F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Jeremiah Gertler
Specialist in Military Aviation
September 23, 2010
Congressional Rearch Service
7-5700
RL30563 CRS Report for Congress
Summary
The largest procurement program in the Department of Defen (DOD), the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), also called the Lightning II, is a new aircraft being procured in different versions for the United States Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. Current DOD plans call for acquiring a total of 2,456 JSFs.
Hundreds of additional F-35s are expected to be purchad by veral U.S. allies, eight of which are cost-sharing partners in the program.
The F-35 promis significant advances in military capability. Like many high-technology programs before it, reaching that capability has put the program above its original budget and behind the planned schedule.
The administration’s propod FY2011 defen budget requested about $6.8 billion in procurement funding for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. This would fund the procurement of 23 F-35As for the Air Force, 13 F-35Bs for the Marine Corps, and ven F-35Cs for the Navy.
The administration’s propod FY2011 defen budget also propod terminating the F-35 alternate engine program, which is intended to develop the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 engine as an alternative to the Pratt and Whitney F135 engine that currently powers the F-35. The F-35 alternate engine program has emerged as a major item of debate on the FY2011 defen budget.
FY2010 defen authorization act: The conference report on the FY2010 defen authorization act authorizes funding for procuring a total of 30 F-35s in FY2010, as requested. The report authorizes $430 million in Air Force and Navy rearch and development funding for continued development of
the F136 alternate engine, and $130 million in Air Force advance procurement funding to begin F136 procurement. Section 131 of the act requires a report on the procurement of “4.5”-generation fighters that is to include, among other things, “a discussion regarding the availability and feasibility of procuring F-35 aircraft to proportionally and concurrently recapitalize the Air National Guard during fiscal years 2015 through fiscal year 2025.” Section 217 requires future DOD budgets to provide parate line items for the F-35B and F-35C within the Navy aircraft procurement account and the Navy rearch and development account. Section 244 requires, for the period 2010-2015, an annual Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the status of the F-35 program.
FY2010 DOD appropriations bill: The explanatory statement on the final version of H.R. 3326 includes $6,840.5 million for 30 F-35s in 2010. Additionally, the statement contains $430 million in Navy and Air Force rearch and development funding for continued development of the F136 alternate engine, and $35 million in Air Force procurement funding designated for the alternate engine program.
Latest Developments: On September 16, 2010, the Senate Appropriations Committee funded 32 F-35s, 10 fewer than the Administration requested.
The report on the Hou-pasd version of the FY2011 defen authorization bill included language limiting procurement to 30 F-35s pending certification that the F-35 had achieved certain testing parameters. The Senate Armed Services Committee-reported version of the bill required similar, but different achievements, but did not withhold funding.
Contents
Introduction (1)
In General (1)
Alternate Engine Program (1)
Background (2)
The F-35 in Brief (2)
In General (2)
Three Service Versions (3)
Alternate Engine Program Summary (4)
JSF Program Origin and Milestones (5)
Procurement Quantities (7)
Planned Total Quantities (7)
Annual Quantities (7)
Program Management (8)
Cost and Funding (9)
Total Program Acquisition Cost (9)
Prior-Year Funding (9)
Unit Costs (9)
Manufacturing Locations (10)
International Participation (10)
In General (10)
Friction over Work Shares and Technology Transfer (12)
International Sales Quantities and Schedule (13)
Propod FY2011 Budget (14)
FY2011 Funding Request (14)
Propod Termination of Alternate Engine (15)
Issues for Congress (15)
Alternate Engine Program (15)
Planned Total Procurement Quantities (15)
Program Performance (16)
Cost Increas and Nunn-McCurdy Breach (16)
February 2010 Program Restructuring (17)
OT&E Report on System Testing (17)
March 2010 GAO Perspective (18)
Testing Performance (18)
Affordability and Projected Fighter Shortfalls (19)
Implications for Industrial Ba (20)
Legislative Activity for FY2011 (21)
Summary of Quantities and Funding (21)
FY2011 Defen Authorization Act (H.R. 5136/S. 3454) (22)
Hou (22)
Senate (23)
FY2011 Defen Appropriations Act (S. 3800) (26)
Senate (26)
Tables
Table 1. F-35 V ariant Milestones (6)
Table 2. Annual F-35 Procurement Quantities (7)
Table 3. FY2011 Funding Request for F-35 Program (14)
Table 4. Summary of Action on FY2011 F-35 Quantities and Funding (21)
Table A-1. Summary of Action on FY2010 F-35 Quantities and Funding (29)
Table B-1. F-35 Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) (50)
Appendixes
Appendix A. Legislative Activity for FY2010 (29)
Appendix B. F-35 Key Performance Parameters (50)
Contacts
Author Contact Information (50)
Acknowledgments (50)
Introduction
In General
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), also called the Lightning II, is a new aircraft being procured in different versions for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. F-35 procurement began in
FY2007. Current Department of Defen (DOD) plans call for acquiring a total of 2,456 JSFs1 for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy at an estimated total acquisition cost (as of December 31, 2009) of about $238 billion in constant (i.e., inflation-adjusted) FY2002 dollars. The F-35 program is DOD’s
largest weapon procurement program in terms of total estimated acquisition cost. Hundreds of additional F-35s are expected to be purchad by veral U.S. allies, eight of which are cost-sharing partners in the program.
The administration’s propod FY2011 defen budget requested a total of about $10.4 billion for the F-35 program, including about $2.5 billion in Air Force and Navy rearch and development funding and about $7.9 billion in Air Force and Navy procurement funding. (Development and procurement of Marine Corps aircraft are funded through the Navy’s budget.) The administration propod to fund the procurement of 23 F-35As for the Air Force, 13 F-35Bs for the Marine Corps, and ven F-35Cs for the Navy in FY2011.2
The administration’s propod FY2011 defen budget also propod terminating the F-35 alternate engine program, which is intended to develop the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 engine as an alternative to the Pratt and Whitney F135 engine that currently powers the F-35.3 The F-35 alternate engine program emerged as a major item of debate on the FY2010 defen budget. The administration threatened to veto the FY2010 defen authorization or appropriation bill if either “would riously disrupt” the F-35 program. In its consideration of the FY2010 budget, Congress authorized and appropriated $430 million to continue alternate engine development, and appropriate
d $35 million for alternate engine procurement.
Alternate Engine Program
A longstanding debate over whether the F-35 program should include funding for an alternate engine has potential implications for the program’s budget, the number of aircraft acquired, and allied nations’ willingness to participate in the program, among other issues. Introductory information on the F-35 alternate engine program is prented in the “Background” ction of this report. Due to the significance of the issues and the pace of developments, the alternate engine debate is addresd parately in CRS Report R41131, F-35 Alternate Engine Program: Background and Issues for Congress.
1 Thirteen of the aircraft will be acquired for flight testing through rearch and development funding.
2 The request propos funding one Air Force F-35A through Overas Contingency Operations accounts rather than DOD procurement funds.
3 Successive administrations propod terminating the alternate engine program in FY2007, FY2008, FY2009, and
FY2010. Congress rejected the proposals and provided funding, bill language, and report language to continue the program.
Background
The F-35 in Brief
In General
The F-35 was conceived as a relatively affordable fifth-generation strike fighter4 that could be procured in three highly common versions for the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Navy, so that the three rvices could avoid the higher costs of developing, procuring, and operating and supporting three parate tactical aircraft designs to meet their similar but not identical operational needs.5
DOD states that the F-35 program “was structured from the beginning to be a model of acquisition reform, with an emphasis on jointness, technology maturation and concept demonstrations, and early cost and performance trades integral to the weapon system requirements definition process.”6
All three versions of the F-35 will be single-at aircraft with the ability to go supersonic for short peri
ods and advanced stealth characteristics. The three versions will vary somewhat in their combat ranges and payloads (e the Appendix B). All three are to carry their primary weapons internally to maintain a stealthy radar signature. Additional weapons can be carried externally on missions requiring less stealth.
4 Fifth-generation aircraft incorporate the most modern technology, and are considered to be generally more capable than earlier-generation aircraft. Fifth-generation fighters combine new developments such as thrust vectoring, composite materials, supercrui (the ability to crui at supersonic speeds without using engine afterburners), stealth technology, advanced radar and nsors, and integrated avionics to greatly improve pilot situational awareness. Among fighters currently in rvice or in regular production, only the Air Force F-22 air superiority fighter and the F-3
5 are considered fifth-generation aircraft. Russia has flown a prototype fifth-generation fighter, and China reportedly has fifth-generation fighters under development. Regarding Russia’s fifth-generation fighter project, e, inter alia, Tony Halpin, “Russia unveils its first stealth fighter jet - the Sukhoi T-50,” TimesOnline, January 29, 2010; and Alexei Komarov, “More Sukhoi T-50s To Fly In Next 12 Months,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 12, 2010. Regarding China’s fifth-generation fighter project, e, inter alia, David A. Fulghum, “China Revs Up Pursuit Of Stealth Tech
nology,” Aerospace Daily & Defen Report, November 20, 2009; and Ted Parsons, “China’s Fifth-Generation Fighter To Fly ‘Soon,’” Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 12, 2009.
Strike fighters are dual-role tactical aircraft that are capable of both air-to-ground (strike) and air-to-air (fighter) combat operations.
5 The program’s operational requirements call for 70% to 90% commonality between all three versions. Many of the three versions’ high-cost components—including their engines, avionics, and major airframe structural components—are common.
Secretary of Defen William Cohen stated in 2000 that the JSF’s joint approach “avoids the three parallel development programs for rvice-unique aircraft that would have otherwi been necessary, saving at least $15 billion.” (Letter from Secretary of Defen William S. Cohen to Rep. Jerry Lewis, June 22, 2000. The text of letter made available by Inside the Air Force on June 23, 2000.)
6 Department of Defen. Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)[for] F-35 (JSF), December 31, 2007, p. 4.
