中英文对照外文翻译truelove
(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)
Analysis on the Chine Enterpri Financing Abstract:The main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterpris (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit a nd other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric informatio n and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choo the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the ca of the static trade-off theory, firms cho o finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is prently located. In this paper, we argue that both of the theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the u of the fun
ds, and the ast side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additiona l Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique datat of Portugue SMEs confirms that the compositio n of the ast side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing ud and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are rejected.
剑桥大学公开课愿意的反义词是什么For SME the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, ban k credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primar ily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs assoc iated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs ari from collecting and analysing i nformation to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collectin g the collateral and lling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ management and shareholders are oft en the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs an
上海口译网d equity is therefor
e the cheapest source.
1 Ast side theory of SME financing
家眷的意思
In the previous ction we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal g enerated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and o ther loans. In this ction the motives behind the different types of financing are discusd.
1.1 Cheap Trade credits
entourage
The first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they reprent financial rvices provided by non-financial firms in competition with financia l intermediaries. The early rearch within this area focud on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary poli cy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known f
irms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent rearch breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using the credits.
Strategic motives
The first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting pay ments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good q uality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then the firms are forced to u trade credi ts to signal the quality of their products. The u of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric i nformation of the products and is therefore more likely to be ud by small firms, if the buyer has lit tle information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to ass their qu ality.
The cond strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can u trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or u them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers. Trade credit s are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be ud as tool for direct price discrim ination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers wi th a low credit standing.
Trade credits are also ud to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the bu yers. This often manifests itlf by the supplier extending the credit period in ca the buyer has tem porary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of t he industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the pr
oblems are of a more permanent nature.
The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is bad on transactions costs. Trade credit s are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to parate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck driver delivering the goods does not have to run around to fin d the
person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .
Financing motives
heaven歌词
The basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to oth er firms. The traditional view of financial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asym metric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and anal yzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the clo relations hip between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to m onitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.
But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving t he problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Pet ern and Rajan [1997] briefly discuss veral ways that suppliers may have advantages over fina ncial institutions. The supplier has a clo working association with the borrower and more frequent ly visits the premis than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with th
e supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this in formation is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financ ial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The u of early payment disc
ounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again t he supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier may be a ble to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.
The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a loc al monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for t he firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In ca of defaults the supplier can ize the goods and in general has a be tter u for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can ll the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. The advantages, of cour, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.
If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then fir ms can
u the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit f rom the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can u tr ade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.
That trade credits are in general cured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot u trade credits to finance the entire operat ions of the firm.
In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information isrelatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the u of trade credit are credit r isk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since the trade credits are cured by the materials delivered tinception
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