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Metaphysics, by Aristotlemultiples
Book VIII
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implementedWE must reckon up the results arising from what has been said, and compute the sum of them, and put the finishing touch to our inquiry. We have said that the caus, principles, and elements of substances are the object of our arch. And some substances are recognized by every one, but some have been advocated by particular schools. Tho generally recognized are the natural substances, i.e. fire, earth, water, air, &c., the simple bodies; cond plants and their parts, and animals and the parts of animals; and finally the physical univer and its parts; while some particular schools say that Forms and the objects of mathematics are substances. But there are arguments which lead to the conclusion that there are other substances, the esnce and the substratum. Again, in another way the genus ems more substantial than the various spccies, and the universal than the particulars. And with the universal and the genus the Ideas are connected; it is in vi小的英文
rtue of the same argument that they are thought to be substances. And since the esnce is substance, and the definition is a formula of the esnce, for this reason we have discusd definition and esntial predication. Since the definition is a formula, and a formula has parts, we had to consider also with respect to the notion of ‘part’, what are parts of the substance and what are not, and whether the parts of the substance are also parts of the definition. Further, too, neither the universal nor the genus is a substance; we must inquire later into the Ideas and the objects of mathematics; for some say the are substances as well as the nsible substances.
But now let us resume the discussion of the generally recognized substances. The are the nsible substances, and nsible substances all have matter. The substratum is substance, and this is in one n the matter (and by matter I mean that which, not being a ‘this’ actually, is potentially a ‘this’), and in another n the formula or shape (that which being a ‘this’ can be parately formulated), and thirdly the complex of the two, which alone is generated and destroyed, and is, without qualification, capable of parate existence; for of substances completely expressible in a formula some are pa
rable and some are parable and some are not.
kickedBut clearly matter also is substance; for in all the opposite changes that occur there is something which underlies the changes, e.g. in respect of place that which is now here and again elwhere, and in respect of increa that which is now of one size and again less or greater, and in respect of alteration that which is now healthy and again diad; and similarly in respect of substance there is something that is now being generated and again being destroyed, and now underlies the process as a ‘this’ and again underlies it in respect of a privation of positive character. And in this change the others are involved. But in either one or two of the others this is not involved; for it is not necessary if a thing has matter for change of place that it should also have matter for generation and destruction.
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The difference between becoming in the full n and becoming in a qualified n has been stated in our physical works.
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Since the substance which exists as underlying and as matter is generally recognized, and this that which exists potentially, it remains for us to say what is the substance, in the n of actuality, of nsible things. Democritus ems to think there are three kinds of difference between things; the underlying body, the matter, is one and the same, but they differ either in rhythm, i.e. shape, or in turning, i.e. position, or in inter-contact, i.e. order. But evidently there are many differences; for instance, some things are characterized by the mode of composition of their matter, e.g. the things formed by blending, such as honey-water; and others by being bound together, e.g. bundle; and others by being glued together, e.g. a book; and others by being nailed together, e.g. a casket; and others in more than one of the ways; and others by position, e.g. threshold and lintel (for the differ by being placed in a certain way); and others by time, e.g. dinner and breakfast; and others by place, e.g. the winds; and others by the affections proper to nsible things, e.g. hardness and softness, density and rarity, dryness and wetness; and some things by some of the qualities, others by them all, and in general some by excess and some by defect. Clearly, then, the word ‘is’ has just as many meanings; a thing is a thresh
old becau it lies in such and such a position, and its being means its lying in that position, while being ice means having been solidified in such and such a way. And the being of some things will be defined by all the qualities, becau some parts of them are mixed, others are blended, others are bound together, others are solidified, and others u the other differentiae; e.g. the hand or the foot requires such complex definition. We must grasp, then, the kinds of differentiae (for the will be the principles of the being of things), e.g. the things characterized by the more and the less, or by the den and the rare, and by other such qualities; for all the are forms of excess and defect. And anything that is characterized by shape or by smoothness and roughness is characterized by the straight and the curved. And for other things their being will mean their being mixed, and their not being will mean the opposite.
It is clear, then, from the facts that, since its substance is the cau of each thing’s being, we must ek in the differentiae what is the cau of the being of each of the things. Now none of the differentiae is substance, even when coupled with matter, yet it is what is analogous to substance in each ca; and as in substances that which is predic
ated of the matter is the actuality itlf, in all other definitions also it is what most rembles full actuality. E.g. if we had to define a threshold, we should say ‘wood or stone in such and such a position’, and a hou we should define as ‘bricks and timbers in such and such a position’,(or a purpo may exist as well in some cas), and if we had to define ice we should say ‘water frozen or solidified in such and such a way’, and harmony is ‘such and such a blending of high and low’; and similarly in all other cas.
Obviously, then, the actuality or the formula is different when the matter is different; for in some cas it is the composition, in others the mixing, and in others some other of the attributes we have named. And so, of the people who go in for defining, tho who define a hou as stones, bricks, and timbers are speaking of the potential hou, for the are the matter; but tho who propo ‘a receptacle to shelter chattels and living beings’, or something of the sort, speak of the actuality. Tho who combine both of the speak of the third kind of substance, which is compod of matter and form (for the formula that gives the differentiae ems to be an account of the form or actuality, while that which gives the components is rather an account of the matter); and the same is true of the kind 英汉 翻译>男士祛痘痕
of definitions which Archytas ud to accept; they are accounts of the combined form and matter. E.g. what is still weather? Abnce of motion in a large expan of air; air is the matter, and abnce of motion is the actuality and substance. What is a calm? Smoothness of a; the material substratum is the a, and the actuality or shape is smoothness. It is obvious then, from what has been said, what nsible substance is and how it exists-one kind of it as matter, another as form or actuality, while the third kind is that which is compod of the two.
