Hypnotic ingroup–outgroup suggestion influences economic
decision-making in an Ultimatum Game
Martin Brüne a ,c ,⇑,Cumhur Tas a ,Julia Wischniewski a ,Anna Welpinghus b ,Christine Heinisch a ,Albert Newen b ,c
a
Rearch Department of Cognitive Neuropsychiatry and Psychiatric Preventive Medicine,Department of Psychiatry,Psychotherapy and Preventive Medicine,LWL University Hospital,Ruhr-University Bochum,Germany
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b Institute of Philosophy II,Faculty of Philosophy and Education,Ruhr-University Bochum,Germany
英语演讲话题c Center for Mind,Brain an
d Cognitiv
e Evolution,Ruhr-University Bochum,Germany a r t i c l e i n
f o Article history:Received 30November 2011Available online xxxx Keywords:Ultimatum Game Economic bargainin
g Tolerance of unfairness Ingroup–outgroup distinction
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a b s t r a c t
Studies in economic decision-making have demonstrated that individuals appreciate social
values supporting equity and disapprove unfairness when distributing goods between two
or more parties.However,this ems to critically depend on psychological mechanisms
partly pertaining to the ingroup–outgroup distinction.Little is known as to what extent
economic bargaining can be manipulated by means of psychological interventions such
has hypnosis.Here we show that a hypnotic ingroup versus outgroup suggestion impacts
the tolerance of unfairness in an Ultimatum Game.Specifically,the ingroup suggestion was
associated with significantly greater acceptance rates of unfair offers than the outgroup
suggestion,whereas hypnosis alone exerted only small effects on unfairness tolerance.
The findings indicate that psychological interventions such as hypnotic suggestion can
contribute to ingroup favoritism and outgroup rejection.
Ó2012Elvier Inc.All rights rerved.1.Introduction
Rearch into economic decision-making has revealed that people are nsitive to unfairness,and inequity.For example,in experimental bargaining scenarios offers that are perceived to be unfair will usually be rejected,even if individuals forgo a net gain of resources (Fehr &Schmitt,1999).Evolutionary theorizing has provided testable predictions why people tend to behave
in ways that are ‘‘illogical’’in a strictly economic perspective (Axelrod &Hamilton,1981;Camerer,2003;Gintis,2000;Trivers,1971).The underlying motivation for not tolerating inequity or unfairness probably resides in the need to rein-force cooperation within social groups,and such behavioral tendencies,including the formation of culturally accepted social rules and moral values,has undergone positive lection in human evolution (Fehr &Fischbacher,2004).
A wealth of studies has shown that humans follow that logic in experimental situations and tend to reject offers below 50%of a distributable people are intolerant towards perceived unfairness.The degree to which one is willing to accept unfairness has widely been studied,including experimental manipulations using brain stimulation techniques or drugs.A sizeable number of studies ud a so-called Ultimatum Game (UG;Camerer,2003),in which one player,called the propor,suggests how to split an amount of (virtual)money.The other player,called the recipient,has the option to accept or reject the offer.In ca he or she rejects,neither of the two gets any money.Thus,the UG entails a mild form of costly punishment and reinforcement of cooperation.Usually,fair offers of around 50%of the total sum are accepted 1053-8100/$-e front matter Ó2012Elvier Inc.All rights rerved.
doi:10.2012.02.009
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Corresponding author at:Rearch Department of Cognitive Neuropsychiatry and Psychiatric Preventive Medicine,Department of Psychiatry,Psychotherapy and Preventive Medicine,LWL University Hospital,Ruhr-University Bochum,Alexandrinenstr.1,D-44791Bochum,Germany.Fax:+4923450771329.
E-mail address:martin.bruene@rub.de (M.Brüne).
by recipients,while the acceptance rate drops dramatically with increasing unfairness of the offer (Sanfey,Rilling,Aronson,Nystrom,&Cohen,2003).In brain stimulation experiments applying repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS)or transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS)of neocortical areas,participants accepted more unfair offers upon functional inhibition of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,suggesting either that the inhibitory effects of brain stimulation over-rode a prepotent emotional respon to reject unfair offers,or,alternatively,that the stimulation produced more lfish behavior by diminishing cortical control over egocentricity (Knoch,Pascual-Leone,Meyer,Treyer,&Fehr,2006;Knoch et al.,2007;van ’t Wout,Kahn,Sanfey,&Aleman,2005).Converly,the administration of social hormones such as oxytocin has been shown to increa trust (Kosfeld,Heinrichs,Zak,Fischbacher,&Fehr,2005)and prosocial behavior in economic games (De Dreu et al.,2010;Israel et al.,2009).In contrast to studies
bad on brain stimulation or application of hormones,there is a paucity of studies into economic decision-making after psychological interventions.
Hypnosis reflects a psychological technique that is known to influence perception and cognition.For example,it has been shown that hypnosis has the potential to influence pain perception (Arendt-Nieln,Zachariae,&Bjerring,1990),speech pro-cessing (Casiglia et al.,2010),mirror lf-identification (Barnier,Cox,Connors,Langdon,&Coltheart,2011;Barnier et al.,2008),to induce motor paralysis (Cojan et al.,2009)or catalepsy (Grond,Pawlik,Walter,Lesch,&Heiss,1995),to alter vol-untary motor control (Haggard,Cartledge,Dafydd,&Oakley,2004),and to impact on moral decision-making (Page,1985;Page &Handley,1988;Wheatley &Haidt,2005).As regards the latter issue,Page (1985)was among the first to show that hypnotic age regression lowers one’s moral reasoning scores on dilemmas such as a broken promis or transgression of laws in life-threatening situations according to Kohlberg’s Moral Judgement Interview (Kohlberg,1976).That is,hypnotized and age-regresd subjects judged moral dilemmas according to the suggested age.However,the same group was unable to rep-licate this finding in a different sample using different dilemmas (Page &Handley,1988).More recently,a study,in which participants received the post-hypnotic suggestion to experience a brief sickening feeling in the stomach,found that indi-viduals rated moral dilemmas as
more vere and disgusting when a particular word that was associated with the suggestion appeared in the vignette of the moral dilemma (Wheatley &Haidt,2005).Such experiments suggest that moral reasoning can be influenced by hypnotic suggestions in manifold ways.However,while focusing on general moral rules,the exper-iments lack personal involvement of the he more direct and context-dependent experience of being treated in an unfair manner,as reflected in economic games.
As regards the social context in economic decision-making,trust and tolerance of unfairness critically depend on one’s cloness to the other person or other persons.For example,people clearly tend to distinguish between ingroup and out-group members,and this distinction has demonstrable effects on one’s willingness to share with others (De Dreu,2010).Even children as young as 6–7years old show a clear preference to share resources such as sweets with kids from their peer-group as compared to kids from a different kindergarten group (Fehr,Bernhard,&Rockenbach,2008).In addition,altru-ism is also clearly more directed towards kin and ingroup members,as oppod to altruistic behavior oriented towards out-group people.This inclination ems to be even stronger upon the administration of oxytocin (De Dreu,Greer,Van Kleef,Shalvi,&Handgraaf,2011;De Dreu et al.,2010),which is known for its pro-empathetic properties (Domes,Heinrichs,Michel,Berger,&Herpert
z,2006).In respect of the findings,it is interesting to note that emotional contagion and empathy have been found to be related to one’s hypnotizability (Cardeña,Terhune,Loof,&Buratti,2009;Wickramakera &Szlyk,2003),and that oxytocin increas hypnotizability even in low hypnotizable subjects (Bryant,Hung,Guastella,&Mitchell,2012).Taken together,this suggests that the hypnotic state could influence the behavior in economic bargaining scenarios.In addi-tion,a hypnotic suggestion of ingroup–outgroup distinction could further bias subjects’economic decision-making,perhaps comparable to the effect of oxytocin.
Accordingly,we sought to examine both the effect of hypnosis and the impact of a hypnotic ingroup–outgroup suggestion on economic bargaining in a UG.Bad on the afore-mentioned studies,we hypothesized that hypnosis alone would increa one’s willingness to accept unfair offers.Moreover,we predicted that a hypnotic ingroup–outgroup suggestion would in-crea or decrea the likelihood of accepting or rejecting unfair offers,depending on the specific content of the suggestion.That is,we expected that subjects’tolerance of unfairness would ri for unfair offers received from ingroup members,whereas the acceptance rate of unfair offers from outgroup members would decline.
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2.Methods
2.1.Participants
Twenty-four right-handed subjects (15women)with a mean age of 25.5years (SD age =3.68years)participated in the eco-nomic bargaining experiment.All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurologic or psychi-atric disorder.Axis I and axis II disorders were excluded by a structured clinical interview (SCID;Wittchen &Fydrich,1997).Participants were recruited by advertiment from the Ruhr-University Bochum.The study was approved by the Ethics Com-mittee of the Medical Faculty of the Ruhr-University Bochum,and all participants gave written informed connt.
2.2.Ultimatum Game (UG)
Prior to testing,all subjects received written instructions and performed a practice trial to ensure that they had com-pletely understood the task.The trials were prented on a computer screen with a resolution of 1280Â1024.The distance 2M.Brüne et al./Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2012)
xxx–xxx
伴郎英文between the screen and the subjects’faces was80cm.As in our previous studies(Wischniewski&Brüne,2011,in press), subjects acted as recipients in44trials of a UG sharing an amount of10money units(MU).There were11trials per split-condition with shares of5:5,7:3,8:2,and9:1,respectively.Accordingly,there was one fair split condition,where the propor offered50%of the total MU;the other conditions differed in degree of unfairness.For example,in the most un-fair condition,the propor offered just10%of the total sum,thus keeping90%for himlf.In each trial subjectsfirst viewed a picture of a virtual person who would make the offer.Next,the propor’s offer how to split the money was displayed on the screen.Participants were then asked if they accepted or declined the offer by clicking a PC mou-button(refusal of the offer led to a complete loss for both,acceptance resulted in an outcome according to the propod split).Finally,participants were informed about the outcome of their decisions.The trials were parated by afixation cross and prented in a random order(the UG scenario is shown in Fig.1).All participants received20Euros plus a specific amount of money according to the participants’actual behavior in the UG.They were told that they could win additional money,but were left unbeknownst to the exact mathematical procedure according to which the gains were calculated.That is,subjects had to infer which partic-ular altruistic versus lfish)was actually rewarded.
2.3.Hypnotic procedure
M.Brüne et al./Consciousness and Cognition xxx(2012)xxx–xxx3
In addition,the participants completed a lf-report questionnaire (the Short Suggestibility Scale,SSS;Kotov,Bellman,&Watson,2007)to asss differences in suggestibility.The SSS compris 21items taken from the Multidimensional Iowa Sug-gestibility Scale (MISS;Kotov et al.,2007).Participants were asked to score their agreement upon each statement (e.g.,‘‘imagining a refreshing drink can make me thirsty’’;‘‘if a product is nicely displayed,I usually want to buy it’’)on a 5-point Likert Scale,with respons ranging from ‘‘not at all’’to ‘‘a lot’’.Higher scores indicated greater suggestibility.In the original study by Kotov and colleagues (2007)the SSS was reliable in a large sample and correlated at .93with the total suggestibility index obtained with the Multidimensional Iowa Suggestibility Scale.Even though the SSS does not reflect hypnotic suggest-ibility,we decided to obtain this additional information,becau it was necessary to follow-up on the behavioral perfor-mance in the UG under hypnosis and compare the findings with the participants’behavior in the abnce of hypnosis (e below).
In the actual experimental pha,the lected participants (N =24)performed an Ultimatum Game (U
G)in full wakeful-ness.The subjects were then individually hypnotized and again performed an UG.Subquently,the participants received one of two hypnotic ‘‘be aware,you are playing against somebody who is not from your peer-group’’(out-group suggestion,11subjects),or ‘‘don’t worry,you are playing against one of your peers’’(ingroup suggestion,13subjects),and then played another round of the UG.报纸的拼音
At 6-month follow-up to the hypnosis ssion,subjects played esntially the same UG in full wakefulness after receiving exactly the same (now non-hypnotic)suggestion as under hypnosis.That is,all participants who had received the ingroup hypnotic suggestion played the UG with the ingroup non-hypnotic suggestion,whereas tho who had received the out-group hypnotic suggestion now played the UG after receiving the non-hypnotic outgroup suggestion.
2.4.Data analys
In line with previous rearch on analys of mean count data (Ridout,Demetrio,&Hinde,1998),we first calculated the percentage of the mean acceptance rate for each offer and transformed the data for longitudinal analys (for details e,Lacroix &Giguere,2007)in which the consciousness state was taken as index variable.Accordingly,a generalized linear model analysis (GLZ or GENLIN in SP
SS Version 19)was performed to examine the association of split conditions (5:5,7:3,8:2,9:1)with the consciousness state (hypnotic,wakeful)during the UG.The reason for using a generalized linear model resided in the fact that the data followed a poisson distribution,that is,they reprented mean count data (number of ac-cepted offers)that were not normally distributed (in fact,one would expect that measuring the acceptance rate of unfair offers produce skewed data,becau previous studies using economic games have shown that the acceptance rate declines steadily with increasing unfairness of offers).The acceptance rates in the different split conditions were therefore lected as respon variables,consciousness as fixed factor,and the suggestibility score rved as a covariate to analyze the predictive role of consciousness and suggestibility on economic decision-making in the UG.The mean acceptance rates were first col-lapd for all unfair split conditions,and then analyzed parately for each unfair condition.Pairwi comparisons were examined when consciousness status had a significant main effect.In a subquent step,suggestion type (ingroup versus outgroup)was included in the model as another factor in addition to consciousness.Pairwi comparisons were examined when the interaction between consciousness and suggestion type had a significant main effect.In all models the goodness of fit/degree of freedom ratio (value/df)and over-dispersion of the respon variables was controlled for.Pairwi comparisons were also assd when consciousness status had a significant main effect (bad on Type III statistics).All statistical anal-ys were carried out using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS,Version 19).
3.Results
3.1.Performance in the Ultimatum Game under hypnosis versus wakefulness
When collapsing the acceptance rates for all unfair offer,the hypnotic state exerted a significant effect (Wald X 2(1)=8.06,p =0.003)on economic decision-making compared to the non-hypnotic state when suggestibility as measured using the SSS was taken into account.In addition,the participants’suggestibility (Wald X 2(1)=14.58,p =<0.001)was found to be an addi-tional independent predictor of decision-making.Non-significant effects of consciousness (hypnosis versus wakefulness)emerged for the fair split condition (Wald X 2(1)=0.032,p =0.858).Similarly,suggestibility had no effect on acceptance of fair offers (Wald X 2(1)=0.026,p =0.872).Additional analys revealed that consciousness and suggestibility significantly ex-plained decision-making in all unfair split conditions,except for the least unfair offer (7:3),where consciousness was the only independent predictor of the model (Wald X 2(1)=14.11,p =<0.001),while suggestibility was not a significant predictor (Wald X 2(1)=0.64,p =<0.425).Pairwi comparisons with estimated results corrected for suggestibility revealed a greater acceptance rate for all unfair offers under hypnosis as compared to wakefulness (p <0.001).Results are shown in Table 1.
3.2.Effects of suggestion type on economic decision-making
Preliminary analys displayed no significant difference in individual suggestibility between suggestion groups (out-group:40.21(5.56),ingroup:42.65(5.21);F (1,22)=1.228,p =0.281).However,the interaction between suggestion type 4M.Brüne et al./Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2012)
xxx–xxx
and consciousness state displayed a significant impact on participants’economic decision-making when acceptance rates were collapd over all unfair split conditions (Wald X 2(1)=4.09,p =<0.043).Pairwi comparisons revealed that under hyp-nosis participants who were instructed to receive offers from an in-group member accepted more unfair offers compared to participants who received an out-group suggestion (p <0.001),whereas no significant difference was obrved in the wake-ful state (p =0.98).Neither consciousness (Wald X 2(1)=1.090,p =0.296)nor suggestion type (Wald X 2(1)=0.060,p =0.806)predicted the acceptance rate in the fair split (5:5)condition.Consciousness and suggestion type were,however,indepen-dent significant predictors in explaining the acceptance rate in each unfair condition.Moreover,the interaction between consciou
sness and suggestion type was significant in the 8:2split condition (Wald X 2(1)=12.38,p =<0.001),but not signif-icant in the 7:3condition (Wald X 2(1)=0.754,p =0.385)or the 9:1condition (Wald X 2(1)=3.20,p =0.073).Accordingly,par-ticipants rejected unfair offers (8:2)under hypnosis less when received from an ingroup member,as oppod to offers from an outgroup member (p <0.001),whereas no significant difference was obrved in wakefulness (p =0.431).The findings are summarized in Table 2and Fig.2.
4.Discussion
The prent study sought to examine the influence of hypnosis and a hypnotic ingroup–outgroup suggestion on economic bargaining using an Ultimatum Game (UG)that has widely been ud to asss one’s tolerance of unfairness and individual differences in costly punishment (Camerer,2003).In line with predictions,hypnosis had a measurable effect on fairness tol-erance in that it incread the acceptance rate of unfair offers.In addition,individual differences in suggestibility made an independent contribution to the acceptance of unfair offers.When hypnotized individuals received the suggestion that offers were made either by an ingroup or an outgroup member,the acceptance of unfair offers differed substantially between the two conditions.Put another way,unfair offers were significantly more often accepted when made by an ingroup,as com-pared to an outgrou
p member.
Table 1
Effect of consciousness on estimated acceptance rate in the Ultimatum Game according to the fairness of offers.
Offer Wakeful state
Hypnotic state Likelihood ratio chi 2p Value Mean
S.E Mean S.E 5:5offer a
100.00 2.0598.49 2.03.321.9567:3offer b
55.39 1.5064.85 1.6030.38<0.0018:2offer c
integrate
39.29 1.2947.09 1.4167.41<0.0019:1offer d
16.940.8823.18 1.0779.46<0.001Unfair offer (mean)e 36.73 1.2544.77 1.3845.47<0.001Note :Generalized linear model estimated marginal means with standard errors;the means can be inter
preted as an estimated proportion of accepted offers after controlling for suggestibility.p -Value and the Likelihood ratio chi 2s reprent model reliability.Wald chi 2s reprent the main effects for consciousness and suggestion in each split condition.Pairwi comparisons for main significant effects are shown below.
a Consciousness:Wald chi 2(1)=0.032,p =0.858,suggestibility:Wald chi 2(1)=0.026,p =0.872.
b Consciousness:Wald chi 2(1)=14.11,p =<0.001.Hypnosis >Wakefulness (p =<0.001),suggestibility:Wald chi 2(1)=0.64,p =0.425.
c Consciousness:Wal
d chi 2(1)=9.21,p =0.002.Hypnosis >Wakefulness (p =<0.001),suggestibility:Wald chi 2(1)=38.84,p =<0.001.
d Consciousness:Wald chi 2(1)=17.29,p =<0.001.Hypnosis >Wakefulness (p =<0.001),suggestibility:Wald chi 2(1)=26.70,p =<0.001.
e Consciousness:Wald chi 2(1)=8.06,p =0.003.Hypnosis >Wakefulness (p =<0.001),suggestibility:Wald chi 2(1)=14.58,p =<0.001.
Table 2
Effect of the interaction of consciousness and suggestion/instruction on decision-making in the Ultimatum Game according to the fairness of the offers.Offer Wakefulness
Hypnosis Likelihood ratio chi 2p Value Outgroup
Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Mean
S.E.Mean S.E.Mean S.E.Mean S.E.5:5offer a
95.82 2.9999.39 2.8097.45 3.0199.08 2.81 1.271.8667:3offer b
41.01 1.9662.68 2.2351.53 2.1973.37 2.51112.78<0.0018:2offer c
clo怎么读37.02 1.8735.03 1.6840.27 1.9552.74 2.0554.52<0.0019:1offer d
36.93 1.8830.99 1.5731.95 1.7532.20 1.6012.490.014Unfair offer (mean)e
38.32 1.9042.74 1.8541.32 1.9755.22 2.1840.87<0.001Generalized linear model estimated marginal means with standard errors;the means can be interpreted as an estimated proportion of
accepted offers after controlling for suggestibility.p Value and the Likelihood ratio chi 2s reprent model reliability.Wald chi 2s are interaction effects for consciousness (W/H)versus suggestion type (Out/In)for each condition.Pairwi comparisons for main significant effects are shown below.
H:Hypnosis;W:Wakefulness;in:Ingroup suggestion;out:Outgroup suggestion.
a Wald chi 2(1)=0.029.p =0.865.
b Wald chi 2(1)=0.754.p =0.385.
c Wal
d chi 2(1)=12.38.p =<0.001.H(in)>H(out),W(out),and W(in)(p =<0.001).
d Wald chi 2(1)=3.21.p =0.073.W(out)>W(in)(p =0.016);W(out)>H(out)(p =0.05).
e Wald chi 2(1)=4.09.p =0.043.H(in)>W(in),H(out),and W(out)(p =<0.001).
M.Brüne et al./Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2012)xxx–xxxcallus
5
Previous studies have shown that economic decision-making depends on a variety of factors,including trustworthiness of players,degree of unfairness of players and incentives associated with one’s willingness to punish inequity (Fehr &Camerer,2007).In addition,recent rearch has demonstrated that contextual factors such as one’s hormonal status,wakefulness or individual differences in impulsivity exert profound effects on economic decision-making (Anderson &Dickinson,2009;Crockett,Clark,Lieberman,Tabibnia,&Robbins,2010;De Dreu et al.,2011).In line with evolutionary theorizing,studies have revealed that people clearly differentiate between ingroup and outgroup members in terms of trust and reciprocity.For example,De Dreu (2010)demonstrated that social orientation impacts upon how people perform in intergroup conflict.Compared to more lf-oriented subjects,prosocially oriented individuals showed stronger ingroup trust and ingroup love,but not more or less outgroup hate or distrust.The differential attitudes towards in-and outgroups can be enhanced by the prosocial substance oxytocin that is known to increa trust and reciprocity (De Dreu,2010;De Dreu et al.,2011).In addi-tion,empathetic respons to one’s suffering also em to be clearly skewed to ingroup members,whereas suffering of out-group members more likely elicits gloating or schadenfreude (Cikara,Bruneau,&Saxe,2011),which probably reflects an emotional patter
n that was ecological important enough in ancestral environments to be lected.Interestingly,hypnotiz-ability has been found to be associated with emotional contagion and empathy (Cardeña et al.,2009;Wickramakera &Szlyk,2003).In addition,it has been reported that oxytocin has the potential to improve the rapport between a hypnotist and low hypnotizable individuals,most likely via enhanced empathetic responsivity (Bryant et al.,2012).A plausible,but tentative interpretation of the prent results could therefore be that the tolerance for unfair offers in the UG incread un-der hypnosis,becau more empathetic individuals were included bad on our pre-lection procedure for hypnotizability.Moreover,this could also explain why participants,when receiving an ingroup or outgroup suggestion,accepted significantly more unfair offers of ingroup as oppod to outgroup members,becau empathy for ingroup members may be paralleled by its negative counterpart for outgroup members,and hence,reduce one’s willingness to accept unfair offers.
Despite the differences in behavior towards ingroup or outgroup members,all participants accepted fair offers more often than unfair offers,and the acceptance of unfair offers declined with increasing unfairness across conditions,irrespec-tive of consciousness state and suggestion type.This indicates that the perception of unfairness was not impaired per dur-ing hypnosis,and th
at tolerance of unfairness is limited,even among ingroup members.Our findings are also interesting in light of recent neuroimaging studies.For example,Volz,Kessler,and von Cramon (2009)revealed that individuals showed incread activation in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the posterior ACC (as well as the temporo-parietal junction and precuneus)when offered the opportunity to favor ingroup over outgroup members.They ud a paradigm referred to as ‘‘minimal group paradigm’’originally designed to examine the effects of social categorization (i.e.ingroup or outgroup)on behavior (Tajfel,Billig,Bundy,&Flament,1971),which was similar to the content of our hypnotic suggestion.Accord-ingly,our experiment may indicate that ingroup versus outgroup suggestion exerts differential effects on the activation of this neural network.An alternative but equally plausible explanation could be that the hypnotic suggestion ud in our experiment differentially impacted on other brain regions,particularly tho involved in fairness perception such as the anterior insula (Craig,2009).
Looking from a bird’s eye view,the experiment furthermore sheds light on the question as to what extent individuals’economic or moral decision-making can be subjected to psychological manipulation.Several decades ago,Milgram (1963)demonstrated in an experiment on manipulating decision-making under authoritative pressure that two thirds of the test subjects obeyed to an authori
ty (like a medical doctor)when instructed to perform unethical acts.For example,individuals were willing to deliver potentially lethal electroshocks of up to 450-V to punish others who emingly disobeyed to orders,although many expresd discomfort when performing the punishment.This experiment therefore demonstrated that
game acceptance rate in wakeful and hypnotic states according to ingroup–outgroup
