Groundless Beliefs
By A. E. Mander五年级上册英语人教版跟读软件
In future we are going to follow the practice—until it becomes a habit—of classifying propositions according to their grounds. Of every statement we come across, we shall ask: “How do we know that? What reason have we for believing that? On what ‘ground’ is that statement bad?” Probably we shall be astonished at the number of propositions met with in everyday life which we shall find it necessary to class as groundless. They rest upon mere tradition, or on somebody’s bare asrtion unsupported by ever a shadow of proof …启德出国留学中介好吗
iousIt may be a belief which we originally accepted as a result of simple “suggestion,” and we have continued to hold it ever since. It has now become one of our regular habits of thought. Perhaps somebody-somewhere-sometime told us a certain thing, and quite uncritically, we accepted and believed it. Perhaps it was way back in our early childhood—before we had even developed the power of questioning anything that might be told to us. Many of our strongest convictions were established then; and now, in adult life, we find it most difficult even to question their truth. They em to us “obviously” true.
But if the staunchest Roman Catholic and the staunchest Presbyterian had been exchanged when infants, and if they had been brought up with home and all other influences reverd, we can had very little doubt what the result would have been. It is consistent with all our knowledge of psychology to conclude that each would have grown up holding exactly the opposi te beliefs to tho he holds now … and each would then have felt as sure of the truth of his opinion as he now feels—of the truth of the opposite opinion. The same thing is true, of cour, of many beliefs other than tho of a religious nature. If we had grown up in a community where polygamy or head-hunting, or infanticide, or gladiatorial fighting, or dueling, was regarded as the normal and natural thing—then we should have grown up to regard it as “obviously” natural and perfectly moral and proper. If an English baby had been adopted and brought up in a German home, and had grown up with no knowledge that his parents were English, all the ntiments and beliefs of that person would be “German” and not “English.” Many of our beliefs—many of our most deeply-rooted and fundamental convictions—are held simply as a result of the fact that we happen to have been “brought up” to them.
Of cour we do not cea, when we cea to be children, to adopt new beliefs on mere suggestion. We continue doing it, more or less unconsciously all our lives; hence, to take only the most striking e
xamples, the enormous influence of newspapers and the effectiveness of skilful advertising. Much of what pass as such is not, strictly, thinking at all. It is the mere “parroting” of ideas picked up by chance and adopted as our own without question. Most people, most of the time, are mere parrots. But as we leave childhood, we tend to accept only such new ideas as fit in with the ideas we already hold; and all conflicting ideas em t o us “obviously” absurd.
Propositions that are accepted simply becau “everybody says so,” must be clasd under the same heading. The dogma may not be that of any particular individual: it may be a dogmatic statement which has been pasd from one person to another, from generation to generation, perhaps for hundreds—perhaps for thousands—of years. It may be part of the tradition belief of the people or the race. In that ca, it is part of our social inheritance from some period in the past. But we should fully face the fact that beliefs which are merely inherited from the past must have originated at a time when men knew much less than they know today. So the fact that a belief is “old” is no argument in its favour.
We need especially to be on our guard when we come across propositions which
em to be “obviously” true.
When we find ourlves entertaining an opinion about which there is a feeling that even to enquire into it would be absurd, unnecessary, undesirable, or wicked—we may know that that opinion is a non-rational one.
When we are tempted to say that any general truth is so “obvious” that it would be absurd even to question it, we should remember that the whole history of the development of human thought has been full of cas of such “obvious truths” breaking down when examined in the light of increasing knowledge and reason. For instance, for ages nothing could have emed more obvious, more utterly beyond question that the proposition that slavery was natural, reasonable, necessary, and right. Some kinds of men were “obviously” “slaves by nature.” To doubt it was impossible.
Again for more than two thousand years, it was “impossible to conceive” the planets as moving in paths other than circles. The circle was “obviously” the perfect figure; and so it was “natural” and “inevitable” to suppo that the planets moved in circles. The age-long struggle of the greatest intellects in the world to shake off that assumption is one of the marvels of history.
mdioIt was formerly “obvious” that the heart—and not the brain—was the organ of consciousness. To most people today it ems equally “obvious” that we think with our brains. Many modern persons find it very difficult to credit the fact that men can even have suppod otherwi. Yet—they did.
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That the earth must be flat, formerly emed so obvious and lf-evident that the very suggestion of any other possibility would have been—and was—regarded as a joke.
It was for two thousand years “taken for granted” as “obvious” that a heavy weight must fall faster than a light one. An assumed or dogmatic proposition which had been universally accepted as “obvious;” and which, when challenged, was supported by reference to a dogma of Aristotle. Until Galileo actually demonstrated the contrary, nothing could have emed more beyond possibility or doubt.
Propositions which are accepted blindly, without question on the grounds of mere assumption or dogma, need to be frankly recognized as such. Progress in human thought ems to consist mainly in getting rid of such ideas.
Other beliefs are held through lf-interest. Modern psychology leaves us no room for doubt on this point. We adopt and cling to some beliefs becau—or partly becau—it “pays” us to do so. But, as a rule, the person concerned is about the last person in the world to be able to recognize this in himlf. Indeed, he would probably be highly indignant if told of what anyone familiar with modern psychology can recognize plainly. It would be quite wrong to attribute all opinions—even political opinions—to lf-interest. But it would be equally wrong to deny that this is one potent factor.
在线日语“Self-interest” is to be understood first in the ordinary n, as referring to a man’s way of earning his livelihood and acquiring wealth. But we may extend the term to cover also his interest in social position; popularity with his fellows; the respect and goodwill of tho who respect and goodwill he values. It covers his interest in his own career, in whatever prestige he enjoys as one of the leaders—or at least as a valued supporter—of some movement or institution, some religious body, some other kind of society or group. There is many a man who is unconsciously compelled to cling to a belief becau he is a “somebody” in some circle—and if he were to abandon that belief, he would find himlf nobody at all.
Putting it broadly, we should always suspect any of our opinions when we recognize that our happiness depends, directly or indirectly, upon our continuing to hold them—when we might lo anything, material or otherwi, by changing our
opinion.
Somewhat similar is the acceptance of an opinion through the desire—probably not recognized by the person concerned—to justify his own nature, his own position, or his own behaviour. The coward can so easily adopt a philosophy which ems to justify cowardice—though, of cour, “cowardice” i
s not the name he gives it! The lazy and bungling person can adopt a t of opinions which prove to his satisfaction that “the grapes are sour”—the “grapes” being the rewards that more energet ic and competent men can win.
Many groundless opinions are held through ntimental associations. The thought is associated with memories—pleasant or unpleasant as the ca may be—of particular persons who held similar opinions. It is found that many a man who in childhood was hostile to his father, in after life is always prejudiced against whatever opinions his father ud to express. And converly in the ca of one who has pleasant recollections of his father, his mother, a teacher perhaps, or some other person who played a big part in his early life.
calIn adult life, as we have often obrved, a bitter quarrel may change a man’s opinion entirely. Antagonism to a man usually produces some antagonism to his opinions; and the bitterness felt against the man usually spreads to the idea for which he stands. What keen satisfaction we find in belittling the opinions, or attacking the opinions, of somebody of whom we are jealous, or of somebody against whom we bear a grudge! But, on the other hand, it is equally true that friendly feelings to a man have an effect in disposing us to feel friendly to his views.
Other opinions again are determined by what we may best call Fashion. To take on example: how largely our opinions on the merits of certain authors, or poets, or compors, are dictated merely by fashion! But the effect of fashion is very much wider than that: we trace it almost everywhere, in every field of thought. We tend very strongly to feel and to believe as others are feeling and believing. Not all others, perhaps; but others of our own t.
But we do not, as a rule, continue all our lives changing our ntiments and opinions with every change of fashion. Sooner or later our minds become fixed. Many a man holds his opinions today—becau they happened to be in fashion ten, twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty years ago.
Once an opinion is accepted, whatever be the cau of its acceptance, it has a strong tendency to persist. Every time we think along a particular thought-pattern, makes it easier for us to think the same way again. It is quite legitimate to speak of “habits” of thought. The “brain path” becomes so well worn; the pattern of brain-centres becomes so well connected up by continual u, that the never current finds a route of practically no resistance, and so it always takes almost exactly the same cour.
veryWe all know the person who has a string of stock anecdotes. We all know too the person who has ce
rtain stock arguments and opinions which he express, almost in the same words, whenever he receive s the “cue.” We all know men and women who minds work like gramophones. Put them on to the “record” about the good old days; or about prohibition; or about the wicked capitalist; or about the lazy and improvident workers; or about the country going to the dogs; or about the modern girl; or some long, tedious anecdote about what I said to him, and what he said to me, and I said … and he said … and then I told him straight…! All we have to do is to start him off—and nothing on earth can stop him—until the “record” has run out!随和
The same thing is true of opinions and beliefs of all kinds. After they have been held a certain length of time, they become, as it were, so stamped in by continual u that it is almost impossible now to change them. While we are young, we are
climbcontinually taking in new ideas, altering our thought-patterns, “making up our minds” afresh. As we grow older, we become less and less able to accept any new idea which will not fit in with our existing thought-pattern. Thus we become, in James’s term, Old Fogeys. Sometimes our thought-patterns t while we are still quite young. In a few rare cas they remain open or alterable even into old age. An Old Fogey may have become such at venteen—or venty. “I am almost afraid to say so (says James), but I believe that in the majority of human beings Old Fogeyism begins at abou
t the age of twenty-five.”
Yet when full allowance has been made for all the non-rational factors in the determination of opinion, there remains—not in all minds, not in most minds, but in some—a desire to discover the facts: to think things out in a clear and rational way; to get at the truth at all costs, whatever it may turn out to be! For such minds this … is written.
