thatpower

SOFTPOWER

,Jr.

TheColdWarisoverandAmericansaretry-

ingtounderstandtheirplaceinaworldwith-

eportthat

nearlyhalfthepublicbelievesthecountryisin

decline,andthatthowhobelieveindecline

tendtofavorprotectionismandtocounl

withdrawalfromwhattheyconsider"overex-

tendedinternationalcommitments."

Inaworldofgrowinginterdependence,such

adviceiscounterproductiveandcouldbringon

thedeclineitissuppodtoavert;forifthe

mostpowerfulcountryfailstolead,thecon-

quencesforinternationalstabilitycouldbedi-

houthistory,anxietyabout

declineandshiftingbalancesofpowerhasbeen

accompaniedbytensionandmiscalculation.

NowthatSovietpowerisdecliningandJapa-

nepowerrising,misleadingtheoriesof

Americandeclineandinappropriateanalogies

betweentheUnitedStatesandGreatBritainin

thelatenineteenthcenturyhavedivertedour

attentionawayfromtherealissue--howpower

ischanginginworldpolitics.

TheUnitedStatesiscertainlylesspowerful

attheendofthetwentiethcenturythanitwas

nrvativeestimatesshowthat

fglobalproducthasdeclined

frommorethanathirdofthetotalafterWorld

WarlItoalittlemorethanafifthinthe1980s.

Thatchange,however,reflectstheartificial

effectofWorldWarII:Unliketheothergreat

powers,theUnitedStateswasstrengthenedby

tartificialpreponderancewas

boundtoerodeasothercountriesregained

ortantfactis

y'sshareoftheglobal

producthasbeenrelativelyconstantforthe

ncilonCom-

fworld

,JR.,isdirectoroftheCenterforInterna-

ticledraws

fromhis1990book,BoundtoLead:TheChanging

NatureofAmericanPower(NewYork:BasicBooks).

153.

FOREIGNPOLICY

producthasaveraged23percenteachyear

,usingnumbers

thatreflectthepurchasingpowerofdifferent

currencies,reportsthattheAmericanshareof

worldproductincreadslightlyfrom25per

centin1975to26percentin1988.

Thestudiessuggestthattheeffectof

WorldWarIIlastedaboutaquartercentury

andthatmostofthedeclineworkeditsway

,

thebigadjustmentofAmericancommitments

occurredwiththenPresidentRichardNixon's

withdrawalfromVietnamandtheendofthe

convertibilityofthedollarintogold.

Thedictionarytellsusthatpowermeansan

abilitytodothingsandcontrolothers,toget

otherstodowhattheyotherwiwouldnot.

Becautheabilitytocontrolothersisoften

associatedwiththeposssionofcertainre-

sources,politiciansanddiplomatscommonly

definepowerastheposssionofpopulation,

territory,naturalresources,economicsize,

militaryforces,-

ample,intheagrarianeconomiesofeight-

eenth-centurvEurope,populationwasacriti-

calpowerresourcesinceitprovidedabafi~r

taxesandrecruitmentofinfantry.

Traditionallythetestofagreatpowerwas

,however,thedefi-

nitionofpowerislosingitmphasisonmili-

taryforceandconquestthatmarkedearlier

torsoftechnology,education,and

economicgrowtharebecomingmoresignifi-

cantininternationalpower,whilegeography,

population,andrawmaterialsarebecoming

somewhatlessimportant.

Ifso,areweenteringa"Japaneperiod"in

worldpolitics?Japanhascertainlydonefar

betterwithitsstrategyasatradingstatesince

1945thanitdidwithitsmilitarystrategyto

createaGreaterEastAsianCo-Prosperity

therhand,

Japan'scurityinrelationtoitslargemilitary

neighbors,ChinaandtheSovietUnion,and

thesafetyofitsaroutesdependheavilyon

heymaydiminish,

theproblemswillnotvanishwiththeendof

uldnotleaptooquickly

totheconclusionthatalltrendsfavoreconomic

powerorcountrieslikeJapan.

154.

,~e

Whatcanwesayaboutchangesinthedistri-

butionofpowerresourcesinthecomingde-

cades?Politicalleadersoftenutheterm

"multipolarity"toimplythereturntoabalance

amonganumberofstateswithroughlyequal

powerresourcesanalogoustothatofthenine-

sisnotlikelytobethe

situationattheturnofthecentury,forinterms

ofpowerresources,allthepotentialchallengers

excepttheUnitedStatesaredeficientinsome

ietUnionlagconomically,

Chinaremainsaless-developedcountry,Eu-

ropelackspoliticalunity,andJapanisdeficient

bothinmilitarypowerandinglobalideological

omicreformsreverSovietde-

cline,ifJapandevelopsafull-fledgednuclear

andconventionalmilitarycapability,orifEu-

ropebecomesdramaticallymoreunified,there

maybeareturntoclassicalmultipolarityinthe

ringsuch

changes,theUnitedStatesislikelytoretaina

broaderrangeofpowerresources--military,

economic,scientific,cultural,andideological

--thanothercountries,andtheSovietUnion

mayloitssuperpowerstatus.

TheGreatPowerShift

Thecomingcenturymayecontinued

Americanpreeminence,butthesourcesof

powerinworldpoliticsarelikelytoundergo

majorchangesthatwillcreatenewdifficulties

ofpowerliesnotinresourcesbutintheability

,the

criticalquestionfortheUnitedStatesisnot

whetheritwillstartthenextcenturyasthe

superpowerwiththelargestsupplyofre-

sources,buttowhatextentitwillbeableto

controlthepoliticalenvironmentandgetother

endsin

worldpoliticssuggestthatitwillbemorediffi-

cultinthefutureforanygreatpowertocontrol

blemforthe

UnitedStateswillbelesstherisingchallenge

ofanothermajorpowerthanageneraldiffu-

snineteenth-century

Britainfacednewchallengers,thetwenty-first

centuryUnitedStateswillfacenewchallenges.

Asworldpoliticsbecomesmorecomplex,

thepowerofallmajorstatestogaintheirobjec-

155.

FOREIGNPOLICY

rstandwhat

ishappeningtotheUnitedStatestoday,the

distinctionbetweenpoweroverothercountries

-

thoughtheUnitedStatesstillhasleverageover

particularcountries,ithasfarlessleverageover

thesystemasawhole•Itislesswell-placedto

attainitndsunilaterally,butitisnotalonein

thissituation•Allmajorstateswillhaveto

confrontthechangingnatureofpowerinworld

politics.

Suchchanges,ofcour,arenotentirely

mple,therapidgrowthofprivate

actorsoperatingacrossinternationalborders,

whetherlargecorporationsorpoliticalgroups,

HenryKissinger,withhisdeeplyrootedbelief

inclassicalbalance-of-powerpolitics,conceded

ina1975speechthat"weareenteringanew

ernationalpatternsarecrumbling.

•..Theworldhasbecomeinterdependentin

economics,incommunications,inhumanaspi-

rations."

Bythelate1970s,however,theAmerican

'sizureofthe

yinTehranandtheSovietinva-

sionofAfghanistanemedtoreaffirmtherole

ofmilitaryforceandtheprimacyofthetradi-

Reagan'spresi-

dencyaccentuatedthetrendsintheearly

ebudgetincreadin

realtermsforfivestraightyears,armscontrol

wasdowngraded,andpublicoppositiontonu-

tional

militaryforcewasudsuccessfully,albeit

againsttheextremelyweakstatesofGrenada

ftingagendaofworldpoli-

ticsdiscreditedthe1970s'concernwithinter-

dependenceandrestoredthetraditionalem-

erdependence

continuedtogrow,andtheworldofthe1980s

wasnotthesameasthatofthe1950s.

Theappropriaterespontothechangesoc-

curringinworldpoliticstodayisnottoaban-

donthetraditionalconcernforthemilitary

balanceofpower,buttoacceptitslimitations

andtosupplementitwithinsightsaboutinter-

raditionalview,statesare

theonlysignificantactorsinworldpoliticsand

onlyafewlargestatesreallymatter•Buttoday

156.

•y•

otheractorsarebecomingincreasinglyimpor-

ghtheylackmilitarypower,trans-

nationalcorporationshaveenormouconomic

corporationstodayeachhave

annualsalesgreaterthanthegrossnational

products(GNPs)1980s,

theannualprofitsofIBMandRoyalDutch/

ShellGroupwereeachlargerthanthecentral

governmentbudgetsofColombia,Kenya,or

ationalcorporationsare

sometimesmorerelevanttoachievingacoun-

try'ual

overasproductionbysuchcorporationx-

regionalcontext,aportraitoftheMiddleEast

conflictthatdidnotincludethesuperpowers

wouldbewoefullyinadequate,butsowoulda

descriptionthatdidnottelloftransnational

religiousgroups,oilcompanies,andterrorist

ueisnotwhetherstateor

nonstateactorsaremoreimportant--states

ntisthatinmoderntimes,

morecomplexcoalitionsaffectoutcomes.

Withchangingactorsinworldpoliticscome

raditionalview,states

giveprioritytomilitarycuritytoensuretheir

,however,statesmustconsider

alcurity

hasbecomemorecomplicatedasthreatsshift

fromthemilitary(thatis,threatsagainstterri-

torialintegrity)totheeconomicandecological.

Forexample,Canadianstodayarenotafraid

rswillburnTorontoforac-

ondtime(asin1813);rathertheyfearthat

Torontowillbeprogrammedintoabackwater

msofvulnerabil-

ityhaveincread,andtrade-offsamongpoli-

ciesaredesignedtodealwithdifferentvuinera-

tedStates,forinstance,might

enhanceitnergycuritybyndingnaval

forcestothePersianGulf;butitcouldaccom-

plishthesamegoalbyenlargingitsstrategic

petroleumrerve,byimposingagasolinetax

toencourageconrvationathome,andby

improvingcooperationininstitutionslikethe

InternationalEnergyAgency.

Whilemilitaryforceremainstheultimate

formofpowerinalf-helpsystem,theuof

forcehasbecomemorecostlyformoderngreat

157.

FOREIGNPOLICY

instrumentssuchascommunications,organi-

zationalandinstitutionalskills,andmanipula-

tionofinterdependencehavebecomeimpor-

rytosomerhetoricalflourishes,

interdependencedoesnotmeanharmony.

Rather,itoftenmeansunevenlybalancedmu-

thelesnamoredof

twoloversmaymanipulatetheother,theless

vulnerableoftwostatesmayusubtlethreats

-

ther,interdependenceisoftenbalanceddiffer-

entlyindifferentspheressuchascurity,

trade,,creatingandresist-

inglinkagesbetweenissueswhenastateis

eitherlessormorevulnerablethananother

cal

leadersuinternationalinstitutionstodis-

courageorpromotesuchlinkages;theyshop

fortheforumthatdefinesthescopeofanissue

inthemannerbestsuitingtheirinterests.

Astheinstrumentsofpowerchange,sodo

ionalistsconsiderthegoalof

curityandtheinstrumentofmilitaryforceto

belinkedbyastrategyofbalancingpower.

Stateswishingtoprervetheirindependence

frommilitaryintimidationfollowabalancing

strategytolimittherelativepowerofother

,however,economicandecologi-

calissuesinvolvelargeelementsofmutualad-

vantagethatcanbeachievedonlythroughco-

ssuesareoftencriticaltothe

hpresi-

denttodaywouldnotinterferewithGermany's

increadeconomicgrowthbecauGerman

growthiscriticaltoFrencheconomicgrowth.

TheFrenchdecisiontoforegoanindependent

economicpolicyandremainintheEuropean

monetarysystemintheearly1980sisoneex-

ampleofsuchinterdependence.

Traditionalistaccountsofworldpolitics

oftenspeakofaninternationalsystemthatre-

suitsfromthebalancingstrategiesofstates.

Althoughbipolarityandmultipolarityareu-

fulterms,todaydifferentspheresofworld

politicshavedifferentdistributionsofpower--

thatis,ry

power,particularlynuclear,remainslargely

rade,where

theEuropeanCommunityactsasaunit,power

esources,money,space,

158.

Ny•

shipping,andairlineachhavesomewhatdif-

erof

statesvariesaswell,asdoesthesignificanceof

m-

ple,thepoliticsofinternationaldebtcannotbe

understoodwithoutconsideringthepowerof

privatebanks.

Ifmilitarypowercouldbetransferredfreely

intotherealmsofeconomicsandtheenviron-

ment,thedifferentstructureswouldnotmat-

ter;andtheoverallhierarchydeterminedby

militarystrengthwouldaccuratelypredictout-

itarypoweris

morecostlyandlesstransferabletodaythanin

,thehierarchiesthatcharac-

gamesofworldpoliticncompassdifferent

playersatdifferenttableswithdifferentpiles

ntransferwinningsamong

tables,butoftenonlyataconsiderabledis-

itarygameandtheoverall

structureofthebalanceofpowerdominate

whenthesurvivalofstatesisclearlyatstake,

butinmuchofmodernworldpolitics,physical

survivalisnotthemostpressingissue.

ConvertingPower

Thefragmentationofworldpoliticsinto

manydifferentsphereshasmadepowerre-

sourceslessfungible,thatis,lesstransferable

sfungible,in

thatitcanbeeasilyconvertedfromonecur-

asalwaysbeenless

fungiblethanmoney,butitivenlessso

ighteenth

century,amonarchwithafulltreasurycould

purchainfantrytoconquernewprovinces,

which,inturn,

wasntiallythestrategyofFrederickIIof

Prussia,forexample,whenin1740heized

Austria'sprovinceofSilesia.

Today,however,thedirectuofforcefor

economicgainisgenerallytoocostlyanddan-

ortof

aggression,thetranslationofeconomicinto

militarypowerresourcesmaybeverycostly.

Forinstance,thereisnoeconomicobstacleto

Japan'sdevelopingamajornuclearorconven-

tionalforce,butthepoliticalcostbothathome

andinthereactionofothercountrieswouldbe

159.

FOREIGNPOLICY

rizationmightthenreduce

ratherthanincreaJapan'sabilitytoachieve

itnds.

Becaupowerisarelationship,bydefini-

shedfun-

gibilitymeansthatspecifyingthecontextis

increasinglyimportantinestimatingtheactual

powerthatcanbederivedfrompowerre-

anever,onemustaskthe

question,"Powerforwhat?"Yetatthesame

time,becauworldpoliticshasonlypartly

changedandthetraditionalgeopoliticalagenda

isstillrelevant,somefungibilityofmilitary

tectiveroleofmilitary

forceisarelevantastinbargainingamong

states,Thedependenceofconrvativeoil-pro-

ducingstatesontheUnitedStatesfortheir

curity,forexample,limitedtheirleverageon

theUnitedStatesduringthe1973oilcrisis.

TheUnitedStatesisstilltheultimateguaran-

torofthemilitarycurityofEuropeand

Japan,andthatroleisasourceofbargaining

ral,

theallies'needforprotectionstrengthens

Americaninfluence,andmaycontinuetodoso

the

ColdWar,theUnitedStatesoftenworried

aboutthefrailtyofitsalliesandtendedto

sacrificesomeeconomicinterestsinitffortto

e

thewaningofthatthreat,iftheUnitedStates

worrieslessthanitsalliesdo,itmaybeableto

demandmoreofthem.

Toevaluatepowerinapost-ColdWar

world,itisnecessarytorecognizeinstruments

andbalance-of-powerstrategiesnecessaryfora

elementsinthe

modernworldarediffusingpowerawayfrom

,anysuccessful

strategymustincorporatebothcontinuityand

change.

Thegreatpowersoftodayarelessabletou

theirtraditionalpowerresourcestoachieve

issues,privateactorsandsmallstateshavebe-

tfivetrendshave

contributedtothisdiffusionofpower:eco-

nomicinterdependence,transnationalactors,

nationalisminweakstates,thespreadoftech-

nology,andchangingpoliticalissues.

160.

,~ye

Newformsofcommunicationsandtrans-

portationhavehadarevolutionaryeffecton

ryago,it

tooktwoweekstocrosstheAtlantic;in1927,

CharlesLindberghdiditin33hours;today,

theConcordefliesacrossinthreeandahalf

telecommunicationsareinstan-

taneous,andsatellitesandfiber-opticcables

haveledtoatenfoldincreainoverastele-

lining

costsoftransportationandcommunication

haverevolutionizedglobalmarketsandacceler-

atedthedevelopmentoftransnationalcorpora-

tionsthattransfereconomicactivityacross

radehasgrownmorerapidly

thanworldproduct,becomingmoreimportant

asmorethan

yoverthe

sinfinancialmarkets

ationalmone-

taryflowsaresome25timestheworld'saver-

idexpansion

ofEurocurrencyandEurobondmarkets(that

is,currenciesheldoutsidetheirhomecountry)

harodedtheabilityofnationalauthoritiesto

1975,foreign

exchangemarketshandledsome$10-15billion

daily;by1986,theyhandled$200billion.

Governmentscaninterveneinsuchmarkets;

butiftheydosowithaheavyhand,theywill

incurenormouscostsintheirowneconomic

-

stance,mentinthe

1960stoslowtheexportofcapitalbyU.S.-

badmultinationalfirmncouragedtho

firmstokeepandborrowdollarsoutsidethe

ultwastherapidbur-

geoningofEurocurrencymarketsoutsideU.S.

controls,

Inadditiontoconstrainingthewaystates

pursuetheirnationalinterests,transnational

actorsaffectthewaysuchinterestsareinitially

ationalinvestmentcreatesnew

interestsandcomplicatescoalitionsinworld

mple,HondaofAmericais

planstoexport50,000carsannuallytoJapanin

anofficialsarenow

pressingEuropeanstoopentheirmarketto

JapaneautomobilesproducedintheUnited

161.

FOREIGNPOLICY

rwords,transnationalinvest-

mcntshavechangedanAmericaninterest.

rs,

FrancerestrictedJapaneautomobilesto3per

centoftheFrenchmarketandrestrictedin-

vestmentbyJapanecompaniesinFrance.

WhenJapaneautomakersbegantoestablish

plantsinotherEuropeancountriesthatcould

exporttoFrance,theFrenchgovernment

ationalinvest-

mentschangedalong-standingFrenchpolicy.

Thediffusionofpowertoprivatetransnational

actorsandtheresultingcomplicationofna-

tionalinterestsislikelytocontinueeven

thoughitisnotrecognizedinmanycompari-

sonsofthepowerresourcesofmajorstates.

Morethanever,onemustaskthe

question,"Powerforwhat?"

Modernization,urbanization,andincread

communicationindevelopingcountrieshave

alsodiffudpowerfromgovernmenttopri-

rypowerismoredifficultto

applytodaythaninthepastbecauasocial

awakeninghasstirrednationalisminotherwi

creadsocialmo-

bilizationmakesmilitaryinterventionandex-

eteenth-cen-

turygreatpowerscarvedoutandruledcolonial

1953,the

UnitedStateswasabletorestoretheShahof

lrantohisthronethroughaminorcovertac-

rdtoimagine,however,howmany

troopswouldhavebeenneededtorestorethe

Shahinthesociallymobilizedandnationalistic

|tedStatesandtheSoviet

Unionfoundthecostsofmaintainingtroopsin

eachca,thecauwaslessanincreainthe

powerofaweakerstatethanthecostlinessfor

outsidersofrulingactivelyantagonisticpopu-

lations.

Anothertrendinthediffusionofpoweris

thespreadofmoderntechnology,whichhas

enhancedthecapabilitiesofbackwardstates.

Whilethesuperpowershavekeptalargeleadin

militarytechnology,theforcesthatmany

162.

N•e

ThirdWorldstatescandeployinthe1990s

makeregionalinterventionmorecostlythanin

tion,atleastadozenThird

Worldstateshavedevelopedsignificantarms-

ile,manyarmsre-

cipientshavesoughttodiversifytheirpur-

chasinordertogainleverageoverthemajor

msaresuppliedfrom

outside,thesupplieroftenhasleveragethrough

technicalassistance,spareparts,andreplace-

wthofindigenousarmsindus-

triesremovesthatleverage.

Inaddition,morecountriesareacquiring

about20countrieshavethecapabilitytomake

chemicalweapons,andbytheyear2000an

estimated15ThirdWorldcountrieswillbe

stateshadthebombwhentheNuclearNon-

ProliferationTreatywassignedin1968;India,

Israel,Pakistan,andSouthAfricahavesince

the

nextdecadeArgentina,Brazil,andveral

othersmightalsodevelopmilitarynuclearca-

r,asmallnuclearcapability

willnotmakethestatescontendersforglobal

power;infact,itmayincreatherisksthey

faceiftheirneighborsfollowsuitorifthe

weaponsfallintothehandsofrebelorterrorist

therhand,nuclearcapability

wouldaddtothestates'regionalpowerand

increathepotentialcostsofregionalinter-

logyalsoin-

-

stance,handheldantiaircraftmissileshelped

guerrillasinAfghanistanandnewplasticex-

plosivesareeffectivetoolsforterrorists.

Theabilityofgreatpowerswithimpressive

traditionalpowerresourcestocontroltheiren-

vironmentsisalsodiminishedbythechanging

singly,

theissuestodaydonotpitonestateagainst

another;instead,theyareissuesinwhichall

statestrytocontrolnonstatetransnational

utionstomanycurrentissuesof

transnationalinterdependencewillrequirecol-

lectiveactionandinternationalcooperation.

Theincludeecologicalchanges(acidrainand

globalwarming),healthepidemicssuchas

AIDS,illicittradeindrugs,

163.

FOREIGNPOLICY

issuesaretransnationalbecautheyhavedo-

mesticrootsandcrossinternationalborders.

AsthenuclearaccidentatChernobylinthe

USSRdemonstrated,evenadomesticissuelike

thesafetyofnuclearreactorscansuddenly

becometransnational.

Althoughforcemaysometimesplayarole,

traditionalinstrumentsofpowerarerarelysuf-

ficienttodealwiththenewdilemmasofworld

erresources,suchasthe

capacityforeffectivecommunicationandfor

developingandusingmultilateralinstitutions,

er,coopera-

tionwilloftenbeneededfromsmall,weak

statesthatarenotfullycapableofmanaging

theirowndomesticdrug,health,orecological

mple,theUnitedStatescan-

notuitstraditionalpowerresourcestoforce

Perutocurtailtheproductionofcocaineifa

weakPeruviangovernmentcannotcontrolpri-

heU.S.

governmentcannotcontroltheAmericande-

mand,atransnationalmarketforcocainewill

ghthetraditionalpowerre-

sourcesofeconomicassistanceandmilitary

forcecanassistincopingwithterrorism,prolif-

eration,ordrugs,theabilityofanygreat

powertocontrolitnvironmentandto

achievewhatitwantsisoftennotasgreatas

traditionalhardpowerindicatorswouldsug-

gest.

Thechangingnatureofinternationalpolitics

hasalsomadeintangibleformsofpowermore

alcohesion,universalistic

culture,andinternationalinstitutionsaretak-

spassing

fromthe"capital-rich"tothe"information-

rich."

Informationisbecomingmoreandmore

plentiful,buttheflexibilitytoactfirstonnew

ationbecomes

power,

capacityfortimelyrespontonewinforma-

eri

ofaninformation-badeconomy,rawmate-

rialshavebecomelessimportantandorganiza-

tionalskillsandflexibilitymoreimportant.

Productcyclesareshorteningandtechnology

ismovingtowardhighlyflexibleproduction

systems,inwhichthecraft-eratraditionof

164.

Nye

custom-tailoringproductscanbeincorporated

as

beenparticularlyadeptatsuchflexiblemanu-

facturingprocess;theUnitedStatesandEu-

ropeneedtodomore,andtheSovietUnion

andChinalagriouslybehind.

Timelyrespontoinformationisnotonly

importantinmanufacturingbutalsoincritical

rvicessuchasfinance,insurance,andtrans-

ast,marketsweredefinedby

thelimitsoftransportationandcommunication

,however,

thenewmeansofcommunicationconveyim-

mediateinformationonmarkettrendsto

itesand

fiber-opticcablesinstantaneouslyandcontin-

uouslylinkpeoplewatchinglittlegreenscreens

inI~ndon,NewYork,ina

andtheSovietUniondonotsignificantlypar-

ticipateinthetransnationalcreditmarkets

riouslylimitstheiraccesstointangible

1980s,othergovern-

mentssuchasBritainandJapanhadtofollow

theUnitedStatesinthederegulationofmoney

marketsandfinancialoperationsinorderto

prervetheirpositionsintheimportant

markets.

Intangiblechangesinknowledgealsoaffect

ionally,governments

majorpowersliketheUnitedStatesandthe

SovietUnionemploycontinuousphotographic

andelectronicsurveillancefromspace,provid-

ingquickaccesstoavarietyofeconomic,polit-

ical,oun-

tries,suchasFrance,arebeginningtomake

low-resolutionsatelliteinformationcommer-

ciallyavailable,buttheUnitedStatesleadsin

high-resolutioninformation.

Anotherintangibleaspectofpoweraris

rtdistribution

ofeconomicresourcespoorlydescribesthebal-

anceofpowerbetweeninterdependentstates.

Ontheonehand,theinfluenceoftheostensi-

blystrongerstatemaybelimitedbythegreater

organizationandconcentrationofitssmaller

fferencehelpstoaccount

forCanada'ssurprisingsuccessinbargaining

therhand,ira

relationshipisbeneficialtobothparties,the

165.

FOREIGNPOLICY

possibilitythattheweakersidemightcollap

underpressurelimitstheleverageoftheem-

"powerofthe

debtor"haslongbeenknown:Ifamanowesa

bank$10,000,thebankhaspoweroverhim.

Butifheowes$100million,hehaspowero~'er

coorsomeCaribbeanstates

becametooweaktodealwithinternalpoverty

ordomesticproblems,theUnitedStateswould

faceanewforeignpolicyagendainvolving

largerinfluxesofmigrants,drugs,orcontra-

rly,thefailureofdeveloping

countriestopreventdestructionoftheirforests

willaffecttheglobalclimate;yetthostates'

veryweaknesswilldiminishothercountries'

rentU.S.

neglectofweakThirdWorldcountriesmay

reduceitsabilitytoaffecttheirpoliciesonthe

tedStates

willhavetodevotemoreattentiontothepara-

doxicalpowerthatgrowsoutofpoliticaland

economicchaosandweaknessinpoorcoun-

tries.

TheChangingFaceofPower

Thetrendssuggestacond,moreattrac-

tivewayofexercisingpowerthantraditional

mayachievetheoutcomesit

prefersinworldpoliticsbecauotherstates

wanttofollowitorhaveagreedtoasituation

n,itis

justasimportanttottheagendaandstruc-

turethesituationsinworldpoliticsastoget

otherstochangeinparticularcas.

Thiscondaspectofpower--whichoccurs

whenonecountrygetsothercountriestowant

whatitwants--mightbecalledco-optiveor

softpowerincontrastwiththehardorcom-

mandpoweroforderingotherstodowhatit

wants.

Parentsofteenagershavelongknownthatif

theyhaveshapedtheirchild'sbeliefsandpref-

erences,theirpowerwillbegreaterandmore

enduringthaniftheyrelyonlyonactivecon-

rly,politicalleadersandphiloso-

phizershavelongunderstoodthepowerofat-

tractiveideasortheabilitytotthepolitical

agendaanddeterminetheframeworkofdebate

inawaythatshapesothers'

abilitytoaffectwhatothercountrieswant

166.

tendstobeassociatedwithintangiblepower

resourcessuchasculture,ideology,andinsti-

tutions.

Softco-optivepowerisjustasimportantas

tecanmakeits

poweremlegitimateintheeyesofothers,it

itscultureandideologyareattractive,others

nestablish

internationalnormsconsistentwithitssociety,

n

supportinstitutionsthatmakeotherstateswish

tochannelorlimittheiractivitiesinwaysthe

dominantstateprefers,itmaybesparedthe

costlyexerciofcoerciveorhardpower.

Ingeneral,powerisbecominglesstransfer-

able,lesscoercive,

trendsandchangesinpoliticalissuesarehaving

significanteffectsonthenatureofpowerand

-optivepower

---gettingotherstowantwhatyouwantmand

softpowerresources---culturalattraction,ide-

ology,andinternationalinstitutions--arenot

arlypostwarperiod,theSoviet

Unionprofitedgreatlyfromsuchsoftre-

sourcesascommunistideology,themythof

inevitability,andtransnationalcommunistin-

strendstodayaremaking

co-optivebehaviorandsoftPowerresources

relativelymoreimportant.

GiventhechangesinworldPolitics,theu

ofpowerisbecominglesscoercive,atleast

rentinstru-

mentsofpowerrangefromdiplomaticnotes

througheconomicthreatstomilitarycoercion.

Inearlierperiods,thecostsofsuchcoercion

asacceptableand

n

thiscentury,theUnitedStatesntmarines

andcustomsagentstocollectdebtsinsome

Caribbeancountries;butundercurrentcondi-

tions,thedirectuofAmericantroopsagainst

smallcountrieslikeNicaraguacarriesgreater

costs.

Manipulationofinterdependenceundercur-

ic

interdependenceusuallycarriesbenefitsin

bothdirections;andthreatstodisruptarela-

tionship,ifcarriedout,canbeveryexpensive.

Forexample,JapanmightwanttheUnited

167.

FOREIGNPOLICY

Statestoreduceitsbudgetdeficit,butthreat-

eningtorefutobuyAmericanTreasury

bondswouldbelikelytodisruptfinancialmar-

ketsandtoproduceenormouscostsforJapan

ethe

uofforcehasbecomemorecostly,less

threateningformsofpowerhavegrownin-

creasinglyattractive.

Co-optivepoweristheabilityofacountryto

structureasituationsothatothercountries

developpreferencesordefinetheirinterestsin

wer

tendstoarifromsuchresourcesascultural

andideologicalattractionaswellasrulesand

UnitedStateshasmoreco-optivepowerthan

utionsgoverningthein-

ternationaleconomy,suchastheInternational

MonetaryFundandtheGeneralAgreementon

TariffsandTrade,tendtoembodyliberal,

free-marketprinciplesthatcoincideinlarge

measurewithAmericansocietyandideology.

Multinationalcorporationsareanother

hauthor

SusanStrangearguedinher1988bookStates

ntheworldecon-

omyhasincreadasaresultoftransnational

production:

Washingtonmayhavelostsomeofitsau-

thorityo-vertheU.S.-badtransnationals,

-

ports,-urts,

andinwarornationalemergencywould

ile,theU.S.

governmenthasgainednewauthority..overa

greatmanyforeigncorporationsmstdethe

hemareacutely,aware

isthebiggestprize.

Thispowerarisinpartfromthefactthat

34percentofthelargestmultinationalcorpora-

tionsareheadquarteredintheUnitedStates

(comparedto18percentinJapan)andinpart

fromtheimportanceoftheAmericanmarketin

anyglobalcorporatestrategy.

Americancultureisanotherrelativelyinex-

-

viously,certainaspectsofAmericancultureare

unattractivetootherpeople,andthereis

alwaysdangerofbiasinevaluatingcultural

ricanpopularcul-

168.

Ny•

ture,embodiedinproductsandcommunica-

tions,apane

whohaveneverbeentotheUnitedStateswear

sportsjacketswiththenamesofAmericancol-

guantelevisionbroadcastAmeri-

canshowvenwhilethegovernmentfought

rly,Soviet

teenagerswearbluejeansandekAmerican

recordings,andChinestudentsudasym-

bolmodeledontheStatueofLibertyduring

etheChinegov-

ernment'erence,

Chinecitizenswereasinterestedaverin

Americandemocracyandculture.

Whereasnineteenth-centuryBrit.

ainfacednewchallengers,the

enturyUnitedStates

willfacenewchallenges.

Ofcour,thereisanelementoftriviality

andfadinpopularbehavior,butitisalsotrue

thatacountrythatstandsastridepopularchan-

nelsofcommunicationhasmoreopportunities

togetitsmessagesacrossandtoaffectthe

ingtopaststudies

bytheUnitedNationsEducational,Scientific,

andCulturalOrganization,theUnitedStates

hasbeenexportingaboutventimesasmany

televisionshowsasthenextlargestexporter

(Britain)andhashadtheonlyglobalnetwork

ghAmericanfilms

accountforonly6-7percentofallfilmsmade,

theyoccupyabout50percentofworldscreen-

1981,theUnitedStateswasresponsi-

blefor80percentofworldwidetransmission

ricanlan-

guagehasbecomethelinguafrancaoftheglobal

economy.

AlthoughJapaneconsumerproductsand

cuisinehaverecentlybecomemorefashion-

able,theyemlessassociatedwithanimplicit

appealtoabroadertofvaluesthanAmerican

successofJapan'smanufacturingctorpro-

videsitwithanimportantsourceofsoftpower,

butJapanissomewhatlimitedbytheinward

apanhasbeen

169.

FOREIGNPOLICY

extraordinarilysuccessfulinacceptingforeign

technology,ithasbeenfarmorereluctantto

'srelationswithChina,

forexample,havebeenhamperedbycultural

paneareconcerned

abouttheirlackof"internationalization"and

theirfailuretoprojectabroadermessage.

WhileAmericanscanalsobeparochialand

inward-oriented,theopennessoftheAmerican

culturetovariouthnicitiesandtheAmerican

valuesofdemocracyandhumanrightxert

ropeancoun-

triesalsoderivesoftpowerfromtheirdemo-

craticinstitutions,butAmerica'srelativeopen-

nesstoimmigrantscomparedtoJapanand

EuropeanscholarRalfDahrendorfhasob-

rved,itis"relevantthatmillionsofpeopleall

overtheworldwouldwishtoliveintheUnited

Statesandthatindeedpeoplearepreparedto

risktheirlivesinordertogetthere."Maintain-

ingthisappealisimportant.

InJune1989,afterPresidentGeorgeBush

criticizedtheChinegovernmentforkilling

studentprotestersinChina,ordinaryChine

emedmoresupportiveoftheUnitedStates

uently,byndinga

delegationoftoohighaleveltoBeijingtoek

reconciliation,Bushsquanderedsomeoftho

ealsareanim-

portantsourceofpower,theclassicdistinction

betweenrealpolitikandliberalismbecomes

listwhofocusonlyonthe

balanceofhardpowerwillmissthepowerof

transnationalideas.

Americansarerightlyconcernedaboutthe

futureshapeofapost-ColdWarworld,butitis

amistaketoportraytheproblemasAmerican

so,concernaboutdeclinemightbegoodforthe

UnitedStatesifitcutthroughcomplacency

andproddedAmericanstodealwithsomeof

r,

pollstersfindthatexcessiveanxietyaboutde-

clineturnsAmericanopiniontowardnationa-

listicandprotectionistpoliciesthatcouldcon-

ytocopewithissues

createdbygrowinginternationalinterdepen-

snovirtueineitheroverstate-

mentorunderstatementofAmericanstrength.

170.

Theformerleadstofailuretoadapt,thelatter

toinappropriateresponssuchastreating

JapanasthenewenemyinplaceoftheSoviet

Union.

Astheworld'swealthiestcountry,the

UnitedStatesshouldbeabletopayforbothits

internationalcommitmentsanditsdomesticin-

aisrichbutthroughitspo-

terms,GNPis

morethantwicewhatitwasin1960,but

AmericanstodayspendmuchlessoftheirGNP

vailing

viewis"wecan'taffordit,"despitethefactthat

eprentasmallerpercentageof

grossdomesticproductthanthoofotherad-

ggestsa

problemofdomesticpoliticalleadershiprather

thanlong-termeconomicdecline.

Ashashappenedmanytimesbefore,themix

ofresourcesthatshapesinternationalpoweris

tdoesnotmeanthatthe

worldmustexpectthecycleofhegemoniccon-

flictwithitsattendantworldwarstorepeat

tedStatesretainsmoretradi-

tionalhardpowerresourcesthananyother

hasthesoftideologicaland

institutionalresourcestoprerveitsleadinthe

newdomainsoftransnationalinterdepen-

n,thesituationisquitedif-

ferentfromthatofBritainatthecentury's

istoricalanalogiesand

fallydeterministicpoliticaltheoriesare

worthanmerelyacademic;theymaydistract

Americansfromthetrueissuesconfronting

fterthe

ColdWarwillbelessthenewchallengersfor

hegemonythanthenewchallengesoftrans-

nationalinterdependence.

171.