Highlights of Key Speeches at the International Conference “Asssing the International Nuclear Agenda”
Steven E. Miller, Francesca Giovannini, Martin Malin, Man-Sung Yim and Tatsujiro Suzuki Editor’s Note:2018研究生国家线
The international conference “Asssing the International Nuclear Agenda”, which was sponsored by the University of International Relations and co-organized by the Journal of International Security Studies and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University was held on June 16-17, 2017, Beijing. Some top scholars in nuclear studies attended the conference and made a splendid array of speeches. The following articles are bad on their shorthand manuscripts of speeches and have been reviewed by themlves. International Security Studies wants to thank the scholars who are willing to share their insightful views with our readers.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Broad Challenges and Possible Respons
Steven E. Miller
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Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
From the early years of the nuclear age, there has been concern that nuclear weapons could spread to additional countries and create undesirable dangers and instabilities. The potential for nuclear proliferation – or what was known initially as the N+1 problem – was widely regarded, as one early article on the subject explained, “as the principal menace lending a n of urgency to our negotiations on arms control and as
a trend to be fought.”1 Fears that nuclear weapons might spread produced sustained and阿凡达英文名
吉林市新东方1 Albert Wohlstetter, “Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country,” Foreign Affairs, April 1961.
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Highlights of Key Speeches at the International Conference “Asssing the International Nuclear Agenda”87 fruitful efforts across decades to build a nonproliferation system that would prevent or inhibit acquisition of weapons by additional states. The legal foundation of that system is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered force in 1970. In the NPT, states that do not posss nuclear weapons accept a legally binding obligation not to get them and agree to allow inspection of their civilian nuclear facilities to provide assurance that tho facilities are not being ud for weapon
s purpos.2 The NPT now has 190 member states, and thus encompass virtually every state in the international system (only India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan are outside the NPT). The institutional foundation of the nonproliferation system is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has responsibility for the monitoring of civilian nuclear technologies to confirm their purely peaceful purpos – inspection arrangements known as the safeguards system. On the foundation provided by the NPT and the IAEA, an extensive web of other commitments, institutions, and practices has been built to reinforce the nonproliferation cau: international groupings such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which aims to regulate the spread of nsitive nuclear technology; UN resolutions and conventions, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials; bilateral arrangements, notably nuclear cooperation agreements between suppliers and recipients of nuclear technology; and unilateral policies, such as export controls intended to limit the international sale of worrying nuclear technologies.
A substantial nonproliferation system thus exists, it creates meaningful constraints on the spread of weapons-related technology, and many would give it at least some credit for contributing to an international environment in which very few states have acquired nuclear weapons. But rious concerns remain about the health, adequacy, and effectiveness of this regime. Indeed, pessimists thi
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nk the NPT system is in “mortal peril,” jeopardized by political friction, rifts between nuclear haves and have-nots, broken commitments and failures to successfully address nonproliferation problems.3 What are key challenges to the NPT regime? What are its limitations? How might it be strengthened? The discussion that follows sketches brief answers to the questions.sites google com
1 Three Nonproliferation Challenges
There are three broad nonproliferation challenges. The fi rst and most obvious challenge is dealing with acute nonproliferation challenges or cris. The are typically very few in number, very long lasting and very diffi cult to deal with. We have two examples on the current international agenda, Iran and North Korea. Both of them stretch over at least two decades and both of them reveal that the instruments and the political 2 The NPT famously rests on three pillars: nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful us of nuclear energy. I am focusing
here in the nonproliferation pillar.
3 On “moral peril”, e Paul Meyer, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Fin de Regime?” Arms Control Today, April 2017.
88Steven E. Miller et al.
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options for dealing with the kinds of cris are both limited and imperfect. In neither of the cas have we come to a resolution that is entirely satisfactory (although the results have been better with Iran than with North Korea). Across a wide sweep of time, the preci character and identity of the nonproliferation cris evolve and vary. But usually there are at least one or two of the on the international agenda in a given time, and they tend to preoccupy us in a very dominating way. Who is next? Is it Saudi Arabia? Is it Turkey? Is it some another country? In the next decade or two, we will fi nd out the answer to that question. But there is nothing in the experience of the past two decades to suggest that the international community is well positioned to deal quickly or effectively with future nonproliferation cris.
Secondly, much more broadly, there is the challenge of managing the spread of nuclear technology while minimizing the risk that civilian programs will facilitate the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As the nonproliferation regime has evolved, it has come to focus very much on limiting tho technologies, known as fuel cycle capabilities, that allow a state to manufacture the special nuclear material required for a bomb. There are two main technologies of concern. The fi rst is uranium enrichment facilities, which can produce either low-enriched uranium (LEU) for u as a reactor fuel or highly enriched uranium (HEU) which can be ud to make nuclear weapons. The cond area of
concern is reprocessing, a technology that allows plutonium to be extracted from the spent fuel produced by the operation of power reactors; as with enriched uranium, plutonium has civilian applications as reactor fuel but can also be ud for weapons. With respect to managing the kinds of dual-u fuel cycle capabilities, there has been one large innovation in recent years: in 2009, the United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) reached a nuclear cooperation deal in which the UAE uniquely agreed in a formal diplomatic document not to pursue either enrichment or reprocessing.4 From a nonproliferation perspective, the US-UAE agreement reprented a “gold standard” in the n that it prevented the spread of nuclear technologies that could lead to additional nuclear-armed states. However, no other state has been prepared to join the UAE in making the gold standard commitment to refrain from the acquisition of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities.
The third big challenge, which is fundamental and permanent, is working to ensure the adequacy of the nonproliferation treaty regime. As noted, this regime is complex and many-faceted, but rests heavily upon a legal instrument – the NPT – and an international organization – the IAEA, which includes among its responsibilities the inspection of nuclear facilities. This NPT-IAEA system has as one of its purpos protecting against the u of civilian nuclear technology for military purpos. Th
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ere are, however, a very wide array of civilian applications, electric power first and foremost, but also in medicine, agriculture and industry. Becau there are a lot of us of nuclear science and technology in the modern world, nuclear facilities, activities, 4 For a uful overview, e Aaron Stein, “US-UAE Nuclear Cooperation,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 13, 2009.
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