将实际控制人纳入公司法人格否认适用中的法律思考

更新时间:2024-11-08 20:35:43 阅读: 评论:0


2022年8月15日发
(作者:中国离婚法)

CHINA LAW 2011/04 I同警馆 

将寅隙控制人纳入公司法人格 

否 遭用中的法律思考 

朱慈蕴(清荤大睾法挈院教授,博士生尊师) 

在中圆的公司寅践中,寅隙控制人不馑赓泛存在, 

而且其滥用控制槎的情沉也十分殷重。因此,中圆《公 

司法》在2005年修 睛,就以成文法方式明碓了寅隙 

控制人的概念和一些规制措施,如《公司法》第16、 

21、125、217僚等。然而,十分遗憾的是《公司法》 

第20僚在突破性地以成文法形式规定公司法人格否韶 

制度畴,蓝没有将寅隙控制人纳入其中一饼规制,颞 

然不利於有效遏制普遍存在的寅隙控制人滥用公司猾 

立人格之罔题。 

中回公司寅践中的寅隙控制人 

提及公司寅陈控制人,庚羲上诺,凡是能封公司 

虚生控制力的人都可以叫做寅隙控制人。比如公司的 

股柬、董事、经理抑或在公司中 任何名分但可以控 

制公司的人。而狭羲上看,寅 控制人馑指蓝燕公司 

董事、短理及股束之身份,但寅 能狗影辔、指挥、 

引尊公司遘行意思表示,蓝能虚生封公司有利或者不 

利後果的人。如果徒中圆公司寅践中看,公司被寅 

控制人控制蓝掏空之事蓝非佃别现象,其中不馑有控 

股股束、董事、经理利用碱耢、身份之便利堂而皇之 

地掏空公司之现象,更有蓝 上述身份者公阴或者隐 

蔽控制公司蓝徒公司獾取不富利益者。 

中园公司法已缀注意到公司寅践中存在著形形 

42 

的封公司有寅隙控制槿的人,他们的行禺妥富舆否, 

直接网保到公司的行焉规箍,网保到公司利益的最大 

化以及舆公司嗣保枢禺密切的中小股束利益、碱工利 

益、债槎人利益的保障。遣些公司的寅 控制人,可 

能是经遇股束舍或者股束大舍的送翠程序或者董事舍 

聘任程序而取得合法地位的管理者,如董事、经理; 

可能是通遇直接或蠲接投资公司而後封公司享有绳封 

控制槽或者相封控制榷的投资人,如控股股束或者控 

制股束;可能是没有履行或没有逋富履行法定任皲程 

序而虚生的事寅上控制公司事耪的人,如r事寅董事 

或者r影子经理 ;甚至可能是 不直接参舆公司的具 

髓事旃,但是谷口能影馨公司泱策的人。所以,我圆公 

司法不馑封股柬、控股股束、控制股束、董事、董事畏、 

法定代表人、经理、德经理、高级管理人具等遣行了 

表述或规定,遢在第217保第(三)项軎朗封寅隙控 

制人造行规定,即r寅 控制人是指雎不是公司的股 

束,但通遇投资嗣保、协装或者其他安排,能麴寅 

支配公司行焉的人。j颞然,公司法网於寅隙控制人的 

定羲是最骂狭羲的,即不包括那些有著正式的各程各 

檬名分的公司控制人。 

以狭羲的角度考量,下列人可能成焉公司的寅隙 

控制人:通遇同接持股的方式控制公司的人,比如, 

通遇持有母公司股份而同接控制子公司或者繇公司, 

或者利用妹公司交叉持股而猿得控制槿;通遇契约 

方式取得公司控制槿的人,比如在阴聊企柴、公司重 束名册中持股数量最多的股束行使的表决榷;②罩猾 

组睛通遇 管协菇、控制协蘸等契糸勺方式取得公司控 

制榷的人;通遇各程方式取得投票槽而控制公司的人, 

比如通遇徵集投票槿、代理行使表决榷、表泱槎信 

等鹰羲的契约方式取得公司控制榷的人;通遇规属明 

保或者其他代理嗣保寅隙控制公司的人,比如,那些 

寅隙出资人属了某棰目的或者出於某干重原因而隐去自 

己真寅身份的隐名股束,他们雎然不是颗名股束,但 

他们速比霸名股束更具有寅榷。上述各颧寅隙控制人, 

我们可以形象地稻之届r影子股束 、r事寅股束 ,即 

他们没有名羲上的股束身份,但因魇能麴封公司享有 

真正意羲上的控制槎,因而是r名副其寅 的股束。 

此外,遐有一些因禺各檀原因而陪段性地控制公司的 

人,比如,公司重整畴的债槿人畲 和公司重整人, 

公司特殊状憋下晾睛指定的管理人等。在台湾地匾的 

公司法中就有蹁睛指定管理人的规定。但一般埸合下, 

遣些人不舍成焉本文中的所捐寅隙控制人。 

然而,謇祝公司寅隙控制人,遐是虑富徒庚羲角 

度把握。强调鹰羲寅陈控制人,主要是{楚寅隙出骠, 

凡能 控制公司且有可能滥用逭棰控制力獾取非法收 

益者,都能囊括其中,否则寅隙控制人的外延将不具 

有周延性。比如,控股股束一般都是公司名正言顺的 

寅隙控制人。此外,那些没有股束身份的董事、高管, 

他们有能力掌控公司,亦有楼台滥用遣檀封公司的控 

制力束獾取不富利益。而将遍部分人纳入庚羲寅隙控 

制人中柬连行规制, 疑有利於雉装公司利益,同接 

有利於公司偾槿人。撩此,我园在上市公司的一些法 

规或规章中,封寅隙控制人的定羲就相封宽泛。如根 

掳《上市公司收蹒管理瓣法》、雨佃交易所的《股票 

上市规则》、《中小企柴板上市公司控股股束、寅 控 

制人行属指引》等文件,有下列情形之一的,将被 

定属r能麴寅陈支配公司 以及寅陈控制人:①罩猾 

或者聪合控制一倜公司的股份、表泱槿超遇兹公司股 

或者聪合控制一倜公司的股份、表泱槿连到或者超遇 

30%;③通遇罩凋或者聊合控制的表决榷能 泱定一 

佃公司董事台半敷以上成其富送的;④能麴泱定一佃 

公司的财 和徭管政策、监能摅以{楚 公司的经瞀活 

勤中獾取利益的;⑤有嗣部朗根掳寅蜇重於形式原则 

判断某一主髓事寅上能封公司的行局寅施控制的其他 

情形。 

二、将寅隙控制人纳入公司法人格否恝中规制意 

蓑重大 

封公司而言,存在寅陈控制人监燕不富,嗣键在 

於控制槿是否被滥用。 

我们知道,公司本是掇制之人,必须依襁於自然 

人代表或者代理其行届。徒某獯意羲上耩,遣些代表 

人或者代理人就是公司的寅隙控制人。遣些代表人或 

者代理人在孰行公司碱耢睛能否尊重公司的猾立人格 

始终将公司的利益置於自己的利益之上,真正地属 

公司利益最大化服耪,早已成焉著名的公司代理成本 

罔题。徙公司制度蕤生那一天起,人颓就一直谋求怎 

檬通遇完善的公司治理柬降低代理成本,使遣些寅隙 

控制人能麴克制追逐自己利益的衙勤,特别是不能属 

了自己利益的寅琨而损害公司的利益。其中一佃重要 

内容就是裸以羲耢,褚如信羲羲耢、馘信羲 等等, 

同睛碓立连反遣些羲 的黄任。事寅上,公司控制榷 

如果被滥用,公司人格之猾立性便受到威耆,公司利 

益将受到损害,同接地就畲影警公司的相嗣利益者。 

有孕者 公司治理的角度探封寅隙控制人圈题,提出 

r公司治理是一佃系统,其核心内容之一是追究公司控 

制人侵槿责任的法律制度。就公司治理而言,公司法 

注重的是侵槿责任,遣主要表现属公司法中封大股柬、 

董事、缝理等封公司具有控制力之人的羲耪责任的规 

CHINA LAW 2011/04 j罔擎馆 

定以及封连反者侵榷责任追究的法律制度。 公司法人 

格否 就是遗些制度中的一佃,雎然主要是针封股束 

滥用公司猬立人格行属而探取的措施,但鐾於我圆公 

司寅践中存在著大量的非股束寅 控制人,只有将逭 

些滥用公司猾立人格的寅隙控制人全部纳人其中遘行 

规制,才能真正寅现劁毅公司法人格否 规则之基本 

目的。 

将寅隙控制人引入r公司法人格否恝 制度下逛 

行规制,有雨黠重要意羲: 

其一,有利於遏制规避法律的行扇。一般而言, 

公司法人格否 之 富然针封的是滥用公司猾立人格 

和股束有限寅任的横橙股束。但是寅践中,因焉往檀 

原因,出琨了大量监不寅隙持有公司股份但卸可以将 

公司玩弄於手掌之中的寅陈控制人。遣些寅除控制人, 

缱大多敷是焉规避法律约束而座生,其中不乏恶意者。 

比如,不具借投资特殊行柴的僚件而隐名的出资人等。 

徒法律制度之尊殷角度看,富然不能漠祝逭往规避法 

律的行禺。雎然揭阴公司面纱制度原本是属那些滥用 

股束榷利蓝通遇封公司的控制而 取不凿利益的股束 

而毅 ,但如果那些以规避法律羁目的而脱掉股束外 

衣的富 控制人,一方面隐藏在名蓑股束的背後肆燕 

忌恽地滥用公司控制槿赚取不富利益;另一方面卸馑 

馑因焉其 股束身份而不受揭阴公司面纱规则的制 

裁,不馑使得公司法人格否恝的制度毅 失去虑有的 

震慑效果,不能骚挥其孺正正羲的功能,燕法使公司 

债槎人得到虑有的救滴,而且遗 容规避法律的行属 

人,使之逍遥法外。 

寅践中,很多公司的寅隙控制人既不是公司名羲 

上的股柬,也不是公司名羲上的董事或者高管。形式 

上看,他们舆公司没有聊繁,寅蜇上他们是公司的真 

正控制人和最大獾利者。将遣些规避法律的寅隙控制 

人纳入r公司法人格否 制度规制之下,是法律公 

平正羲的所在。 

其二,有利於解泱董事、缝理等管理屠侵害公司 

利益,同接地损害公司债槿人利益睛,债榷人獾得有 

效救滂的同题。我们知道,董事、经理是公司的受瓿人, 

其行焉後果虑凿由公司承j)彗。如果董事、缝理连反受 

托人羲 侵害了公司利益,蓝搏致公司借债不能,董 

事、经理亚不直接封公司债榷人承搪责任。除非特定 

埸合,如有些圆家破麈法规定,如果董事、经理明知 

公司借债不illl将破虚,但退封外犟债,此睛的董事、 

经理虑 封兹簟债 承搪直接责任。但若公司遐未连 

到即将破崖的境地,公司债槿人的利益只能依敕於公 

司法上的其它制度同接保装。因禺在傅统的公司法理 

念下,董事、经理作禺公司的受 人,他佣的行禹就 

是公司的行属,理虑由公司届他们的不富行禹承搪不 

利後果。如果蘸董事、经理直接封公司债榷人承搪寅 

任,畲使公司法人猸立地位被勤摇。 

就傅统公司制度而言,根攘受 羲耪的要求,董 

事、经理虑以一佃善良管理人的身份谨慎行事,以 

保 公司利益最大化。如果董事、经理逮反受瓿羲 

耪,利用碱 便利肆 忌悼地侵害公司利益,掏空公 

司,徒公司獾取大量的不富利益,如钷额高薪之r肥 

猫现象 、大量桎不公允的内部交易等,可以受到以下 

畿棰措施的规制:①董事畲或者监事畲代表公司直接 

董事和高管,要求其向公司承檐赔偕责任;②有著 

正羲感的小股束代表公司提起股束代表 ,追回公 

司管理者们连反受 蓑祷的不富行属给公司造成的损 

失;③如果该董事、短理遗具有股柬身份,公司债榷 

人遗有楼台提出揭阴公司面纱之 ,雉凌自己的合法 

榷益。然而,喾公司董事、经理等高管不具借股柬身 

份而又是公司的寅隙控制人畴,我们舍骚现,上述措 

施鞋以奏效。因属在董事、经理的寅隙控制之下,公 

司董事台和监事舍往往徒具空觳,不能鼗捧作用;而 

公司其他股柬或者敦量梅少,或者舆其有各檀聪繁, 

不顾意或者不可能拿起股束代表拆 的武器维蘸公司 

利益;公司的债槿人则因兹董事、经理不具侑股束身 

份,也燕法连用揭阴公司面纱的利器去雉蘸自己的合 

法榷益。在此檀埸合下,如果能 在滥用控制槿的董 

事、经理和债槿人之同槽架一佃r寅隙控制人 的橘棵, 

就能狗授予债槎人一把利刽,将滥用公司狷立人格谋 

取利益的董事、经理祝餍公司的寅隙控制人,逋用公 

司法人格否韶之规制。 

三、封寅隙控制人遭用公司法人格否恝规剧_jI蘸十 

分蓬慎 

公司法人格否恝规则是一把堡刃刽,司法寅践中 

更臆谨慎逋用,以连到既能不折不扣地坚持维蘸公司 

法人制度大度的基磁——公司猖立人格和股柬有限责 

任——遍佃被祝羁可以舆蒸氯横之鹱明相媲美的法律 

詹lJ翠,又能有效地憨韵公司猾立人格面纱背後的损害 

债榷人利益的可耻行羁。遣就如同走纲绦的雄技演具, 

必须畴刻保持一檀平衡,不可以随意逋用逭一规则而 

使债槎人渐渐丧失看管自己钱包的能力,甚至可能因 

属遇度逋用遣一原则而颠覆整佃公司制度大废的基 

硭;亦不可以放 股束和寅隙控制人滥用控制槿而 

祝公司猾立人格的存在,连而使债榷人蒙受额外的损 

失。 

疑,封於股束以外的公司寅 控制人逋用揭阴 

公司面纱规则,借助的是r寅耍股束j或者r影子股束J 

的概念,即遣些寅 控制人就如同真寅股柬一般控制 

公司、影譬公司,但又燕祝了公司的猸立人格,滥用 

了运檀控制力。我们也可以借助表兄制度, 定寅 

控制人在公司中的地位颧似於公司的股束,将其颧比 

焉表兄股柬。作魇公司的寅隙控制人,其可以利用寅 

隙控制人的身份封公司行使控制榷,其控制行禺使相 

封人有理由相信他们就是公司的股束。凿寅 控制人 

滥用控制榷而 祝公司的猖立人格,特别是其将公司 

利益连行不富翰送,使其非法獾得不富利益,直接损 

害公司利益,同接加害於公司债榷人,那麽,封寅隙 

控制人逋用r公司法人格否恝j,要求其封债槿人承 

搪责任,虑富是顺理成章的。遣襄需要谊调的是,封 

寅隙控制人逋用揭髓公司面纱的虎詈i,必须十分殿格, 

除了强调寅隙控制人必须存在滥用封公司的控制槿蓝 

使公司狷立人格受到桓大挑戟的行局外,以下畿黠必 

须考量:一是必须碓定其舆公司之同的控制舆被控制 

嗣保,即其享有封公司的控制槎,如公司的隐名股束、 

董事、经理或者r事寅董事、经理 、r影子股束J等。 

公司债槎人燕法 明寅隙控制人舆公司之同的控制舆 

被控制网保的,则不能支持揭阴公司面纱的 莆求 

二是必须 明寅隙控制人通遇控制槎 公司獾取了不 

富利益,而造棰不富利益的掠夺结果是封寅隙控制人 

施以揭冈公司面纱规则的必要保件;三是嗣注寅陈控 

制人的不裁信行属,因雳富降控制人往往不具倩股柬 

身份,而隐去股束身份的目的是局规避法律约束,以 

便其可以在不受盛控之下隐蔽地掏空公司。因此,只 

要寅隙控制人具有各檀规避法律的行属,都可以 定 

其不馘信,在揭阴公司面纱之 中虑富虚生封不馘信 

的一方的不利後果。 

徙公司法的司法逋用角度看,我们可以通遇《公 

司法》第20僚第1款的规定封寅陈控制人造行相虑规 

制,包括要求他们虑富封公司和其他股束负有馘信羲 

;封公司债槿人负有尊重公司凋立人格的羲 。如 

果遣些『股束佣 滥用股束槿利损害公司利益和其他 

股柬利益,虑富负有赔偻责任;如果逭些I股柬们 

滥用公司法人猾立地位猿取不常利益损害了债槎人利 

益的,虑凿承受揭阴公司面纱的r憋窬J。困 

Thinking from the Legal Way about the 

Adoption of Actual Control ler to Disregard of 

Corporate Personal ity 

By Zhu Ciyun(Professor and doctoral supervisor in law school of Tsinghua University) 

Du ring the practice of Chinese companies.actual 

controllers do not only exist widely,but abusing the controI 

power is quite serious.Therefore.when Company Law 

in ChIna was amended in 2005.the concepts and some 

relative measures are defined,for instance,the article 1 6, 

21,125 21 7 and others in Law Company.However,it ls pity 

that the actual controller is not regulated when the article 

20 in Company Law breakthrough writes the system of the 

disregard of corporate personality.Evidently,the problem of 

actuaI controller’s abusing disregard of corporate personality 

ls not contained effectively. 

●.ActuaI controller ln the Practice of 

Ch。inese companies 

BroadIY.the actual controller ln companies refers 

to whoever could have a great effect on companies, 

for exampie.sha reholders,board directors,managers 

in companies o r whoever without titles COUld controI 

companies.Narrowly speaking.actuaI controller refers to 

whoever could affect,guide and give orders to companies 

and they do not have any titles,Iike board directors, 

rnanagers and shareholders.They could have aood or 

bad effect on the company.From the practice of Chinese 

companies.actual controllers and their behaviors a re 

seldom.Not only do sha reholders,board directors and 

managers make use of their titles to empty the company, 

but some without any titles controI the company publicly or 

covertly and they attain iIlegal benefits from companies. 

Company Law in China has noticed kinds of actual 

controller to exist in the practice.Whether their behaviors 

are proper has a direct relation to norms of behaviors in 

companies.to the majorization of benefits in companies 

and to the safegua rd of benefits of smaI Io r medium 

sharehoIders.workers and creditors who are cIose to 

companies.Actual controllers in these companies may be 

elected through board of shareholders,generaI meeting of 

shareholders or board of directors to be Iegal controllers. 

for instanee board of directors and managers They are 

investors who invest the company dj rectly or indirectly 

and have absoIute or relative control on the company. 

They might not ca rry out the procedu re of assignment 

or not properly so that they COUld actuaIlY controI the 

business jn companies.for instance“actual dlrector”or 

“shadow manager”.They even take part in business in 

companies directly but affecting companies’decisions. 

Therefore,Company Law in China does not only write or 

regulate shareholders,holding stockholders,controlling 

shareholders,board of directors,chairman of the board,legal 

representatIVe,manager,general manager,senior controller 

and so on.but also the item three In article 21 7 regulates 

the actuaI controller In pa ̄icular.That is.“actuaI controller 

does not companies’sharehOIders.but they could control 

the actuaI behaviors in companies th rough investment. 

ag reement or other a rrangement”.Evidently,the most 

narrow definition referring actuaI controller in companies。is 

not including companies’controllers with formaI and various 

titles. 

From the narrow perspective,the following becomes 

]03 

CHINA LAW 2011,04 1 Place of Learning 

possibly actuaf centrefler in c0mDanies.They COUfd 

centreI companies through holding shares,for example, 

or unitedly shares,voting rights jn one company more than 

those who hold the most shares and act the vote.b.Having 

shares and votes reaches or over 30%jn one company 

alone or unitedly.c.Deciding over half of members of board 

i13 a company to be elected through voting alone or unitedly. 

indirectly to centrel subsidiary company or sub-subsidiary 

company through holding shares in parent company or 

to attain centreI power through inter—holding shares in 

sister company.Those who get the centrel power through 

contracts,for example,those who attain centrel power 

through entrustment agreement,centrel agreement and 

others in aff…ated enterprises and when restructu ring. 

Those who centreI companies th rough having electing 

rights.for instance.those who could controI the company 

through collecting election rights,acting voting rights, 

entrusting voting rights and other b road ag reements. 

Those who actually centrel the company through kinship 

or other entrustment,for exampie,those sha reholders 

who conceaI thelr true names for some a1ms or some 

reasons.AIthough they are not shareholders with names, 

they are more powerful than shareholders with titles.As 

for those actuaI centrellers above.we could call them 

“shadow sharehOlders”.“actuaI sha reholde rs”vividly. 

That is.they do not have titles to be sha reholders,but 

they COUId have true controI on companies.As a result, 

they are“true”sharehofders.Jn addition.there are some 

controllers to centreI the company at stages for kinds of 

reasons,for instance,creditors’meeting when restructuring 

and rearranging personneI in companIes.the temporaf 

managers in particular conditions and so on There is a 

temperaI manager in company law of l alwan.However.in 

generaI occasions,those people could not be discussed as 

actual controllers in this paper. 

Howeve r.the concePts of actuaI cont roIIe rs 

;n comPanies shouId be from a broad pe rsPective. 

EmPhasizing the broad definition is mainly from the 

practice;whoever COUId centre J the company and attain 

iUegaI benefits through abusing the power which could be 

included;otherwise,the denotation of the concept does 

not have comprehensiveness.For instance,shareholders 

are truly actual controllers jn companies.In addition.those 

directors and senior managers who are not shareholders 

are able to centrel the company and to get illegal benefits 

th reugh abusing the powe r.Those a re incIuded as 

broadly actuaI controllers to be controlled.which could be 

beneficiary for the company and for creditors jndirectly.As 

a result.the definition of actuaI controllers in China is wide 

in some regulations and provisions in listed companies in 

China.For example,according to Measures on Purchasing 

Listed Companies。RuIes of Going PubIic.Behavio ral 

Guides of SharehOlders and ActuaI Controllers in Listed 

Companies in Medium and Small Enterprises Board and 

other documents in two stock exchanges.ORe of foIlowing 

conditions could be considered as who“could centreI the 

company actually”and actuaI controllers.a.Having alone 

104 

d.Deciding companies’financiaI and operating policies and 

taking benefits frOm the operation.e.Relative departments 

COUld iudge some body who could centrel the company 

according to the nature rather than forms. 

II.To incorPorate actuaI controlIer to 

the disregarding of corporate personality of 

Company Law is of great regulatory significance 

For companies.jt js not jmpropriate to have actua J 

controller and the key is whether the right of centrel has 

been abused. 

We know that it is the company which formulate 

reguIations and must rely on naturaI persons to represent 

o r act fo r its behavio rs.F rom certain sense.these 

rep resentatives o r agents a re actuaI centreller of the 

company.Whether these reDresentatives or agents are 

able to respect the corporate independent personality 

and always set the company’s interests above their own 

interests and reaIIY se rve to maximize the company’s 

interests when executing their duties has long been the 

famous cost problem of corporate agents.Since the first 

day when corporate mechanism was born,human belng 

have being pursuing to reduce agent cost by ̄mprovmg 

corporate governance so that these actual controtters are 

able to restrain their impulse to pursue their own interests 

especially they shouldn’t harm the company’s interests for 

the sake of their own fnterests.One of the important content 

is to impose obligations such as obligation of trust.fairness 

and honesty and identify Jlabilities when breaching their 

duties.As a matter of fact when the company’s centreI right 

is abused,the independence of corporate personality wilI 

be threatened and the company’s interest wilI be subject 

t0 harm which wilIindirectly impact related stakeholders of 

the company.Some scholar discussed the issue of actuaI 

controller fr0m the perspective of corporate governance。 

and mentioned that“corporate gOvernance is a syStem With 

hoIdinq actuaI contrOIle r’s liabilItV 0f breaching as the cOre 

cOntent.As fbr corp0rate gOvernance,what the Company 

Law focuses is the liab…tv f0r tOrt which is mainIy reflected 

0n the Company Law stipuIate abOut the ObIigatiOns and 

respOns_bilities 0f big sharehOIders,directOrs and managers 

whO have cOntrOl Of the cOmpanV and accOuntabIlitv to the 

actual controllers’IIabiIitv 0f t0rt.”Disreaarding 0f persOnaIity 

in廿1e COmpany Law is One Of these mechanisms aIthOugh 

it is mainIv abOut measures fbr sharehOIcIers whO abuse 

cO rpO rate independent persOnaIity.HOweVer,giVen a 

Iot of non.shareh0 Jer actua J con£ro}Jers exjst in Chjna’s 

company practices,only when actuaI controllers who abuse 

independent corporate personality are all incorporated into 

regulation can the fundamentaI purpose of establishing of 

the rule to disregard corporate personality is really realized. 

There are two points of significance in incorporating 

actuaI controIle r into the mechanism of“dis rega rding 

corporate personality in the Company Law”: 

Firstly.it is conducive to curb Iaw.evasive behaviors. 

Generally speaking,lawsuit about disregarding corporate 

personality is targeted at active sharehOIders who abuse 

corporate independent personality and those with limited 

shareholder responsibiIity.However,in practice.because 

of various reasons.there are lots of actuaI controllers who 

don’t possess comparty shares but can play the company 

in their own palms.The absolute majority of these actuaI 

controllers are born to evade IegaI restrictions and some of 

them are of eviIjntention.For instance.the investors who 

are not qualified to invest in special industnes chose to keep 

their names secret etc.From the perspective of the dignity 

of Iaws and regulations.we should not ignore these Iaw— 

evasive behaviors。AIthough exposing the veils of corporate 

mechanIsm intended to design for those sharehOlders who 

abuse shareholder rights by controlling the company to seek 

their own iIlegal rights.jf the actuaI controllers who take 

off coat of shareholders in order to evade Iaw make iIlegal 

profit by hiding behind nominaI shareholders and abusing 

corporate controI right on the one hand.and get free frOm 

punlshment on the other hand.it doesn’t only make the 

institutional design of disregarding corporate personality 

losing its effect,faiI to correct justice and faiI to help creditor 

get due remedy but also connive doers who evade Iaw and 

remain out of the law’s reach. 

1n practices.actual controllers of many companies are 

neither nominaI shareholders of the company nor nominaI 

directors or senior management of the company.In forms, 

they have no connection to the company while in fact they 

are the actuaI controllers and the biggest beneficiaries of 

the company.To Incorporate Iaw-evading actuaI controllers 

to the mechanism of“disregarding corporate personality” 

demonstrates the fairness and iustice of law. 

SecondIY.it is conducive to resoIve the issues of 

creditor get effective remedy when management such as 

directors and mangers infringe corporate interests and 

indirectly ha rm the interests of credito rs.We aII know 

that djrectors and mana ̄ers are trustees of the company 

whose behavior consequences shouId be shouldered by 

the companY.1f directors and managers break trustee 

obligations.harm corporate interests and make the company 

faiI to pay debt.the directors and managers don’t have 

direct respOnsib.1jtV to creditors of the company.UnIess 

on specific occasions Iike some countries’bankruptcy Iaw 

stipulate that if directors and managers know clear that the 

company is going to be bankrupt but still borrow money, 

then the directors and managers should shoulder direct 

resp0ns_b.¨tV to this debt.If the company is not close to be 

bankrupt.the interests of creditors can only rely on indirect 

protection of other institutions of the Company Law,for 

under the traditional concept of the Company Law,directors 

and managers act as companies’trustee and their behavior 

are the company’S behavior so that the company should 

shoulder the bad consequences for their improper behavior. 

If Iet the directors and managers to shoulder respOns_bility 

for creditors,the independence 0f the corporate iudiciaI 

person will be threatened. 

In terms of traditionaI corporate mechanism.directors 

and managers should act carefuIly jn capacity as a kind 

manager according to trustee obligations to guarantee the 

maximized corporate interests.If directors and managers 

break their obIigation.infrinqe corporale inte rests and 

make a Iot of iIlegaI profit by taking advantages of their 

own pcsitions such as extremeIY high saIa ry nameIY 

“fat cat phenomenon”.abundant unfai r insiders trading, 

they should be subject to the regulations of the following 

measures:(1)Board of Directors and Board of Supervisors 

represent the company to di rectly file a Iawsuit against 

directors and senior management to demand them shoulder 

105 

CHINA LAW2011,04 l Place of Learning 

remedy responsibility to the company; ̄)Small shareholders 

who have sense of iustice represent the company to file 

the dependent personality of companies and abuse the 

controlling power.By facie system,we could also define 

Iawsuit as representative of shareholders to recover Iosses 

caused by improper actions ot Company managers wI1o 

break trustee obligations;(3)If the director or manager ls 

also shareholder of the company,the creditors have the 

opportunity to file lawsuit to unveiI the company and protect 

their own lawfuf rights and interests.However.if the senior 

management Iike the director and manger is the actuaI 

controller of the company but is not shareholder,we will find 

the above.mentioned measures fa.I to work.Because under 

the actuaI centrel of directors and managers.the Board of 

Directors and the Board of Supervisors are no more than 

empty shells and can’t play their role.Other shareholders 

are either few in numbers or have various connections that 

they are not wiIling or ab}e to use the weapon of shareholder 

representative Iawsuit to protect the company’s;nterests 

whiIe creditors can’t use the weapon of unve.¨ng the 

company to protect their own IawfuI rights for the director 

or manager js not shareholder.On this occasion.if a bridge 

of“actual controller”js estabIished between director or 

manager who abuse the centreI right and creditor.then the 

creditor will get a sword to apply mechanism of disregarding 

corporate personality by regarding the director or manager 

who abuse corporate independent personaIity to seek 

their own interests as actual controller of the company. 

….Cautious to adopting actuaI controllers to the rules of 

disregard of corporate personality 

RuIes of disrega rd of corpo rate pe rsonaIity is a 

double—edged sword.So the application to the Iaw should 

be cautious,fn order to completely keep the basis of the 

system of legaI body in companies:dependent personality 

and limited resp0nsib.Iity 0f sharehOIders,which could 

be compared to creating steam engines.It aIso couId 

effectively punish bad acts that are harm r creditors’ 

benefits.They are behind the depend personality.It appears 

as acrobat walking on a rope.We should keep balance.We 

could not make creditors lose powers to keep their benefits 

because of application of this rule,even destroy the basis 

of the whole building with abusing this rule.We could not 

overindulge sharehoIders and actual controllers to abuse 

the centrel power so that the dependent personality is 

ignored.Furthermore.creditors suffer more losses. 

1t js undoubted that rules of the actual controller who 

js not shareholder apply to rules which could unveiI the 

company and which depends on the concepts of“actual 

sharehOIder”or“shadow shareholder”.That is.as the true 

shareholders,these actuaf controllers could be in charge 

of and have an effect on companies.However,they ignore 

1o6 

the status of the actual controller similarly as shareholders 

in companies and to facie sharehOIders.As the actuaI 

controllers in companies,they could make use of their 

status to be in charge of companies.Their centreI makes 

others believe that their shareholders of companies.While 

actuaf controllers abuse the power rather than ignor。ng 

dependent personality in companies,especially while they 

transfer companies’benefits improperly or attain iIlegaI 

benefits so that the companies su仃er losses and so to 

creditors indirectly,the adoption of actuaI controllers to 

“disregard of corporate personaIity”requires that they 

should be responsible for creditors.which js reasonable.Jt 

should focuses on that the punishment for actuaI controllers 

which unveils the company should be strict.Except that the 

actual controllers have abused the power and made the 

dependent personality challenged,the following should be 

considered.First,the relationship between the controlling 

and the controlled,i.e.they share the power in the company’ 

for example,underlying shareholders。board of directors, 

managers o r“actual di recto rs.managers”,“shadow 

sharehOIders”and so on.Creditors can not demonstrate 

that the relation of actual controller and the company is 

the controlling and the controlled,otherwise their claims 

can not apply to unveiling the company.Second。it should 

proves that actuaI controllers have aRained iIlegaI benefits 

through controlling.Moreover,their behaviors’results are 

necessity to adopt rules of unveiling the companies for 

actual controllers.Third.concerning incredible acts of actuaI 

controllers because they generally are not sharehOIders 

and conceaI their jdentiifcations.They aim to escape fr0m 

faws in order to empty the company without supervising and 

secretly.Therefore,only when actuaI controllers act such 

behaviors.they could be{dentify as incredibility.The claim 

f0r unveiling the company should Iead MRfavorable results 

to incredibilitY. 

From the perspective of iudicial application,the actual 

controllers could be regulated c0rrespondingIy according 

to item one in article 20 in Company Law.1t includes 

to request them to be responsible to the company and 

other shareholders and respect dependent personality for 

creditors.1f these“shareholders”abuse shareholders’righfS 

to damage benefits of the company and other shareholders, 

they should be responsible for compensation.If these 

“sharehOIders”abuse the dependent status of IegaI body 

and further make creditors suffer Iosses through getting 

illegal benefits,they should be“punished”by unveiling the 

company.固 


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