷款是企业债务融资的主要方式，中国以银行为主要的金融媒介，目前学界对银行贷款的监管作用存在两种观点：一种观点认为，由于没有完善的破产和退出机制，债权人缺乏对债务人的约束机制，债务无法充分发挥其监督治理作用。另一种观点认为，银行债权的公司治理作用已开始发挥作用，并增加了对债务人的约束。因此，银行贷款是否有效发挥其监督治理作用仍是一个值得探索的命题。
到目前为止，我国学术界关于股权激励与企业风险承担关系的研究没有得出统一的结论。股权激励对企业风险承担影响的文献大致分为壕沟效应假说和利益趋同假说两派。所以股权激励与风险承担的关系值得进一步研究。而股权激励与银行贷款的关系、银行贷款与风险承担的关系国内外鲜有学者研究讨论。所以本文将探究股权激励、银行贷款与企业风险承担这三者间关系。基于上述背景，本文主要研究：股
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权激励会对上市公司风险承担产生何种影响？银行贷款对上市公司风险承担产生何种影响？股权激励是否影响银行贷款？银行贷款在其中是否起中介作用？股权激励与银行贷款是否交互影响上市公司风险承担？
为此，本文首先引入委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、信号理论和风险承担理论，为本文的实证研究奠定理论基础。然后基于对已有文献的回顾和理论分析，提出关于股权激励、银行贷款和企业风险承担的研究假设，选取2013——2017年在我国沪、深交易所上市且发行A股的上市公司为研究样本，研究全样本下股权激励、银行贷款对企业风险承担的影响，为进一步研究，对样本按照控制人性质、市场化水平、股权集中度分别进行了分组检验，两组分别进行回归。得出如下结论：（1）股权激励和银行贷款的提高均会显著提高企业风险承担水平，三者关系中，银行贷款具有调节作用，在银行贷款的调节作用下，股权激励对企业风险承担的正向作用得到加强。（2）非国企股权激励与企业风险承担间的正相关关系显著强于国企，而银行贷款与企业风险承担间的关系非国企与国企同样显著正相关。（3）市场化水平高的企业股权激励
学生周总结与企业风险承担的关系弱于市场化水平低的企业，而市场化水平高的企业银行贷款与企业风险承担的关系强于市场化水平低的企业。（4）股权集中企业的股权激励与企业风险承担的关系强于股权分散企业，而股权集中企业的银行贷款与企业风险承担的关系弱于股权分散企业。
本文的贡献在于，考察社会层面（银行贷款）对上市企业风险承担的影响。验证了中国制度以往背景下银行贷款对企业风险承担水平的影响机制，丰富了关于企业风险承担的研究文献，论证银行贷款的持有如何影响企业风险承担。另外，将股权激励与银行贷款共同引入研究，为研究企业风险承担水平提供了一条新思路。对不同产权性质、不同市场化水平、不同股权集中度的样本公司进行细致分类，深入考察不同具体情境下股权激励和银行贷款对企业风险承担的影响，进一步厘清三者的关系。笋瓜
关键词：股权激励；银行贷款；企业风险承担；委托代理；信号理论
ABSTRACT
Enterpri risk-taking decision-making refers to the choice of expected return level and volatility degree in the process of business investment. As a profit-making organization, enterpris must take corresponding risks while pursuing high returns. As a lf-financing legal person organization, enterpris must also prevent excessive risk-taking, avoid being listed as "zombie enterpris" and avoid facing bankruptcy crisis. Therefore, in the process of business decision-making, enterpris should learn how to avoid risks while pursuing interests, so as to make the level of risk-taking appropriate. According to agency theory, equity incentive is considered as an effective means to solve the principal-agent problem. Implementing equity incentive can not only attract high-quality tale
真逍遥
nts, but also effectively solve the principal-agent problem. However, excessive equity incentives will cau executives to ek private interests and harm the interests of enterpris, thus excessively improving the level of enterpri risk-taking, resulting in adver economic conquences. Therefore, enterpris must pay attention to equity incentive and its degree in order to develop well in today's fierce market competition environment. Bank loan is the main way of enterpri debt financing. In China, banks are the main financial media. At prent, there are two opinions on the supervisory role of bank loans in academic circles: one is that becau there is no perfect bankruptcy and withdrawal mechanism, creditors lack the restraint mechanism for debtors, debts can not give full play to their supervisory and Governance role. Another view is that corporate governance of bank claims has begun to play a role, and has incread the constraints on debtors. Therefore, whether bank loans can effectively play their supervisory and governance role is still a topic worth exploring.
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So far, there is no unified conclusion about the relationship between equity incentive and enterpri risk-taking in Chine academic circles. The literature on the impact of equity incentives on corporate risk-taking can be roughly divided into trench effect hypothesis and interest convergence hypothesis. Therefore, the relationship between equity incentive and risk-taking derves further stu
dy. However, the relationship between equity incentive and bank loans, and the relationship between bank loans and risk-taking are ldom discusd by scholars at home and abroad. Therefore, this paper will explore the relationship among equity incentives, bank loans and enterpri risk-taking. Bad on the above background, this paper mainly studies: What impact does equity incentive have on risk-taking of listed companies? What is the impact of bank loans on risk-taking of listed companies? Does equity incentive affect bank loans? Do bank loans play an intermediary role? Does equity incentive and bank loans interact with risk-taking of listed companies?
For this reason, this paper first introduces the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, signal theory and risk-taking theory to lay a theoretical foundation for empirical rearch in this paper. Then, bad on the review and theoretical analysis of the existing literature, the rearch hypothesis on equity incentives, bank loans and enterpri risk-taking is put forward. The sample of listed companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges and issued A-shares from 2013 to 2017 is lected to study the impact of equity incentives and bank loans on enterpri risk-taking under the whole sample. For further study, the sample is bad on the analysis of the data. Controller nature, financial development level and ownership concentration were tested in groups, and the two groups were regresd. The conclusions are as follows: （1）Increa of equity incentiv
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建文帝墓es and bank loans will significantly improve the level of enterpri risk-taking. Among the three relationships, bank loans play a regulatory role. Under the regulation of bank loans, the positive role of equity incentives in enterpri risk-taking is strengthened. （2）The positive correlation between non-state-owned enterpris'equity incentive and enterpri risk-taking is significantly stronger than that of state-owned enterpris, while the relationship between bank loans and enterpri risk-taking is also significantly positive correlation between non-state-owned enterpris and state-owned enterpris. （3）The relationship between equity incentive and risk-taking of enterpris with high marketization level is weaker than that of enterpris with low marketization level, while the relationship between bank loans and risk-taking of enterpris with high marketization level is stronger than that of enterpris with low marketization level. （4）The relationship between equity incentive and risk-taking of equity-centralized enterpris is stronger than that of equity-decentralized enterpris, while the relationship between bank loans and risk-taking of equity-centralized enterpris is weaker than that of equity-decentralized enterpris.
The contribution of this paper is to examine the impact of social level （bank loans）on risk-taking of listed companies. It verifies the influence mechanism of bank loans on enterpri risk-taking level under the background of Chine system in the past, enriches the rearch literature on enterpri ri
sk-taking, and demonstrates how the holding of bank loans affects enterpri risk-taking. In addition, the joint introduction of equity incentives and bank loans provides a new way to study the level of enterpri risk-taking. The sample companies with different property rights, different levels of development and different degree of ownership concentration are carefully classified, and the impact of equity incentives and bank loans on enterpri risk-taking under different specific circumstances is investigated in depth, so as to further clarify the relationship between the three.
Key words:Equity incentive，Bank loans，Enterpri risk-taking，Principal-agent，Signal theory
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