commonn

alism

Introduction

TheFirstCognitiveRevolution,developingasanaspectofthebroaderScientific

Revolution,yesofmanyofits

participants,thepivotalissuewaswhetherornotallknowledgeisacquiredfromthe

hecurrenttendencyincultural

studiesisresolutelyempiricistbythisadmittedlyrestrictivedefinition,andcritical

practicecharacterizedbythecontinuedtracingofhumancapacitiesandqualitiesto

culturalcaus,theearlyBritishEmpiricistsprovideaparticularlyappropriatestarting

pointforsituatingCognitiveCultureTheory,withitsrationalistclaimsaboutthe

relevanceofhumanuniversalsintheunderstandingofculturalforms.

Innateideas

Earlyoninthefirstcognitiverevolution,thedebatebetweenrationalistsand

empiricistswasphradsimplyintermsofwhetherornotknowledgewasacquired

ationalistside,lordHerbertarguedinDeVeritate(1645)that

certainmoralpropositionsareinnate;ontheempiricistside,Lockemaintainedthe

mindisablankslateatbirth(eLocke'sargumentsagainstinnateideas).Locke's

positionthattheunderstandingisatofpropositionsprenttoconsciousness,

however,missthecentralpoint:whatisinnateisfaculties,notconscious

propositionalknowledge.

Innatefaculties

ThecommonnassumptionofcognitivetransparancyisnotchallengeduntilHume,

whointrospectiveexperimentsledhimtopositcognitivefacultieswith

derminedthenotion

thattheunderstandingisaproduct,consistinginpropositions;rather,itisaprocess,

wherethepowerofmakinginferences(Hume’scelebratedProblemofInduction)

requiresanexplanation.

ItisthearchforthixplanationthatleadsKanttoaformulationoftranscendental

categories,whichreprentsapartialresolutiontotherationalist/empiricistdichotomy.

AccordingtoKant,empiricisminabledbyfacultiesthatcannotthemlvesbe

derivedfromexperience.

NotuntilgenetictheoryiswellestablishedisKant'ssolutionentobecompatible

withDarwin'stheoryofevolution,(1977)

pointsoutthatwhatKantcouldonlyplaceinatranscendentalrealm,inthetradition

ofrationalism,renz,however,genesdo

notdirectlycontrolbehavior;foradiscussionofthiarlymisunderstanding,eThe

ationbetweeninnatestructuresandtheenvironment

remainsahighlycomplexissuethatshownosignsofgoingaway.

Erasingtheboundaries

Topotheempiricistquestionagain,wemightputitthisway:Whatistheevidence

thatcognitiveprocessingisnotwhollydependentoninformationacquiredfromthe

ns?Ifitisnotfromthens,whereisitfrom?

Theproposalofevolutionarypsychologyisthatnosharplinecanbedrawnbetween

informationthatoriginatesintheenvironment--includingthatacquiredfromthe

vesusavery

differentoverallpictureofcognitivedevelopment.

Inthegeneticmodel,ormation

inthegenescannotexpressitlfinbodilystructuresunlesstheyareinacomplexly

specifiedsuitableenvironment--somuchsothat99%oftheinformationforbuilding

anorganismmaybethoughtofaslocatedintheenvironmentandonly1%inthe

genesthemlves(theproportionisnotstrictlyquantifiable).Theenvironmentactsas

atriggerforlectivegenetranscription,whichinturnhasaneffectuponthe

nformationinthegeneexpressitlfinresponto

thestructureoftheenvironment,andtheenvironmentinturnrespondstotheactionof

thegenes,ifmatteritlfcontains

mostoftheinformationforlife;itjustneedsalittleextrahint.

Intermsofcognitivedevelopment,thismeansthatgeneticandenvironmental

the

environmentalinformationthatactivatescertaingenesmaycomethroughthens;

forinstance,catsareunabletoperceiveverticallinesiftheyarenotexpodtothem

beforeacertainage,andchildrenwhohavenotheardalanguagebeforetheageoften

mplexscenarioswith

intermediatecontrolstructuresarealsopossible,asanalternativetoacontinuedrole

forthegenes.

Whiletherationalistargumentagreeswiththegeneticmodelinthatbothaffirmthat

cognitionisdependentonstructuresthatdonotderivefromexperience,thegenetic

modelhashistoricizedrationalism,playingthepartofempiricisminunderminingits

,thedistinctionbetweenempiricismand

rationalismhasbecomelargelymeaningless,liketwoaspectsofthesamecointhat

havefudintoasphere.