标 题: Economist - China’s shadow banks
发信站白菜怎么炒: 水木社区 (Wed Aug 7 09:19:02 2013), 站内
China’s shadow banks
The credit kulaks
The growth in wealth-management products reflects deeper financial disto
rtions
中国众多的影子银行——信贷富农
财富管理产品的猛增，反映出更深层次的金融扭曲
AS THE grandson of a “rich farmer”, a stigmatid class in communist C
hina, Joe Zhang grew up on the wrong side of the ideological tracks. At
school he envied the town-kids who could look forward to a cushy job min
ding grain-stores or writing propaganda. But after winning a spot at uni
versity, he eventually escaped into central banking in Beijing and, late
r, investment banking in Hong Kong. By pleading, petitioning and playing
a lot of ping pong (a sport he hates) he was even admitted into the Com
munist Party in 1985.孕妇尿路感染
富农在社会主义中国曾是耻辱阶层，而作为富农的孙子张JOE在错的意识形态下长大
成人。学生时代他羡慕城里的孩子，因为他们会得到照看粮食店和写宣传单这样的
轻松工作。但他在大学里赢得了得一席之地，最终使得他进入北京的中央银行，后
来，他又去了香港的投资银行。写入党请求，申请书以及没完没了打他讨厌的乒乓
球，使得他在1985年终于被接纳为中共党员
Then, in 2011, his social climb suffered an abrupt reversal. He took on
a role that remains stigmatid and discriminated against in today’s Ch
ina: he became a shadow banker. His new book, “Inside China’s Shadow B
anking: the Next Subprime Crisis?”, recounts his trials as the head of
a microlender in Guangdong. Elwhere in the world, microcredit is a res
pectable, even canonid, endeavour. In China, Mr Zhang complains in his
book, it is “only slightly more respectable than perhaps massage parlo
urs or nightclubs.”
然后在2011年，为社会地位向上爬的他遭受了大的挫折。他接受了一份即使在今天
的中国也是耻辱和备受歧视的工作：他成了影子银行家。他的新书《中国影子银行
界：第二次次贷危机？》，详细再述了在广东他因带领小型借贷而遭受的一系列审
判。在世界其他地方，小型信用借贷备受人尊敬甚至被神圣化。然而他在书中抱怨
道，在中国小型借贷可能只比按摩馆或者夜总会受尊敬一点。
He describes the variety of institutions and instruments that operate an
d innovate in the shadow of China’s mammoth banks, where they are hard
for the authorities to e. They include the informal lenders, kerbside
capitalists and back-alley bankers for which China is famous. But the mo
st important institutions are China’s 67 trust companies, lightly regul
ated finance firms that make loans and other investments but cannot coll
ect deposits. And the most significant instruments are the uncountable w
ealth-management products(WMPs), which rai money from better-off inves
tors, in large increments (at least 50,000 yuan, about $8,160) and for s
hort periods (typically less than six months, sometimes much less).
他说，中国庞大银行体系的影子里，那些不被中国当局所察觉的地方。有各种各样
的公司在运转，玩弄各种各样的新花样。他们中，以不正规放高利贷者、路边资本
家以及藏身后街破巷的诸多银行家，使中国“闻名于世”。最主要的机构是中国的
67家信托公司，对他们监管松散；他们贷款，投资但是不能吸收存款。最主要的花
样是数都数不过来的财富管理产品，这些产品以大数额(至少5万元人民币，约8160
美元)短期形式（大多少于半年，有些则更短）从富裕的投资者那里筹集资金。
Like banks, shadow banks are middlemen, issuing liabilities and holding
asts. Another point of remblance is that their asts are often less
liquid, longer-term and riskier than their liabilities purport to be. Y
et unlike banks they lack an official safety net, such as a lender of la
st resort, should the mismatches ever be expod.
类似银行，影子银行也是中间人，它们发行很多债务，握有诸多资产。另外它们与
银行相似的还有，它们的资产流动性更低，时间更长，也比它们吹嘘的更有风险。
然而银行有官方的安全保障，它们没有，万一最后一点钱也被贷走，只能自求别被
人发现吧。
That makes shadow banking a bit scary. The International Monetary Fund f
rets that “a fast-growing share of credit is flowing through the less-w
ell-supervid parts of the financial system.” Mr Zhang’s book is mark
eted to people who suspect that systemic dangers lurk in the shadows.
But the tale it goes on to tell is more interesting. Shadow banking, he
argues, is “more a symptom than the dia itlf.”
从这点上讲，影子银行有点恐怖。国际货币基金不无担忧地指出：金融体系里少受
监控信贷的份额在快速增长。怀疑在阴影里存在体制隐患的这些人是书的目标读者
。但是接下来书里的故事更有吸引力。在书里张强调：影子银行是疾病的症状而非
疾病本身。
The dia itlf is financial repression. China impos a ceiling on t
he interest rate that banks can pay to depositors. This keeps banks’ co
st of funding low, making them eager to lend. To curb their enthusiasm,
the regulators must impo offtting limits on their lending, as Dong H
e and Honglin Wang of the Hong Kong Institute of Monetary Rearch have
pointed out. The limits range from conrvative loan-to-deposit ratios
to heavy rerve requirements and blacklists of overexpod borrowers,
such as property developers or local governments.
在金融上的约束才是病的本身。中国强制设定银行给储户的最高利率，使得银行融
资陈本相当低，这样它们更愿意贷款给别人。香港货币研究所的何东和王洪林指出
，为抑制它们此种热情，监管者必须对他们的借贷强制设定补偿限制。这些限制措
施，从保守的贷储率到要求大数额储备金，到大力曝光贷款人黑名单，这些人有地
产商人和地方政府。
Where there is regulation, there is evasion, notes Mr Zhang. Much of Chi
na’s shadow-banking system rves merely to help banks evade deposit ce
ilings and lending guardrails. It would be less pervasive if China’s le
nding limits were less strict. But then tho limits would not need to b
e so tight if banks’ funding costs were not represd.
张说，有监管，就有方法规避。大多数中国影子银行恰恰就是为银行规避存款利息
上限和贷款限制服务的。这恰恰反过来说明了中国的贷款限制有多严格。但是如果
不压制银行融资成本，这些限制规定也不会这么严格。
Neglected by the banks, small firms are willing to pay the 20-24% intere
st rates charged by China’s 6,080 microlenders. But micro-loans amounte
d to only 592 billion yuan ($97 billion) at the end of last year, equiva
lent to less than 1% of bank credit (e table). A far bigger source of
finance for illiquid firms is other more liquid ones. Non-financial comp
anies are barred from lending directly to each other, but they can make
“entrusted” loans via a bank or trust company. This lending is sizeabl
e, but also relatively safe, according to Standard & Poor’s. Most of th
e loans are made by big firms to their sister companies.
正规银行所忽视的是，6080家中国小型借贷者收取20-24%的利率，而小公司是愿意
支付这么多的利息的。截止去年年末，小额贷款总额只有5920亿元（970亿美元），
比银行贷款规模的1%还少。对流动性很小的公司，最重要的资金来源恰恰是最具流
动性的。非金融性公司之间的互相借贷并不被禁止，而他们却能从银行或信托公司
借到“正规”的贷款。标准普尔说：这种借贷规模有大有小，但相对而言更安全。
大多数贷款是由大公司借给他们的姊妹公司。
WMP! There it is
找到规避的花样了：财富管理产品！
As well as midwifing loans from one firm to another, trust companies als
o rai pools of money from investors by issuing their own WMPs. The p
roducts amounted to 1.9 trillion yuan at the end of 2012. Most mature wi
thin 1-3 years, according to Jason Bedford of KPMG, an auditing firm. Th
e money is often invested in loans to credit-starved enterpris. Some p
roducts are, however, more Imaginative, speculating on tea, spirits, or
even graveyards. In at least one ca, a product was not just imaginativ
e but entirely imaginary: raising money for a non-existent project dream
ed up by a rogue trust-company manager.
与公司与公司之间的相互借贷相像的是，信托公司也通过发行财富管理产品从投资
者那里筹集大量资金。截止2012伏组词语年，这些产品筹得资金高达1万9千亿人民币。来自乌梅是什么
审计公司KPMG的杰森 BEDFORD说：这些产品大多数会在1到3年内到期。这些钱很多
被借给信用紧缺的企业。但是有些产品真是很有想象力，如茶叶，酒品，甚至墓地
。至少有一个例子可以说明，他们没有停留在想象力上，而是凭空想象：信托经理
会像无赖一样，为凭空编出来而事实上不存在的项目筹集资金。
The products are, then, risky. But potential loss are cushioned by c
ollateral and unmagnified by leverage, Mr Bedford points out. In princip
le the loss are also borne by investors. The buyers of two faltering
products issued by CITIC Trust, China’s largest trust company, have be
en told not to expect a bail-out. In practice, however, many trusts are
less stiff-spined. They are tempted to rescue investors to maintain thei
r good name.
那么就是说，这些产品是有风险的。但BEDFORD指出，担保会减轻潜在损失，运用杠
杆潜在损失会被缩小。原则上来讲，投资者会承担这些损失。中国最大的信托公司
CITIC发行了两款面目不清的产品，购买者被告之不会保本。但是，实践中很多信托
公司会更隐晦不明地这么做。是为了救投资者于水火，更是为了他们的声誉。
Often, the trust products are sold through banks, which distribute the
m, without guaranteeing them. The public, however, “pretends not to und
古诗的故事erstand the distinction”, Mr Zhang says. By feigning ignorance, aggriev
ed investors hope to browbeat the government into holding the banks liab
le, he argues. In Hong Kong banks had to ea the pain of loss on Lehm
an minibonds sold through their branches. It is notable that one of the
banks involved, Bank of China, has been unusually reluctant to ll WMPs
in the mainland,
points out Mike Werner of Sanford C. Bernstein, a rearch firm.
这些产品经常是通过银行销售的，银行不提供保证地分销这些产品。张说：大众则
好像完全不明白其中的区别。他说：投资者们自装不知，而又愤愤不平地希望能威
胁政府让银行负责。在香港，银行必须为通过其下属分行销售的雷曼迷你债券擦屁
股。市场调查公司SANDFORD C. BERNSTEIN的Mike Werner指出，引人注目的是，深
陷其中的中国银行，在大陆非常地抗拒销售这些财富管理产品。
Trust products sold by banks tend to be confud with a less risky kind
of WMP: bank products packaged by trusts. In the first ca, Mr Bedford
explains, the bank provides a rvice to the trust companies, offering i
ts staff and branches as a distribution channel. In the cond ca, the
roles are reverd: trust companies and, increasingly, curities compa
nies, provide a rvice to the bank, helping it to package asts in its
WMPs.
银行销售的信托产品很容易与低风险类型财富管理产品——信托包装的银行产品—
—混淆。BEDFORD解释说，前者是银行为信托公司服务，让员工把分行作为分销渠道
销售信托公司的产品。后者则主客倒置：信托公司和越来越多的证券公司为银行服
务，在它们财富管理产品里帮助银行打包销售资产。
Unlike trust products sold by banks, bank products packaged by trusts ar
e fairly conrvative. They are mostly “deposits in disgui”, as Stan
dard & Poor’s put it, offering yields one or two percentage points high
er than the deposit-rate ceiling. As well as helping banks to breach thi
s ceiling, the products allow banks to window-dress their balance-shee
ts, points out Mr Werner. The WMPs are typically timed to mature just be
fore the end of each quarter. As the money is returned to the WMP-buyers
, it is paid into their deposits
at the bank, just in time to bring the bank’s loan-deposit ratio below
the regulatory limit of 75%.
与银行销售信托公司产品不同，信托公司打包销售银行产品相当保守。如标准普尔
所说，它们大多是“伪装的存款”，比最高规定的存款利息多带来一到两个百分点
的收入。WERNER指出：帮助银行规避存款利息规定的同时，这些产品也让银行把资
产负债表写的更工整。财富产品都恰好每个季末到期，资金以打进储蓄账户的形式
，而回到那些购买财富管理产品的人手里，及时地把银行的贷储率降到规定上限的
75%以下。
If enough of the riskier WMPs fail, it might prompt investors to stop bu
ying fresh products. Since WMPs usually mature long before the underlyin
g asts do, that could inflict a nasty credit crunch on otherwi solve
nt ventures. But the impact on the banking system would be less obvious.
If investors lo confidence in WMPs, they are likely to switch to depo
sits instead. The result would be a run to the banks, not a run on them.
The only worry is that investors may not run to the same banks that iss
ued most of the WMPs. China’
s smaller joint-stock banks, which have led WMPs issuance, could therefo
健康睡眠re face a funding squeeze.
如果足够多更具风险的财富管理产品出现问题，投资者就会停止购买新推出的产品
。财富管理资产远早于标的资产到期，就会有人以偿付能力得到保证而进行商业冒
险，会带来严重的信贷危机。但是对银行系统的影响则不是那么的显眼。如果投资
者对财富管理产品失去信心，就会转而进行储蓄。结果是大家挤向银行存款而非把
银行踩在脚下。唯一值得担心的是投资者可能不会挤向那些发行大部分财富管理产
品的银行。中国有许多小型的合资股份制银行，它们引领财富管理产品发行市场，
也可能因此面临融资紧缺的局面。
One answer would be to introduce formal deposit insurance. That would fo
rce banks to pay for the implicit backing they enjoy from the state. It
would instil confidence in the smaller banks, as well as the ones that a
re obviously too big to fail. It would also draw a clearer distinction b
etween safety (insured deposits) and risk (uninsured investments).
简单地说，正规储蓄有所保证，国家会含蓄地为它们提供支持，也正由此，它们恐
怕要为之付出代价。同那些大到不会倒闭的银行一样，这使得小型银行的信心逐渐
增强。也让有保障存款的安全与无保障投资带来的风险之间的区别更加明显。
Critics of China’s shadow banking like to compare WMPs to the collatera
lid debt obligations at the heart of the global financial crisis. But
according to Ting Lu of Merrill Lynch, the banks’ WMPs bear a clor re
mblance to American money-market funds, investing mostly in safe, liqu
id, short-term paper. Tho funds, which first arrived in America in 197
1, competed successfully with bank deposits, forcing legislators to phas
e out America’s caps on deposit interest rates in the 1980s. Perhaps th
e banks’ WMPs will prove a similar spur to reform in China.
有人对中国影子银行指责说：它们的财富管理产品与处于全球金融危机中心的债务
抵押债券可相提并论。美林银行发行的财富管理产品与美国金融市场基金
较为相似，后者大多数投资那些短期，安全和具流动性的债券。那些基金于1971年
在美国出现，比银行储蓄业务更为成功，使得立法委员会在十九世纪八十年代淘汰
了给美国储蓄利息率的设定上限的规定。银行财富管理产品也有可能产生此等刺激
双击，使得中国政府改革。
Mr Zhang is impatient for that day. He graduated from the central bank’
s academy back in 1986 with a thesis entitled “The Path to Interest-Rat
e Liberalisation”. Then, he thought the removal of interest-rate contro
ls was only five years away. Over a quarter of a century later, students
are still writing the same thesis, he says. “Tho five years have nev
er ended.”
张迫不及待等着那天的到来，他于1986年从中央银行学院毕业，毕业论文题为：放
开利息率。那时，他认为对利息率的控制会在五年内结束。然而过了25年，毕业生
仍在写着同样题目的论文。他说：“永远不会结束的五年”
--
It's really important to say this. Often the faith schools were founded
before the state provided education. I want good education in this
country so I'm not going to slag off faith schools. I think that it's
important that people of different backgrounds and different faiths go to
school together and many faith schools do that.
关于教育的名言
